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ABSTRACT 
This doctoral dissertation is an examination of the propaganda campaign initiated by John 
the Fearless, duke of Burgundy (1404-1419) during the first phase of the fifteenth-century 
French civil war. The position taken is that John the Fearless was the more efficient 
propagandist in the conflict. He set the ideological pace, forcing his rivals, Louis of Orleans 
and the Armagnacs, to implement counter-propaganda to undo the damage he had caused 
to their reputations. 
So that we may investigate John the Fearless' ideological campaign accurately, this study 
investigates the theoretical concept of propaganda, questioning whether it is a relevant term 
to use in a late medieval context. The issue is critical because many theorists in the field of 
propaganda argue that it did not exist as a phenomenon before the twentieth century. We 
argue that this assessment is not valid, using the criteria outlined by academics in the 
discipline to demonstrate that the terms `propaganda' and `public opinion' are applicable to 
our present case study. It is our contention that John the Fearless consciously disseminated 
his ideology as widely as possible, seemingly to win over public opinion. His approach was 
dynamic and adaptable, employing all available channels of communication to convey a very 
consistent rhetorical message to his extensive audience base. These factors, we argue, are 
conditions of a pre-modern forerunner to `mass media', and are further evidence 
establishing that John the Fearless' ideological warfare was as important as armed battle in 
his dispute with his rivals. 
This thesis is divided into four parts, which correspond to the most important elements of a 
successful propaganda campaign: the underlying structure of thought, the ideological 
message of the campaign, the media employed, and the audience who received it. The first 
chapter offers a detailed explanation of the methodology employed in this thesis, and the 
theories relating to propaganda that frame it. The second contextualises the climate of 
political thought within which the duke of Burgundy's ideology operated. It teases out the 
main ideas that academics, courtiers and lay people were contemplating in the fifteenth 
century, so that we will understand more fully how his propaganda, and the counter- 
propaganda of his rivals, corresponded in a practical way to fifteenth-century mentalities. 
The third and fourth chapters offer a close examination of two of the predominant themes 
underscoring his propaganda, as they related to the public profiles that he wished to convey 
of himself and of his rivals, respectively. Chapters five through eight analyse the various 
media Burgundy employed to communicate the rhetoric examined in the previous two 
chapters. These are: the Burgundian texts, the letters, the visual symbols, and the public 
ceremonies. It is our contention that propaganda exists only where dissemination was 
widespread and deliberate. Therefore, this section is pivotal to our study. It argues that 
although each of these media was used effectively individually, Burgundy's success was due 
mainly to the manner by which his media collaborated together. Finally', chapter nine 
examines the audience of the rhetoric - the bonnes viler - focusing primarily on Paris. It 
analyses the partisanship that occurred, with the objective of ascertaining whether the 
duke's propaganda achieved an impact upon the townspeople of the realm. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The reign of Charles VI (r. 1380-1422) was one of the most tumultuous in French 
history, due mainly to the devastation which befell the realm as a consequence of the 
ongoing Hundred Years War with England, and the outbreak of the French civil war in 
1410. There is little doubt that the foremost internal difficulty was the king's mental illness, 
which began when Charles VI succumbed to the onset of dementia in July 1392. 
Subsequent psychotic episodes were generally shorter, but also more frequent until his 
death in 1422. When ill, the king could not recognise his queen, Isabeau of Bavaria, or his 
children, and he would sometimes attempt to erase Isabeau's coat of arms from the decor 
around him. He frequently ran around the royal household shouting and screaming until he 
was exhausted. Although the king had periods of lucidity, some of which were substantial, 
his ongoing mental illness severely weakened royal authority. It was, therefore, the primary 
cause of the quarrel that developed between the house of Burgundy and Orleans, as they 
became entangled in a desperate battle for control over the king and royal council. 
The conflict only worsened with time. In early 1410, it erupted into a full-scale war 
between partisan factions, which were popularly referred to as the `Burgundians', and the 
`Armagnacs'. ' John the Fearless, duke of Burgundy, led the first of the two factions; 
Charles, duke of Orleans, Bernard, count of Armagnac and John, duke of Berry, the 
second. Written with hindsight in the mid-fifteenth century, the chronicle accredited to 
Jean Juvenal des Ursins included a fantastic allegorical anecdote relating to the events of 
1410,2 which foretold the destiny of the French realm: 
RSD, 4: 446; Histoire de Charles VI, p. 467. The Bourgeois de Paris chronicler's version of events held that 
the Armagnacs received their name in 1410. Bourgeois, p. 10. 
2 Peter S. Lewis argued that this particular chronicle was probably not actually written by jean Juvenal des 
Ursins. Yet because the author has not yet been determined, Lewis suggested that we cite him as the 
`Jouvenal compiler'. Henceforth we will comply with this suggestion, but we shall cite the chronicle as Histoire 
2 
Environ le premier jour de juillet, il advint chosen merveilleuses. 
Car les cicognes s'assemblerent d'une part, et les herons d'une 
autre, et se combatirent cruellement; et pareillement les pies 
contre les corneilles. Et y eut desdits oiseaux de morts bien 
deux chariots pleins. Et aussi les moineaux, ou passereaux, et 
autres oiseaux es maisons, se combatoient et tuoient les uns les 
autres. Laquelle chose estoit en grande admiration, et 
espouvente a plusieurs gens d'entendement 3 
The author claimed to have witnessed this large battle in July 1410, several months before 
the peace treaty of Bicetre was ratified (2 November 1410). Here then, we are witness to an 
inspired analogy alerting readers to the devastation brought upon the French realm as a 
result of the infighting between the royal princes, who were here embodied by the swans 
and herons. Under them were the ravens and the magpies, representing the nobles, whilst 
the sparrows and the `other house birds' represented the lower estates of the realm. This 
literary motif was both astute and accurate, for there is little doubt that what started as a 
conflict between princely houses ended as a full-scale civil war involving people of every 
social stratum until the peace of Arras was ratified in 1435. 
The lingering question is: how were the greater magnates able to sweep the lower 
estates up into the dispute? It is implicit in the Jouvenal chronicler's allegory that they 
engaged in the violent struggle by their own volition, much to the surprise of those of 
`standing', who were, presumably, the scholarly and clerical elites in French society. ' Hence, 
we must discern firstly whether or not it was indeed the case that the wider populace was 
encouraged to take part in the conflict, and, more importantly, how this was achieved. 
It is the aim of this doctoral dissertation to begin resolving this issue by 
undertaking an exhaustive examination of John the Fearless' multifaceted propaganda 
de Charles VL Lewis `Some Provisional Remarks upon the Chronicles of Saint-Denis and upon the (Grandest 
Chromquer de France in the Fifteenth Century' in Nottingham Medieval Studies 39 (1995), pp. 146-181. See also La 
vie et ! 'oeuvre. Ecrits politiques de Jean juvenal des Ursins (Paris, 1992), 3: 88-91. 
3 Histoire de Charles VI, p. 454. 
4I am basing this assumption on the fact that this appears to be a personal statement about the chronicler's 
own astonishment. There is little doubt that both he and Michel Pintoin, the author upon whose work our 
chronicler based his own, were clerics. For background on Pintoin, see: Bernard Guenee, L'opinion puhlique ä 
la fin du Moyen Age d'aprs la `Chtnnique de Charles VI' du Religieux de Saint-Denis (Paris, 2002), pp. 12-13, and 
Guenee, RSD, 1: xxii-xiii. See also Lewis `Some Provisional Remarks', p. 153. 
3 
campaign during the initial stage of the conflict, between 1405 and his assassination at the 
hands of the dauphin, Charles, and his `Armagnac' partisans in 1419. First, it is our 
contention that John the Fearless was the more assertive propagandist from the outset. 
Second, we will establish that he was more proficient in judging the potential impact of a 
highly coordinated ideological campaign. Interestingly, despite the intensive academic 
interest in the conflict for well over a century, to date there is very little analytical 
information available on how he executed his propaganda campaign, and why his rivals 
appear, initially, to have been less successful at it than he was. ' Our first aim is, therefore, 
to redress the imbalance in the historiography of the French civil war. Concurrently, we 
will undertake the first systematic study of the many facets of a medieval propaganda 
campaign. 
To accomplish this objective, this thesis is divided into four parts. Part One 
includes our introduction and the methodology employed. The second part of this 
dissertation dissects the thematic and semantic content of the duke of Burgundy's ideology; 
the third analyses the diverse channels through which he articulated it; the fourth examines 
the intended audience's response and interrogates why the duke of Burgundy prioritised an 
urban audience. Regarding the latter, we are primarily concerned with the way that 
recipients in Paris and the other bonnet vines of the realm received and responded to the 
duke of Burgundy's rhetoric. For it is our view that propaganda existed only where it is 
evident that the propagandist deliberately attempted to disseminate his material widely and 
to diverse audiences, rather than circulating it exclusively within the social sphere of society 
that was directly linked to high politics. 
5 For the most recent monographs outlining the details of the conflict and its immediate impact, see: Richard 
Vaughan, John the Fearless. the gmwth of Burgundian power, rep. (Woodbridge, 2002); Richard C. Famiglietti, Royal 
Intrigue: crisis at the court of Charles VI, 1392-1420 (New York, 1982); Francoise Mutrand, Charles P lafolie du mi 
, gnonr: 
!a (Paris, 1986); Jean de Beny: l'art et le pouvoir (Paris, 2000); Bertrand Schnerb, Les Arnragnacs et let Bourgt 
mauditeguerrr (Paris, 1988), and jean sans Peur. Le prince meurtnier (Paris, 2005); Bernard Guenee, Un meurtre, une 
soeiete. L'assassinat du due d'Orlians 23 novembre 1407 (Paris, 1992). See also the earlier monographs by Francoise 
Lehoux, jean de France, duc de Berri: sa tie, son action politrque (1340-1416), 4 vols. (Paris, 1966-1968), and Michael 
Nordberg, Let duct et la myautl. Etudes sur la rivalite des duct d'Orleans et de Bourgogne, 1392-1407 (Uppsala, 1964). 
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This thesis will provide a methodical analysis of Burgundy's propaganda campaign 
between 1405-1419 by employing an approach that is at once empirical and 
epistemological. ' Accordingly, we will concentrate on ascertaining both how John the 
Fearless became an effective propagandist, and his motivation. We will argue throughout 
that there were a number of factors that contributed to his ostensible success. These were: 
a holistic and collaborative approach to the media he employed to convey his message, his 
ability to anticipate when propaganda would be useful, his skill at foreseeing its potential 
impact, the level of consistency in the articulated polemic, and his shrewd ability to appeal 
to the lower estates of fifteenth-century society. We will demonstrate that while the lower 
and higher aristocracy, and especially the royal courtiers, were not excluded from his 
various campaigns, they were also not his primary concern. Rather, it will be evident that he 
was specifically interested in targeting a far wider audience, and therefore concentrated his 
efforts on the urban contingent of French society. 
Additionally, it is our intention to contest the position held by modern propaganda 
theorists, which holds that it is anachronistic to apply the term to the middle ages. This 
view was first posited by the eminent communications theorist, Jacques Ellul, who argued 
that propaganda did not truly exist until the twentieth century, when technological 
`efficiency' encouraged people to consciously acknowledge its importance and its potential 
impact upon political and social affairs. It was this awakening that Ellul identified as the 
`social phenomenon' which was only after World War I worthy of intense study. Any 
propaganda that was produced and disseminated before this period, he claimed, was merely 
6 To enable a deeper understanding of the way propaganda works and why, Stanley Cunningham suggested 
that scholars consider its epistemology: `Given that the social construction we call "propaganda" is 
constituted by a skein of cognitive and ethical conditions, it needs to be situated and understood through the 
kinds of philosophical analysis such as we are used to finding in ethics and epistemology. More to the point, 
propaganda is originally, primarily and unavoidably a philosophical concept. ' Stanley Cunningham, The Idea of 
Propaganda: a Reconstruction (Westport, 2002), pp. 1-5, and especially, 4. 
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an `antecedent' to modem occurrences. ' As Stanley Cunningham stated, `it is problematic 
to read anything like modem or contemporary propaganda back into periods before the 
emergence of mass media and mass communications. " According to this standpoint, the 
essential differences lie in the diversified media of communication and the frequency with 
which propaganda inundates our modern-day society. However, although there are 
indisputable differences in the implementation and mass impact of pre-modem and 
modem propaganda, this does not in itself constitute a solid argument for negating the 
existence of medieval propaganda. It is the aim of this thesis to establish that the terms 
`propaganda' and `public opinion' are both relevant and useful concepts to discuss medieval 
ideological warfare, for, as Bernard Guenee explained, `daps ce domaine comme dans tant 
d'autres, les realites ont largement devance les mots. " 
Furthermore, it is our position that modem definitions of propaganda, and that 
which occurred in the fifteenth century, are not incompatible. As indicated by Garth Jowett 
and Victoria O'Donnell: `Propaganda is the deliberate and systematic attempt to shape 
perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behaviour to achieve a response that 
furthers the desired intent of the propagandist. 'lo This thesis will demonstrate that John the 
Fearless used the technology available to him to implement an ideological programme 
specifically designed to achieve the above criteria. Therefore, I will argue that medieval 
propaganda was an existent social phenomenon by the fifteenth century, and that public 
opinion did matter to those involved in high politics. 
7 Jacques Ellul, Histoire de !a pmpggande (Paris, 1967). Subsequent theorists of [modern] propaganda have 
generally followed this line of argument. For example, Stanley B. Cunningham, The Idea of Propaganda, pp. 17- 
19. 
8 Cunningham, The Idea of Propaganda, pp. 17-18. 
9 Bernard Guenee, L'opinion publigue, p. 10. 
10 Garth S. Jowett and Victoria O'Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion, 2' ed. (Newbury Park, California, 1992), 
p. 4. 
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1.1. HISTORIOGRAPHY 
One might reasonably question how a study of medieval propaganda fits within the 
wider, well-established historiography of the fifteenth-century French civil war. " The 
highly empirical nineteenth-century historians, who satisfied their curiosity in the many 
facets of the conflict with their diverse works, first set the historiographical pace. As was 
the general trend of the period, many of the monographs produced during this period were 
important compilations of diverse pieces of documentary evidence from the early fifteenth 
century. For example, Louis Douet d'Arcq's edition of Enguerran de Monstrelet's 
fifteenth-century chronicle (1857) remains the only one in scholarly use at present. 'Z 
Additionally, in his Choix de pieces inidites relativer au regne de Charles VI (1863-1864) he 
assembled a varied selection of documents relating to Charles VI's reign - documents that, 
when examined together, provide a much clearer picture of how the civil war affected both 
the countryside and high politics. " These two volumes include royal and ducal letters 
patent, documents relating to judicial process, and royal mandates. As a result of these 
endeavours, his work provided a wider view of the context in which the princely factions 
battled for power. 
Others writing in the nineteenth century were more specialized in their approach to 
the conflict, choosing to investigate the development of each of the two factions. In 
providing a detailed analysis of Louis of Orleans' political career, Eugene Jarry wrote a 
history of the war through the lenses of the house of Orleans (1889). " Pierre Champion 
assumed a similar approach in his historical analysis of the life of Charles of Orleans 
(1911). '5 On the Burgundian side, Ernest Petit undertook the considerable task of 
II The narrative of events is, therefore, also well known, and for this reason it will not be examined in singular 
depth here. 
12 Louis Douet d'Arcq (ed. ), La Chronigue d Engue, ran de Monstrelet en deux Burrs avec pieces justificatives 1400-1444, 
3 vols. (Paris, 1857). 
13 Douet d'Arcq, Choix de pieces inedites relatives au i ne de Charles VI, 2 vols. (Paris, 1863-1864). 
14 Eugene Jarry, La vie politigue de Louis de France, duc d'Orlians 1372-1407 (Paris, 1889). 
15 Pierre Champion, La vie de Charles d'Orleans (1394-1465) (Paris, 1911). 
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surveying the ducal accounts of the first two Valois dukes, Philip the Bold and John the 
Fearless, which enabled him to write the highly esteemed and very practical Itineraires... des 
ducs de Bourgogne (1888). 16 Similarly, Leon, marquis de Laborde compiled a three-volume 
oeuvre listing the account holdings relating to `art and industry' of the house of Burgundy 
at Dijon (volume three) and Lille (volume two). And for the purpose of making convenient 
comparisons with the house of Orleans, he included the ducal accounts at Blois (volume 
one). " As a scholar at the turn of the twentieth century, Alfred Coville must be included in 
our discussion here. In addition to editing one of the extant manuscripts of the ordinance 
published during the 1413 `Cabochien Uprising' in 1891, Coville has written two valuable 
monographs for scholars of the early fifteenth-century: Les Cabochiens et 1'ordonnance de 1413 
(1888), and Jean Petit et la question de tyrannicide au commencement du XV° siecle (1932). 18 As 
empirical studies that offer a detailed analysis of the subjects they explore, they are very 
useful, but both are rather dated analyses, and were written to the detriment of both Louis 
of Orleans and the queen, Isabeau of Bavaria. 
Notwithstanding Coville's prejudicial viewpoint on the war, Schnerb illustrated in 
his recent historiographical survey of John the Fearless, that he was typically vilified in the 
greater majority of traditional historical accounts of the Charles VI's reign, and of the civil 
war in particular. ' Indeed the convention among historians writing a positivist history of 
France, from Jules Michelet to the very Burgundian-centric B. A. Pouquet du Haut Jusse, 
and even more recently, the eminent scholar Bernard Guenee, have described John the 
Fearless in a remarkably pejorative manner. 20 This was obviously due to his decision to 
16 Ernest Petit, ItinIrairet de Philippe le Hardi et de Jean sans Peur, duct de Bourgogne (1363-1419) d'aprer les comptes de 
depenses de leur hotel, recueillis et mi r en ordres par Ernest Petit (Paris, 1888). 
17 Leon, marquis de Laborde, Les duct de Bourgogne. Etudes sur let letters, let arts et l'industrie pendant !e XV siecle, 3 
vols. (Paris, 1852). 
18 Alfred Coville (ed), L'Ordonnance cabochienne, (Paris, 1881). Coville, Les Cabochiens et 1'ordonnance de 1413, rent. 
(Geneva, 1974); `Le veritable texte de la Just jflcation du due de Bourgogne par jean Petit (8 mars 1408)', in BEC 72 
(1911): 57-91; Jean Petit et la question de tyrannicide au commencement du XV siecle (Paris, 1932). 
19 Schnerb, Jean sans Peur, pp. 11-14. 
20 Ibid. For Pouquet du Haut Jusse's work, see: `Jean sans Peur, son but, sa methode', in Annales de Bourgogne 
14 (1942): 181-196j. 1 France gouvernee par Jean Sans Peter. Let depense du receveurgeneral du evyaume (Paris, 1959); 
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have the king's brother, Louis, duke of Orleans, assassinated in September 1407. French 
history has been biased against the house of Burgundy because Louis XII (r. 1498-1515) 
and his heirs were issues of Orleans' bloodline. 
It was not until the early and mid-twentieth century that scholars such as Leon 
Mirot (1914), Joseph Calmette (1949) and Henri David (1959) attempted to redress the 
balance in French historiography. 21 These more impartial studies, in addition to Johan 
Huizinga's seminal work on aristocratic culture Le declin da moyen äge, which paid particular 
attention to the Valois dukes of Burgundy, paved the way for a surge in interest in 
Burgundian history, one that remains strong at present. 22 Yet, it is arguably the detailed 
monographs on the four Valois dukes of Burgundy written by Richard Vaughan that 
offered the first most objective historical narrative of the civil war from a Burgundian 
perspective. 23 Additionally, Schnerb has offered several detailed studies on the Valois house 
of Burgundy, including a larger biography on John the Fearless (2005). 24 The latter provides 
a thorough analysis of every aspect of the duke's life from his political endeavours, to the 
organisation of his ducal court and courtly interests, and is therefore an essential point of 
reference for any historian wishing to gain a thorough understanding of this particular 
duke's motivations and personality. Other recent historians who have contributed to the 
general re-writing of the Burgundo-Armagnac civil war are: Richard Famiglietti, Franroise 
and `Jean sans Peur, programme, moyens et resultats' in Revue de I'Univerriti de Bruxelles 7 (1954-55): 385-404. 
Guenee, Un meurtre, une sociite. 
21 Leon Mirot, `Autour de la paix d'Arras, 1414-1415' in BEC 75 (1914): 253-327; L'Assassinat de Louis 
d'Orllans et la theorie du tyrannicide au XVe siecle (Paris, 1933); `L'enlevement du dauphin et le premier conflit 
entre Jeans sans Peur et Louis d'Orleans (juillet-octobre 1405) in Revue des questions histoziques, vol. 51, n. 45 
(1914): 329-355; vol. 52, n. 46 (1914): 47-68. Joseph Calmette, Logrands dues de Bourgogne (Pari s, 1949); Henri 
David, Du nouveau sun Jean sans Peur (Dijon, 1959). 
22 For Huizinga, see Le declin du moyen äge, trans. J. Bustin (Paris, 1948). Recent Burgundian scholarship has 
been promoted through scholarly associations such as the Centre europeen d'etuder hourguignonnes headed by Jean- 
Marie Cauchies. Consult for example, Jean-Marie Cauchies (cd. ), Relations entry princes et villes aux XIVeXVf 
. Tiedes: arßects politiques, 
economiques et sociaux, (Neuchätel, 1993). 
23 Vaughan's monograph that concerns us most here is: John the Fearless. 
24 Schnerb, Armagnacs et let Bou ignons, also, L71tat hour uignon 1363-1477 (Paris, 1999), and Jean sans Peur. 
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Autrand, and Bernard Guenee. ZS As we shall see, Guenee's influential work has also paved 
the way for French historians in the field of medieval propaganda and public opinion. " 
Yet it was the historians of later medieval England, and in particular, scholars of the 
Hundred Years War and the Wars of the Roses, who were the forerunners in the field of 
medieval propaganda. John Hale, for example, published his article on the development of 
public opinion during periods of war over the course of the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries in 1962.27 This work discussed the change in attitudes regarding war over the 
course of the two centuries, highlighting the dichotomy between the glamourization of the 
war, and the reality that it became `more impersonal, brutal and squalid. P2' Hale urged 
historians to keep looking beyond the battlefield to tease out what the soldiers, the general 
population, and the literary and artistic communities commonly thought about war. 
Within the three decades since, a plethora of works on medieval propaganda in 
England emerged. John Maddicott's article on the `making' of public opinion in the 
counties appeared in 1978, echoing the inroads made by Hale the decade before Z' Here, 
Maddicott employed the historiographical approach typical at that time, which involved 
moving away from high politics to focus more on the localities. Consequently, Maddicott 
argued convincingly that the county court played a crucial role in formulating and 
regulating public opinion during periods of war. He stated: `The political consciousness 
thus created was not confined to a provincial elite. P30 
25 Famiglietti, Raja! Intrigue. Mutrand, Charles Vi; Jean de Berry. Guenee, Un meurtn, tine so ite. 
26 In particular, States and Rulers in Later Medieval Europe, trans. Juliet Vale (Oxford, 1985); `Les campagnes de 
lettres qui ont suivi le meurtre de jean sans Peur, duc de Bourgogne (septembre 1419-fevrier 1420)', in 
ABSHF (1993): 45-65; L'opinion puhlique. 
27 John Hale, `War and Public Opinion in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries', in Past and Present 22 (1962): 
18-35. 
28 Ibid, p. 23. 
29 John Maddicott, `The County Community and the Making of Public Opinion in Fourteenth-Century 
England', in Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 5'h series 28 (1978), pp. 27-43. 
30 Ibid., p. 42. 
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More recent historians, such as Alison Allan, Colin Richmond, and James Doig 
have examined more particular channels of propaganda. 3' For example, Allan, Ross and 
Doig were predominantly interested in the royal proclamation as an important vehicle for 
the dissemination of propaganda, though other scholars examined different forms, such as 
literary texts, news-bills, painting, and historiographical works (or the lack thereof). 32 The 
general consensus held that the Yorkists were, initially, the better propagandists. The 
above-mentioned scholars tend to agree that it was the Yorkists who perfected the use of 
proclamations as an instrument of propaganda. 33 They outline weaknesses in Henry VI's 
attempts to provoke the people, which paled in comparison, they claimed, to the very 
strong, disparaging proclamations that Edward IV used against him. This king skilfully 
hailed the Yorkist military victories as the result of divine intervention from God, who had 
put things `right' after nearly more than half a century of usurpation 3' Ostensibly, Henry 
VI's proclamations did not seize the opportunity to communicate and influence the public 
in the same effective way. To further highlight Henry's inefficiency in this regard, 
Richmond demonstrated that where a propagandist manipulates information and lies `when 
versions of the truth could not be depended on in the endeavour to win support', Henry 
VI only used this approach under exceptional circumstances. 35 He added that, generally, 
`English kings became propagandists only when driven to it'. 3' This lack of foresight, he 
3' Alison Allan, `Royal Propaganda and the Proclamation of Edward IV', in Bulletin of the Institute of Historical 
Reseach, 59, n. 139 (1986): 146-154; Colin Richmond, 'Propaganda in the War of the Roses', in History Today, 
42 Quly 1992): 12-18; James Doig, `Political Propaganda and the Royal Proclamation in late Medieval 
England', in Historical Research, 71 (1998): 253-275. 
32 See for example, Allan, `Yorkist Propaganda: Pedigree, Prophecy and the "British History" in the Reign of 
Edward IV', in Patronage, Pedigree and Power in Later Medieval England, ed. C. Ross (Gloucester, 1979), pp. 171- 
192. Elizabeth Danbury, 'English and French Artistic Propaganda during the Period of the Hundred Years 
War: Some Evidence from Royal Charters', in Power, Culture and Religion in France c. 1350-c. 1500, ed. 
Christopher T. Allmand (Woodbridge, 1989), pp. 75-97; Sarah Gaunt, `Visual Propaganda in England in the 
Later Middle Ages', in Propaganda. Political Rhetoric and Identity 1300-2000, pp. 27-39; Paul E. Gill, `Politics and 
Propaganda in Fifteenth-Century England: The Polemical Writing of Sir John Fortescue', in Speculum, 46 
(1971): 333-347. 
33 Especially Richmond, `Propaganda in the Wars of the Roses', pp. 12-18; Allan, `Royal Propaganda', pp. 
146-154; Doig, `Political Propaganda', pp. 253-80. 
34 See Allan, 'Royal Propaganda', pp. 148-149. 
ss Richmond, Propaganda in the Wars of the Roses', p. 13. 
36 Ibid., p. 18. 
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explained, was unlike the more effective strategy their neighbours across the channel 
employed. 
French scholarship in medieval propaganda has also been flourishing for some 
time. Without doubt Bernard Guenee has been the leader in this field, composing several 
seminal works on the relevance of the concept in medieval historiography, public opinion, 
and propaganda, and their particular usages in analyses on the French civil war. 37 Guenee 
has, arguably, been so influential in this area because he has addressed the theoretical 
problems inherent in using a concept so embedded in our contemporary mindsets as a 
purely `modern' phenomenon to describe that which occurred in the later middle ages. 
Moreover, he has accurately identified the most common misappropriation of the concept 
with regards to medieval propaganda among both historians and literary scholars, who tend 
to characterise all politically charged literature of the period under this blanket term. In 
fact, Guenee had long since argued emphatically, that it is entirely inappropriate to label a 
small number of controlled polemical texts as propaganda literature. 38 He claimed that 
scholars should reserve this term for texts which were widely disseminated; texts whose 
circulation was limited, we ought to characterise strictly as `[politically] engaged' literature. " 
This is a position with which we agree. 
Other influential French scholars such as Philippe Contamine, Nicole Pons and 
Claude Gauvard have also made substantial contributions to medieval propaganda, 
providing insightful and constructive models from which we may extend the field of 
study. 4) Contamine, for example, stated: `L'on considere comme propagande de guerre 
37 See above, n. 25. 
38 Guenee, `Les tendences actuelles de l'histoire politique du moyen age francais', in Actes du 100e Cons 
National des Societes Savantes, Paris, 1975. VoL 1. Tendences, perspectives et mithodes de 1'bistoire medievale, ed. BNF. 
Paris, 1977), 1: 59. 
39 Guenee, `Campagnes de lettres', p. 45. 
40 Philippe Contamine, 'Apercus sur la propagande de guerre, de la fin du XII° au XVe siecle: les croisades et 
la guerre de cents ans', in Lt forme delta propaganda politico net due e nel trecento, ed. Paolo Cammarosano (Rome, 
1994), pp. 5-27. Nicole Pons, `Ia propagande de guerre francaise avant I'apparition de Jeanne d'Arc', in 
Journal des Savants (April June 1982): 191-124; `Informations et rumeurs: quelques points de vue sur des 
evenements dc la guerre civile en France (1407-1420)', in Revue bistorique, 297 (1997): 409-433, and `Michel de 
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toute action psychologique menee par des pouvoirs, formels ou informels, en vue 
d'accroitre mediatement ou immediatement l'efficacite d'une enterprise guerriere 
quelconque. '4' He also provided a very practical, analytical outline of the diverse media 
used by medieval propagandists, arguing that any message whose destination is public is a 
rudimentary form of propaganda. " 
Even before Guenee and Contamine, interest in this field was growing across the 
channel. Peter S. Lewis' influential article, `War Propaganda and Historiography in 
Fifteenth-Century France and England' (1965) examined various polemical texts written 
under Charles V and Charles VI, which he identified, hastily, as literary propaganda 43 In a 
more recent article in Saint-Denis et !a royaute. Etudes offenes d Bernard Guenee (1999), Lewis 
acknowledged Guenee's parameters for the classification of literary propaganda in his 
discussion on later medieval French polemic texts. Yet Lewis rightfully queried the rigidity 
of Guenee's framework, arguing here that these particular politicised texts `avaient, eux, 
quand meme, du moins pour leurs auteurs, quelques chances d'etre influents sur la 
conduite des hommes; sinon pourquoi les ecrire? '44 Craig Taylor added to the field by 
developing on Lewis' original propaganda article 45 Taylor argued that the various texts 
discussed in his first work on the subject were not direct `propaganda documents' as we 
might typically interpret them. Rather, they were primarily produced by royal officials for 
their administrative and diplomatic colleagues, functioning as `resource documents' with 
which government officials might prime themselves for public assemblies and 
Pintoin et 1'historiographie orleanaise', in Saint-Denis et la myaute. Etude; ofertes ä Bernard Guenie, eds. Frangosie 
Autrand, Claude Gauvard and Jean-Marie Moeglin (Paris, 1999), pp. 237-260. Claude Gauvard, `Le roi de 
France et l'opinion publique a l'epoque de Charles VI', in Culture et ideologie daut laSenese de lItat moderne. Ader 
de la table mnde organisee par le Centre national de la recharhI sdentj/ique et lEeole franfaise de Rome (Rome, 15-17 octobre 
1984), (Rome, 1985), pp. 353-366. 
41 Contamine, `Apercus sur la propagande', p. 7. 
42 Ibid., p. 12. 
43 Lewis, `War Propaganda and Historiography in Fifteenth-Century France and England', in Transactions of the 
Royal Historical Society, 5th series 15 (1965), pp. 1-21; "Des humanstes en mal d'ecrire'. Reflexions sur la 
motivation et sur la reception de la polemique, en France, ä la fin du moyen age', in Saint-Denis et la royaute, pp. 
637-646. 
44 Lewis, `Des humanistes en mal d'ecrire', p. 638. 
as Craig Taylor, War, Propaganda and Diplomacy in Fifteenth-Century France and England', in War, 
Government and Power in Late Medieval France, ed. Christopher Allmand (Liverpool, 2000), pp. 70-91. 
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negotiations 46 Therefore, although these documents would indeed serve as propaganda 
documents in the larger sense, they were not designed for wider dissemination for the 
purpose of persuasion. 
1.2. DEFINING PROPAGANDA 
If the main objective of propaganda is to persuade audiences, to `manipulate 
behaviour and behaviour patterns', that is, to influence public opinion or alter commonly 
held perceptions, then the ideological message that the propagandist conveys to his 
audience is paramount. 47 To accomplish his goal, the propagandist diffuses his ideology 
employing a corrupted variation of `informative communication' 4S The latter is defined as a 
process of sharing information that is designed to instruct or enlighten audiences. Yet 
because the propagandist carefully controls both the outflow of information and how it is 
transmitted, the process is, from the outset, biased toward the sender. This allows him to 
exert influence over the perceptions of the audience. 
Recent theoretical scholarship on propaganda has shown that it can be broken 
down into diverse categories. The principal types are generally classified as agitation and 
integration, political propaganda, and empirical, or, `rational' propaganda 49 Agitative 
propaganda is essentially subversive, and used to provoke audiences, whilst its converse is 
the more passive subtle manifestation of the same. John the Fearless frequently employed 
the former, which is most easily observed in the justification speech master jean Petit gave 
on behalf of John the Fearless for the murder of Louis of Orleans (8 March 1408). "' 
46 Taylor, War, Propaganda and Diplomacy', p. 72-73. 
47 Jowett and O'Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion, p. 34. 
48 Ibid, pp. 19-20,31. 
49 Foulkes, Literature and Prnpa«anda (London, 1983), pp. 10-11. See also Jowett and O'Donnell, Propaganda and 
Persuasion, pp. 3-4,8-13. 
so In this thesis I use the copy of the Justification transcribed in Enguerrand de Monstrelet's Chmniques, 1: pp. 
177-242. Hereafter noted as Petit, Just jcation. This choice of text is justified by three factors. First, upon close 
comparison, there are only minor divergences between Monstrelet's copy and one of the three remaining 
fifteenth-century illuminated manuscripts (BNF, ms. fr. 5733). Second, Monstrelet's transcription was the 
most readily accessible. Finally, because the objective of this doctoral thesis is to examine the main themes 
14 
Immediately following the presentation, Petit's speech was copied into four illuminated 
manuscripts, and numerous paper copies. " This example reveals Burgundy's deliberate 
attempts to excite the people of the realm against the duke of Orleans, a strategy that didn't 
go unnoticed. In January 1414, the Armagnacs accused John the Fearless of writing to the 
bonnes villes `pour faire commotions' S2 Here, then, is an acknowledgement of John's 
purported propaganda objective, but the Armagnacs' statement was itself agitative 
propaganda. 
`Political' propaganda can be defined as the techniques that governing bodies 
employ to transmit particular information to the governed with the intention of influencing 
a reaction that is consistent with their own interests. `Empirical', or `rational' propaganda is 
used to denote that which is `factual', or presented as such. As Foulkes warned however, 
regardless of whether this form of propaganda is truthful or merely appears to be, the 
anticipated result is to evoke an impassioned response 53 Propaganda theorists agree that 
the question of truth is very important for the purpose of building public credibility. To 
maintain any measure of integrity, the propagandist must therefore construct a rational 
ideology that is based, at least superficially, on facts; if his statements are unbelievable he 
and accusations that the duke of Burgundy made in his propaganda campaign over the long term, it is 
sufficient for our purpose in bringing out the most important arguments, to use a close transcription of jean 
Petit's presentation. 
51 At present, there are fifteen known extant manuscripts including Monstrelet's transcription. Of these 
fifteen, there are twelve fifteenth or sixteenth century copies: Vienna, Oesterreichische National-Bibliothek, 
Cod. 2657 (illuminated); BNF, ms. fr. 991 (fifteenth century, paper compilation); BNF, ms. fr. 2885 (fifteenth 
century, paper compilation); BNF, ms. fr. 5060 (fifteenth century paper compilation); BNF, ms. fr. 5061 
(fifteenth century, paper compilation); BNF, ms. fr. 5733 (illuminated); BNF, ms. fr. 5732 (fifteenth century, 
paper); BNF, ms. fr. 11512 (sixteenth century, paper compilation); BNF, ms. fr. 17513 (fifteenth century, 
paper compilation); Paris, Arsenal, ms. 3726, n. 158 (fifteenth century, paper compilation); Chantilly, Musee 
Conde, ms. 878, n. 1197 (illuminated); Chantilly, Musee Conde, ms. 879, n. 1694 (fifteenth century, paper); 
BR, ms. 10419 (fifteenth century, parchment); BR, ms. 4373/6 (fifteenth century, paper). For specific details 
on the various BNF manuscripts in order of appearance above, consult Henri Omont, Catalogue [generale] des 
manuscrits franfais. Andenfonds (Paris, 1868-1902), 1: 171,511; 4: 499-500,500-501; 5: 85. And of the same 
catalogue, Anden supplement francais (Paris, 1896), 2: 319-320; and Anden Saint-Germain Franfais, (Paris, 1898), 2: 
112. For the Arsenal manuscript, Henri Martin, Catalogue des manurciits de la Bibliothique de ! Arsenal (Paris, 
1887), 3: 497. The Chantilly manuscripts: Chantilly. Le Cabinet des livr s. Manuscrits (Paris, 1911), 3: 142-143. See 
also Coville, `Le veritable texte', pp. 79-91. 
sz Histoire de Charles VI, p. 491. Monstrelet, 2: 459. 
53 Foulkes, Literature and Propaganda, pp. 10-11. 
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will not find success. 4 Moreover, the condition of credibility depends upon the 
propagandist's ability to ensure that the message conveyed conforms to pre-existing 
frameworks of thought and political understanding, frameworks which reflected the world- 
view of the recipients. Regarding medieval society, this fundamental propaganda principle 
is closely related to the central social concept of good Fama (good repute). The concept of 
reputation, also known as renomme, was a complex but integral aspect of medieval thinking, 
and was bound to both honour and prestige. Consequently, John the Fearless concentrated 
on promoting a public image consistent with good governance, one where he emphasised 
his heroic character and loyal service to the king and dauphin. 
Adherence to these multi-faceted conditions is observed in John the Fearless' 
propaganda. Although on the surface his arguments may appear to modern critics to have 
been radical statements, they were consistently reliant upon a measure of truth. For 
example, when in his 1405 campaign he called for a general reform, he focused attention 
on Louis of Orleans' corruption and mishandling of royal finances. As we shall understand 
in chapter two, this was a popular rhetorical tool in the later middle ages. The widespread 
conception of the importance of protecting the common good encouraged a general 
awareness, at least in theoretical terms, of the monarchy's responsibility to sustain a system 
of government that safeguarded justice, in establishing equitable laws, and vigorously 
defending peace in the realm. This way of thinking was even more important in a period 
fraught with internal and external conflict. Therefore, Burgundy employed a well 
established and popularly received trope to agitate his urban audiences into reacting in a 
hostile way to the duke of Orleans. It is noteworthy from the outset that the latter had 
increased his personal wealth exponentially in the year 1404-1405, and in the view of many, 
54 Bernard Taithe and Tim Thornton, 'Propaganda: A Misnomer of Rhetoric and Persuasion? ', in Propaganda. 
Political Rhetoric and Identity 1300-2000 (Pheonix Mill, 1999), p. 2. 
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he had done so at the expense of the crown's revenue. 55 Therefore, when Orleans moved 
to raise yet another supplemental tax in March 1405 for the purpose of war against the 
English, many Parisian citizens were outraged. " Burgundy shrewdly played upon Orleans' 
negative public reputation, exploiting an issue that appeared, at least superficially, to be true 
'fact'. 57 
Empirical propaganda can be very effective because although it always appears 
accurate, honest and exact, propagandists generally combine it with irrational, misleading or 
untruthful information. " Theorists define propaganda in shades of `white, `grey' and `black' 
to assess their level of reliability. The differences between them are important in any 
discussion on propaganda because they are helpful epistemological markers. White 
propaganda is defined as mainly accurate and truthful, relying predominantly, though not 
exclusively, upon facts' Jowett and O'Donnell added that when using white propaganda, 
the sender frequently tries to appear as the hero of a given situation. 60 As the middle 
ground between white and black, grey propaganda is generally characterised as being vague 
or ambiguous, as distorted facts, and as irrelevant information which diverts recipients 
from receiving the knowledge that they believe they are actually acquiring. "' Finally, `black' 
propaganda is described as the transmission of untruthful, misleading information, and is 
also frequently identified as `disinformation'. 62 Political leaders commonly employ this 
tactic by either creating a deflective source of the original, official information, which the 
propagandist then communicates to audiences personally, or by using a valid, authoritative 
source that takes possession of the information. Ultimately the propagandist coordinates G' 
55 Jam, La vie politigue de Louis de France, pp. 324-325; Vaughan, John the Fearless, pp. 30-31; Guenee, Un meurln, 
pp. 171-172; Famiglietti, Royal Intrigue, pp. 39-46. 
56 Ibid. 
57 I explore this issue in depth in chapter 4, `Desloiaulx traistres'. 
58 Foulkes, Literature and Propaganda, p. 11. 
59 Cunningham, The Idea of Propaganda, p. 66; Jowett and O'Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion, p. 8. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid., p. 13; Cunningham, The Idea of Propaganda, p. 68. 
62 Cunningham, The Idea of Propaganda, p. 67; Jowett and O'Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion, pp. 13-15. 
63 Jowett and O'Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion, p. 15. 
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its publication legitimately, thereby distancing himself from any social or political 
accountability. 
There are many examples whereby we observe John the Fearless using both models 
of black propaganda, or `disinformation'. Concerning the first model, one observes John 
implementing black propaganda of the first degree in the early months of 1414. It was 
during this period that he deflected his own accountability in laying siege to Paris in 
February, which he launched from Saint Denis. He claimed that the dauphin, Louis duke of 
Guyenne, had sent him three letters in January in which he begged John to free him from 
the control of the Armagnac princes. In assuming this particular pretext for war, 
Burgundy's unlawful military action was mediated by his observance of his duty to his lord, 
the dauphin. 
An example of how John the Fearless used the latter form of `disinformation' by 
creating a legitimate source for his propaganda occurred in November 1411, when the 
Armagnacs were excommunicated from the Church on the grounds that they had gathered 
in arms against the king's sovereign power. " On the surface, therefore, it was the 
University of Paris and the representatives of the Church who used the very public 
platform of a liturgical procession to publicise this papal bull; Charles VI consequently had 
the proclamation decreed across the realm. However, it would be exceedingly naive to 
assume that the duke of Burgundy had little to do with this event. Firstly, it was his princely 
rivals who were the victims of both religious and secular persecution and public 
defamation; this was not mere coincidence. Secondly, this event came at the beginning of 
the height of Burgundy's control over the royal council. The scholars who recovered and 
authorised the bull purportedly did so on the orders of the royal council 6S Furthermore, it 
64 Ordonnances, 9: 652; RSD, IV: 532-550; Monstrelet, 2: 210; Hirtoire de Charles VI, p. 470. For critical 
scholarship on this issue see Laurent Tournier, LVniverrite de Paris 
danr ler ivenements po/tique du myaume de 
France (1405-1452) (Doctoral diss., Universite de Reims Champagne-Ardenne, 2000), pp. 79,88; Lehoux, jean 
de France, 3: 253, n. 1. 
65 This is substantiated by Michel Pintoin, the'Religieux de Saint Denis' chronicler. RSD, 
4: 532. 
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is likely that these men were either supporters of the duke of Burgundy's campaign, or at 
least on his payroll. We know that at least nine scholars from the University of Paris were 
given wine and monetary gifts in February 1412 66 
A final type of propaganda that Cunningham termed `linguistic propaganda' is 
relevant for our discussion. It is characterised as prejudicial words and motifs, expressions 
and epithets used to demonise the 'other'. " Such repetitious use of language was, as we 
shall observe in chapters three and four, a strategy that the duke of Burgundy and his 
chancery employed in their propaganda against the Armagnacs. This is because for 
propaganda to be successful, it is always necessary that it bear an intelligible level of 
rhetorical consistency, so that the main tenets of the ideology permanently resonate with 
audiences. 
Because structuralist theory states that everything in the realm of communication, 
verbal and non-verbal, textual and non-textual, has an underlying system from which it 
draws its usage, propaganda is arguably best explored by loosely employing a structuralist 
methodological framework. Indeed structuralism and semiotics are concerned with the 
realm of `codes, signs and rules that govern communication. " Based on the writings of the 
eminent French linguist, Ferdinand de Saussure, the theory of structuralism argues that 
there are established systems, or langfies, that prevail which governs usage, or parole, through 
a series of set rules and conventions 69 Thus it is only within the larger system that one may 
perceive the `usage', or `code', which is characterised successively through the articulation 
of `signs'. 
66 ACO, B 1570, fols. 233-235. 
67 Cunningham, The Idea of Propaganda, p. 70. 
68 Charles E. Bressler, Literary Criticism. An Introduction to Theory and Practice, 2nd edn. (New Jersey, 1999), p. 93. 
69 Ferdinand de Saussure, The Object of Study', in Modern Criticism and Theory: a Reader, eds. David Lodge and 
N. Wood, 2"d edn. (Harlow, 2000), pp. 5-8; Terrence Hawkes, Structuralism and Semiotics (London, 2003), p. 13; 
Bressler, Literary Criticism, p. 92; David Macey, The Penguin Dictionary of Critical Theory (London, 2000), pp. 342- 
343,351-352. 
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Within our early fifteenth-century context, the underlying system was made up of 
contemporary political thought, notions that were made accessible to a varied range of 
social spheres. We have identified the code, or parole, as whichever form of propaganda 
Burgundy used to communicate the message at that particular moment. Moreover, there 
were set systems within the overarching system of political thought -a pre-conceived 
language for ceremony, for heraldic and popular badges, for letters and manifestoes. These 
were well-established and familiar frameworks, and it was up to the propagandist to use 
them effectually. Therefore propaganda is `structuralist' by its very nature. Furthermore, 
this manner of thinking is useful for understanding how rituals and symbols affected their 
audiences. This is the notion upon which semiotic methodology is founded. It is valuable 
to this thesis because it helps us to understand how meaning is transferred to signs, which 
includes the realm of the symbolic. For the reason that propaganda is not restricted to 
verbal or textual communication, it will help elucidate the process of interpretation 
between sender Uohn the Fearless) and receivers (his target audiences). 
The noteworthy semiotic theorist, Roland Barthes, stated that the meaning of the 
sign is derived from the relationship between its two components, the signifier (word or 
image) and the signified (the concept). " He also emphasised that a binary nature of 
opposition exists between all signs, and these fit within the wider system of discourse, or 
langue. " Using John the Fearless' propaganda, we see Barthes' theory in practice. John the 
Fearless adopted a carpenter's plane with wood shavings as his badge in 1405. On its own, 
as a word-image, the plane is merely a building tool, and therefore an empty signifier. 
However, placed in conjunction with the 'signified'-the conceptual image of the sign- the 
sign becomes meaningful. This is because the concept/signified was something that 
Burgundy actively chose in response to his rival's badge, the knotty cudgel and 
accompanying motto `Je l'envie' ('I challenge'). Thus he actively assigned meaning to the 
70 Hawkes, Structuralism and Semiotics, pp. 106-107. 
71 Bressler, Literary Criticism, p. 97. 
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carpenter's plane, which he complemented with a reactionary motto `Ich houd' (`I accept'). 
It is generally accepted among scholars that the intended meaning ascribed by the duke of 
Burgundy to this symbol correlated to the fundamental concept of good government in 
medieval political thought. This is argued mainly because of the two clear binary 
oppositions that Burgundy evoked by using this badge and motto. Firstly, the discharged 
wood shavings suggest that the tool had, metaphorically, already been put into use. It is not 
a far leap to draw a connection between it and the duke of Orleans' knotty stick. Secondly, 
the duke of Burgundy's main platform in 1405, when this badge was adopted, was in point 
of fact centred on reform and the concept of `good government'. Because this was a firmly 
grounded political, cultural and social trope within medieval mentalities, it is logical to 
assume that Burgundy's plane was a palpable metaphor which referred to the `rebuilding' of 
what he identified as the duke of Orleans' oppressive, dishonest government. Whether 
audiences interpreted it in this way is debatable. Yet the American leader of semiotics, 
Charles Peirce, has argued that it is through repetition and experience that recipients begin 
to recognize signs and ascribe learned meanings to the relevant symbols. " Therefore, it is a 
reasonable conjecture to state that the association between the two badges and mottoes, 
which was reinforced by Burgundy's explicit platform for reform, would have been 
accessible. It is therefore likely that through learned, shared experience, the destined 
audience(s) would have been able to make the necessary connections and draw the same 
conclusions. 
To assist us in our inquiry, chapter two examines the underlying structure of 
political thought during our period of interest so that we may contextualise John the 
Fearless' propaganda and the Armagnac counter-propaganda correctly. The prevailing 
political theories of the period under study are significant because issues of the common 
good, fair taxation, reform, the implementation of justice, and the defence of the king's 
72 Hawkes, Structuralism and Semiotics, p. 100. 
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peace were important elements relating to the notions of `good government', and its 
antithesis: tyranny. These were highly important because they were essential components in 
John the Fearless' propaganda. 
Part two of this thesis is comprised of chapters three and four, which concentrate 
on the duke of Burgundy's ideological message. From the outset, John the Fearless' 
constructed a clear dichotomy between him and his rivals, Louis of Orleans and later, the 
Armagnacs, which adhered to the rather typical medieval trope opposing `good' and `evil'. 
This overarching contrast was in turn broken down into smaller binary oppositions which 
gave primacy to the duke of Burgundy. The two predominant ones were made between 
loyalty and betrayal to the crown, and good government and tyranny. To preserve the 
integrity of the important contrast John deliberately evoked between himself and the 
Armagnacs, chapter three and four are separated accordingly: chapter three examines the 
public profile that the duke of Burgundy advanced of himself; chapter four discusses the 
negative profile of Louis of Orleans and the Armagnacs. In both, we scrutinize the 
recurring themes and semantic uses of the language employed. We also consider the import 
of good and bad fama and how critical it was in the formulation of Burgundy's ideological 
campaign. 
Part three examines the way by which this multi-layered message reached 
audiences. John the Fearless' propaganda campaign was not restricted to textual forms of 
media. From as early as 1405, the first moment of true conflict between him and the duke 
of Orleans, Burgundy relied on a number of collaborative channels for the dissemination of 
his ideology. " In a matter of weeks, the duke employed ceremonial discourse in the forms 
of an entry ceremony and the encampment of his army around Paris, symbolic propaganda 
73 The incident to which I refer here is the so-called `kidnapping' of the dauphin from Paris. For a complete 
discussion of the events relating to this incident (August to November 1405) see Mirot, `L'enlevement du 
dauphin', pp. 348-349. See also Guenee, Un meurtre, pp. 166-171; Famiglietti, Royallntrz ue, pp. 46-51; Schnerb, 
Jean sans Peur, pp. 172-177 and Annagnacs et Bouttuignons, pp. 58-64; Vaughan, John the Fearless, pp. 33-37; 
Jacques D'Avout, La guerelle des Armagnacs et des Bourgignons (Paris, 1943), pp. 78-81; Autrand, Charles VI, pp. 
403-407. 
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in the form of the adoption and dissemination of his badge and motto - both of which 
were direct and aggressive overtures to the duke of Orleans. This he complemented with a 
hard-hitting letter campaign aimed at denigrating his rival. This concerted approach set the 
tone for all his later propaganda. In March 1408, a further dimension of the duke's 
propaganda was added. Only four months after having the duke of Orleans assassinated, 
John defended his actions by having the Justification de monseigneur !e duc de Bourgogne drafted 
and presented by the scholar jean Petit in Paris, to an audience consisting of the king, 
queen and dauphin, the princes of the royal blood, numerous members of the nobility, 
scholars from the University of Paris, and burgesses of the capital. After the presentation, 
these were made available in paper format for mass consumption. So that we might 
understand the manner by which Burgundy disseminated his propaganda effectively, 
chapters five, six, seven, and eight are each committed to analysing in depth the following 
mediums: the Burgundian texts, the letters, the symbols, and the ceremonial display. 
The final section of this thesis examines the duke of Burgundy's predominant 
audience base: Paris and the bonnes Lilles. In this chapter we interrogate why the duke was 
more preoccupied with appealing to the lower estates of the realm than he was in securing 
the favour of the aristocracy and `gentry' of French society, although the latter groups were 
not entirely excluded from his destined audience base. In this chapter we consider why 
Burgundy approached the bonnes villes with such determination, and whether or not he was 
successful in securing the great majority of public opinion. Therefore we question whether 
the obvious partisanship in the realm during the duke of Burgundy's political career was the 
direct result of his propaganda, or whether there were other factors which may have led 
them to adhere to his policies, at least overtly. 
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CHAPTER 2 
MEDIEVAL POLITICAL THOUGHT: 
MONARCHY AND GOOD GOVERNMENT 
One of the predominant concerns among political theorists, jurists and moralists 
throughout the middle ages, was to define the role of the king and the measure of his 
authority. ' From Thomas Aquinas to jean Gerson, the intelligentsia borrowed from several 
different ideological frameworks including ancient philosophy, Roman law, Christian 
theology, and feudal discourse, to determine precisely how a monarchical government 
should operate, and what the practical implications of this system were for the king and his 
subjects. ' By the second half of the fourteenth century, a nascent consciousness had 
developed which considered political thought as an important tool in effective governance, 
and increasingly, a science to be studied. Nicolas Oresme was the first to articulate this 
change in mentality in his translated editions of Aristotle's Ethics and Politics (1370-1374) 3 
It is well known that Charles VI's father, king Charles V, the Vise' (r. 1364-1380), 
had a keen interest in endorsing literature, and in particular, the translation of tracts on 
astrology, liturgy, history and politics from Latin into French. Indeed between 1370 and 
1380, his enthusiastic interest in scholarly work resulted in the translation of a number of 
highly political texts. In addition to Oresme's translations of Aristotle's most important 
works, Raoul de Presle translated St. Augustine's 04 of God between 1371 and 1375, Denis 
I There have been a number of survey studies on the evolution of political thought. Walter Ullman's A History 
of Political Thought: the Middle Ages (Baltimore, 1965). For more recent works, see Joseph Canning, A History of 
Medieval Political Thought 300-1450 (London, 1996); Antony Black, Political Thought in Europe 1250-1450 
(Cambridge, 1992); James Henderson Burns (ed), The Cambridge History of Medieval Political Thought c. 350-c. 
1450 (Cambridge, 1988), and especially jean Dunbabin `Government', pp. 477-519. For works specific to the 
development of French political thought: Jacques Krynen, `Droit Romain et etat monarchique. A propos du 
cas fran5ais' in Representation, pouvoir et myautl ä !a fin du moyen äge, ed. Joel Blanchard (Paris, 1995), pp. 13-23, 
Ideal du prince et pouvoir royal en France ä la fin du mqyen äge (1380-1440): etude de la titterature politique du temps (Paris, 
1981), and L'ernpiie du rvi. Idles et croyances politiques en France XII! XV siecles. (Paris, 1993). See also Guenee, Un 
meurtn, pp. 25-45; and Dunbabin, The Political World of France, c. 1200-c. 1336', in France in the Later Middle 
ages, ed. David Potter (Oxford, 2002), pp. 23-46. 
2 Antony Black, Political Thought, pp. 14-24,136- 146. 
3 Autrand, Charles V. " !e Sage (Paris, 1994), pp. 731-732. 
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Foulechat translated John of Salisbury's Policraticus in 1372, and the Sonde du Verlier was 
translated, probably by Evart de Tremaugon, between 1374 and 1378. As Autrand stated: 
`La nouveaute avec Charles V et son club, avec Nicolas Oresme et ses traductions, est que 
la science politique est reconnue comme telle, qu'elle fait un bond en avant et qu'elle sort 
de l'universite pour se diffuser largement dans la culture des hommes de pouvoir. ' Without 
doubt, this dynamic literary activity resulted in a progressive intellectual culture, one that 
was aimed, the scholars claimed, at preserving the common good. ' Accessible to the king, 
his councillors, and any other governmental advisors or administrators, the many translated 
texts were designed to educate the king and his entourage in the practice of good 
governance, which in turn protected the common interests of his subjects. ' 
The vibrant intellectual culture of Charles V's court spilled over into the reign of 
his son, Charles VI, though the latter was not the same bibliophile as was his father. Yet for 
a number of very critical reasons, the practice of publicly discussing political issues 
continued. Mainly, these were the three major crises the royal government faced: the 
continuation of the Hundred Years War with England, the king's debilitating mental illness, 
and the civil war that ensued due to the king's inability to rule the realm effectively. As a 
natural response to such substantial political upheaval, writers used their pens to encourage 
those in a position of power - the royal princes, the royal councillors and administrators - 
to accept their responsibility to conform to prevailing theories on good government. 
Above all, these continued to be primarily concerned with promoting the common good. 
The fifteenth-century conception held that it was the king's main duty to dispense 
justice and to rigorously defend peace and tranguilitae in all parts of his realm. ' Indeed peace 
was only possible if justice was firmly established; without it the expectation was that the 
4 rlutrand, Charles V, p. 372. 
5 For more details on the literary culture see Jeannine Quillet, Charles V, !e mi lett>e. Essai sur la pensee politique 
d'un regne (Paris, 1984), pp. 96-105, and also 105-113. 
6 Mutrand, Charles V, p. 725; Quillet, Charles V, pp. 96-97. 
7 Ibid., pp. 34,152-153; Dunbabin, 'Government', pp. 482,484-485, and The Political World of France', p. 
44; Jacques Krynen, Ideal du prince, pp. 155-157. 
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realm would descend into chaos and violence! Emphasising the importance of harmony 
between the various groups within the social hierarchy, the expectations of the king were 
most regularly expressed, by the early fifteenth century, by the corporate metaphor known 
as the body politic. This topos described the realm in terms of a human body, whereby the 
king was the head, and the other sections of society were its lower members and limbs. It 
was a classification system that reinforced the descending hierarchy of the middle ages. 
Nevertheless, it also emphasised that each part of society had an equally important role to 
fulfil for the healthy functioning of the `body. This is evident in Christine de Pizan's 
version of the body politic in the I1vre de lapaix (1412-1414): 
0! voirement, qui seroit la puissance qui peust oprimer ne 
fouler tel corps s'iI est tout ensemble, sans separacion de nulz 
de ses membres, c'est assavoir le chief qui est le roy, les espaules 
et parties haultes qui representent les princes et seigneurs, les 
bras qui est la chevalerie, les flans qui est la clergie, les reins et 
ventre qui sont les bourgeois, les cuisses qui sont les marchans, 
les jambes et piez qui sont le menu peuple. 9 
This image is even more interesting if we consider that the L1vre de la paix was written 
during the height of tension between John the Fearless and his Armagnac rivals. Pizan 
began writing part one of the text immediately following the peace treaty of Auxerre 
(August 1412), but was interrupted by the renewal of violence during the notorious 
Cabochien uprising (April July 1413). She did not recommence her work until 3 September 
1413, following the publication of the Peace of Pontoise. 10 The corporal metaphor given 
above was written during that latter period, after the `paix deffaillie'. Because it was written 
shortly after a period of violent upheaval Pizan's analogy is rather telling about the 
conceptual importance of harmony and unity within the political body. 
8 Krynen, Droit Romain', p. 20. According to Ben Lowe, by 1380 the concept of `peace' was firmly equated 
with the restoration, or preservation of order, stability, and concord between subjects. Lowe, Imagining Peace. 
A History of Early English Pacifist Ideas, 1340-1560 (Pennsylvania, 1997), pp. 142-143. 
9 Christine Pizan, The Zim de la Paix' of Christine de Pi! ýan; a Critical Edition with Introduction and Notes by Charity 
Cannon Willard, ed. Charity Canon Willard (Gravenhage, 1958), p. 124. 
10 Ibid., p. 57. John the Fearless was not at this assembly, for it was mainly Armagnac princes. John the 
Fearless had left Paris on 23 August 1413. In a letter to the duchess of Burgundy, John's chancellor, jean de 
Saulx described his flight. ACO, B 11942, n. 24. See also Schnerb, Armagnacs et Bourguignons, pp. 141-143. 
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Yet to summarise later medieval theories on government solely in terms of the 
corporate metaphor would be a tremendous over-simplification of what was essentially a 
complex combination of theories that helped define the role of the king, notions of 
sovereignty, and the concepts of tyranny, `good government' and the `common good', all of 
which were circulating at this time. If we are to understand the claims made by John the 
Fearless and his Armagnac rivals in their propaganda and counter-propaganda campaigns 
between 1405 and 1419, it is critical that we examine how they fit within the underlying 
structure of political thought and performance in which it operated. 
2.1. TIIE COMMON GOOD AND TIIE BODY POLITIC 
Although the concept of the common good was in itself an abstraction, it was 
nevertheless made more tangible through various legislative applications such as issues 
relating to obedience to the crown, the punishment of treason, and the systems of 
taxation. " Medieval society's predisposition for shared communal identities was equally 
manifest in the regular collective groupings such as guilds, assemblies, religious orders, and 
also through a variety of rituals and symbols. 12 So important was the notion of a common 
good that it was an effective political tool used to justify political action. " Certainly by the 
fifteenth century it was a very important rhetorical formula, one that people in high 
politics, such as John the Fearless, used ceaselessly in the propagation of their political 
platforms. " 
The origins of the notion of the common good stretch back as far as Aristotle, 
whose argument held that the common good was the natural goal of a political community 
"Matthew Sean Kempshall, The Common Goodin Late Medieval Political Thought (Oxford, 1999), p. 9. 
12 Ihid, p. 17. 
13 Did, p. 8. 
14 It is one of the aims of part 2 to prove this point in regard to John the Fearless in particular. For other 
works maintaining this view, see Lewis, `France in the Fifteenth 
Century', p. 4. 
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because it led to a high degree of universal morality. 15 But, his philosophy was not the only 
influence upon the formation of a medieval notion of the common good. It was already 
well established in medieval consciousness, due partly to Roman legal and philosophical 
tracts. The Roman utilitas publica, a principle formally articulated in Roman law, claimed that 
the good of the community was greater than the individual. As a result, it was reiterated in 
civil and canon law in the high middle ages, which explains its prominence in royal 
ordinances and letters patent from the thirteenth century to the fifteenth century, and 
beyond. " Cicero's role was equally significant in the evolution of the concept. In his De 
ofciis he stated: `non nobis solum nati' (We are not born for ourselves'). " This view 
reappeared throughout the middle ages in various works, like that of John of Salisbury. 
" 
Because John of Salisbury's Policraticus (1159) was itself highly influential in articulating 
theories on the body politic, it is unsurprising that we find Christine de Pizan and Jean 
Gerson expressing views that echoed Ciceronian thought. Pizan explained: `un prince doit 
cognoistre que la vie est ainsi comme ou milieu du monde, et qu'il n'est pas nez ne ordonne 
ä estre seigneur pour lui, mais est establi pour le bien dun chascun. i19 This was confirmed 
also by her contemporary, jean Gerson, who explained that the king's power was 
legitimately based on the laws of succession, but that `le bien commun vault mieulz que le 
particulier personnel. )20 
Because of these crises the issue of health and illness within the political body was a 
popular theme in political writings during this period. On 5 October 1405, during the 
1 Kempshall, The Common Good, p. 24. 
16 The reform ordinances during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries provide an interesting example. The 
language used in these ordinances gave the illusion that the reforms were initiated for the public good, and 
generally as the result of the dissatisfaction among the people. See Raymond Cazelles, `Une exigence de 
l'opinion depuis Saint Louis: la reformation du royaume', in ABSHF (1962-1963): 91-92; Gauvard, 
`Ordonnance de reforme et pouvoir legislatif en France au XIV° siecle (1303-1413)', in Renaissance dupouvoiret 
genese de ! 'ctat. Publications de !a societd d'histoire du droit et des institutions des anciens pays de droit ccrit, eds. Andre 
Gouron and Albert Rigaudiere, vol. 3 (Montpellier, 1998), pp. 90,94. 
17 Quentin Skinner, `Ambrogio Lorenzetti: the Artist as Political Philosopher', in Proceeding of the British 
Academy 72 (1986): 10. 
18 Kempshall, The Common Good, p. 15. 
19 Pizan,. Umr de la Paix, p. 121. 
20 Jean Gerson, `Vivat Rex, Vivat Rex, Vivat Rex', in Oeuvres completes, vol. 7, part 2 (Paris, 1968), p. 1149. 
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height of the first armed conflict between the duke of Orleans and the duke of Burgundy, 
Pizan wrote a letter to the queen in which she insisted that it was her responsibility to 
resolve the conflict, thereby acting as the human remedy for the realm. " In the same year, 
Jean Gerson explained that the health of the body depended upon the princes putting aside 
their own agendas to defend the king's sovereignty. " Although Gerson sought to highlight 
the royal princes' obligations to preserve the health of the body politic through unification 
of purpose, he was equally emphasising their natural obligation to obey the king. 23 
The princes' infighting was a serious threat to the king's sovereignty, particularly 
because they frequently disregarded his commands forbidding the assembling of their 
armed forces. Consequently, John the Fearless and his rivals attempted to demonstrate 
throughout their conflict how committed they each were to the king and the realm, in their 
various forms of propaganda. For example, in a letter John wrote on 14 March 1414 to the 
bonnes villes he attempted to justify his march on Paris in January by stating that he had done 
so `pour obeir a lui [Louis de Guyenne] comme drois est et tenus y sommes et a lonneur de 
monseigneur le Roy, de ma dame la Royne et pour le bien publique et utilite du dit 
roiaulme'. 24 Similarly, in his April 1417 letter to the Donner villec, in which he stated his 
intention to embark on a military campaign to `liberate' the king, he wrote: `nous vous 
promectrons par la by et loyaulte que Nous devons a Dieu, a mon dit seigneur, et a la 
chose publique de son royaume, que tout nostre entencion et voulente est d'empescher de 
tout nostre pouvoir que mon dit Seigneur ne son royaume ne vienquerir a la 
destruction.. 
"i25 These were palpable attempts to appease accusations that his rivals made 
against him, in which they declared that John's numerous military campaigns had subverted 
the best interest of the king and the realm, and that he had, consequently, committed 
21 'An Epistle to the Queen of France', in The Epistle of the Prison of Human Life' With An Epistle to the Queen of 
France' and Lament on the Evils of Civil War, ed. and trans. Josette A. Wisman (New York, 1984), pp. 70-72. 
22 Gerson, `Vivat Rex', p. 1147. 
23 Canning, Medieval Political Thought, pp. 61-62. 
24 ADN, B 658, n. 15.253. 
25 ACO, B 11895, layette 72, n. 39. See also the copy, AN, K 60, n. 8. 
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treason. John's more concrete objective was thus to prove his campaigns were for the good 
of the king and the realm, whilst in a figurative way, to demonstrate that he had always 
been a contributing member of the body politic. 
To avoid openly criticising the king or his peers, the allegory of the ailing body 
expounded by the literati referred directly to the lack of leadership in the realm. This was 
arguably due in some part to the king's genuine infirmity. However, whilst the king was 
unable to rule his realm properly, the princes ought to have rallied around the king to 
preserve the common good. Consequently, the early fifteenth-century writers concentrated 
their efforts on reminding the princes of their duties to the crown (the institution), to the 
king (the individual ruler), and to the people of the realm. According to Pizan, one of the 
foremost responsibilities of a prince of royal blood was the defence of the public good 2" 
These were explained in advice manuals, as a manner of `truth-telling'. They came 
predominantly in the form of the mirmrs for princes tradition, and was one way that the 
prevailing political theories were made accessible, at least notionally, to a courtly audience. 
Z' 
Indeed, their main purpose was to provide a model for the `art of governing' within 
a moralistic context 28 The fifteenth-century conceptualisation of rulership echoed earlier 
views in binding peace, justice, and the common good together, and in firmly establishing 
them as an integral condition of the king's right to rule. Pierre Salmon was direct about the 
importance of establishing a just society for the king's subjects, stating: `Et furent les Roys 
jadis creez pour justice maintenir et garder. i29 To achieve this, virtue would govern the 
prince, and he would rule according to certain steadfast principles: justice, magnanimity, 
26 `[L]es nobles entenderont i la defence de la couronne et la chose publique si que c'est leur mestier'. Pizan, 
L. ivre de la paix, p. 90. 
27 Joel Blanchard, `Vox Poetica, Vox Politica. The Poet's Entry into the Political Arena in the Fifteenth 
Century', in Selected Writings of Christine de Pitian, ed. Renate Blumenfeld-Kosinski (New York, 1997), pp. 362- 
371. Also, Liliane Dulac, 'Authority in the Prose Treatises of Christine de Pizan: the Writer's Discourse and 
the Prince's Word', in Politics, Gender and Genre: the Political Thought of Christine de Pitian, ed. Margaret Brabant 
(Boulder, Colorado, 1992), pp. 129-140. 
28 Krynen, Ideal du prince, pp. 52-53, pp. 97-106; Kate Langdon Forhan, The Political Theory of Christine de Pitian 
(Aldershot, 2001), pp. 34-35. 
29 Demander, p. 31. 
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prudence, liberty and honesty. "' Furthermore, he should be `semblable a Dieu en aucunes 
manieres' 3' Accordingly, a king should condemn all crime or malice, and should be 
merciful, courteous, wise and humble, and work diligently to preserve his royal dignity. " 
Salmon explained that these virtues were necessary because of the very nature of kingship: 
`Le Roy est nomme Roy pour arreer et gouverner, et pource doit-il bien gouverner sa 
personne; car qui ne scet gouvemer soy-mesmes, il ne deveroit pas bien gouverner un 
autre. i33 Finally, it was very important that the prince be counselled well, and by loyal 
subjects who desired to preserve the common weal34 All political and moralistic writers 
during the first decades of the fifteenth century placed great emphasis on the prince's 
advisors because, if he were to allow people who were motivated by covetousness to assist 
him in governing, then the common good would most certainly suffer. 3s 
2.2. TYRANNY AND GOOD GOVERNMENT 
An irresponsible prince, who acted for his own personal gratification rather than 
for the good of his subjects, was a tyrant by definition. 36 In the Iivre de la paix Christine de 
Pizan explained the difference between the good prince and the tyrant: `le prince naturel 
soit entre ses subjiez si comme le pere sus ses enfans, ou le Pasteur en la garde de son parc, 
prest de exposer sa vie pour la defence d'icellui; et le tyrant est comme le loup ravissable 
entre les brebis'. 37 The former's main focus was on dispensing justice, which he achieved 
30 Pizan, Livre de la paix, pp. 57,64. See also Krynen, Ideal du prince, pp. 109-136. 
31 Demander, pp. 24-25. 
32 Ibid., pp. 25-27. 
33 Ibid., p. 27. 
34 Krynen, Ideal du prince, pp. 144-145. Christine de Pizan explained to the dauphin in the Live de lapaix (p. 73) 
that `cellui qui moult de choses aä faire doit ouvrer par conseil, pues tu veoir que selon prudence par laquelle 
to convient ouvrer se bien to veulx disposer, tu qui moult de choses ai faire, t'est besoing avoir consiel. ' See 
also Krynen, Ideal du prince, pp. 144-154. 
35 Consult chapters 7, and 9-15 in Book I in The Lit're de la Paix, pp. 69-71,73-87. Also, Krynen, Ideal du prince, 
pp. 144-154. For the prevalence of the concept of `evil councillors' among the king's royal officers see 
Gauvard, `Le roi de France et l'opinion publique', pp. 353-366, and especially pp. 364-365. 
36 Quillet, `Tyrannie et tyrannicide dans la pensee medievale tardive (XIVe-XVe siecle)', in Dune cite 1'autre. 
Prohfines de philosophie politigue medievales (Paris, 2001), p. 149; Dunbabin, 'Government', p. 493; Black, Political 
Thought, pp. 140,149. 
37 Pizan, Liwe de la Paix, p. 143. 
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only when the powerful did not dominate the weak, when he established fair laws, where 
he maintained order, and where he raised and acquired taxes equitably and morally. 38 The 
tyrant ruled with violence, aggression and self-interest, he disregarded established laws or 
norms, over-burdened his subjects with excessive taxes, subjected them to the destruction 
of private property, allowed corrupt royal officers to remain in their positions, and 
generally treated his subjects as slaves by ruling against their collective will, and hence, was 
against the common good. " 
Aristotelian scholarship posited that there were two distinct categories of tyranny: 
`tyrannie regitive' and `tyrannie acquisitive'. "' In the former case, the tyrant held legitimate 
authority as the sovereign ruler, but deliberately abused it without exercising any thought 
for his subjects; in the latter, the tyrant had usurped power unlawfully, most likely through 
violent means. Usurpation was particularly offensive to medieval theorists, because they 
stubbornly maintained the illusion that princes only held their sovereign position with the 
approval of their subjects " Although in France and England the majority of theorists 
agreed on hereditary succession, they did believe that the people originally elected kings, 
and that God sanctioned their choice through their spiritual anointment 42 Because of this 
tradition of thought, therefore, the usurpation of sovereign power from the rightful ruler 
was illegitimate not only because it was unlawful, but also because it was not founded upon 
the communal will of the people in either theoretical or rational terms. " 
38 Ibid., pp. 68-69. Jacques Krynen, Ideal du prince, pp. 184-193. 
39 Lewis, `Jean Juvenal des Ursins and the Common Literary Attitude towards Tyranny in Fifteenth-Century 
France', in Essays in LaterMedieval Firnch Histoy, pp. 180-187; Black, Political Thought, p. 141. 
40 Coville's expressions that he explained in detail in jean Petit, p. 180. For a detailed overview of the 
theoretical development of tyranny, see pp. 179-206. 
41 Black, Political Thought, p. 137 
42 See also Black, Political Thought, pp. 146-148. 
43 Aquinas' De Rrgno and Coluccio Salutati's De tyranno were clear on this point. For the former, see Black, 
Political Thought, p. 25. For the latter see Quillet, `Tyrannie et tyrannicide', p. 149. 
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However, the most contentious issue for theorists was not in defining the tyrant; 
rather, it was in deciding how to lawfully proceed against him. " Regarding the quandary 
over whether it was licit to commit tyrannicide, many Christian obstacles impeded a 
straightforward answer, particularly the Sixth Commandment prohibiting homicide! ' 
Additionally, St. Augustine argued that God had sent tyrants to test the wills of men. 46 
Nevertheless, there were some who advocated tyrannicide. John of Salisbury had given his 
approval to the forceful removal of a tyrant, though his position was deliberately complex 
to avoid excessive opposition. " Coluccio Salutati argued that a tyrannical ruler could be 
legitimately deposed if his subjects collectively agreed on this course of action. 48 John of 
Paris maintained that the pope legitimately held the power to excommunicate anyone who 
followed a tyrannical king. This would, Paris hoped, incite people to depose any tyrant who 
stood against papal authority in this regard 49 
Equally, there were allowances made for the deposition of tyrants who did not hold 
sovereign power - these were typically categorised as `usurpers'. Aquinas argued that a 
tyrant could be lawfully killed if there was sanction from the higher authority, such as the 
king. Master Jean Petit attempted to justify John the Fearless' murder of the duke of 
Orleans in March 1408, by claiming that the latter's treasonous attempts to usurp the 
throne and kill the king, his brother, were tyrannical. In fact, he attempted to prove that 
such a severe case of lese-majesty was by its very nature tyranny. To make his case, he 
ensured in his text that Louis of Orleans fit every criterion of the tyrant's profile: he had, 
purportedly, tried to kill the king and the royal family through various means, including 
poison and maleficium; he had over-burdened the king's subjects with taxes, which he 
44 Coville Jean Petit, pp. 179-206; Simon Cuttler, The Law of Treason and Treason Trials in Later Medieval France 
(London, 1981), pp. 4-27; Quillet, `Tyrannie et tyrannicide', pp. 147-157; Black, Political Tbonght, pp. 148-149; 
Dunbabin, `Government', pp. 494-495. Also, Guenee, Un meurlrr, pp. 190-193. 
45 Coville, Jean Petit, p. 180. 
46 Canning, Medieval Political Thought, p. 113. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Quillet, `Tyrannie et tyrannicide', p. 152. 
49 Black, Political Thought, p. 149. 
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allegedly diverted to his own funds and to the king of England; and he was directly 
responsible for the despoilment of the French countryside due to his futile engagement in 
war with England. 
Yet we must bear in mind, that these types of disparaging accusations were 
conventional rhetorical tools during this period, and could be applied as easily to one 
faction as the other in any campaign whose purpose was to discredit the rival. "' According 
to Black, to call someone a tyrant during the later middle ages was in fact `an exercise in 
winning hearts and minds. " For corroboration on this point, we need only look at the 
various letters patent, letters close, and manifestoes sent during the period under study 
here, 1405-1419, where accusations of tyranny abound SZ 
2.3. PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS 
That which constituted `good government' in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries 
was not merely ideological; there was a concrete socio-political structure within which the 
prince had to operate before he was guilty of misgoverning the realm, or worse, of tyranny. 
Universal expectations held that the monarchy should establish fair and equitable taxes, 
both ordinary and extraordinary, preserve the royal domain, protect the realm from 
corruption and dishonesty among royal officers, and establish and maintain security within 
the realm from both foreign and domestic threats. It is very clear that these aspects, which 
made up the edifice of `good government', were very closely bound to the 
conceptualisation of the common good, the preservation of justice and the defence of 
peace. Yet, during the first two decades of the fifteenth century, and in particular, whilst 
Louis of Orleans or his Armagnac successors had control of the royal government (1404- 
1407 and 1413-1418 respectively), it was popularly believed that all of the above were 
5" Kempshall, The Common Good, p. 8. 
S' Black, Political Thought, p. 149. 
52 See chapter 4 `Desloiaulx traistres'. 
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compromised to varying degrees 53 In many respects this was not purely an illusion. For 
example, between 1404 and 1405, the duke of Orleans was able to increase substantially 
increase his personal wealth with royal funding during a period in which he also raised a 
number of extraordinary taxes in the king's name for the war with England. ' This caused 
outrage among the people of Paris, and was one of the things John the Fearless accused 
him of in his letter campaign between August and September 1405. It subsequently 
appeared in jean Petit's Justification. In addition, we know that John the Fearless had an 
aptitude for putting himself forward as the paragon of `good government' whilst making a 
case against his rivals for corruption and ruthlessness 55 To understand how he 
accomplished this, it is necessary to examine briefly the tangible factors that constituted 
`good government'. 
One of the fundamental ideas advocated a very distinct division between what 
funds belonged in the royal coffers, and what funds were to be kept in the public domain, 
to be used for the good of the king's subjects. 56 This was based on the traditional, feudal 
convention which stipulated that the king should live off the revenue of his own royal 
demesne, which included rents, fees and tariffs, and all other forms of revenue that were 
customary in each region. This made up the recette ordinaire. 57 It was also commonly held by 
jurists, theorists, and equally in public opinion, that the king should not alienate his physical 
domain by partitioning it off. However, it was also necessary to accommodate the needs of 
his closest male relatives: the princes of royal blood. The fourteenth-century creation of 
S3 On the negative public image of Louis, see Jarry, Iv vie poCitigue de Louis de France, p. 325; Vaughan, john the 
Fearless, p. 31-32; Schnerb, jean sans Peter, pp. 168-171; Famiglietti, Royal Intrigue, p. 39. 
sa Ibid. 
ss One example of this, which we shall subsequently examine in greater detail, was first his requests for 
reform in September 1405, and the implementation thereof October 1408 January 1409. See chapter 3, `Le 
bon duc Jehan'. 
56 Cazelles, `Une exigence de l'opinion', p. 98. 
57 David Potter, `The King and his Government under the Valois, 1328-1498', in France in the Later Middle 
Ages, p. 172; Maurice Rey, Le domain du roi ei let finances extraordinaiirs sous Charles VI 1388-1413 (Paris, 1965), 
p. 41, and Let finances royales sous Charles VI. Ler causes du deficit 1388-1413 (Paris, 1965), pp. 14-16; Cazelles, 
Socletd politigue, noblesse et couronne sous jean k Bon et Charles V (Geneva, 1982), p. 15; Norberg, Lis ducs et la 
royaute, p. 4. 
35 
apanages for royal princes was designed to circumvent the problem: only male heirs could 
inherit, and if there was any lapse in the blood line the territory would return to the 
crown. " The holders of the apanage were essentially the king's vassals, and therefore owed 
the king homage and an oath of fidelity upon reception of the large holding. 59 
The notion that the royal demesne be the primary means of royal finance was not 
merely a theoretical principle that was aimed at protecting the common good. According to 
Maurice Rey, `le peuple y croyait fermement', and perceived any act which opposed this 
principle as 'malhonn&e, un vol. " Nevertheless there was little dispute that the king had 
the right to raise taxes outside the recette ordinaire. In theory, this was acceptable only if he 
consulted his subjects and acquired their consent either by convoking the Estates General, 
or smaller local assemblies. " Moreover, to raise extraordinary taxes, there had to be an 
urgent need, such as for the purpose of war. "' Indeed Charles V had used the extraordinary 
taxes to help fund the ongoing conflict with England, and also to pay his father's ransom, 
though he did so with the agreement of the Estates General and the provincial estates 63 
However, after the crisis of the 1350s, the Jacquerie revolt and the failure of the estates to 
collect the taxes to which they conceded, Charles V began to devise a system that did not 
depend solely upon consent 64 
By the mid and late fourteenth century, the situation had reached a point where the 
revenues from the royal demesne were insufficient for the king to support himself and the 
58 See Michael Jones, 'The Crown and the Provinces in the Fourteenth Century', in France in the Later Middle 
Ages, pp. 66-73; Nordberg, Let duct et !a royaute, pp. 4-8. 
59 Nordberg, Let dues et !a miaute, p. 4. 
60 Rey, Domain du rvi, p. 41. 
61 Ibid., and Let finances myaf, p. 15; Potter, `The King and his Government', p. 172; Lewis, `Pourquoi aurait- 
on voulu reunire des Etats Generaux, en France, ä la fin du moyen age? ', in Representation, pouvoir et myauti, pp. 
119-120; Michael Nordberg, Ler ducr et la myaute, p. 11. 
62 Rey, Domain du mi, p. 41. See also Jones, °The Crown and the Provinces', pp. 83-87, and Norberg, I -, s duct 
et la royaute, pp. 8-12. 
63 Ferdinand Lot and Robert Fawtier, Histoirr des institutions francaises au moyen äge (Paris, 1958), 2: 259-260; 
Nordberg, Les duct et la royaute, p. 8. 
64 Jones, The Crown and the Provinces', p. 86. 
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royal family. 65 The war with England had drained the realm and caused a substantial 
deficit. " Also the increasingly extravagant lifestyle of the king, his family and the princes of 
royal blood, in addition to the many pensions for the nobility and tax exemptions for royal 
officials, meant that it was necessary to substantially augment royal expenditure 67 
Consequently, during the reigns of Charles V and his son Charles VI, raising extraordinary 
taxes became a regular occurrence, and more often than not, without public consent. Yet, 
however permanent the event of raising the royal aides became, it was still perceived 
publicly as an extraordinary measure 68 Moreover, the fact the royal government retained 
the conventional terminology for these measures, such as the finances extraordinaires et aides 
levees pour laguerre only exacerbated the problem. " Consequently, the regularity of raising the 
aides met with a great deal of resistance, in the forms of recurrent rebellion (1358,1382, 
1413) and strong polemic. "' In 1405 John the Fearless criticised the duke of Orleans openly 
for burdening the king's subjects with the aide he had raised in 1404. " This was a cyclical 
recrimination, which reappeared in jean Petit's 1408 justification speech after Orleans' 
assassination, and in later propaganda letters such as the letter that John had sent to the 
bonnet villes on 8 October 1417.72 
Whereas the revenues from the royal demesne itself might only produce 
approximately 300,000 Buret tournois (l. t. ) per year, the aides and taillec could produce over 
two million, three quarters of which would come directly from Languedoil ' However, it 
should be noted that only about a third of this sum would actually reach the royal 
65 Rey, Les finances royales, pp. 9-10; Cazelles, Societe politique, pp. 15-17; Nordberg, Les dues et Ica royauti, p. 8. 
66 Potter, The King and his Government', pp. 172-173. 
67 Rey, Domain du roi, pp. 198-199; Potter, The King and his Government', pp. 
68 Rey, Domaine du roi, p. 41. See also Jones, 'The Crown and the Provinces', pp. 83-87, and Norberg, Les dues 
et la 7nyaute, pp. 8-12. 
69 Rey, Domaine du mi, p. 197. 
70 For a detailed background on the impact of the extraordinary taxes upon urban society, see Rey, Domaine du 
mi, p. 164-167, and 195; Potter, Me King and his Government', p. 176. See also Lot and Fawtier, Histoirr des 
institutions, 2: 262-263. 
71 AN, XI, 8602, fol. 189, cited in Mirot, Pieces, p. 402. 
72 Petit, Jurtjfication, p. 241. For the 1417 letter, Plancher, Preuves, p. 307, n. 305. 
73 Rey, Domaine du roi, pp. 177-180; Potter, `The King and his Government', p. 175; Nordberg, Les duct et la 
royaute, pp. 8-11. 
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government 74 The holders of royal apanages, and other great fiefs were given a large 
portion of the income collected in their territories, which amounted to approximately one 
third of the total revenue 75 In Burgundy, Flanders, and Brittany the fief holders had the 
traditional right to the full revenue of the aides. 76 The final third of the total revenue of the 
aides within the realm would evaporate unexplicably. One cause was probably that a 
substantial number of social groups were excluded from tax collection, such as royal 
officials and the nobility. " Furthermore, the crown was entirely dependent upon local 
cooperation in the collection of taxes. Finally, it was virtually impossible for the royal 
government to know precisely how many taxpayers there were in the realm. 
" This 
provided the opportunity for corruption among the administrators of the tax system, 
especially among the receteurs, and the ilus. Given that the princes had been authorised a 
percentage of the aides raised in their apanage or fief holding, the officers in the two top 
tiers were most susceptible to influence by noble or princely intervention, and likely to be 
more interested in prioritising the latter's needs over those of the crown. " 
Finally, Rey argued that the tax collectors at all levels were in concert to acquire 
great fortunes, which they did by falsifying accounts and extorting money through various 
other means. "' Due to this type of corruption, it was commonly felt that the tax collectors 
were primarily interested in self-enrichment at the expense of the royal demesne and the 
public good 81 The result was that many people who were in higher positions of authority, 
in the king's treasury or the finances extraordinaires, and especially the generaux-conseillers des 
74 Potter, The King and his Government', p. 175. 
75 Rey, Domain du roi, pp. 197-198; Potter, `The King and his Government', p. 173; Nordberg, Les duct et la 
myaute, p. 7. 
76 Nordberg, Les duct et !a rojaute, p. 7. For the duke of Burgundy's holdings (Burgundy and Flanders) 
specifically, see pp. 25-38. See also Rey, Domain du 'vi, pp. 269-270. 
77 Potter, The King and his Government', p. 173. 
78 Ibid, pp. 173-174. 
79 Rey, Domain du roi, p. 179. 
80 Ibid, p. 196. 
81 Did, pp. 195-196. 
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finances, were vulnerable to attack. 82 The very public fall of jean de Montaigu, the grand 
maitre d'hotel, from his position of power in 1409 stands as a compelling example. On 7 
October 1409, he was arrested by Pierre des Essarts, the provost of Paris, on the order of 
the duke of Burgundy, and convicted of being an accomplice to Louis duke of Orleans. He 
was subsequently found guilty of causing the king's mental illness, and also for 
appropriating funds from the tailles and the aides. B3 
According to Claude Gauvard, it was the royal officials who received the brunt of 
the public's dissatisfaction. Indeed, they took on rather typical stereotypes which embodied 
persecution, wealth and self-interest. " These were naturally at variance with both academic 
theories and popular understanding relating to the common good. For this reason many 
considered the tax system to be unjust. Slanderous attacks against those controlling royal 
finances and against administration regarding over-taxation were, therefore, useful 
rhetorical tools for those searching for a way to appeal to the king's subjects: `[c]'est le 
theme universellement repandu ä 1'epoque, repete ä satiete, et qui, chaque fois qu'il est 
repris, ne manque pas d'obtenir un plein succes. '85 Chevalier argued that the bonnet Lilles 
were more inclined in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries to support those leaders who 
promoted the idea of reform, and consequently allied themselves with self-assured princes 
such as Charles the Bad, king of Navarre and John the Fearless. These two formidable 
princes had appeared capable of imposing improvement upon the evil counsellors and 
administrators of the king. "' 
Therefore, it is certain that because there were some very obvious abuses in the 
royal administration, particularly in the farming of taxes, the call for change was the 
82 Ihid, pp. 282-312. Rey, Les finances royale s, pp. 10-11. 
83 RSD 4: 273-277; Bourgeois, p. 6; Histoire de Charles VI, p. 451. Lucien Merlet, `Biographie dc jean de 
Montaigu, grand maitre de France (1350-1409)' BEC, 3rd Series 3 (1852): 273-279; Vaughan, John the Fearless, 
pp. 79-80; Famiglietti, Royal Intrigue, pp. 78-81; Schnerb, Armagnacs et Boutuignons, pp. 101-103. 
&+ Gauvard, `Le roi de France et 1'opinion publique', p. 365. 
es Rey, Domain du roi, p. 195. 
Bernard Chevalier, Les bonnes villes de France du XIV au Xvi' siecle (Paris, 1982), p. 100, and 94-99. 
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preferred way to allay social tension. It was in effect an important political convention 
whereby the king, or one of the peers of the crown, publicly identified the many purported 
abuses committed by royal officers scattered around the realm. On the surface this was all 
done for the `utilite publique'. 87 To oversee the reform programme, King Philip V (r. 1316- 
1322) had created the official post henceforth known as the r formateursgeneraux du royaume, 
whose duty was to correct the corruption of royal officers such as the king's provosts, 
baillis and senechaussaux around the realm 88 Throughout the fourteenth and the early 
fifteenth centuries, the reform programmes were repetitive with very little innovation, but 
they were nonetheless ideologically effective. Cazelles and Gauvard have argued in their 
respective studies on public opinion, that it was one of the most important propaganda 
themes during times of political crisis. " 
Indeed, the presentation of the ordinances is very revealing of their late medieval 
value. Although there was very little modification to the template provided by Philip IV's 
1303 reform ordinance, and despite the fact that the actual reforms were either ephemeral, 
or not implemented at all, it was the principle behind them that was important in a real and 
practical way. "' This is because the ordinances acknowledged the unease among the 
populace; they were, superficially, the result of the `clamour' of the people. " Nonetheless, 
we must not blindly assume that the royal governments were responding in a direct way to 
the dissatisfaction of the people. Even if there had been `clamour' among the king's 
subjects regarding abuses of power when the twenty-four reform ordinances issued 
between Philip IV and Charles V, and the six ordinances between 1389-1413 under Charles 
VI, were promulgated, it was not direct pressure from the people that had led to their 
87 Cazelles, `Une exigence de l'opinion', pp. 91-99. 
88 Ibid, pp. 93-94. 
89 According to Cazelles, `Une exigence dc l'opinion', pp. 94-95. Gauvard, `Ordonnance de reforme', p. 89. 
90 One major change between earlier ordinances and later ones was the language used: the 1303 ordinance for 
reform was in Latin, wheras later ordinances would always be published in French. Gauvard, `Odonnance de 
reforme', p. 89. 
91 Ibid., p. 94, and `Le roi de France et l'opinion publique', pp. 356-359; Cazelles, `Une exigence dc l'opinion', 
pp. 95-96. 
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publication. Regardless of the socio-economic standing of those who had requested 
change, they were always suppliant to the king. This was an important sign of his authority. 
Therefore there is little reason to suggest that the popular view held much sway in practical 
terms. Gauvard reminded us that even the violent Cabochiens were compelled to plead 
with the king for reform. "' 
What is important here, is that the ordinances gave the public impression that the 
king was responding to the clamour of the people; it was effectively a rhetorical device, 
which reinforced the ideology of good government at ground level. Evidence to this effect 
is found in the request for reform presented on the behalf of John the Fearless and his 
brothers to the king and the Parlement the 26 April 1405, where he explained: `il est moult 
ä doubter qu'il n'en aviegne grans inconveniens, attendu le murmure qui de cc est entre 
gens d'eglise, nobles et autre de vostre royaume, et s'en porroit ensuir de tres grant 
commocion, que seroit moult perilleuse... "This in turn strengthened the notion that the 
prince maintained peace, order and justice within his realm for the good of his people. 
In this chapter we have charted the development of theories on monarchical 
government and the concept of good rulership in order to understand the underlying 
structure of political thought and affairs. It was within this context that the fifteenth- 
century civil war erupted. The main understanding of what constituted good government 
was the establishment, maintenance and vigorous defence of peace and justice within the 
realm, which essentially equated to protecting the common good. However, Charles VI was 
unable to perform his duty as the defender of his people and the guardian of the common 
good adequately due to his incapacitating mental illness. Those who were left to oversee 
the government in his stead, were thus vulnerable to attack, and incurred culpability for 
failing to meet the responsibility of the royal government. Such was the case, as we shall 
see, for Louis of Orleans and the Armagnacs under the consistent onslaught of John the 
92 Gauvard, `Ordonnance de reforme', p. 91. 
11 AN, X'' 8602, fol. 189, cited in Mirot, Pikes, pp. 402-403. 
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Fearless' ideological warfare. John the Fearless criticised Louis of Orleans freely for 
misgoverning the realm, accusing him of misappropriating public money for his own 
personal gain, of nepotism, of despoiling the countryside, and for attempting to usurp the 
French throne. These accusations fell within the well-established doctrinal and practical 
frameworks of thought, which were accessible to the nobility, and indeed to the urban and 
rural populations. With regard to the intelligentsia, it is self-evident that the academic works 
and juristic treatises circulating throughout the period under study here, were available to 
the universities of the French realm, and in particular, that at Paris. The didactic treatises 
for princes, allegories and sermons allowed the theories to reach the royal and princely 
courts of the French realm, and also many royal officials. With regard to the townspeople 
and villagers in the realm, the theories were expounded in documents such as royal 
ordinances, reform mandates, letters patent and official proclamations, which were 
constantly being published throughout the realm, typically to large and mixed audiences 9' 
As we shall see, the leading burgesses of the towns were able to respond to these 
documents using the same politicised language. Additionally, the active engagement of the 
townspeople in fifteenth-century political process, including the taking of arms during this 
civil conflict, suggest that many were not only actively aware of the prevailing political 
discourse, but contributed to its edification. Therefore, this present study argues that John 
the Fearless' main advantage in his conflict against Louis of Orleans and the Armagnacs 
was his approach to propagandising his position with a barrage of visual, textual and oral 
cues by tapping into this very recognisable ideological framework which he ensured were 
accessible to all levels of society. 
94 The publication process and the response of the tonnes villes to these documents will be discussed in 
Chapter 6, `Letters'. For their impact on the king's subjects see Chapter 9 Taris and the Donner Lille?. 
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CHAPTER 3 
`LE BON DUC DE BOURGOGNE'1 
Successful propaganda campaigns must bear an intelligible level of rhetorical 
consistency if the main tenets of the ideology are to resonate with audiences. Therefore, 
effective propaganda relies upon repetitive rhetorical devices such as recurring turns of 
phrases, expressions and constructs. These must fit within a conceptual framework that is 
familiar to audiences. It is our contention that this was the approach that John the Fearless 
undertook in his propaganda campaign, one that reflected current thinking on loyalty and 
disloyalty to the crown, on the practice of good government, and on tyranny. 
By and large, Burgundy's propaganda cultivated a constant opposition between 
himself and his Orleanist rivals, which corresponded to the dichotomy between good and 
evil -a typical medieval trope. Thus, John the Fearless was very concerned with promoting 
a public persona of himself as a good leader, whose loyalty to the king and to the public 
good was `notoire' (well-known). Conversely, he ardently endorsed a profile of Louis of 
Orleans and the later Armagnacs which emphasised their tyranny, dishonesty and treason. 
John the Fearless was a `loyal subget du roy', whereas Louis of Orleans, it was said, was a 
`desloial traistre'. Distilling a good reputation -`fama' or `renomme'- was an essential 
component in John the Fearless' propaganda. Bound to honour and prestige, Fama was an 
integral aspect of medieval thinking. It will, therefore, help us to gauge whether, whilst 
preserving his own reputation, John the Fearless' propaganda was effective in 
compromising that of his rivals. 
John the Fearless was not the first to employ recognisable theoretical and semantic 
devices in his propaganda. He was innovative, however, in the organisation of his campaign 
and in his decisive implementation of it. It is our objective here to investigate how John's 
I This was a phrase used repeatedly in the Geste to describe John the Fearless. See, for example, lines 3320 and 
3464, pp. 358 and 362 respectively. 
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various media of propaganda - the letters and manifestoes, the symbols, the ceremonies 
and the texts - collaborated to convey his message with clarity. In this chapter, we will 
centre our focus on how he presented his devotion to the crown and to the realm by 
examining two of the central themes that he used to set himself quite apart from his rivals: 
his loyalty to the crown and his programme for `good government'? The latter focused 
mainly on reform and anti-taxation, two very popular ideas among the urban population. 
3.1. LOYALTY TO THE CROWN 
One of the most important recurring themes that John the Fearless advanced in his 
propaganda was his duty to serve and protect the king, a responsibility that was determined 
by his various `obligations' to his monarch and to the realm. These were frequently 
underscored in the letters and manifestoes that he sent to the bonnes villes, and figured 
prominently in the introduction to the 1408 justification speech given by jean Petit on his 
behalf. This motif put his blood lineage ahead of the other obligations: John the Fearless 
was the grandson of King John II (r. 1350-1364), and was, therefore, Charles VI's first 
cousin. This he followed by explaining that he was a double peer of the crown, due to his 
feudal holdings as the duke of Burgundy and the count of Flanders. ' Moreover, because he 
held the title of duke of Burgundy, he held the additional honour of being the doyen der perr 
of France, the highest-ranking peer of the crown. 4 Indeed, Petit reminded his audience that 
the office of the doyen des perl offered `la premiere prerogative qui soit en ce royaume de 
seigneurie, noblesse et dignite, apres la couronne. i5 He was further tied to the king via the 
double marriage alliance between his daughter Margaret of Burgundy and the dauphin, 
2 There were other oppositional themes that he evoked in his propaganda, such as spiritual purity and its 
opposite, sacrilege, but due to the confines of this doctoral thesis, these will not be examined here. 
3 In total, there were twelve peers of France - six ecclesiastical and six lay. These were the archbishiop of 
Rheims, the bishops of Laon, Langres, Beauvais, Noyon and Chalons-sur-Marne, the dukes of Burgundy, 
Normandy and Aquitaine, and the counts of Flanders, Toulouse and Champagne. See Lot and Fawtier, 
Histoir des institutions, p. 297; Schnerb, L tat bouBuignon, p. 42. 
4 It was established feudal tradition that the dukes of Burgundy held the title doyen despairs. Schnerb, LL°tat 
bouquignon, p. 42. 
1 Petit, Justfcation, p. 180. 
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Louis duke of Guyenne, and between his only son and heir Philip, count of Charolais, and 
Michelle of France. ' However one of the more dramatic reasons given for his loyalty to the 
king was because he and his brother Anthony had sworn to their father, on his deathbed, 
that they would protect the king and serve the bier public. According to the official reform 
manifesto that he, Anthony, and their younger brother Philip presented to the king's royal 
council, the Parlement, and later sent to the bonnet villec the 26 August 1405, they had 
promised to `servir et obeir [Charles V]] devant et sur toutes choses mondaines. ' 
The story of John and Anthony's oath resurfaced in 1408, when jean Petit 
presented the duke's Justification at Hotel St. Pol. 8 By the time it was included in the Geste, it 
had taken on near mythical significance. The reason it was so important was because it 
helped to set the tone for his ideology: henceforth Burgundy claimed that everything he did 
was to further the interests of king and the bien public. The Geste's imagined version of Philip 
the Bold's speech to his two sons in confirms its importance within the Burgundian 
ideology: 
Que vos metes vo cuer et vo discretion 
A warder le roiaume de tout presomtion 
Et le cose publique sans nulle variation 
Et le roi vo segneur c'on apielle Carlon. 
Sierves, cremes, ames en vraie opinion 
Lui et tous ses enfans de generation; 
Gardes-les loiaument, car ils en ont besong. ' 
The most important feature of this oath was clearly his sons' duty to protect the realm and 
the chose publique, and serve the king and royal family loyally `car ils en ont besong. ' This 
supplemental clause alluded to the king's madness and his inability to govern 
independently, but primarily it referred to the general view that a king should have help 
6 To confirm the consistency of these `obligations' between documents, see for example Petit, Jurtiftcation, pp. 
179-180. The letter John and Anthony wrote requesting reforms the 26 August 1405 in AN, X1' 8602, fol. 
189, cited in Mirot, Pieces, p. 400; and the letter John wrote to the banner tiller from Hesdin, 25 April 1417 in 
ACO B 11895, layette 72, n. 39 (and AN, K60 n. 8). 
7 AN, X'' 8602, fol. 189, cited in Mirot, Pieces, p. 400. See also jean Chousat's letter to the chambre des comßtes 
(Dijon), ACO, B 11942, n. 10. Vaughan, John the Fearless, p. 29,70; Schnerb, Jean sans Peur, pp. 132-133. 
8 Monstrelet, 1: 180-181. 
9 Geste, p. 295. 
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from his peers and counsellors. "' There is little doubt that for both these reasons, Charles 
VI needed someone who was both trustworthy and steadfast to protect the interests of the 
crown of France. John seems to have recognised that, if he hoped to play an important role 
in the government, he had to appropriate that role for himself. Hitherto, he had been 
prevented from taking up his father's chair in the royal council. Because Philip the Bold 
was Charles V's brother, he had joint guardianship with his brother, John Duke of Berry, 
over Charles VI during the latter's minority. " John found that he was justly refused the 
same distinguished standing as his father, and that the king had reduced his royal pension 
to half of what he had formerly given to Philip. 12 This was a significant problem for John as 
he had been left with his parents' debts; in order to maintain his duchy and counties, he 
was in need of substantial financial support from the crown. " John had to find an alternate 
route leading to a position of significant power within the governing council. Consequently, 
he embarked on a programme whereby he promoted himself as the king's loyal subject and 
protector, though Vaughan astutely remarked: `Obedience and loyalty to Charles VI meant 
dominating and making use of this periodically insane ruler. ''' 
Yet it was important to outwardly appear as though he took his subservient 
position seriously. Therefore, he persistently reiterated it in his communications with the 
bonnet tvilles. For example, in the 1405 request for reform, the duke made a public 
declaration of his obedience to the king `comme raison est, que chascun de vostre royaume 
est naturelment tenus et obligiez de vous apres Dieu servir, amer et obeir. "5 Similarly, 
John's Hesdin letter (25 April 1417) to the bonnet Lilles emphasised that he had indeed 
10 Krynen, Ideal du prince, pp. 144-145. 
11 Mutrand, Charles VI, pp. 19-21. 
12 Between 1402-1403, Philip the Bold received 198,941 francs in pensions and gifts, and 188,000 between 
1403-1404. The king terminated John the Fearless' pension, and although he was offered several gifts, he 
received only 37,000 francs in 1406, and 2,000 in 1407. The king still owed John 347,591 in April 1407. 
Vaughan, John the Fearless, pp. 41-42. See also Famiglietti, Royal Intrigue, pp. 55-56; Schnerb, L'ctat hourguignon, 
p. 143. 
13 Pouquet du Haut Jusse, lean sans Peur, son but, sa methode', p. 184 
14 Vaughan, John the Fearless, p. 29. 
is AN, XI' 8602, fol. 189, cited in Mirot, Pieces, p. 399. See also BNF, Collection Bourgogne, vol. 54, fols 95r-96r. 
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fulfilled his natural duty to the king, explaining he had been `obligies a luy et a la couronne 
comme chascun scet'. '6 John's addendum, `as everyone knows', demonstrates that the 
theory had become convention within all levels of society by 1417, including urban milieux. 
Moreover, John used it to suggest that everyone ought to know already that he himself had 
always complied with the concept, and had only ever laboured to protect the king and his 
realm from any potential `inconveniens' that might arise. Thus the second meaning of the 
phrase `comme chascun scet' attended to the question of what was common knowledge 
regarding his personal repute and his intentions concerning the king. Public renown 
centred on forging positive fama, which was inexorably related to honour and credibility. " 
Although the Hesdin letter was for the most part tacitly aggressive, it integrated a defensive 
element which was designed to influence his fama in a constructive way. This was crucial, 
because his 1417 campaign relied in great part on winning the people of the realm over to 
his cause, and for that, it was necessary that any public talk that circulated about him - the 
rumours and bruit - remain positive. The concept of loyal service to the king had gained 
such prevalence in fifteenth century France that it became a useful feature of political 
propaganda. 
To further support his public image, John the Fearless unfailingly claimed that 
whatever plan he had executed to protect the king and dauphin, was done to `pourveoir 
aux inconveniens qui de ce pourroient ensuir... i18 It was an expression that John generally 
followed with a statement emphasising his unwavering devotion to Charles VI and his 
family. Thus, he continuously made analogous declarations to that which featured in a 
letter he disseminated the 19 August: `nous qui de tout nostre cuer et de toute nostre 
16 ACO, B 11895, layette 72, n. 39. 
17 Thelma Fenster and Daniel Lord Smail, `Introduction' in Fama. The Politics of Talk and Reputation in Medien! 
Eumpe (Ithaca, 2003), pp. 1-11. 
18 Arch. Comm. de Macon, EE 41 n. 1, cited in Mirot, Pieres, pp. 396-397. For this quotation see p. 397. In his 
letter requesting reforms, he explained that if the reforms were not implemented, 'grans inconveniens... s'en 
porroit ensuir de tres grant comocion, que seroit moult perilleuse... ' AN, XI' 8602, fol. 189v, cited in Mirot, 
Pieces, p. 403. In the 1417 Hesdin letter, he wrote that he was beginning a military campaign to `pourchasser 
de tout nostre pourvoir que lesdits inconvenients cessassent et que bonne reparation feust mise en la dicte 
chose publique... '18 ACO, B 11895, layette 72, n. 39. 
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chevance et puissance noun vouldrions sur toutes autres choses mondaines entierement 
emploier au bien de mon dit seigneur le Roy et de mes seigneurs ses enfans et de tout son 
royaume. '" His fidelity to the king, to the royal family and to the realm here expressed 
remained his foremost rationale behind any verbal and military attacks against Louis of 
Orleans and his Armagnac successors. 
Indeed it was ubiquitous, appearing more than once in every letter John sent to the 
bonnes villes, featuring in every Burgundian text that appeared after the Justification. Similar 
assertions also frequently appeared in royal letters and ordinances which were published 
around the realm. In a royal mandate issued the 2 November 1411, the king acknowledged 
that the duke of Burgundy had always shown him and the dauphin `grande loyaulte et 
bonne amour'. "' In the second letter written that same day for the same purpose, the king 
described the duke of Burgundy's character as decidedly loyal: `la preudomie, leaulte et 
bonne diligence, grant sens, strenuite et vaillance de nostredit cousin le duc de Bourgoigne 
lequel savons certainement avoir ä nous et a nostredite lignee, parfaite et entiere amour et 
trez grand courage ä ceste besongne. '21 
Later, in 1412, a royal mandate published in the king's name, which authorised 
Burgundy to take charge of the royal army, declared `il nous attaint la bonne amour loyaute 
et vraie obeisance quil a tousiours eue et portee envers nous et notre couronne, et aussi 
envers le bien publique de nostre dit Royaume, et a la conservation protection et defense 
dicellui, en quoy il le temps passe sest grandement et loyaument emploie'ZZ There is a 
danger here of presuming that these letters were mere hyperbole, overstating the duke's 
loyalty to the crown. However, the suggestive force of repetitive discourse may well have 
affected audiences significantly. Moreover, the letters were the medium through which 
Burgundy could express precisely what he wanted to. In issuing letters, he ensured that 
19 For this example, see again Arch. Comm. de Macon, EE 41 n. 1, cited in Mirot, Pieces, p. 397. 
20 ACO, B 11893, layette 85, n. 8. 
21 Planher, Prruver, p. 277, n. 276. 
22 ACO, B 11893, layette 85, n. 10. 
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whatever message he imparted was conveyed unambiguously, irrespective of any 
exaggeration therein. 
In addition to letters and manifestoes, Burgundy also used symbolic and ceremonial 
discourse to communicate his ideology. The 1405 `kidnapping' and the aftermath provide 
an excellent case study of how many channels of communication were used in tandem by 
him. In particular, we note how prevalent the issue of loyalty was to John's rhetoric from 
the outset. Superficially, his reason for coming to Paris was legitimate: he was responding 
to the king's summons to pay homage for his newly acquired county of Flanders (1404). '3 
But John had already gained some momentum for his political agenda by gaining the 
respect of the Parisians earlier on, in March 1405, when he refused to support the tax that 
the duke of Orleans had ostensibly raised for the war with England. ' For this reason, John 
had already secured the affections of a great many Parisians. 25 Many subsequently hoped 
that he would become their advocate in governmental affairs, and in particular, a great 
number of merchant families who hoped for its improvement, offered him their full 
support. 26' Therefore, the popular perception was that John was coming to Paris to defend 
the people's rights? ' Although the removal of the dauphin from Paris by Louis of Orleans 
and the queen was entirely unexpected, it was, in point of fact, a timely stroke of luck for 
the duke of Burgundy. According to Guenee, by the end of the fourteenth century, most 
townspeople believed that the king's rightful place of abode was Paris, and for that reason, 
the king's absence from the capital for any lengthy period of time was a source of 
23 Vaughan, John the Fearless, p. 33. 
24 'Et adonc defendi ä tous ses subgetz d'icelles deux contez, clue nul ne paiast la taille dernierement imposee 
i Paris par le conseil royal, dont Loys d'Orleans, au gre duquel la plus grant partie des besongnes du royaume 
se conduisoient pour cc temps'. Monstrelet, 1: 97-98. 
25 Vaughan, John the Fearless, pp. 31-33; Coville, Jean Petit, p. 105,113; Guenee, L'opinion pubüque, pp. 181-196. 
26 Mutrand, Naissance dun grand corps de 1'Etat lesgens du Parlement de Paris, 1354-1454 (Paris, 1981), pp. 83-89. 
See also Marie Reine Lobry, Les relations entre !a tour de Bourgogne et les milieux d'affairrs parisiens sous jean Sans Peur 
(Diplome d'Etudes Superteures d'Histoire, Memoire Principal, L'Universite de Lille, 1958), p. 16-27; Jean 
Favier, Paris au XV siecle, 1380-1500 (Paris, 1974), pp. 154-155. 
27 Jarry, La vie politigue de Louis de France, pp. 324-325. 
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considerable agitation Za Burgundy must have recognised that in `rescuing' the dauphin his 
desire to protect the king, the royal family, and realm might well be celebrated. This would 
have increased his positivefama. Therefore, to ensure that his hurried decision to intercept 
the dauphin's convoy was publicly legitimised, he staged an entry ceremony, which he 
followed by a substantial letter campaign and a solemn request to Parlement and royal 
council for governmental reform. "' At this time, John also adopted the emblematic 
repertoire of carpenter's planes, reinforcing his rhetorical platform against Louis. All of 
these elements collaborated in the effort to justify his decision to return the dauphin to 
Paris by delivering a full-scale ideological attack on Louis. 
Although John played a central role in the entry ceremony, he was prudent not to 
appropriate for himself the role customarily reserved for the king. This would have been 
ruinous for the duke, for the people were very fond of their king; he was their `Roi bien 
aime'. Instead, the dauphin was the centre of attention during this performance, while 
Burgundy simply emphasised his role as his son-in-law's natural protector. The event was 
highly dramatised in his subsequent letters to the towns, where he was lauded as a hero 
who had rescued the innocent child from the wicked clutches of his uncle. The whole affair 
was tailored to highlight John's intrepidness, claiming that he had saved both the dauphin 
and the realm from the certain turmoil that would have ensued had Orleans' plan been 
successful 30 Indeed Louis was highly criticised in Burgundy's letters to the bonnes villes for 
lacking any concern for the dauphin's health, or giving any heed to the terrible weather 
through which the convoy drove 3' In his mid-fifteenth century chronicle, Monstrelet's 
account romanticised Burgundy's passionate desire to rescue the dauphin, writing: 
Lesquelles lectres par lui visitees, un peu se dormy, et puis au 
son de la trompete, avecques ses Bens, de ladicte ville se party 
28 Guenee, Un meurtre, pp. 121-131. 
2' For more detail on the entry ceremony, see chapter 8, `Ceremonial Discourse', pp. 187-188. 
30 Arch. Comm. de Macon, E[E] 41 n. 1, and EE 41, n. 2. Both letters cited respectively in Mirot, Pieces, pp. 
396-397, and 405-413. 
31 Arch. Comm. de Macon, EE 41, n. 2, cited in Mirot, Pieces, p. 407. 
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tres matin, et hastivement s'en ala audit lieu de Paris afin de 
trouver ledit duc d'Aquitaine... Et pour cc, icellui duc de 
Bourgongne, sans descendre ne atarger, chevaucha tres fort, a 
tout ses gens, parmy ladicte vile de Paris, tant que son cheval 
povoit troter, et suivy ledit daulphin, lequel il raconsuivy pres de 
Corbueil 32 
Interestingly, the chroniclers who are generally considered pro-Armagnac appear at first 
glance to be in agreement with this perspective. The Jouvenal compiler highlighted his 
great diligence and speed, and the joy of the people upon his return with the dauphin. " 
Michel Pintoin's account explained that John had ridden so hard that when he finally did 
reach the young prince he was completely covered in dust's Although this account seems 
initially rather straightforward, one could instead take Pintion's story as a criticism of 
Burgundy's undue haste. This is supported by the fact that the first line of the segment 
dealing with this particular event referred back to the discord between the princes. 5 From 
this angle, a dusty duke of Burgundy is a rather ridiculous character. Likewise, the Jouvenal 
compiler also appears to have passed a moral criticism of his own: after providing his 
description of the event, the chronicler explained how significant this event had been in 
exacerbating the hostility between the parties, ultimately contributing to the destruction of 
the realm. " Therefore, whereas Monstrelet's portrayals of John the Fearless' great haste to 
save the dauphin helped reinforce a view that John was the loyal guardian of the king, his 
children, and the realm, Michel Pintoin and the Jouvenal compiler used this story to 
demonstrate how injudicious and damaging his reaction had been. Indeed Pintoin's 
exaggerated descriptions highlighted the irrationality in the duke's choice to `save' the 
dauphin from his own mother, and of course, Louis of Orleans. Nevertheless, during the 
32 Monstrelet, 1: 109. 
33 Histoire de Charles 1/1, p. 432. 
34 RSD, 3: 294. 
35 `[D]iscordia inter majores regni'. RSD, 3: 292. 
36 `Si peut-on penser que grands debats y avoit, et que la reyne et le duc d'Orleans estoient tres-mal contens, 
et se disposoient les choses ä un bien grand mal, pour estre cause de la destruction finale du royaume. ' Histoirr 
de Charles VI, p. 432. 
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event in question, Burgundy sought to unsettle the Parisians by insisting on the need to 
shut the dauphin in the Louvre for his own `protection'. 
This event was, however, an excellent opportunity for Burgundy to launch an 
aggressive letter campaign against Orleans 37 The latter was portrayed as a man who 
deliberately benefited from the king's illness. Burgundy claimed in his official complaint 26 
August 1405 that, because of his natural obligation to serve the king earnestly and loyally, 
he was forced to inform him of the corruption in Orleans' government. Furthermore, he 
claimed that if reforms were not swiftly implemented, `great inconveniences' would befall 
the realm as a result of `le murmure qui de ce [a present] est entre gens d'eglise, nobles, et 
autres de vostre royaume'. In this way, John's open criticisms of Orleans' government were 
executed `au bien de mon dit seigneur et son royaume'. 38 To emphasise awareness of 
`public talk' - or the fama - of the people, was a common trope medieval political leaders 
used as a sign of their concern for the common good, although this did not necessarily 
mean that it was true. 39 Thus, by claiming it here, Burgundy gave the impression that he 
was averting any undue violence, thereby protecting the king and the interests of the king's 
subjects. 
One of the first of the four major issues discussed in the request for reform 
forthrightly criticised Orleans for diminishing the royal dignity of the king by refusing to 
provide proper provisions, forcing him to live in near squalor. " The king's inability to 
provide for himself and maintain his royal dignity was obviously due to his mental illness, 
and therefore was not addressed here. However, the question of the `gouvernement de la 
personne du roy' served John's cause well because it emphasised the king's pitiable state. 
The tacit contrast he thus created between the king's vulnerability and his own strength of 
37 See Mirot, Pieces, pp. 395-414. 
38 As noted by jean Chousat in a letter to his colleagues at the cbambre des comßtes in Dijon. BNF, Collection 
Bourgogne, vol. 54, fol. 99r. 
39 Gauvard, `Ordonnance de reforme', p. 94, and `Le roi de France et l'opinion publique', pp. 356-359; 
Cazelles, 'Une exigence de l'opinion', pp. 95-96. 
40 AN, X"' 8602, fols 189, cited in Mirot, Piker, pp. 400-401. 
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character helped to consolidate his position because it insinuated that the king needed a 
strong custodian. Thus, whilst Burgundy put himself in a position of great influence, his 
ostensible desire to uphold the natural order was nonetheless evident. This was significant 
because it framed Burgundy's ideology throughout the conflict with the house of Orleans 
and their allies until his death in 1419. 
In reality, the consequences of the 1405 `kidnapping' was merely the first instance 
whereby John highlighted the necessity for the physical `rescue' of the king or the dauphin. 
The second occasion was, unsurprisingly, the assassination of Louis of Orleans. 
Throughout the Justi ication jean Petit gave numerous examples of Orleans' attempts on the 
king or the dauphin's life by using sorcery, poison, and arson 4' By killing Louis of Orleans, 
John had effectively removed the king and dauphin from physical danger. 
The third time that Burgundy was called upon to `rescue' the king was in the 
autumn of 1408. When he returned to Paris after the brief war with the Liegeois, the 
Parisians implored him to retrieve the king from Tours, where the queen and the princes of 
royal blood loyal to the late Louis of Orleans were purportedly holding him against his will. 
So momentous was this occasion for the Parisians, that the king made a formal entry 
ceremony upon his return to the capital in March 1409.42 The king's subsequent return to 
the capital with John's help was, for this reason, of great rhetorical significance to the 
latter's political ideology. This is evident in the volume of time and space that the author of 
the anonymous Geste committed to the detailed description of the circumstances. " In the 
Geste, the duke entered Paris to the joyous acclamation of the people crying `Noel'. They 
personally thanked the duke for saving the king and the dauphin: 
Ayl Dus de Bourgongne, nobles prinches gentis 
Par foi, se to ne fusses, Ii mis seroitfinis 
Et trestous li roiaumes permues et honnis. 
Helas! Or est nos mis vilainement trais, 
41 See jean Petit's Minor. Monstrelet, 1: 223-242. 
42 Bourgeois, p. 5. 
43 Gerte, pp. 333-342. 
54 
Menes et eslongies ensu de son pals as 
It is significant that in this account, John the Fearless rescued the king from the trairon of 
the dukes of Berry and Bourbon. The message here is unambiguous: had it not been for 
John's involvement, the king would have been `finished'. It is certainly an exaggerated view, 
as it is certain that no one would have caused the demise of the king at Tours. However, 
what is important, is that the Burgundian text claimed that it would have happened. This 
was done to underscore John's heroic intervention. Critically, it tells us what import this 
particular event had within the Burgundian ideology, and what message the duke had 
initially hoped to convey to the people: he had done his duty and acted as the king's 
guardian and protector, releasing him from the control of the treasonous Orleanist princes. 
John continued to publicise his ideology via symbols and letters even while he was 
excluded from the government. During his exile from Paris, following the violent 
Cabochien Uprising in 1413, he included in his emblematical repertoire the image of the 
diligent bee for himself and his partisans 45 Although this is not one of his more 
recognisable badges, the message it conveyed was just as powerful as those discussed 
above. The imagery of the bee and beehive was a well-established trope in the later Middle 
Ages, symbolising loyalty. In the Quadrilogue Invectif, Alain Chartier used this analogy to 
outline the responsibilities that the nobles had in maintaining the state. The nobles ought to 
`deffendre et entretenir leur assemblee et leur petite pollicie et pour garder la seigneurie de 
leur roy' and, `se laissent mourir pour luy mainteinir sa seigneurie et sa vie . 46 By 
appropriating this symbol for himself and his Parisian supporters, a predominant number 
of whom had been officially banished, John was expressing his ideological view that he and 
his partisans had continued to perform their duty to defend the kingdom for their 
44 My italics. Geste, p. 342. 
45 Laurent Hablot, `Les signes de I'entente. Le r6le des devises et des ordres dans les relations diplomatiques 
entre les ducs de Bourgogne et les princes etrangers de 1380 i 1477', in Revue du Nord, 84, n. 345-346 (April- 
September 2002): 83. 
46 Alain Chartier, Quadtiloque Invectif, ed. Eugenie Droz, 2nd edn. (Paris, 1950), p. 65. 
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sovereign out of loyalty and subservience. His emphasis on his continuous loyal conduct 
implied also that his exile was unjustifiable, while the subtextual meaning of the image 
supported his prevailing theme of fidelity to the crown. 
Furthermore, several of John's letters to the bonnes Lilles during different periods of 
crisis corroborate how central the king's need for protection was to the duke's public 
platform. Between January and February 1414, for example, John insisted that the king and 
dauphin were being held captive by the Armagnacs. He claimed that the dauphin had 
begged him to march on Paris and release him, and had done this by writing three letters of 
request. John used the dauphin's letters as `evidence' of the Armagnac's treason, and wrote 
several of his own letters to the bonner viler before he took his army to Paris. He also sent 
letters after his siege of Paris had failed. The introduction to a letter written on 11 February 
1414, reminded the towns of his reason for coming to Paris with his army, asserting that he 
had simply followed the dauphin's orders. He declared that he would persist in fighting the 
Armagnacs until they released the dauphin, and returned to their own territories. 
Additionally, he accused his adversaries of contravening the peace treaty that they had 
sworn to uphold at Pontoise duly 1413) by remaining in Paris in the first place 
47 
Dramatising the issue further, he claimed that he would rather die than leave the king and 
dauphin in a state of confinement. " He expressed surprise that any loyal subject of the 
crown would allow the subjugation of the king and his heir to continue without resistance, 
and he reprimanded the Parisians in particular for refusing to open their gates to him. He 
concluded by asking for help from the bonnes tiller, arguing that only those who supported 
his campaign were loyal servants of the king. Finally, he asserted that because he held the 
moral high ground in the conflict, God had chosen to support his cause over the 
47 The Peace of Pontoise was sworn on 26 August 1413, and published by a royal herald in Paris on 8 August. 
RSD, 5: 136-142; Bourgeois, pp. 34-35. See also Vaughan, John the Fearless, pp. 100-101. 
48 Nous ne nous departirons ne deporterons dc nostre entrepinse; car nous ariesmes plus chier ä mourir que 
de voir Monseigneur le Roy et Monseigneur d'Acquitaine ainsy estre demourez en servaige'. Plancher, Preuves, 
p. 297, n. 289. See also, Monstrelet, 2: 434-436. 
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Armagnac faction. For these reasons, he had already secured the help of several other 
banns titles in the realm! ' 
This letter serves as an excellent example of `subversive disinformation', because it 
was designed to obtain a reaction from audiences that would favour his cause: he hoped 
that they would join him in his campaign against the Armagnacs, who at that time had 
control of the royal government 50 Additionally, the `legitimate' information that Burgundy 
sought to use as the catalyst for agitation among the townspeople, was the alleged 
imprisonment of the dauphin. He thus created a deflective source of original information 
by insisting that the military campaign was the direct result of the dauphin's written request 
for assistance, and not because he had come to Paris `pour quelque ambition ou 
concupiscence d'avoir administration ou gouvernement de ce Royaume'. Thus the 
dauphin's letters became the `legitimate' basis for his siege of Paris. Because the duke of 
Burgundy was, for all intents and purposes, laying siege to the king's city of Paris against 
the king's will, Burgundy was, effectively, committing lese-majesty. Yet, because Burgundy 
used the dauphin's alleged captivity as his declared cause for the campaign, he distanced 
himself from culpability. Portrayed as the victimised party, he asserted that he was wrongly 
castigated for obeying the dauphin. Far from being a traitor, he declared that his attempts 
to save the heir apparent from captivity proved the opposite. 
Furthermore, the dramatic statement that he would rather die than see the king or 
dauphin oppressed was an effective declaration of his loyalty, and a firm challenge to his 
rivals that he would not back down. He used a similar tactic in the letter he wrote from 
Hesdin to the bonnet villes in April 1417, in which he declared that he was about to launch a 
military campaign to free the king from Armagnac control. According to the duke, 
49 `[C]ar a 1'ayde de Dieu et du bon droit clue nous avons en ceste querelle'. At this time, he did have garrisons 
in Compiegne, Soissons, Laon and several others. 
50 See chapter 1, pp. 16-18. 
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`Monseigneur le Roy, sa noble generation leurs Bens et officiers estoient tenus petitement'. 5' 
He explained that, as a result of this and the many other atrocities the Armagnacs had 
committed, he was declaring war. `car nous vous promectrons par la foy et loyaulte que 
nous devons a Dieu, a mon dit seigneur, et a la chose publique de son royaume, que tout 
nostre entencion et voulente est d'empescher de tout nostre pouvoir que mon dit seigneur 
ne son royaume ne vienquerir a la destruction. "' In a manner similar to the February 1414 
letter, he hoped that the bonner Lilles would believe that it was his utter devotion to the king 
and the realm that was his primary motivation for embarking on his military campaign(s). 
His commitment to liberate the king from the control of the Armagnacs was 
reinforced in a subsequent series of letters that he sent to the bonnet villec in the autumn of 
1417. When, for example, ambassadors were sent to Troyes in October 1417 to find out 
why the town had not responded to John the Fearless' letter patent, the ambassadors 
insisted that they publish it, explaining that it was important because it was `la declaration 
du bon [... ] affection qu'il a au bien du Roy'. 53 The letter patent to which his ambassadors 
referred, was likely the letter that had been drafted on 29 September 1417 and sent to the 
bonnes villes. Indeed, the strong introduction of this letter unambiguously explained that his 
intention was to make war on the Armagnacs and to protect the king and the realm. 
Comme pour le bien de... monseigneur le Roy, ä la 
conservation de sa seignourie et aussy pour la reparation de la 
chose publique de ce royaulme qui par long espace de temps a 
este moult desolee par la culppe de aucuns gens de petit estaz 
qui de leur auctorite... ont entreprins le gouvernement de la 
personne de mon seigneur le Roy et de tout son royaume... 
nous soyons mis sur le champs en armes en nostre compaignie 
tres grande quantite de seigneurs, barons, chevaliers et escuyers 
et autres gens de guerre en intention et ferme propos desditz 
gouverneurs dejectter et ouster dudit gouvernement pour eviter 
que par leur convoitise et ambition ledit royaulme ne sois 
perdu... " 
51 ACO, B 11895, layette 72, n. 39. 
52 Ibid. 
53 BNF, Collection Bourgogne, vol. 55, fol. 248r. 
54 BNF, Collection Bourgogne, vol. 55, fols. 254r-v. For this quote, see fol. 254r. 
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The duke of Burgundy's message was unequivocal here, where he insisted that he would 
fight the Armagnacs and all of their supporters with every ounce of strength, for the good 
of the king and the realm. Interestingly, he noted that it was the covetousness and ambition 
of the Armagnacs that would, if he did not intervene, lead the realm to ruin. 
The insistent repetition of contrasting terminology between the duke of Burgundy 
and the Armagnacs was intended to impress upon the audiences the stark contrast between 
Burgundy's natural propensity to righteousness, and the duke of Orleans' and his 
successors' natural inclination to convoitire. This was also very clearly stated in the 
introduction to the later Burgundian text, the Pastoralet, where the author explained that, in 
order to produce an example of what to avoid in the future, he would narrate a tale about 
shepherds and shepherdesses who `a bon droit les loiaux be / Et les faulz desloiaux 
desloe'. 55 The dichotomy presented in the Burgundian literature was designed to associate 
certain ideas with the corresponding personality: John the Fearless with positive 
characteristics such as `bon', `loyal', `noble'; Orleans and his allies with disparaging 
characteristics, such as `convoitise', `desloial', `criminel' and `tyrant'. 56 
Moreover, there were many occasions where the duke of Burgundy claimed that his 
own personal cause against the Armagnacs was, in fact, the king's cause. Significantly, this 
occurred most frequently when he was officially branded as a traitor to the crown, between 
the autumn 1413 and spring 1418. The letters that he sent during this period defended his 
campaigns on the grounds that he was trying to liberate the king from the oppressive 
clutches of the Armagnacs. Therefore, he argued, loyal subjects of the king were required 
to surrender their support to him as wells' In the letter sent from St. Denis 11 February 
1414 for example, he explicitly stated that his side in the quarrel with the Armagnacs was 
the virtuous side. He explained that those who were the king's loyal subjects should help 
ss Pastorale!, p. 39-40. 
56 `Leonet, le loial, le vray / Le hardy plus clue ne prouvay / Le bon, le franc et le nobly... ' Pastoralet, p. 147. 
57 For example, in a letter dated 29 September 1417, he wrote: `veuillons savoir qui en ce seront amis de 
mondfit seigneur le Roy et de nous... ' BNF, Collection Bourgogne, vol. 55, fol. 254r. 
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him, warning that those who did not would eventually be found guilty of treason 58 He 
similarly used this tactic in the 25 April 1417 letter written at Hesdin, where he stated that 
he would achieve his end with the help of the king's loyal subjects. He threatened that he 
would advance on all those who didn't help him `par voye hostile de feu et de sang', 
regardless of their social standing, because they were acting disloyally to the kings' 
Given that he claimed that his military campaigns of 1414 and that of 1417 were 
both to `free' the king from the control of the Armagnacs, he could insist also that those 
who refused to help him were actually colluding with the king's real domestic enemies: the 
Armagnacs. Consequently, subjects such as these were as disloyal as the Armagnac princes, 
and were therefore traitors. This view was clearly expressed in the Hesdin letter: 
Et pour ce vous prions, requerons et neantmoins tournons sur 
la loyaute et obeisance que [vous] devez a mon dit seigneur et a 
la chose publique de son royaume, et pour eviter le crime de 
lese majeste que vous et chacun de vous nous soiez aidans, 
conseillans et confortans a faire punir les destructeurs de la 
noble maison de France et coulpables des faulsses traysons, 
meurdries, tirannies et empoisonnements dessus diz que tenus y 
estes selong raison divine, naturelle et civile. 1S0 
Threatening the towns in this way was a clever, if unoriginal, tactic. By calling the towns 
supporting his rivals his `enemies' and hence, those of the king, he created'a false legitimacy 
for any prospective sieges. 
Furthermore, his 29 September 1417 letter made it clear that Burgundy's campaign 
would right the wrongs done by the Armagnac administration. To do this, he would replace 
any corrupt officers of the crown with his own reliable men, and in particular those 
involved in financial control. First he stated that he was giving the lord of Toulonjeon full 
plenary powers to act `ou nom de mondit seigneur le Roy et de nous' to carry out a policy 
58 `[R]equierant i tous les bienveuillans et loyaulx subjects, qu'ils nous veuillent aider et conforter et nous 
servir contre trous ceulx qui ainsy ont mis en dangier et servitude mondit seigneur d'Acquitaine, en eulx 
significant du fait contraire de en temps et en lieu accuser du fait contraire de desloyaute envers leur 
souverain Seigneur et de ce n'ayent point de doubte'. Plancher, Preuves, p. 297, n. 289. 
59 ACO, B 11895, layette 72, n. 39. 
11 Ibid. 
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change in the towns in Champagne, Brie, Burgundy and `autres villes sujettes ä mondit 
seigneur le Roy', such as Sens, Auxerre, Langres, Lyon, Macon and others that continued to 
support `le pard des adversaries de mondit seigneur le Roy et de nous' that is, the 
Armagnacs. To claim that his deeds would be executed in the king's name was truly 
audacious, for it is clear that the duke of Burgundy did not have royal backing for this 
campaign. Nevertheless, Toulonjeon was instructed to operate in the following way: 
De yceulx lieux et places veoir et visiter et a la garde et 
provision y mettre telle personne que bon luy semblera, de 
veoir les estats des receveurs et autres gens de finances, des 
deniers, des receptes de mondit seigneur le Roy tant du 
domaine comme des aydes, prendre et arrester et faire recevoir 
par telle personne qu'il verra estre expedient et necessaire de 
pouvoir oster et desapointer tous officiers quelsconques et en 
mettre et instituer autres en leurs lieux tells qu'il verra estre 
convenable et neccessaire pour le bien de la chose dessus dite. '6' 
For a number of reasons it is significant that John stated his intention to control the 
outflow of royal finances on behalf of the king. First, camouflaged within this piece of 
rhetoric was his need for financial assistance, and likewise his desire to regain control of the 
central government. Second, it is very telling of the level of legitimacy that he wanted to 
impart to the bonnet villec to encourage them to join his side in the conflict. The reforms that 
he intended to implement in the name of the king were effectively attempts to authenticate 
his illegal campaign, and advance his ostensible devotion to the common good. This was 
obviously part of his other predominant propaganda theme, relating to good government, 
which focused primarily upon reform and anti-taxation. 
3.2. GOOD GOVERNMENT 
John's consistent platform for reform is pivotal to our present study. On the 
facade, reform programmes were introduced for the public good. Logically then, it was an 
efficient political tool for the purpose of manipulating public favour. It was also an 
61 BNF, Collection Bourgogne, vol. 55, fol. 254v. 
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expedient means of criticising the government, without attacking the king himself. Indeed 
the above letter (29 September 1417) demonstrates how vital it was in currying public 
opinion. In the letter, John the Fearless explained that his military campaign was 
undertaken `pour le bien de... monseigneur le Roy, ä la conservation de sa seignourie et 
aussy pour la reparation de la chose publique de ce royaulme . 62 
His ostensible devotion to the common good is equally evident in the other letters 
he wrote during the 1417 campaign. In the Hesdin letter (25 April 1417), he first discussed 
his enemies' crimes against the king, the chose publigue, and against himself in great detail. 
Here again, John explained that he had been victimised by the Armagnacs for his attempts 
to liberate the king and realm from excessive control. However, he added that he had taken 
comfort in knowing that throughout history people had suffered from similar persecution. 
He wrote: `Et en oultre poursuivrons la dicte reparation de ce royaume par nous 
commencee comme dit est le relevement du povre peuple qui tant est greve et oppresse de 
subsides, aydes, impositions, tailles, gabelles, dixiemes, empruns, pilleries, roberies et autres 
exactions. "' He complemented this by claiming that he was `nez pour les homes aidier et 
conservez. ' Willing to sacrifice himself for the preservation of the chose publigue, he was the 
epitome of the `good' prince described in didactic treatises. Whilst Burgundy called the 
Armagnacs false traitors, rapists, and perjurers, he referred to himself and his partisans as 
men who `aymoient et ayment mondit Seigneur'. ' Accordingly, Burgundy had sworn on his 
loyalty to God, the king and the chose publique to pursue his good intention to `empescher de 
tout nostre pouvoir que mon dit Seigneur ne son Royaume ne vienquerir a la destruction 
que noitoirement pourchassent lesdits traistres, destruiseurs, rapineurs et empoisonneurs et 
que punition raisonables soit faictes. ' 
62 BNF, Collection Bourgogne, vol. 55, fol. 254r. 
63 ACO, B 11895, layette 72, n. 39. 
64 Ibid 
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To distance himself from the tyranny of the Armagnacs, Burgundy further 
emphasised the dissimilarity between them and the Armagnacs. In his 8 October letter 
written at Montlhery he accused the Armagnacs of establishing a `trez maulvais 
gouvernement', whilst he insisted that his goal was to `perseverer, quelque chose qu'il nous 
puist advenir, affin que puissant censer lesdits inconveniens, et que marchandises puist 
avoir cours, et le Royaulme soit gouvernez en justice en tant que pourrons, et cc avons 
ferme en nostre propos et intention pour acquitter nostre loyaulte. '65 The message was 
explicit: Burgundy's primary aim was to re-establish justice and stability by removing the 
traitors from control of the government. He assured the people that he would restore the 
realm to its former glory and would personally ensure that the needs of the bonnes villes were 
looked after. 
As early as August 1405 the duke tried to actively manufacture a public reputation 
for himself as the defender of the people. In his very first letter to the banner tiller (19 
August 1405), Burgundy explained that he had come to Paris not only to pay homage for 
his newly acquired lands, but because the king asked him to `pourveoir au bon 
gouvemment de son royaume. '66 This he reiterated in his letter patent to the bonnet vrlles 
written 8 September, in response to Louis of Orleans' attack, stating that his two reasons 
for coming to Paris were to pay homage to the king, and to `remonstrer Testat de son 
royaume... et lui supplier que reparation y fust mise. i67 
So that he might achieve the level of authority in the government that he desired, it 
was essential that he eliminate Louis of Orleans. To accomplish this, it was most expedient 
to substantiate Louis' ostensible corruption, whilst putting himself forward as a reformer 
prince. In this way, he would appear to be responding directly to the `clamour of the 
people', and thus serve the bien public. Therefore, in his official complaint (26 September 
65 Planher, Preuves, p. 307, n. 305. 
66 Arch. Comm. de Macon, EE 41, n. 1, cited in Mirot, Pieces, p. 396. 
67 Ibid., n. 2, cited in Mirot, Pieces, p. 409. 
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1405), he asked that changes be made in the administration of the government and the 
raising of taxes, so that all `inconveniences' would be avoided for the king and his subjects. 
Here was an unambiguous criticism of Louis of Orleans' notorious nepotism with regard to 
the government G8 The swiftness with which the remonstration was presented to the royal 
council, and subsequently to the Parlement, suggests that it was intended to take Orleans 
off balance. Orleans, he hoped, would be unable to react swiftly enough. 
Moreover, because the king was incapacitated by his mental illness, John portrayed 
himself as the man to fulfil the king's administrative responsibilities, a programme which 
corresponded to current theoretical trends. It is clear in his final statement where he 
declared that he would not leave Paris until the wellbeing of the king and the realm was 
assured, that he hoped to be taken seriously in his role as the faithful defender of the crown 
and of the bier public. `9 
In actual fact, John did not leave the capital immediately. Instead, he retained a 
considerable army with him in Paris, to `protect' the king and the citizens of the city. John 
the Fearless' receveurgeneral in 1405, jean Chousat, described the army as overwhelming, and 
explained that they were in Paris to help him while he waited to find out whether the royal 
government would implement the programme of reform that he and his brothers had 
recommended on 26 August 70 Chousat's estimate of the size of Burgundy's army was 4500 
`lances ou hommes d'armes, chevaliers et escuyers'. Although it seems rather unlikely that 
such a substantial army could be anything less than intimidating, Chousat's account records 
of that year explain that Burgundy's army was in Paris `pour le bien du roy et de son 
royaume. '" This account was, of course, written in this particular way to advance a 
6' Schnerb, Armagnacr et Bourguignonr, pp. 49-51; Jean sans Peur, pp. 166-168. 
69 AN, X'' 8602, fol. 189, cited in Mirot, Pieces, p. 403. 
70 BNF, Collection Bourgogne, vol. 54, fol. 99r; Monstrelet, 2: 108-114; RSD, 3: 306-308; Hirtoirr de Charles VI, 
pp. 432-433. 
71 BNF, Collection Bourgogne, vol. 65, fol. 77v. See also Petit, Itinerairer, p. 580. 
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consistent view of the duke's endeavours in Paris at that time rather than to give an honest 
report of any problems that may have arisen from the mass assembly of men-at-arms. 
As an additional support for his reform programme, John complemented his letter 
campaign and his armed `protection' of Paris with his new badge: the carpenter's plane. 
With such a massive army surrounding Paris at this time, it is certain that John the Fearless' 
carpenter's planes would have been highly visible around the city. The carpenter's plane 
and the motto `Ich houd' was a personal challenge to Louis of Orleans. The device 
intimated that he would plane down the knots on Orleans' stick, an image that doubtless 
represented his intention to strip Orleans' government of its corruption and vice. Its 
heraldic significance denoted judiciousness, prudence and moderation, and represented the 
desire of the bearer to `conform all his actions to the laws of right and equity. "' These 
qualities were naturally found in Saint Joseph, who was a carpenter by trade. Cynthia Hann 
explained that there was a surge in social and devotional interest in Joseph in the early 
fifteenth century, which had centred on his virtues as a conscientious provider for his 
family; he was a model of perfection. 73 Admired as Jesus' devoted and virtuous father, 
artistic works of the period began including Joseph hard at work in scenes with Mary and 
Jesus. The concept was not a new one. Saint Ambrose had commented extensively on 
Joseph, praising him as Jesus' earthly father, and made the direct connection between 
Joseph and God. As the `artisan of all things', God trims men's souls by cutting off that 
which was worthless, or sinful, with his axe. 74 
Ambrose's comparison between the earthly and divine artisan was influential, 
according to Hann, surfacing in a number of important patristic texts, including the Glossa 
Ordinaria for the Bible. 75 But for our purposes, the fact that Ambrose likened God to an 
72 Cecil Wade, The Symbolism of Heraldy (London, 1898), p. 98. 
73 Cynthia Hann, "Joseph will Perfect, Mary will Enlighten and Jesus Save Thee': the Holy Family as Marriage 
Mode in the Merode Triptych', in The Art Bulletin, 68 (March 1986): 54-58. 
74 Hann, `Joseph will Perfect', p. 58. 
75 Ibid., p. 58. 
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`artisan of the soul', whose duty was to cut down the vices of the `unfruitful trees', is 
exceedingly significant. There is a very clear parallel between this image and what John the 
Fearless' plane expressed symbolically with regard to Louis of Orleans and his knotty club. 
Moreover, Joseph's relationship to Jesus was not unlike John the Fearless' relationship to 
the dauphin: both were father figures to two `princes': one the prince of the French realm, 
the other the prince of mankind. John's choice in badge therefore evoked an interesting 
parallel to Christ's earthly father, particularly when we consider that the catalyst for this 
choice had been the issue of the alleged kidnapping of the dauphin. John used the incident 
to underscore his father-son relationship to the young dauphin, making direct references to 
it in his manifestoes and letters. Most intriguing is the inscription on the back of a cameo 
ring, similar to that which he gave to the dauphin circa 1412. It reads: Vent filius Dei Brat 
('Truly he was the son of God'), and is accompanied by a carpenter's plane (fig. 2). " 
Furthermore, early fifteenth-century imagery surrounding the Holy Family 
emphasised their humanity over their divinity, making them more accessible. Although 
blessed by God, Joseph was the head of a hard-working artisan family. This model was 
compatible with John's own model; his carpenter's plane conveyed his desire to associate 
himself with the artisanal orders of French society. " It suggested that rather than restricting 
himself to being the people's advocate, he was, in a figurative sense one among them. It 
implied that he understood them, and would fight for their interests, by constructing a 
strong edifice of good government. 
This argument is further corroborated by Burgundy's adoption of corresponding 
badges to help develop his `rebuilding' theme 78 For the etrennec gift exchange on 1 January 
1410, he adopted the carpenter's level, which like the carpenter's plane, was also a heraldic 
76 See Lart ä la tour de Bourgggne. Le mecenat de Philippe !e Hardi et de jean sans Peur (1364-1419) (Paris, 2004), p. 
134. 
77 This was the conclusion that Bertrand Schnerb also drew in jean sans Peur, p. 519. For details on the level 
and the hammer as additional badges, see chapter 7 'Symbols'. 
78 Simona Slanicka, Krieg der Zeichen. Die visuelle Politik Johanns ohne Funht und der armagnakisch-burgundische 
Bürgerkrieg (Göttingen, 2002), pp. 170-173. Schnerb, Jean sans Peur, pp. 514-519. 
66 
symbol of equity and propriety, and represented the command of reason and justice over 
all deeds "" Thus John used this emblem to symbolise the restructuring that he would 
undertake within the government, and to emphasise the stability that he wished to re- 
establish within the realm. 80 According to Monstrelet the meaning behind the symbol was 
discernable: 
Et lesdiz dons estoient en certaine significacion, car ilz estoient 
en semblance de ligne ou d'une rigle qu'on appelle nivel de 
mason... Laquelle chose estoit en significacion, comme on 
povoit croire et penser, que ce qui estoit fait par aspre et 
indirecte voie, seroit aplanye et mis a son reigle, et le feroit 
mectre et mectroit a droicte ligne 8' 
Here it is clear that this was an assertive emblem which explained that Burgundy would 
keep the king's subjects `in line' and that those who did not conform to his reformative 
programme, would suffer the consequences. Certainly this had been the case for jean de 
Montaigu, the king's grand maitre de ! 'hotel, who had been executed in October 1409. "Z 
Montaigu was arrested for his alleged embezzlement of royal funds, but when the 
allegations could not be proven, he was accused and convicted of conspiring with Louis of 
Orleans to murder the king. Many other royal officers and administrators were either fined, 
arrested, or decommissioned following Montaigu's execution, including the five conseillers 
generaux de finances des aides 83 Monstrelet acknowledged this, explaining that `ceulx qui 
estoient commis ä la reformation devant dicte besongnoient soigneusement chascun jour, 
et tant y continuerent que ä plusieurs de ceulx qui avoient gouverne les finances furent 
recouvrez grans deniers. "' 
It is significant that John chose the mason's level as an additional emblem shortly 
after implementing his programme for reform in earnest because there was a clear 
79 Wade, The Symbolisms of Heraldry, p. 98. 
80 Denis Bruna, `De 1'agreable ä futile: le bijou emblematique ä la fin du Moyen Age', in Revue Historigue 301, 
no. 609 (January-March 1999): 17; Slanicka, Krieg der Zeichen, pp. 170-177; Schnerb, Jean sans Peur, pp. 518-519. 
81 Monstrelet, 2: 57. See also BNF, Collection Bourgogne, vol. 65, fol. 91r. 
82 See Schnerb, jean sans Peur, p. 516; Famiglietti, Royal intrigue, p. 78. 
83 Rey, Domain du roy, pp. 299-301. 
84 Monstrelet, 2: 59-50. 
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association between the two, which made its intended meaning more accessible. Thus we 
observe a conscious effort to choose emblems representative of his programme; these 
evoked a very specific message that was, doubtless, intelligible to audiences of all social 
standing. By taking first the plane, then the level, which he sometimes complemented with 
the hammer, the three building implements were ideal for communicating his plan for 
constructing a strong, virtuous government B5 Additionally, the three tools also carried 
assertive undertones to those who would stand in John's way. It is doubtless true that John 
the Fearless knowingly chose these emblems for those reasons. The confirmation lies in the 
association between the badges and the actions Burgundy undertook concurrently. First, 
the plane and the knotty stick had a direct figurative relationship; this association was 
underscored in his declaration of Orleans' corruption and the need to implement reform. 
Second, we note a parallel comparison between the level and the number of arrests he had 
ordered, purportedly for the good of the king, and of the Bien public. 
An additional theme underpinning John's programme of good government related 
to establishing and defending the peace. This is explained by the fact that it was expected 
that the princes help the king maintain peace and implement justice in the realm; it was 
considered to be one of their primary obligations to the crown of France 8C Given that this 
was such an entrenched expectation in the late medieval France, the duke of Burgundy 
underscored this obligation in the letters that he dispatched and published throughout the 
conflict. It became an additional way of justifying his course of action, especially when he 
had disobeyed a royal ordinance. For example, Burgundy's 1414 letter emphasised his 
intention to restore peace even though he was defending the siege he lay to the capital. He 
explained that there had been two reasons why he had driven his army to Paris: the first 
85 The hatchet may have referred to St. Joseph's axing of the 'unfruitful' and `worthless' tree, freeing it of its 
vice. Ambrose of Milan cited in Hann, `Joseph will perfect', p. 58. 
86 See for example Christine de Pizan's, `Lament on the Evils of Civil War', in The Epistle of the Prison of Human 
life', pp. 84-95 and Chartier's Quadtilogue Inveaif, p. 65. 
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was because the dauphin had requested his help; the second was to `exposer aucunes 
besongnes touchans le bien de paix et de tout ce royaume . 87 
After the Jargeau Manifesto was published in July, Burgundy insisted in his letter to 
the queen that he had never personally broken any of the peace treaties: 
Q]e n'aye sceu aucune chose par quoy Pen me puisse noter que 
j'aye [re]quis voye de fait contre la paix et bien publique de ce 
royaume, pour laisser voye de traite, ainsy que mande m'avez 
n'agueres par vos autres lettres, et que toujours depuis la paix de 
Chartres et traitte de Vincestre [sic] ... 
88 
One of the reasons why it was so important that Burgundy insist he had not contravened 
either peace treaties was because Charles of Orleans and his brothers accused him of doing 
so. One example that the brothers gave was the forced confession Burgundy's men had 
extracted from jean de Montaigu through torture. His `confession' had led to a guilty 
verdict for complicity in Louis of Orleans' alleged plot to dethrone the king. 89 Montaigu's 
unjust trial not only offended the Orleanist camp because he was one of theirs, but it was, 
effectively, public slander against Louis of Orleans. This was not in keeping with the 
negotiations for a peaceful settlement between the two factions. The princes of Orleans 
called the peace treaty of Chartres `nul et de nulle valeur', and insisted that Burgundy's 
pardon was `une chose delusoire et illusoire et a proprement parler une vraye derision et 
moquerie de justice. '" 
The importance of upholding peace treaties is also evident in publication of the 
amended version of the peace treaty of Arras, signed at Rouvres on 30 July 1415 91 
Burgundy had this published widely so that all of his allies and vassals would swear to 
87 Plancher, Preuves, p. 297, n. 289. See also, Monstrelet 2: 434-436. 
88 Plancher, Preuves, pp. 274-275, n. 274. Cited with only minor discrepencies in pp. 465-466. 
89 For these specific references, Plancher, p. 282; Histoire de Charles VI, p. 461. For the whole document, 
ADN, B 657 n. 15.183. For copies, see AN, K 56, n. 18. 
90 For the specific quotes, Plancher, p. 281; Histoire de Charles VI, p. 460. 
91 For the original document John disseminated regarding the peace: ACO, B 11894, layette 72, n. 34. See also 
BNF, Collection Bour7oSne, vol. 55, Pols. 173r-175r. For details on the negotiations leading to this treaty, 
Schnerb, jean sans Peur, p. 601; Famiglietti, RoyalIntrzgue, p. 164. 
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uphold the agreement, including the count of Charolais. The letter emphasised that he 
himself had conformed to the king's desire to re-establish peace in his realm. 
[Le Roy] veuillans les subgez relever, garder et preserver 
d'icelles oppressions, et desirans de tout son cuer ferme propos 
ou volonte faire cesser toutes voyes de fait, et en bon amour et 
union, soient doresnavant entre ses subgiez 
tellement ... considerant 
le bien de paix qui est inestimable et les 
grans maulx qui par guerre seront. 92 
Although this letter provided a reflection of what the king willed regarding the re- 
establishment of peace, when Burgundy declared his agreement to it publicly he transmuted 
it into an element of his ideology. Crucially, however, this did not truly represent what was 
happening behind the scenes. The reality was that the duke of Burgundy had continuously 
challenged the treaty from the moment that his sister and brother had conceded to it on his 
behalf (4 September 1414). In fact, Burgundy even refused to agree to the Rouvres 
settlement, insisting that the five hundred banished Cabochiens' be pardoned by the king 
and re-admitted to the realm. Under pressure, the dauphin granted absolution on 31 
August 1415 to all but forty-five on the list. " Yet John the Fearless remained unsatisfied, 
and continued to try to secure the pardon of all his remaining partisans. Obviously it would 
do Burgundy little good to publicise these surreptitious activities alongside the treaty, which 
were, for all intents and purposes, against that for which good government stood. 
Therefore, it was essential that Burgundy outwardly appear to be an obedient vassal of the 
king, one who complied to the king's desire to re-establish order and stability in the realm 
for the good of the people. 
To ensure that his many political manoeuvres were not perceived as dubious it was 
important that John the Fearless distract the people from his many illegal decisions, such as 
the 1405 interception, the 1414 siege of Paris, or the 1417 military campaign. In order to 
accomplish this, he strongly emphasised his loyalty to the crown, and his fulfilment of his 
92 ACO, B 11894, layette 72, n. 34; BNF, Collection Bourgogne, vol. 55, Pols. 173r-175r. 
93 Hirtoire de Charles VI, p. 512-513. Vaughan, John the Fearless, p. 204. 
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duty to the king and realm. John assumed an identity that made him the king's natural 
guardian. In this way, his professed devotion to the king legitimised his many military 
campaigns against the Orleanists, and was also an efficient way to contrast himself to his 
rivals. As a result, this theme was more likely to improve his Fama. If this were the case, he 
would avoid resistance from the people of the realm, whilst effectively deprecating the 
reputation of the duke of Orleans and his successors. 
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CHAPTER 4 
DE SL 01A UL XTRAIS TR ESi1 
LOUIS OF ORLEANS & THE ARMAGNACS 
In the previous chapter we examined the duke of Burgundy's positive profile as 
presented in the various media of propaganda, noting that his arguments fit into wider 
trends in fifteenth century thought and popular culture. In this chapter we will take a 
similar approach and consider the diverse media and universal ideological devices he 
implemented to examine how Louis of Orleans and the Armagnacs were portrayed. We 
will disentangle the rhetorical complexities to assess how Burgundy attempted to construct 
a negative Fama for the Orleans and the Armagnacs through his overt criticisms against 
them, by closely analysing the central themes that underscored this facet of his propaganda: 
tyranny, disloyalty and misgovernment. 
4.1. TYRANNY 
It is well known that the main argument advanced by Burgundy's spokesman, 
master jean Petit, in the Justification address (8 March 1408), held that John the Fearless had 
justly committed tyrannicide rather than homicide when he had ordered the assassination 
of Louis of Orleans? This was the first overt Burgundian accusation of tyranny against 
John the Fearless' rival. However, once Petit had set a precedent in this particular 
composition, claims for tyranny against Louis of Orleans persisted in Burgundian 
propaganda, featuring prominently in Burgundy's various manifestoes, letters patent and 
close. They also appeared in texts written in honour of John the Fearless, such as the Geste 
I John the Fearless' propaganda frequently referred to his rivals as `desloiaulx traistres' and `faulx traistres'. 
Petit, Justification, p. 206. See also his letter from 14 August 1411 in Monstrelet, 2: 160. 
2 Petit wrote: `Je dy que l'occision dudit tirant n'est point homicide, pour ce qu'elle fut juste et licite. ' 
Justification, p. 210. See below, chapter 5 Burgundian Texts'. For a comprehensive analysis of the Justification 
consult Coville, jean Petit. See also Guenee, Un meurtn, pp. 194-199; Schnerb, A, mqlnacs et Bourruignona, pp. 80- 
83; Vaughan, John the Fearless, pp. 70-72. 
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des duct de Bourgogne (1412-1420), 3 and the Pastoralet (c. 1422). 4 Burgundy made similar claims 
against the Armagnac faction after Louis was killed. For example, in August 1411, shortly 
after Charles of Orleans and his brothers wrote and published the Jargeau manifesto' in 
which they openly challenged the duke of Burgundy and claimed his assassination of their 
father was unjust, Burgundy published a series of letters defending himself, which he sent 
to the bonnet villes. s In one of these letters, written 14 August 1411, he claimed that Charles 
and his brothers were as treasonous as their father, insisting that, `[ils] sont venus et yssus 
de si faulx, mauvaise et desloial traistres comme a este leur pere, ainsi qu'il est tout notoire 
et commun par tout le royaume. i6 By likening the Orleans princes to their father and 
emphasising the `false treason' of their House, Burgundy's letter marks his deliberate 
attempt to malign their reputations, whilst also reinforcing his original accusations of 
treason against their father. Jean Petit devoted much of his work in the Jrrstifrcation to 
explaining the concept of tyranny in relation to high treason against the king, which he 
synonymously called lese-majesty. He frequently used the term `tirant' alongside `traistre' 
and the adjective `desloial ." By conflating the nouns, they became mutually inclusive. This 
made the necessary bridge between the potential gaps in Petit's argument of a just 
tyrannicide, and established resolutely that Louis had the motive and intention to usurp the 
crown. Both tyranny and lese-majesty were therefore central to the case against Orleans, 
3 Institut de Parir, ms. 303. It was Kervin de Lettenhove, the only editor of the poem, who gave it its current 
name, the Geste des duct de Bourgogne. According to him, the first instalment of this work was completed in 
1412. However, there is a second manuscript of which he had no knowledge. It reveals that the narrative 
continued up to 1420, after John the Fearless' death in 1419. Consult Georges Doutrepont, La litterature des 
duct de Boulogne, rep. (Geneva, 1970), pp. 79-82. 
4 BR, ms. 11064. The date for this anonymous allegory is also unknown. The catalogue of the 1967 exhibit of 
Philip the Good's library indicates that it was composed `peu apres 1422. ' Joel Blanchard specified that it was 
written between 1423 and 1425, but admitted that no precise date can be given. Georges Dogaer and 
Marguerite Debae, La libraitie de Philippe le Bon. Exposition o7anis ea ! 'occasion du 509 anniverain de la mori du duc 
(Brussels, 1967), p. 131. Blanchard, 'Introduction', in Pastoralet, pp. 25-28. 
5 ACO, B 1570, fols. 277v-278v. 
6 Monstrelet, 2: 161. 
7 For example, `La septiesme verite ou cas dessusdit, est qu'il est licite ä ung chascun subject, honnorable et 
veritable, occire le tirant traistre dessus nomme et desloial ä son Roy et souverain seigneur... ' In a second 
example, Petit explained that anyone who used fire to appropriate the king's sovereign power and dominion 
for himself `commet crime de leze-majeste ou premier degre et est tirant, traistre et desloial ä son Roy'. Petit, 
Justification, pp. 216-217, and 219 respectively. 
73 
and against his later Armagnac rivals. For the reason that jean Petit's case against Louis of 
Orleans for tyranny was in many ways used as a foundation for later propaganda, it is 
imperative that we first analyse the portrait of Louis of Orleans as it was presented in the 
Justification. 8 
4.1.1. The Justification (1408) 
Jean Petit incorporated the two traditional views of tyranny (regitive and acquisitive) in 
his work to argue that Louis of Orleans had attempted to acquire sovereign power 
illegitimately for his own profit, and secondly, that he was responsible for misgovernment 
and abuse of power in his legitimate capacity as a prince of royal blood. It was important 
that Petit base his arguments within the framework of both forms of tyranny because it was 
crucial to emphasise that it was Orleans' ambition and greed that had compelled him to 
attempt usurpation. Louis' convoitise was in effect the main thrust of Petit's entire work, 
because, as he explained as his first line of reasoning of the Justification, `convoitise est de 
tous les maulx la racine. '9 The fact that the king was not only Louis' sovereign lord but was 
his brother only helped to further vilify the prince. Petit underscored both betrayals to strip 
Orleans of morality, which, he hoped, would reinforce his argument that Orleans had a 
tyrannical spirit: 
Loys nagueres duc d'Orleans, fut taut embrase de convoitise et 
honneurs vaines et richesses mondaines, c'est assavoir de 
obtenir pour soy et sa generacion, et de toler et substraire 
pardevers lui la tres haulte et tres noble seigneurie de la 
couronne de France au Roy notre sire, qu'il machina et estudia 
par convoitise, barat et sortileges et malengins, pour destruire la 
personne du Roy de ses enfans et generacion, en tant qu'il fut 
espris de tirannie, convoitise et temtacion de 1'ennemi d'enfer, 
que, comme tyrant ä son Roy et souverain seigneur, il commist 
crime de leze-majeste divine et humaine en toutes manieres et 
degrez... I" 
8 For details on the extant manuscripts of this document see chapter 5 Burgundian Texts'. 
9 Petit, Justification, p. 185 
10 Ibid., p. 223. 
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Thus, according to Petit, it was clearly Louis' convoitise that had tempted him, causing him to 
be a `tyrant to his king'. Moreover, it had led him to commit all the various forms of 
tyranny, those which Petit had outlined as the four degrees of corporal lese-majesty, and 
the two degrees of divine lese-majesty. " 
Petit also explained that if any man was proven to execute any of these high crimes 
of treason, they should be tried for it, even if it was done posthumously, if proven guilty, 
the person's lands, property and goods ought to be confiscated by the crown. t2 Therefore 
Justification was, effectively, an ideological trial in which Petit intended to prove Louis of 
Orleans' guilt of numerous crimes of high treason against the king and the common good. 
It was an approach used to validate his exceptionally aggressive attack on the duke of 
Orleans, for to accuse the king's brother of such serious offences was a rather precarious 
endeavour. 
It was because the crimes of divine and corporal lese-majesty were so severe that 
Petit's entire justification centred on the argument that it was morally permissible, and just, 
for any subject of the king to kill any person who had committed these crimes, even 
without the official permission of the king. He argued: 
Il est licite a chascun subject, sans quelque mandement, selon les 
lois morales, natureles et divines, de occire ou faire occire 
traistre desloial ou tirant, et non point tant seulement licite, mais 
honnorable et meritoire, mesmement quant il est de si grant 
puissance que justice n'y peut estre faicte bonnement par le 
souverain. 13 
Having established that it was just to kill a tyrant in this, his first part of the work, the 
sequitur major, Petit's sequitur minor focused on providing specific examples of Orleans' 
tyranny as evidence of his attempts to usurp the throne. He divided Louis' conspiracies to 
kill the king into three distinct categories. First, he accused Louis of using `malefices, 
II Ibid., p. 187-188. 
12 Ibid., p. 188. 
13 Ibid., p. 206. 
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sortileges et supersticion'; secondly, Louis had also used `poisons, venins et intoxicacions'; 
and finally, he argued that Orleans had tried to kill the king `par armes, eau, feu ou autres 
violentes injections'. '' These he tried to `prove' by providing specific examples for each 
category of corporal lese-majesty. 
He argued that Orleans was directly responsible for the king's illness which he had 
contrived through sorcery: `feu le criminel duc d'Orleans fut acteur des dessusdictes 
invocacions de dyables, supersticions, charmes, exoracions, sortileges et malefices. ''S Petit 
listed numerous incidences where Orleans had made use of black magic by summoning the 
devil, and attempting to use poison and charms to achieve his goals. In one of the tales, 
Orleans solicited the help of an apostate monk, a knight and an escuier so that he could 
`parfaire les malefices en la personne du Roy'. '6 
Poison was the second means by which Petit claimed Louis of Orleans attempted 
to slay the king and the royal family, though supposedly he only resorted to poison when 
his spells had proven unsuccessful. " One story posits that Orleans had paid two individuals 
to poison the king. 18 The two would not do the deed, so Louis of Orleans purportedly 
turned on them, accusing them publicly of conspiring to poison the king. According to 
Petit, he had done this so that he could save himself from reprisal. Feeling guilty perhaps, 
Orleans only later intervened on behalf of the two men: `Et lors empescha 1'execution de 
justice, ä fin que sa deslaulte ne feust descouverte'. " Having saved the two from execution, 
Louis then sheltered them in his domains. This story was important because it contended 
that Louis' intervention was effectively a miscarriage of justice in addition to underscoring 
his betrayal of the king by scheming to murder him. Because the implementation of justice 
14 Ibid., p. 224. 
15 Ibid., p. 230. 
16 Ibid., pp. 225-226. See Jan. R. Veenstra, Magic and Divination at the Courts of Burgundy and France. Text and 
Context of Laurens Pignon's 'Contre lea devineurs (1411)' (Leiden, 1998), pp. 59-67. 
17 Ibid., p. 221. 
18 Ibid. 
Ibid. 
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was the most important duty of the king, Orleans' interference had prohibited its natural 
course. This in turn was demonstrative of his general lack of interest in good government. 
Petit also alleged that Orleans had tried to poison the dauphin. " Interestingly, the 
poisoned apple story had already surfaced in 1396, when his wife Valentina Visconti was 
permanently exiled from Paris. According to the tale, in attempting to give the dauphin an 
apple she had tampered with, she inadvertently killed her own son. 21 Moreover, as per 
popular rumour at this time, Valentina was also held accountable for the king's madness, 
which she had engineered through sorcery. However, the chronicler Michel Pintoin was 
adamant that these were merely malicious rumours. 2 For our purpose, it is interesting that 
Louis was held responsible for this crime in the justification whereas Valentina took the 
blame earlier, in 1396, and later, in the Geste. 23 Yet the discrepancies between the texts and 
the rumours simply highlight the improbability that any such event actually took place. 24 As 
a form of slander, the disparaging stories were tools with which Petit's Justification and the 
later Burgundian texts attacked both Louis of Orleans and his wife so that they would both 
be discredited for the texts' respective audiences. 
The audiences had considerable bearing on who was held culpable for this incident. 
The audience of the Justi ication was considerably wider than the Geste, including the royal 
family, the high nobility, members of the University of Paris, and a great number of 
burgesses from the capital. Given that the main purpose of the former was to prove that 
Louis of Orleans was a tyrant who intended to usurp the crown, there is little wonder that 
the focus of the above anecdote was centred on his personal culpability in the alleged 
poisoning, excluding Valentina from the discussion entirely. Conversely, because there was 
not the same urgency in the Geste, there was room to return to the rumours of 1396. Blame 
20 Petit, Just jcation, p. 239. 
21 Veenstra, Magic and Divination, pp. 81-85. 
22 RSD, 2: 406. 
23 Lines 2128-2166, Geste, p. 322. 
24 See also Veenstra, Magic and Divination, p. 83; Emile Collas, Valentine de Milan, duchesse d'Orleans (Paris, 1911), 
pp. 219-227. 
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for the outbreak of civil war could be shared out between Louis of Orleans and his allies, 
Philippe de Mezieres, Gian Galeazzo Visconti, and Valentina. It is true that Mezieres and 
Visconti were maligned in Petit's Justification as well; Petit had, for example, called Mezieres 
a `faulx ypocrite.. le propre ministre de la trahison . 25 However, it was more important to 
spread the guilt between all of Louis' allies in the Geste because this text argued the alliance 
between Orleans, Mezieres and Visconti was the root of the civil war: Pourquoy la guerre 
esmut [... ] / Mais tous ces fais vinrent par mauvaise alianche Z6 In this way the evil 
conspiracy against which Burgundy fought was made even more perilous; Burgundy was, 
thus, made all the more heroic for his endeavours to protect the king. This literary device 
was inevitable considering that the main objective of an epic chanson de Beste, such as our 
Geste des duct de Bourgogne, was to praise the prowess, courage and loyalty of the 
protagonist. 27 
According to Petit, the third way by which Louis had allegedly conspired to kill the 
king was by fire, at the infamous Ba! des Ardents on the 28th January 1393 28 At a party 
thrown at the Hotel St-Pol, the king and princes decided to disguise themselves as wild 
men and dance around so that they could shock the ladies of the court. According to the 
perspective provided in the Justification and the later Burgundian texts, Orleans' ultimate 
plan was to kill the king at this moment; it was he who had suggested the costumes of hair 
in the first place, though he refused to wear one himself. Furthermore, he insisted upon 
leading the men into the ballroom holding a lit torch. The story goes that the men were 
suddenly, and without explanation, set on fire. Due to the swift reaction of the duchesses 
of Burgundy and of Berry, who enveloped the king in the skirts of their gowns, Charles VI 
25 Petit, Justification, p. 230. 
26 Geste, p. 261. 
27 D'Arcy J. D. Boulton, The Knights of the Crown. The Monarchical Orden of Knighthood in Later Medieval Europe 
1325-1520 (Woodbridge, 1987), p. 7. 
28 For the Burgundian account of this event see Petit, Justification, pp. 233-234; Geste, pp. 273-277; Lien' des 
trahisons, pp. 4-5. For the fifteenth-century chroniclers' perspective: RSD, 2: 64-70; Histoire de Charles VI, p. 
390; Monstrelet, 2: 233-234. Finally, for scholarly analyses of this event, see Coville, Jean Petit, pp. 332-337, 
and Veenstra, Magic and Divination, pp. 89-95. 
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narrowly escaped death ' Others were not so lucky. the bastard of Foix, the count of 
Joigny, Aymerie of Poitiers and Huguet de Guisay were all burned alive? " Michel Pintoin 
explained that it was later discovered that Louis of Orleans was indeed responsible for the 
incident, but that it had been unintentional. Pintoin remarked that it was because of his 
rank that the duke was not punished for his grave blunder, but that he publicly sought 
forgiveness by founding a chapel at the Celestins' convent 31 
It is significant that Jean Petit used this actual event in his text, because it offered a 
perfect opportunity to manipulate the `true' facts to the prejudice of Louis of Orleans. This 
was crucial, for propaganda is always most effective when it is based in truth. Most of the 
nobility would have had some knowledge of this event, and Pintoin divulged that upon 
hearing the news many burgesses in Paris and in the surrounding area had gone 
immediately to the royal palace of Saint Pol to be sure that the king had survived the 
tragedy. 32 Therefore Burgundy's spokesman must have recognised that here was an 
excellent opportunity to rehash the entire catastrophe for those who did remember it, 
whilst providing a biased version for those who did not. This was evidence that would 
categorically prove, he hoped, that Orleans was guilty of attempting to murder of the king. 
Even though many did not believe Petit's arguments in the justification, we know 
that it had a negative impact on Louis of Orleans' fama. 33 This is certain because it was one 
of the Orleanist camp's foremost complaints against John the Fearless thereafter. Indeed in 
his refutation, Cerisy referred to arguments made against Louis for divine and corporal 
lese-majesty as a `defamatory libel and full of lies... [designed] to forever tarnish his 
29 RSD, 2: 66; Petit, justification, p. 233; Geste, pp. 273-275. 
30 RSD, 2: 66. 
31 Ibid., p. 72. 
32 RSD, 2: 70. 
33 Regarding the disbelief among many after the presentation, see RSD, 3: 764; Hictoirr de Charles VI, p. 445; 
and Monstrelet, 2: 244. 
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reputation and that of his family. "' This was in effect Louis of Orleans' `second murder'. 
Furthermore, Cerisy claimed that Burgundy's slanderous Jristj rcation was an even greater 
crime than ordering the 1407 assassination, because by defending a homicide in this way, 
Burgundy maintained his sin through his own obstinacy. He was, therefore, resisting God, 
who desired that all sinners seek forgiveness. " The Orleanist princes took the same line of 
reasoning as Cerisy in the 1411 manifesto written at Jargeau, in which they wrote of the 
duke of Burgundy: 
[L]equel non content d'avoir une fois tue & meurtri si 
dampnablement son cousin germain, vostre seul frere, comme 
dit est, mais en perseverant en l'obstination de son tres desloyal, 
faux & mauvais courage, s'est efforce de le tuer & meurtrir 
encores une autre foil; c'est assavoir de vouloir esteindre, 
damner & effacer entierement sa memoire & renommee par 
fausses mensonges & controuvees accusations, comme la Dieu 
grace, il vous est bien apparu notoirement et ä tout le monde. " 
Not only did John the Fearless disregard these statements by tenaciously standing by his 
accusations, he reiterated them in his letters of response addressed to the king and to the 
bonner Lilles. According to the Jouvenal compiler these letters were `mal comburee et dirigee, 
et en effet se fondait sur la proposition de maistre Jean Petit. "' 
We can thus see that the accusations against Orleans for tyranny persisted well 
beyond the remit of the Justification's presentation in March 1408. In the autumn of that 
year, the queen, the duke of Berry and others who were sympathetic to the Orleanist cause 
took the king to Tours. Negotiations between their party and John the Fearless reveal that 
this group demanded that Burgundy give a public apology for Louis' assassination. 8 
Predictably, John the Fearless refused. A similar situation arose just prior to the infamous 
34 `Sed inde proponi fecit contra eudem libellum unum diffamatorium et mendacem, sibi imponendo crimina 
lese majestatis divine et temporalis, et ut famam suam et progeniei sue in perpetuum redderet 
denigrandum... ' RSD, 4: 114. 
35 '[... I preseverando per obstinacionem mends in pecato, et, ut scitis, qui defendit preccatum, resistit Deo, 
approbando id quod Deus odit. ' RSD, 4: 114. Guenee, Un meurtrr, pp. 206-207. 
36 ADN, B 657 n. 15.183. For copies, see AN, K 56; Plancher, Preuves, p. 279, n. 277; and Histoire de Charles 
VI, p. 458. 
" Hirtoire de Charles VI, p. 464. 
m Merlet, `Biographie de jean de Montagu', pp. 273-279. 
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`Cabochien Uprising' in 1413. It seems that jean Jouvenal, lord of Traignel, then one of the 
king's procureurs in the Parlement, approached the duke of Burgundy and asked him to 
admit his wrongdoing in the murder of the duke of Orleans so that the obvious tension in 
the capital would abate 39 Again Burgundy flatly refused, claiming he had done nothing 
wrong. '" After the devastation of the rebellion, jean Gerson set upon having the Juctifrcation 
and the allegations of Orleans' tyranny and lese-majesty condemned by the papal see. This 
he accomplished at the Council of Constance in 1415.41 
Notwithstanding these counter-attacks, Burgundy not only went unpunished for 
killing Louis of Orleans, he was also granted absolution from the king for Louis of Orleans' 
assassination. " His ostensible success provided fertile ground for the cultivation of later 
accusations of tyranny against his sons and their allies. Indeed Burgundy's letters continued 
to emphasise that it was the Armagnac's greed that had compelled them to act like tyrants. 
This is clear in the letters that Burgundy wrote during the course of the 1411 war, in which 
he routinely exaggerated the purpose of the Orleanists' armed campaign. Whereas they 
were merely interested in pursuing the duke of Burgundy, the latter claimed that their intent 
was far more sinister. According to the Jouvenal compiler, Burgundy `faisoient entendre au 
peuple, et de faict escripvoient aux bonnes villes "qu'ils [les Armagnacs] vouloient faire un 
nouveau roy, et priver ses enfants de la couronne. si43 Similar statements were made during 
the 1417 campaign. In April 1417, he wrote to the bonnes vines from Hesdin, calling the 
Armagnacs `les destructeurs de la noble maison de France et coulpables des faulsses 
traysons, meurdries, tirannies et empoisonnements dessudiz', and insisting that the towns 
`chastier leur tyrannie, inhumanite, desloyaulte, fureur, cruaute, vanite et avarice. " 
39 Histoire de Charles VI, pp. 480-481. 
40 Ibid. 
41 BNF, Collection Bourgogne, vol. 65, fol. 103v. For the letter of condemnation published in Paris by the 
archbishop: AN, K 58, nos. 84-5. 
42 For the letter of absolution published in March 1408: ADN, B 656, n. 15.088; Plancher, Pnuves, p. 254, n. 
256. For that of March 1409 ACO, B 11892, no. 18 and 18hir, Plancher, Preuves, pp. 256-258, n. 258. 
43 Histoire de Charles VI, p. 467. 
44 ACO, B 11895, layette 72, n. 39. 
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4.2. DISLOYALTY TO THE CROWN 
We note, therefore, that in John the Fearless' propaganda, tyranny and treason to 
the king remained very closely linked, and were effectively interdependent. However, 
whereas the Burgundian concept of tyranny centred on the acquisition of power and the 
misgovernment of the realm, disloyalty was a far more general, yet still a severe offence, 
encompassing acts of treason, the disregard for feudal or natural obligations to the crown, 
and the mistreatment of the royal family. For example, 5 April 1412, during the height of 
the first conflict, a royal mandate was published in Charles VI's name, giving John the 
Fearless command over a substantial royal army. It also officially confiscated the lands of 
the Armagnac princes for their alleged treason. John was given this army so that he could 
help the king impose obedience on the Armagnacs: 
Comme pour mettre ä sujection et vraye obeisance, et reduire 
en nostre main et seigneurie, plusieurs villes, citez, terres, 
chasteaulx et forteresses que ont tenu et occupe, tiennent 
encore et occupent en nostre royaume Jehan nostre oncle, duc 
de Berry, Charles nostre nepveu d'Orleans, Jehan de Bourbon, 
Jehan d'Alencon, Charles de Lebret nos cousins, Bernard 
d'Armignac, et autres leurs adherans, alliez et complices, nos 
ennemis rebelles et desobeissans ... 
"s 
It is clear that disloyalty to the crown carried its own self-determining significance in 
medieval political thought and practice. This was not a detail that the Burgundian 
propaganda machine overlooked. 
Whereas John was represented as an intimate of the king, Orleans' wickedness was. 
highlighted in the justification, where Petit almost exclusively referred to him as `le criminel 
duc d'Orleans'. Petit employed the expression at least fifteen times in the second part of his 
work. The repetition of this term was designed to negate Louis of Orleans' true identity as 
the king's only brother, the first prince of royal blood, by turning him into an anonymous 
traitor of the crown. He became a man devoid of any sense of duty, loyalty or personal 
45 Plancher, Preuver, pp. 290-291, n. 285. 
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affection for Charles VI. Although Orleans was admired by the majority of his peers and 
considered to be very intelligent, eloquent and charming, the `criminal duke of Orleans' 
from the Justification was a man whose only distinguishing characteristic was his treason 46 
This transmutation was possible for Petit because he had already proven how Louis had 
subverted his natural duties to the king. As a confirmed traitor, Orleans had forfeited his 
right to be mourned. Petit was unambiguous about the magnitude of Orleans treachery in 
his conclusion, where he encouraged the king not to despair over the loss of his brother, 
but instead to rejoice that the `criminel duc d'Orleans' was punished for his evil scheme: 'le 
Roy nostre sire ne doit pas tant seulement estre content, mail doit avoir mondit seigneur de 
Bourgongne et son fait pour agreable et le auctorizer en tant que mestier seroit. " 
Repetitive language was an important instrument in sustaining Burgundy's ideology. 
As `the root of all evil' and mainspring of the civil war, convoitise was evoked recurrently. 
The same repetitive style was present in the Burgundian texts. For example, within only 
thirty lines of the Geste (ins. 15-45), `convoitise', its cognates and derivatives are found 
seven times, while `hayne' is evoked twice. 49 Other epithets such as `desloial traistre' and 
`faulx traistres' were repeated unremittingly throughout the texts. Additionally, Louis of 
Orleans and his allies are regularly called `felons' and `traItres', but they are also associated 
with an assortment of negative nouns or adjectives such as `convoitise', `envie', `hayne', 
`mauvaise pensee', `mauvais ceur', `folie', `faus', and `diabolique'. Conversely, the duke of 
Burgundy was most frequently called `le bon duc Jehan' or `le noble duc Jehan', and 
predominantly associated with loyalty as a both a noun and an adjective. ' In one example, 
the Geste compared Orleans' `convoitise et folle pensee' to `le bon duc Jehan [quiz a le loial 
46 For Louis' reputation among his peers, see Guenee, Un meurtre, pp. 143-144. 
47 Petit, Just cation, p. 242. 
48 Geste, pp. 261-260. 
49 For example, `Dou noble duc Jehan qui par grant loyaute / Sievy le trache au pere qui l'avoit engenre' Ibid., 
p. 293. 
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pensee'. 50 Likewise: `Le bon duc de Bourgongne au gentil cuer s'atanti51 was opposed to the 
`mauvais cuers [que] en va tout dechevant! ' 
Likewise, the vocabulary, semantic constructions, and discursive stereotypes in a 
large number of Burgundy's letters effectively mirrored the Justification de monseigneur de 
Bourgogne and the later Burgundian texts. Indeed Burgundy faithfully labelled his rivals `faulx 
traistres' or `desloiaulx traistres'. In a letter written to the town of ChMons (likely Chälons- 
sur-Marne in Champaign) post-Agincourt, he described the Armagnacs' administration of 
the realm as `dampnable gouvernement . 52 In the letter written at Hesdin in April 1417, he 
called his rivals `faux traitres, seditieux, perjures, tyrans, meurtriers et rapineurs, dissipeurs 
et empoisonneurs', and blamed the decay of the bien public on their `dampnable avarice et 
convoitise'. S' Burgundy used the word `rapineurs' eight times in this particular letter. 
Meanwhile, he associated himself only with terms of loyalty and fidelity, and claimed that 
he was embarking on a campaign to fight for the `bien et conservation de son Roy et 
souverain seigneur. "' 
One of the more overt propaganda letters that Burgundy sent to the bonnes villes 
during his career was drafted on 14 August 141 5S The date is significant, because it was 
one month after the Orleanists published their `Jargeau Manifesto' around the realm, and 
therefore also a month after the Orleans princes' letter of defiance to the duke of 
Burgundy. Burgundy had not responded to Charles and his brothers until 13 August, only 
one day before publishing this particular letter. In wider context, the document was 
dispatched after the king's initial mandate forbidding any of his subjects from arming in 
so Ibid., p. 270. 
S'Ibid., p. 337 and 338: line 2624 and 2655 respectively. 
52 ACO, B 11895, layette 72. The date of the letter is missing entirely. The parts of the letter which are 
readable appear to refer back to the defeat at Agincourt, and the arrests of John the Fearless' ambassadors in 
Paris in late December 1415. It was, therefore, written after these two incidents. 
53 ACO, B 11895, layette 72, n. 39. 
54 Ibid. 
55 The letter to Amiens is transcribed in full in Monstrelet, 2: 159-161. 
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favour of any of the princes involved. " The letter began by acknowledging the king's 
mandate, which John followed with an explanation of how diligently both he and the king 
had worked to allay the hostility the duke of Orleans and his brothers for John: 
[C]es faulx et desloiaulx traistres, rebelles et inobediens, Charles, 
qui se dit duc d'Orleans, et ses freres, qui nous ont envoye leurs 
defiances et qui, devant icelles, se sont plusieurs foiz efforcez 
desloialement et traistreusement contre leur serment, nous on 
diffame, dommage, et deshonnoure, et, tant de fait comme 
autrement, pourchacie. s' 
This selection is critical for it demonstrates the semantic resonance of the `faulx et 
desloiaulx traistres'. These deliberate repetitions corroded the receivers. It was a defamation 
tool -a hostile attempt to damage the Fama of his opponents. Indeed the formation of a 
bad reputation was the result of commonly held knowledge of something relating to an 
individual; it could also be considered `notoire', as was the case here. 58 The consequences 
of such public accusations is manifest also by Burgundy's own complaint in this letter that 
the Orleanist letter both defamed and dishonoured him. In legal terms, when slander was 
used for the purpose of damaging a reputation, it was considered to be a very serious 
crime. Therefore, retribution was generally condoned by society. " This might explain 
Amiens' agreement with the duke of Burgundy, who concluded the letter with the assertion 
that the king would not impede anyone from joining him so that he could `garder nostre 
honneur et icelle maintenir et defendre avecques nosdiz subgetz. "' Monstrelet explained 
that the bailli of Amiens and other royal officers of the bonnes tilles were happy to comply. " 
Burgundy arranged to have royal support on this issue. On the 2 November 1411 a 
letter patent was published in the king's name which explained to the bonnes villes that John 
56 Monstrelet, 2: 159. 
57 Ibid., p. 160. 
58 F. R. P. Akehurst, 'Good Name, Reputation, and Notoriety in French Customary Law', in Fama, p. 82. For 
an analysis of the term 'notoire' and its cognates, pp. 83-86. 
59 Akehurst, `Good Name', pp. 86-87. 
60 Monstrelet, 2: 161. 
61 `Auxquelles lectres, Ferry de Hangest, qui lors estoit bailli d'Amiens, et tous autres qui avoient le 
gouvemement de la justice, furent tres contens de favoriser et eulx encliner ä la requeste dudit duc de 
Bourgogne. ' Monstrelet, 2: 161. 
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the Fearless would lead an army against the Armagnacs, with the duke of Brittany's help bZ 
In this letter, the king explained that his `treschier et tres amez cousin' would challenge the 
Armagnacs, to `obvier et pourveoir a la male voulente et entreprinse de plusieurs de nostre 
sang et lignage'. After listing all the terrible atrocities they had, and continued to commit, 
including raping and pillaging the countryside, the king officially branded them `rebelles et 
desobeissans'. Interestingly also, the Armagnacs' allies were referred to as `complices', or 
`adherents', whereas Burgundy's allies were named without the same prejudice as his 
`compaignie', or his `gens-d'armes et de trait'. This particular contrast highlighted the 
official permission that Burgundy had to assemble an army, while emphasising that those 
who helped the Armagnacs were accomplices to their treason. 
Furthermore, on numerous occasions, royal letters issued by Charles VI while John 
the Fearless controlled the government frequently likened the rebel Armagnacs to enemies 
of the realm. Indeed this was the case with the royal letter discussed immediately above (2 
November 1411). After giving a full description of the evil deeds that the Armagnacs had 
committed Charles VI claimed: `encores ne cessent de commectre et perpetrer chascun jour 
sur nous et nosdiz subjiez tous les maulx que ennemis de nous et nostre di Royaume 
pourroient faire... '6' In the same letter, Charles VI acknowledged Burgundy's `grande 
loyaulte et bonne amour'. " 
It was essential to rely so heavily on expressions such as `tyrant', `traitor', or 
`treason' in official documents, such as royal or ducal letters patent, and also in the duke of 
Burgundy's justification text because these were vehicles for the publication of `white' 
propaganda; also known as `empirical propaganda'. This term describes what a 
propagandist presents which would be perceived publicly as `truth', or `fact, but is 
62 ACO, B 11893, layette 85, n. 8. Plancher transcribed a letter that was also written by the king on 2 
November 1411 but there are noticeable differences between the two. Plancher's is much longer, and makes 
no reference to the duke of Brittany's assistance. There were probably two separate letters written that day. 
See Plancher, Preuves, p. 277, n. 276. 
63 ACO, B 11893, layette 85, n. 8. 
64 Ibid. 
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surreptitiously designed to agitate recipients 65 It is also a tool used to typecast the 
propagandist as a hero. By encouraging Charles VI to officially brand his rivals `rebelles 
desobeissans', John was able to disassociate himself from the legitimate source of the 
information: the king and his royal council's official condemnation of the Armagnacs, as 
though he had no involvement. He could then appropriate this information for his own 
campaign and use it against the Armagnacs, thereby producing an image in which he was 
the protector of the king and his realm. 
This is further evident in the royal council's decision to publish what was both a 
royal and ecclesiastical mandate excommunicating the Armagnacs and their supporters 
from the Church for having raised arms against the king. " It is important to note that 
Burgundy was in control of the royal council in 1411.6' Therefore, although these were 
royal documents that were published, they were orchestrated by the duke of Burgundy and 
expressly served his propaganda. Burgundy altered facts; he disseminated `disinformation'. 
Indeed we must not forget that when the Armagnacs published the manifesto in July 1411, 
they had restricted themselves to challenging the duke of Burgundy. Yet because Burgundy 
was able to manipulate the king and his royal council, he was able to gain royal sanction for 
his cause. The conflict had escalated from here, resulting in full-scale war. 
In actual fact, Burgundy's initial reaction to Orleans' manifesto was rather weak. He 
wrote his own letters to the bonnes villes in which he simply restated what Petit had outlined 
in the Justification: he accused the late duke of Orleans of trying to usurp the throne, and 
suggested that Charles of Orleans and his brothers were intending to execute a similar plan 
to their father's: `et pour ce que toy et tes dits freres ensuives la tres faulse et desloyalle et 
fellonie de vostre pere, cuidans venir aux dampnables et desloyaulx fins. " Burgundy's 
letters did not originally have their desired effect, which partly explains why he was so 
65 Foulkes, Literature and Propaganda, p. 11. 
66See chapter 8, `Ceremonial Display'. 
67 See chapter 6, `Letters', p. 136. 
68 ADN, B 657, n. 15.183. 
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reliant upon producing royal documents in the autumn that would offer firm support for 
his ideological campaign. Moreover it suggests that John's successful attempt to get the 
king on his side was, in fact, part of the duke's organised strategy. 
4.3. MISGOVERNMENT 
4.3.1. Administration 
After Philip the Bold died in April 1404, Louis of Orleans took over the 
governance of the realm with the help of the royal council, but he was an exceptionally 
unpopular leader with the people because of his alleged dishonesty. According to Bertrand 
Schnerb, Orleans looked after his own men very well, and placed many of his clients and 
adherents in high positions within the royal administration between 1392-1407.69 
For this reason, the duke of Burgundy's letter campaign in August and September 
1405 focused on criticising Louis of Orleans openly for mishandling the government and 
included a list of reforms that were presented to the Parlement, which he hoped would be 
implemented immediately. He explained to the king and royal council that currently the 
state of the king and his government was a disgrace to the royal dignity. Therefore he 
would expose `les choses qui se font au dommage de vous et de vostre royaume. i70 The list 
of suggested reforms that John's spokesman, jean de Nielles, presented on behalf of him 
and his younger brothers to the Parlement (26 August 1405) is an excellent example of 
John's propaganda in action. " The document was structured according to the four points 
that the duke of Burgundy and his brothers claimed were threatening the king's sovereignty 
and the welfare of the realm: the flagrant neglect of the king; an acute failing of justice in 
the realm; the diminution of the royal demesne; and the negative effects of the current 
69 Schnerb, Armagnacs et Bout uignons, pp. 49-51. 
70 AN, X'' 8602, fol. 189, cited in Mirot, Pieces, p. 400. 
71 Jean de Nielles later became the duke of Guyenne's chancellor in December 1409. See Vaughan, John the 
Fearless, p. 81. 
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government on the common good. 72 As pieces of rhetoric, these four premises are very 
interesting because they touched on the major concerns of political theorists and moralists, 
in regards to the theories on good government. First, the royal dignity and the inalienability 
of the royal demesne were exceedingly vital to the preservation of the crown and issues of 
sovereignty. Moreover, because the king was still expected, in theory, to live off his 
domains alone, it was imperative that he not compromise his revenue by partitioning his 
lands. 
The administration of justice was vital to the preservation of the common weal, and 
was therefore the primary responsibility of the royal government. For this reason, it was 
one of the principal concerns of the bonnet rillet. " According to this particular reform 
document the French realm's reputation for the preservation of justice had, hitherto, been 
unsurpassed. 74 Yet according to the Burgundian princes: `Or va il au present tout 
autrement, et communement a ceulx qui les procurent äy mettre non mie a vous mais 
contre vous, dont voz droiz et revenues sont moult fortement diminuees. i75 
Developed `au regart des gens d'eglise, nobles, et peuple de vostre royaume', 
Burgundy's fourth and final article centred on the abstract notion of the common good. 
Unsurprisingly, Burgundy claimed that the lack of justice and the manner by which the 
government was administering the realm was destroying the people. He argued that officers 
of justice and men-at-arms alike oppressed the realm's churchmen by stealing their victuals. 
The lesser nobles and gentry classes were equally demoralized, he maintained, because they 
were constantly called to arms `soubz umbre de vostre guerre'. 76 Regarding the remaining 
people of the realm, Burgundy further claimed `il est tout cler et nottoire qu'il va presque 
72 AN, X'' 8602, fol. 189, cited in Mirot, Pieces, p. 399-403. 
73 `[E]lles [les bones villes] veulent un roi qui fasse son office comme gardien de la paix et defenseur du 
royaume. ' Chevalier, Les tonnes vines, p. 95. 
74 `[V]ostre justice, de laquele ou temps passe vostre royaume a este sur tous les autres le mieux renomme', 
AN, X'' 8602, fol. 189, cited in Mirot, Pieces, p. 401. 
7s Ibid. 
76 Ibid. 
89 
tout ä destruction', because the people were overworked and exploited by the king's own 
officers. According to the duke, men-at-arms had occupied a presence in the countryside 
under the smokescreen of war for too long, adding that God would surely become enraged 
if something was not done to end their false occupation's 
On war, Burgundy's remonstration argued that the conflict with the English 
persisted because `on ne met aucun remede souffisant'. While the English attacked the 
coast of the realm, `moult de vaillans gens marchans et autres sont destruiz et desheritez'. 
Additionally, he described what he called `irreparable damages' in Picardy, Flanders, 
Normandy, Brittany and Aquitaine. Naturally Burgundy emphasised the current economic 
uncertainty so that it would stand as a clear example of how the common good was 
compromised, arguing that the current government was wholly unable to safeguard the 
realm adequately, or administer finances equitably. Therefore, Burgundy blamed the 
ongoing war on the fact that the aides, taxes, and subsidies that had been raised were being 
diverted to alternative ends. Yet these forms of income `devroient estre converties en 
vostre guerre et non autre part'. 78 Although there was no conjecture as to where the money 
was diverted, the clear implication was that the duke of Orleans had appropriated it; he 
had, after all, been the one to suggest the supplemental taxes between 1402 and 1405.79 
This was a very important point for his case against Louis of Orleans because it 
demonstrated the latter's refusal to govern morally and in accordance with established 
political principles. It was universally agreed that the crown should keep the revenue it 
raised for the royal coffers separate from that which it raised for the public domain in the 
form of aides and imp 8/s. These were to be used strictly for the good of the realm, such as in 
the defence and protection of the king's subjects. Thus John's letter of recommendation 
concluded by stating that if the money was not used for the proper reasons `great 
n Ihid., p. 402. 
78 Ibid. 
79 J arty, Iv vie politique de Louis de France, pp. 324-325; Vaughan, John the Fearless, pp. 30-31; Guenee, Un meurhr, 
pp. 171-172; Famiglietti, Royal Intrigue, pp. 39-46. 
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inconveniences' would naturally result from the rumours which were circulating at that 
time. He insisted that the king call upon properly elected and `non-suspect' officials to help 
him administer to the realm, and closed the letter stating that he and his brothers would 
remain in Paris until `le bien de vous, vostre generacion et de vostre royaume n'y soit avant 
pourveui81 This early request for reform was, and remains, a very significant document 
from John the Fearless' propaganda campaign. It is important because as the first public 
criticism of Louis of Orleans, it was very influential in setting the tone of future 
propaganda, thereby helping to construct the Burgundian conceptual framework within 
which the ideology would operate over the course of the following decade. 
The claim against Louis of Orleans for misgoverning the realm gained momentum 
in jean Petit's Justification, where his corruption became another example of his multifaceted 
tyranny. Indeed under Petit's interpretation of lese-majesty, misgovernment was the final 
degree of corporal treason. Whoever was found to commit the four degrees of corporal 
treason and the two degrees of divine treason was ultimately a tyrant. Tyrannical 
government was in all ways the direct opposite of good government, as a `good' prince 
made decisions with the public good in mind, and demonstrated that he actually cared 
about the people. " Therefore when jean Petit justified Burgundy's killing of Louis of 
Orleans, he claimed that Louis had been a tyrant, declaring that the assassination was 
`perpetre pour le tres grant bien de la personne du Roy, de ses enfans et de tout le 
royaume'. SZ 
The importance of tyranny as the absolute opposite of a good prince who fulfils his 
duty to the common good is now clear. 83 To compare these two models of government 
effectively, Christine de Pizan frequently employed pastoral imagery. "' In the Body Politic 
80 AN, X'' 8602, fols. 189, cited in Mirot, Pieces, p. 403. 
81 Quillet, Tyrannie et Tyrannidde, p. 149. 
82 Geste, p. 181. 
83 Chapter 2 `Political Theory', pp. 32-34. 
84 Pizan, Lire de !a paix, pp. 68-69. 
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(1407), she explained that the nobles were responsible for protecting the people from their 
enemies, just as shepherds would protect their sheep. " The pastoral allegory was effective 
in defining the theoretical role of the prince as regards his subjects, because there was, in 
point of fact, a recurrence of wolf attacks on cattle, and wolves thus posed a general threat 
to the king's subjects during the period under discussion. " Therefore, it was genuinely 
expected that, for the sake of the common good, princes would resolve this problem by 
organising large wolf hunts. 87 Accordingly, John the Fearless was an avid hunter of the 
animal 88 However, he also recognised the allegorical expediency of this type of activity, and 
used it in his long conflict with the house of Orleans and their allies. The frontispiece of 
the illuminated versions of the Justification featured the courageous lion of Flanders killing 
the wolf of Orleans, because the latter had attempted to steal the crown of the fleurr-de-lys 
(fig. 7). It was equally present in the Geste, and most obviously in the Pastoralet. 89 
In the Pasloralet the Armagnac faction was known as the `Lupalois'. This name was 
a direct reference to Louis of Orleans, which the author used to call attention to the tight 
bond between the duke of Orleans and his `successors' - the league of princes that had 
grouped around Charles of Orleans and his father-in-law (Bernard of Armagnac). 
According to the text the Armagnacs were, effectively, the wolves lurking among the herd 
that Pizan had been concerned with in the Livre de la paix. 9" If in theory and practice it was 
the princes' duty to protect the sheep from wolves and other similar enemies, by reversing 
this trope the Lupalois became the very enemies that they should have been fighting. It was 
85 Pizan, Body Politic, pp. 16-18. 
86 `Les loups representaient, au debut du XVC siecle, l'animal nuisible par excellence. Leurs hurlements 
nocture, qui causaient 1'effroi... Leur pullulement, dans un periode marquee par 1'extension des friches et des 
bois, les ravages qu'ils causaient aux troupeaux et au gibier et le danger reel qu'ils representaient pour 
l'homme constituaient les vrais motifs de la peur et de la haine suscitees par cet animal et etaient autant de 
raisons d'organiser des campagnes de destruction systematique. ' Schnerb, Jean sans Peur, pp. 478-479. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid., pp. 480-481. The wolf was one of Louis of Orleans' main badges. Colette Beaune, `Costume et 
pouvoir en France ä la fin du Moyen 
Age: les devises royales vers 1400', in Revue des Sciences Humaines, 55 
(1981): 144. 
90 'Ne tyrant est comme le loup ravissable entre les brebis' in Pizan, I1mr de la paix, p. 143. 
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an efficient way to show how tyrannical the Armagnac rule truly was, and how much 
damage the countryside had sustained because of them. 
The Pastoralet did not hesitate to develop the allegory further. When describing the 
devastation that the Lupalois imposed on the countryside during their war, the author 
accused the Lupalois shepherds of actually being wolves: 
Car, pour vous vray dire, a ce tour 
Ja deviennent loup ly pastour; 
Et plusours pillent la proie [... ] 
- Ce sont les bestes portans laine 9' 
To accuse the Armagnacs of being `wolves in sheep's clothing' was a severe indictment of 
their behaviour, one that the author used to epitomise their wickedness. Although they 
were the nobility of France, they had essentially shown themselves her enemies by their 
incessant warmongering and the devastation it caused in the realm. The consequence of 
their unremitting pursuit against the Burgundians was that the Armagnacs' `prey' had 
effectively become the king's own subjects. 
Although the Pastoralet was posterior to the period under examination, it is 
nonetheless valuable because it was the product of a natural rhetorical progression in the 
Burgundian propaganda. One observes, for example, similarities between the devastation 
of the herd in the Pastoralet and a number of letters and manifestoes sent by Burgundy to 
the bonnes rifles. In the letter sent on 8 October 1417 to the bonnes rifles, the duke of 
Burgundy focused exclusively on the Armagnacs"evil government'. Echoing the 26 August 
1405 remonstration for reform, he declared that although justice had always been practiced 
diligently in the realm, at present it was being utterly neglected92 Throughout the document 
he accused the Armagnacs of abusing their power and sending the realm to its ruin. 
Les dessusdits gouverneurs Pont gouverne a leur 
plaisir... tellement que leur ambition et convoitise a este cause 
de la perdition des dominations que mondit seigneur a perdu et 
perd chascun jour, de la destruction des nobles morts et 
91 Pastoralet, p. 117. 
92 Plancher, Preuves, p. 307, n. 305. 
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destruits par les anciens ennemis de ce royaulme, et avec ce des 
grands finances sans nombre levees par yceulx gouverneurs en 
ce royaulme, dont tous les bons subjets de mondit seigneur, les 
nobles, le clerge, les bourgeois et le commun peuple de cc 
royaulme, sont a peu prez tour deserts et destruits 93 
Here was a clear reference to the crushing defeat at Agincourt. The outcome of this battle 
had caused great humiliation for the French realm, and had also left it vulnerable to the 
English advances in the northern regions of France. In particular, Normandy, Picardy, and 
Champagne were under serious threat. " Yet the king, under Armagnac influence, had 
prohibited John the Fearless from participating in the battle, providing Burgundy with the 
ideal opportunity to use the defeat to his ideological advantage. 9S He accused the 
Armagnacs of mishandling the aides that they had raised for the purpose of war, which had 
consequently led to the death or captivity of many nobles, and the financial ruin of the 
king's loyal subjects. This, Burgundy implied, was evidence of the Armagnacs' excessive 
avarice and self-interest at the expense of the common good. It was an expedient 
accusation to make, because aides were indeed raised for the war against the English. 
Therefore John the Fearless recognised the opportunity to convince the bones rilles that it 
was the misuse of royal funds, rather than what was essentially an ineffectual combat 
strategy, that was the cause of the devastating loss. This struck at the very heart of the 
common good. Any regime that did not raise and use taxes morally or defend the peace 
adequately was tyrannical by its very nature. 
Furthermore, Burgundy accused his enemies of openly despising the people of the 
realm. After explaining that he had tried to intervene on several occasions to put an end to 
the `inconveniences' that the Armagnac government notoriously caused in the realm, he 
93 Ibid. 
94 Anne Curry, The Hundred Years War (Basingstoke, 1993), pp. 94-102; Curry, `Henry V's Conquest of 
Normandy 1417-1419: The Siege of Rouen in Context[o]', in XXXI Semana des Estudios Medienales, 18 a 22 de 
Julio de 2004 (Pamplona, 2005): 237-254. See also Schnerb, jean sans Peur, 617-623. 
95 Schnerb, jeans sans Peur, pp. 619-621. Juvenal transcribed a letter from John to the king in which he declared 
that he was offended that he was not asked to go to war against the English because the peace with Orleans 
was still too fresh. He explained that `je n'ay pas intention de laisser perdre vostre seigneurie, lä ou je pourray 
loyaument employer mon sevice. ' Histoire de Charles 1/I, pp. 510-512. 
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alleged that the Armagnacs `s'efforcerent de continuer les dessusdits gouverneurs en leur 
mauvaise gouvernez, pour toudis plus destruire et anihiller les pouvres subgets de mondit 
seigneur contre lesquels ja pieta ils ont conceu hayne mortelle pour ce qu'ils scevent bien 
que leur desplait et mauvais gouverneurs, perditions et destructions par eulx advenues et 
qui adviennent chascun jour en ce Royaulme. '96 It is significant that Burgundy accused his 
enemies of having `mortal hatred' for the people of the realm because it declared that the 
Armagnacs were more than indifferent to the common good: they were overtly hostile to it. 
In an attempt to make it sound plausible, he argued that the Armagnacs were aware that 
the people were unhappy, yet they continued governing as they always had. Their blatant 
disregard for the welfare of the people was thus self-evident. 
Here we note that the duke of Burgundy shrewdly manipulated `truth' to serve his 
own purpose. It was a categorical fact that the realm had faced a disgraceful defeat at 
Agincourt, and that many in the realm were displeased with the loss of life and valuable 
revenues raised through endless taxes 97 John seems to have recognised that successful 
propaganda must be convincing for the intended audience to receive it willingly; it must, 
therefore, rely to some degree on reality. 98 If the common feeling among a great number of 
people truly held that the Armagnacs were not governing the royal finances equitably, 
Burgundy's claims were clearly prescient accusations to articulate at this time of 
uncertainty, a period when the English army was such a threat to the peace and security of 
the realm. Because of this, the king's subjects had a vested interest in how the aides they 
gave for war were being used. 
His concentration on this issue is further evident in the Hesdin letter, where 
Burgundy wrote: `Noun avons trouve la disposition de la noble chose publique de ce dit 
96 Plancher, Preuves, p. 307, n. 305. 
97 All the chroniclers, even those who were sympathetic to the Armagnac party, attested to the excessive 
taxes, and the general displeasure among the people of the realm from 1414-1418. For example, Histoire de 
Charles VI, pp. 505,531. 
98 Taithe and Thornton, `Propaganda', pp. 1-2; Cunningham, The Idea of Pmpaganda, pp. 13,24,50. 
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royaume dissipee et depouillee par gens de petit estat incogneuz es lignage qui nous 
entendu que a eux allier et ensemble par maniere de monopole puiser en appert et 
occultement par voyes innumberables les finances de la dicte chose publique'" Once again 
the duke chastised the Armagnac government for allegedly raising excessive `tailles, 
emprunts et autres exactions' without putting any of the money that they had raised back 
into the defence of the realm. John the Fearless focused on taxes and aides frequently 
because this was something tangible which had a direct bearing on the well being of the 
king's subjects. If Burgundy was to really seize their attention and maintain it in his 
propaganda, he had to ensure that it was not simply abstract rhetoric, but had meaning to 
his audience's lives. 
This is also why his propaganda concentrated on the implementation of justice, 
arguing for the forceful ejection of `evil counsellors' and corrupt officials from the king's 
entourage and government. Thus the execution of jean de Montaigu in 1409 and 
prominent Armagnacs in 1413 reflected the duke of Burgundy's ideological agenda, and the 
message that he had conveyed to his partisans as far back as 1408, when he had attempted 
to publicly justify his assassination of the duke of Orleans. Indeed John the Fearless alleged 
that Montaigu had participated in the conspiracy to bring about the king's demise. One 
finds that the Geste later incorporated Montaigu's alleged complicity in its long tale of 
Armagnac greed and corruption. ' Even though Montaigu was rather notorious for his 
ostentatious lifestyle, the execution was nonetheless contentious, and was consequently not 
well received at street level, or within the courtly circle. 10' It was therefore necessary to 
validate the duke of Burgundy's decision to put Montaigu to death by vilifying him 
ruthlessly in the literature. 
99 ACO, B 11895, layette 72, n. 39. 
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4.3.2. Enemies of Peace 
In addition to wickedly over-taxing the people for their own selfish needs, Louis of 
Orleans and the Armagnacs were equally accused of physically destroying the realm by 
allowing their armies to devastate the countryside, a common trope for fifteenth-century 
discussion on war. In Petit's Justification, he alleged that Orleans' men-at-arms had despoiled 
the land, raped women and murdered innocent peasants: 
[Il] a tenu les Bens d'armes sur les champs en cc royaume par 
l'espace de quatorze ou quinze ans, qui ne faisoient autre chose 
que menger et exilier le povre peuple, piller, robber, raenconner, 
occire, tuer, et prendre femmes ä force; et mectoit capitaines es 
fortresses, pons et passages de cc royaume, pour parvenir a sa 
faulse et dampnable entencion, c'estassavoir usurper la 
seigneurie du royaume. "°2 
Likewise, the royal ordinance of 2 November 1411, which Burgundy orchestrated, claimed 
that the Armagnac princes were increasing their army daily, and subjecting his people to 
countless evil deeds. 103 They had allegedly destroyed various churches, pillaged, killed and 
murdered innocent people, ransomed the king's men, kidnapped women, raped virgins and 
generally committed all the common evil deeds that enemies of the realm would commit. 
1 ', 
Whether or not there was some truth to the claims that Orleans' soldiers had 
robbed, pillaged and raped the land and people, we must be aware that this was a common 
stereotype - part of the standard discourse of war. Indeed it is found in a broad range of 
texts of the fourteenth and fifteenth century, and in particular during the Hundred Years 
War. 10S Chroniclers, such as the Jouvenal compiler, used it indiscriminately when referring 
to armies of all allegiances: English, Orleanist/Armagnac and also Burgundian. 
"" Gauvard 
has insisted that these stereotypes were based in truth, but that they were a means of 
102 Petit, Justification, p. 16. 
103 r1CO, B 11893, layette 85, n. 8. 
104 Ibid. 
IOS Gauvard, `Rumeur et stereotypes ä la fin du moyen age', in Iv dn-elation des nouvelles an moyen äge. Ades du 
XXIV Congrer de !aS. H. M. E. S. (Avignon, join 1993) (Paris, 1994), p. 160. 
106 Compare his descriptions of the newly-formed League of Gien in the summer of 1410 and John the 
Fearless' army in 1417. Histoire de Charles VI, p. 455, and 533 respectively. 
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creating a clearer image of war based on the collective memory. They often `correspond to 
the specific needs of the people', because it was, effectively, a reflection of the values that 
the community held dear. 107 
Burgundy's propaganda is replete with this literary device because it was such an 
effective and familiar convention. There can be little doubt that he was fully aware that this 
particular issue was one of the dominant concerns of the people of the realm. The French 
countryside had truly experienced great destruction at the hands of marauding soldiers over 
the course of the Hundred Years War. 1°8 Yet Burgundy's army was equally vile. Even 
Monstrelet agreed that it was as guilty of destruction as the Orleanist one: `Si fut pour ce 
temps faicte tres grant assemblee ou royaume de France, tant d'un parti comme d'autre, ou 
prejudice du povre peuple. '"'9 Yet despite his own blameworthiness, he continued to try to 
deflect any responsibility from himself. According to Burgundy, the Armagnacs were the 
warmongers. He maintained that he had never imposed upon the people of the realm with 
his army, and claimed that his army had always paid their own way. "' Once again, it is clear 
that Burgundy used `empirical' or `white' propaganda, continuing to manipulate truths for 
his own personal gain: there is little doubt that various armies were indeed terrorizing the 
king's subjects. 
Furthermore, when Burgundian propaganda, such as jean Petit's Justzfication, 
employed the standard war stereotype in his attack on Orleans, it did so to put a face to an 
existing problem, and try to show its audience that this was one part of Orleans' ultimate 
plan to destroy the king and the realm. This was because the destruction of the realm was 
1°7 Gauvard, `Rumeurs et stereotypes', p. 160. 
log Allmand, `War and the Non-Combatant', in Medieval Warfare. A History (Oxford, 1999), pp. 253-272. 
AIlmand, 'Changing Views of the Soldier in Late Medieval France', in Guem et soeieti en France, en Anýgletem et 
en Bourgogne XIVXV siecle, eds. Philippe Contamine, Charles Giry-Deloison and Maurice Keen (Lille, 1991), 
pp. 171-188. 
1o`ß Monstrelet, 2: 79. See also p. 89. 
110 For example, the letter written at Lille the 11 March 1414 reads: `Et ja soit ce clue en faisant le dit voyage, 
ne a laler ne au retournier <nous> en entretenant nostre dicte entencion et volente naions meu ne fait guerre 
a personne quelconque ancois sommes paisiblement aler et repassez en paiant noz despens en chemin Benz 
meffaire. ' ADN, B 658, n. 15.253r. 
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corporal treason of the fourth degree, and was therefore an important element of Petit's 
version of tyranny. Attacks on the public good were, allegedly, the worst crimes that the 
public experienced at the hands of Louis of Orleans and his successors. It was, 
consequently, a very useful convention to employ. 
Burgundy used a second strategy to expose his enemies' ostensible disregard for the 
common good during the war: he highlighted the number of peace treaties that they had 
allegedly transgressed. For example, in 1417 he explained that 'lesdiz rapineurs et 
empoisonneurs ne veulent entendre par effect a la dicte paix ne prendre pitie du peuple de 
France qui incessamment en mis a desercion a l'occasion des debats dessudiz, moult 
maligne, maleureuse et indigne est leur nature qui ne veult que mal et division et qui a 
enfraint six traicties de paix solemnellement jures c'en scavoir de Chartres, Vincestre, 
Auxerre, Pontoise, Arras, et Rouvres en Bourgongne'"' The comparison Burgundy created 
between himself and his rivals in terms of their disregard for peace treaties was also 
included in his Lille letter (11 March 1414). First, Burgundy cited the previous group of 
letters he had sent to the `citez et bonnes villes de ce roiaume', in which he had previously 
justified his siege to Paris. The Lille letter insisted that in going to Paris, John had intended 
to put an end to the `tres mauvais exemple' of his adversaries, through whom `tant de 
maulz sont taillie d'en ensievir a la destruction du dit roiaulme et du peuple d'icellui'. 12 
Once again, he admitted to bringing his army to Paris, but insisted that it had never pillaged 
or stolen from the people. His adversaries had, however, turned `notoirement contre la 
dicte paix et les sermons et promesses pour faire guerre et mettre division ou dit roiaulme a 
la destruction d'icellui et pour empescher le fait de la marchandise laquelle se fait ou profit 
commun de la chose publique : "3 
II ' ACO, B 11895, layette 72, n. 39. 
112 ADN, B 658, n. 15.253. 
13 Ibid. 
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Because the aristocracy, and the royal princes in particular, were expected to help 
the king maintain peace, if they did the opposite by arming themselves, or making war 
contrary to the king's explicit orders, they would compromise their feudal obligation to 
their lord. This in turn compromised their honour. Consequently, the king's letter patent 
written 1 March 1412 castigated the Orleanist princes for aiding the English. "' This alliance 
was analogous to breaking any internal peace treaties. Yet to claim that such an alliance 
existed was a long-held accusation of the Burgundian camp. Jean Petit's Justification claimed 
that Orleans had embezzled the money for himself to share with the English army. "' By 
accusing Orleans of such a perfidious relationship, Petit implied that he was as much an 
enemy of the realm as the `ancient ennemis du royaume'. 
This theme was pursued in later Burgundian propaganda, as it was very effective in 
highlighting the Armagnac tendency towards disloyalty and treason. The ideal opportunity 
arose in 1412, when the dukes of Berry, Orleans, and Bourbon, and the count of Alencon 
decided to negotiate an alliance with Henry IV, the purpose of which was to gain English 
assistance against the duke of Burgundy. The first point of interest here is that Burgundy 
had already solicited, and received, help from the English earl of Arundel and his army. "' 
They were, according to the duke of Burgundy's letters to the bonner villes, there to fight for 
the good of the king and realm, to help restore peace. "' To a modem audience, it may 
appear rather hypocritical of John the Fearless to use the Armagnacs' request for English 
assistance as a further reason to attack them, but the difference would, perhaps, have been 
much clearer in 1412. The duke of Burgundy had the king's full support in his war against 
the Armagnacs; he was given official permission to raise an army against them, and the king 
had asked the bonnes villes to offer their categorical support to his cause. Thus, the support 
that his army had received from the earl of Arundel was also given royal sanction. 
114 ACO, B 11893, layette 85, n. 9. Plancher, Preuves, p. 286, n. 281. 
ISS Petit Justification, p. 241. 
116 ACO, B 1571, fol. 99r. 
117 Hictoire de Churlex 1/I, p. 470. 
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Conversely, the dukes of Berry and Orleans must have known that in inviting the king of 
England to send them an army to help their cause without royal sanction, they were 
effectively committing lese-majesty. "' This is explained by the fact they had unequivocally 
disregarded the king's many mandates forbidding the assembly of troops. As a result, the 
king, who appears to have enjoyed respite from his illness in the spring of 1412, raised 
600,000 francs for war against the Armagnacs, and eventually chose to lay a royal siege 
against the Armagnacs at Berry's town of Bourges. "' 
Indeed, on 1 March 1412, the king published a letter giving John the charge of 
raising troops to `chase the English from the realm. "'" At the end of the month, the 30 
March, Burgundy disseminated a letter patent in which he had the king's royal mandate 
transcribed verbatim. "' In the letter, the king explained that the English had descended 
onto the realm, and were, with `plusieurs de nos vassaulx et subjets' committing the usual 
evil deeds in the realm, including pillage, murder, molestation and mutilation of loyal 
subjects of the king, the rape of virgins, the kidnapping of married and religious women, 
and the robbing of churches. 'ZZ The fact that Burgundy republished the king's royal letter 
from 1 March by transcribing it into his own letter patent published 30 March, 
demonstrates how important his appointment to the head of the royal army actually was to 
his own ideological and military campaign(s). He did this firstly to underscore his position 
of grace and favour with the king so that he could oppose his rivals, the `ennemis rebelles 
et desobeissans'. Additionally, it helped reinforce his military authority during the 
118 This is confirmed by the royal mandate confiscating their lands and titles, published across the realm 5 
April 1412. In this letter the dukes of Orleans, Berry and Bourbon, John of Alencon, Charles of Albret and 
the count of Armagnac with their allies and `accomplices' were identified as `ennemis rebelles et 
desobeissans'. The confiscation and forfeiture of lands was part of the two-pronged punishment `comme il 
appartient'. The royal army's campaign, led by John the Fearless, was the second part of the punishment. 
Planchers, Prruver, p. 291, n. 285. 
119 For the king's recovery, see Famiglietti, RgyalIntnigue, p. 104. 
120 ACO, B 11893, layette 85, n. 9. See also Plancher, Preuves, pp. 286-287, n. 281. 
121 ACO, B 11983, layette 81, n. 25. Plancher, Prruver, pp. 289-290, n. 284. 
122 ACO, B 11893, layette 85, n. 9. See also Plancher, Preuves, p. 286, n. 281. 
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campaign, and his right to do whatever was necessary to be victorious on the king's behalf, 
including receiving royal revenue, and troops for war. 
102 
CHAPTER 5 
THE BURGUNDIAN TEXTS 
If literature is, as Foulkes stated, `a network of relationships which involve the text 
in a series of causes, intentions, effects and acts of mediation', than it is not a far leap to 
assume, as George Orwell did, that all literary works are, to some degree, propaganda. ' This 
appears particularly true if we consider that propaganda is a form of communication whose 
primary purpose is to influence the mentalities, choices, or actions of its audiences to the 
benefit of the propagandist. These criteria appear, at first glance, to apply to the works that 
are directly linked to John the Fearless, namely the Justification de monseigneur /e d; « de 
Bourgogne (1408), the Geste des dues de Boulogne (c. 1412-1420), and the Pastoralet (c. 1422- 
1425). According to the eminent scholar, Georges Doutrepont, these texts represented a 
particular Burgundian `spirit', ostensibly confirming John the Fearless' more direct political 
and cultural inclination towards Burgundy, rather than to France! In his seminal work, La 
litteraturefrancaise ä !a cour des ducs de Bourgogne (1909), Doutrepont argued that the Valois 
dukes of Burgundy consciously detached themselves from the royal house of France to 
build a cultural and political domain that would rival royal authority. One aspect of this 
development was that the house of Burgundy created a distinct `litterature bourguignonne' 
antithetical to `la grande litterature de France'. ' Notwithstanding the fact that John spent 
the majority of his time in Paris and his northern territories (Flanders and Artois), 
Doutrepont argued that John the Fearless `n'est pas un Francais: il n'en a pas le tour 
d'esprit ou la mentalite... [s]a politique est bourguignonne et sa litterature en bonne partie 
aussi. ' Accordingly, many of the works produced during the fifteenth century were 
1 Foulkes, Literature and Propaganda, p. 7,18. 
2 Georges Doutrepont, La litteratuie francaire ä la cour des ducs de Bourgogne. Philippe Ic Hardi, jean sans Peur, Philippe 
le Bon, Charles le Timiraire (Paris, 1909), pp. 81-82. For his analysis of the Justification see pp. 283-289, and for 
the Geste and the Pastorale! see pp. 69-90. 
3 Ibid., p. v. 
4 Ibid., pp. xxiii-xxiv. 
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expressly created for the princes and their relatives, designed to glorify their illustrious 
family history. In addition, he argued that the Justification became the foundation upon 
which later Burgundian poetry and historiography was based: `Elle [the Justification] 
penetrait, mais resumee, dans la Geste des discs, le Pastoralet et le Livrr des trahisons, trois 
productions essentielles de notre literature'. ' 
It is indisputable that to effectively analyse politicised literature we must 
interrogate the cultural, social and historical conditions within which the work was 
produced to unearth the underlying motivations behind each work, and whose interests it 
served in the process of consumption. " However, Doutrepont overlooked the fact that the 
first two Valois dukes, Philip the Bold and John the Fearless, were very much involved in 
French politics; it was John's son, Philip the Good, and grandson, Charles the Bold, who 
were mostly intent on distinguishing themselves from France. Doutrepont's work was 
nonetheless highly influential. French historians have subsequently relied on his assertions 
to argue almost universally that the literature produced for or about John the Fearless was, 
effectively, propaganda. For example, in his study on magic at the royal court, Jan R. 
Veenstra commented that to malign his rivals, John the Fearless `employed the most 
effective means at his disposal, namely literary propaganda', listing the justification, the Geste 
and the Pastoralet under this heading! Charity Cannon Willard wrote: `In addition to the 
obvious propaganda to be found in the Geste des ducs de Philippe et Jehan de Bourgogne, and Le 
Pastoralet, the curious manuscript variations to be found in Pierre Salmon's Reponses to 
Charles VI should not be overlooked. " Many scholars have indeed flagged Pierre Salmon's 
overt sympathy to the Burgundian cause in his Demandes, suggesting that he was a partisan 
s Ibid., p. 289. The Bure des trahisons will not be examined in this chapter because it was written at the end of 
the fifteenth century and is, therefore, well outside the temporal boundaries of this present study. For 
information on the composition date of this text see Lettenhove, `Introduction', Chroniques, 2: i-ii. 
6 Foulkes, Literature and Propaganda, pp. 2-17, especially p. 8. 
7 Veenstra, Magic and Divination, p. 45. 
8 Charity Cannon Willard, 'The Manuscripts of Jean Petit's Justification: Some Burgundian Propaganda 
Methods of the Early Fifteenth Century', in Studi Francesi 13 (1969): 272-273. 
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of the duke. G: A. Crapelet, who remarked on Salmon's blatant partisanship throughout 
his edition, was the first to advance this view, a view that seems to have endured. ' Guenee, 
Brigitte Roux, and more recently, the Paris 1400 catalogue all suggest, with varying degrees 
of obstinacy, that Salmon was a Burgundian agent. " 
The common standpoint that all four texts were media of Burgundian propaganda 
is appealing, for all superficially appear to meet the necessary criteria of propaganda 
literature in terms of the rhetorical importance of the highly charged politicised content 
within. The inflammatory style, the exaggerated accusations, the scare tactics and the 
common elements of discourse which one observes therein were certainly intended to 
transmit a particular Burgundian ideological perspective, and was, perhaps, also intended to 
influence the opinions of the intended audiences. Moreover, as we will see below, the 
content corresponded to the underlying themes of John the Fearless' propaganda 
throughout his conflict with the Armagnacs. Yet it is the question of circulation and 
audience that makes this general assumption rather problematic. Because the Justi cation 
was the only text to have undergone a deliberate attempt at wide scale dissemination, the 
other texts cannot, on their own, be considered individual pieces of propaganda. 
However, it is our position that although jean Petit's Justification was the only true 
propaganda text, due to John the Fearless' direct involvement in its composition and 
publication, the Geste and the Pastoralet were important works of literature in their own 
right. As records of John the Fearless' conflict with the house of Orleans, they were 
deliberately designed to glorify his achievements, whilst vilifying the deeds of his rivals. 
Even more importantly, they were, along with Salmon's Demander, highly influenced by the 
content and structure of the Justification. In the two previous chapters we noted the very 
9 Observe, for example, a footnote to the transcription of the I November 1408 letter addressed to Charles 
VI: `Dejä font voit que Salmon commencoit ä embrasser les interets du duc de Bourgogne... ' G: A. Crapelet 
in Demander, p. 101, n. 1. 
10 Guenee, Un meurtre, p. 213; Brigitte Roux, Les dialogues di Salmon et Charles VI : images du pouvoir et enjeux 
polrtiques. Geneva, 1998, p. 25; Paris 1400: ter arts sous Charles VI (Paris, 2004), p. 122. 
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close parallels between what was written in the aforesaid literary texts and John the 
Fearless' underlying propaganda message. It is our contention, therefore, that all the above- 
mentioned works represent a progression of Burgundian thought. In addition, they are 
useful for gauging how effectively the Burgundian ideology might have influenced other 
literature drafted during this period. Salmon's first edition of the Demander (c. 1409) was, 
for example, distinctly pro-Burgundian, yet was written by a man who was not necessarily a 
true partisan, and for an audience (mainly the king) that was not necessarily `Burgundian'. 
5.1. JEAN PETIT'SJustification (1408) 
There is little doubt that jean Petit's justification stands as one example of 
`propaganda' literature: it was replete with highly provocative criticisms of the duke of 
Orleans which were intended to influence its audience; it was presented to a large and 
varied audience, which included the royal family and council, members of the university of 
Paris, and a large number of Parisians; and was subsequently transcribed into four 
illuminated manuscripts, and an unknown number of paper copies for popular 
consumption. " Unfortunately it is still unclear how many of the Justificalion texts were 
copied and distributed, and whether the texts reached an audience outside strictly pro- 
Burgundian circles. 
Shortly after the duke of Burgundy admitted to having ordered the murder of 
Louis, duke of Orleans, in November 1407, he fled Paris for Flanders where he 
immediately embarked upon a political campaign of self-justification. 12 On 15 December, 
he met with his councillors to consider the situation. According to Burgundy's account 
II On 27 July 1408, jean Petit was paid for `quatres copies escrite a la main reliees et enluminees dor et dazur 
couvert de parchemin du discour quil a fait pour le duc en 1'h6tel du roy a Paris, a St. Pol. L'un pour 
le duc, 
1'autre la duchesse, le xxxeme pour le duc de Brabant et le ive pour le comte de Charollois, F iicvii'. BNF, 
Collection Bourgogne, vol. 65, fol. 84r. See above, p. 14, n. 51. Also, Willard, Some Burgundian Propaganda 
Methods', pp. 274-275. 
12 See Petit, ltineraires, p. 362. For a full description of John the Fearless' activities between the assassination 
on 23 November 1407 and the Justification de monceigneur de Bourgogne given in Paris 8 March 1408 see Coville 
`Le veritable texte', p. 57-91; Vaughan, John the Fearless, pp. 67-102; Schnerb, Armagnacr et Bouquignons, pp. 78- 
97; Famiglietti, Koyollntrigue, pp. 65-72; Guenee, Un meurtre, pp. 180-184. 
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records, the meeting was held at Senlis `ou fut resolu de quelle maniere Yon soustiendroit 
que le duc avoit deu faire tuer le duc d'Orleans. ''} Master Jean Petit and brother Pierre au 
Boeuf, both of whom were doctors of theology and the duke's counsellors, were listed as 
present in this meeting. Later, John held an assembly in Ghent to which he invited the 
Three Estates of Flanders, his most important relatives and allies, and the leading members 
of Paris' urban society to hear his first oral justification of the assassination. " By mid- 
January 1408, the duke came to Amiens accompanied by `un grant nombre de soldats, 
seigneurs, bannerets, bacheliers et escuyers. i15 He had come to hold a conference with his 
uncles, the duke of Berry and the king of Sicily, his brother, the duke of Brabant, and 
several other `grans seigneurs'. 16 However, he had also brought with him master jean Petit, 
master Andre Cotin, Nicole de Savigny and Pierre de Marrigny, `licentier ez loix', who 
worked diligently on the duke's defence for twenty days, until 3 February. " 
From Amiens, Guillaume Euvrie, master in the arts, `dressa des lettres en forme de 
manifeste pour justifier le duc, et le prieur de Moustier (Simon de Saulx), docteur en decret 
et conseiller du duc, assista ä ses conseils le premier mars [1408]'. '8 Although the 
destination of these manifestoes is unknown, one can reasonably assume that the letters 
were sent to his allies in neighbouring territories and probably also some of his own towns 
in Flanders, Artois, and Burgundy, to ensure that he had their full support. 1' Perhaps these 
were the `introductions donnees par le Duc de Bourgogne apres son demele avec le duc 
d'Orleans' that had been sent to the duchess of Burgundy, the duke of Lorraine, and `les 
nobles du pais de Bourgogne', which were recorded in Burgundy's financial accounts. "' 
Before he could attempt to win over the royal council and the French realm, it was critical 
13 BNF, Collection Bourgogne, vol. 65, fol. 8&v. 
11 Probably given by Simon de Saulx, abbot of Moustier Saint Jacques. Coville, Jean Petit, p. 97-98. 
15 This is recorded in BNF, Collection de Bourgogne, vol. 65, fol. 194. 
16 Arch. comm. d'Amiens, BB. 1, fol. 40r, BNF, Collection Bourogne, vol. 65, fol. 83v. 
17 BNF, Collection Bourgogne, vol. 65, fol. 80v. See also Vaughan, John the Fearless, p. 68-69. 
18 BNF, Collection Bourgogne, vol. 65, fol. 80v. 
'9 This was also Vaughan's view. Vaughan, John the Fearlesr, p. 68. 
20 ACO, B 11892, layette 59, n. 33. 
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that John explained himself adequately so that he could gain the support of his own allies 
and subjects. The effort that the duke had put towards his self-justification demonstrates 
that he was very much aware of the importance of gaining public acceptance for what was 
in actual fact, a treasonous homicide. Therefore, this endeavour to secure public opinion 
was his first initiative in manipulating the king and royal council into granting absolution. 
On 8 March 1408, Jean Petit presented the Justification to a large audience which 
included the king and queen, the dauphin, the princes of royal blood, a number of scholars 
from the University of Paris, and representatives of the Parisian bourgeoisie. " The main 
argument of the Justification claimed that John the Fearless had committed `tyrannicide' 
rather than homicide when he had ordered Louis of Orleans' assassination, by providing 
tangible examples of Orleans' alleged treason, sorcery and most importantly, tyranny. 
Although Michel Pintoin and the Jouvenal compiler both testified that many considered 
the Justi acation `odd' and even `reprehensible', no one challenged the duke's defence 
ZZ 
Monstrelet's chronicle was in agreement. He stated that the duke of Burgundy's pardon 
surprised many `grans seigneurs et aussi autres sages'. 
23 It is fairly certain that if many found 
the duke's justification incredible it was probably not the content of the text that had 
secured a royal pardon. The Jouvenal chronicler claimed that no one was bold enough to 
challenge the duke of Burgundy. 
24 If this was an exaggeration, it must only have been slight, 
for the duke of Burgundy had arrived in Paris just prior to the presentation with a rather 
intimidating entourage, consisting of at least 800 men 25 According to Monstrelet, he 
arrived in Paris the 28 February, and was met by the Parisians who cried `Noel! ' as 
he 
21 Monstrelet, 1: 178. 
22 Michel Pintoin reports: `Sic parlamento soluto, quosdam presentes circumspectos et eminentis sciencie 
memini perorata in mutlis reprehensibilia cencuisse'. RSD, 3: 764. According to the Jouvenal chronicler: 
`Et 
concluoit qu'il estoit licite ä un chascun de le tuer, ou faire tuet, veu que autrement, comme il disoit, ne se 
pouvoit faire. Laquelle chose sembloit bien estrange ä aucuns Bens notables, et clercs: mais il n'y eut si 
hardy 
qui en eust oze parler au contraire. ' Histoire de Charles VI, p. 445. 
23 Monstrelet, 2: 244. 
24 Hirtoire de Charles VI, p. 445. 
25 BNF, Collection Bourgo : e, vol. 65, fols 84r-85r. 
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entered the capital. " A Burgundian reporter named Thierry le Roy gave his impression of 
the duke's procession through Paris on 8 March, claiming: `la compaignie des gens de mon 
dict seigneur duroit et estoit teile que ains que les derreniers de son hostel fussent parties, 
les premiers estoient jä entrez en 1'hostel du Roy ä Sainct Pol, et estoient en les rues, entre 
deux, plaines des chevaulx de mon diet Seigneur'. ' Although this particular report is almost 
certainly an embellishment, it is nonetheless valuable because it was a representation of the 
witness' overall impression of the cortege. One is therefore inclined to agree with Alfred 
Coville, that `[1]e duc de Bourgogne avec ses hommes d'armes etait maitre de la ville . 28 
After he was officially pardoned for the murder by the king on 9 March 1408, John 
commissioned the production of several illuminated manuscripts of the text for his more 
powerful relatives and allies. Towards the end of 1408, he paid clerks to make copies of the 
text for popular consumption. "' It is impossible to estimate with any degree of accuracy 
how many reproductions were made, and who received or paid for them, but there were 
enough distributed throughout Paris to have at least two book burnings following the 
Bishop of Paris' condemnation of Petit's work in 1414.3° When the University of Paris 
called a meeting to discuss whether the text was heretical, they ordered everybody to 
submit their copies of jean Petit's Justification to the University, in both `quaternis et 
transciptis voluminibus'. 31 This would suggest that there were a large number of paper 
copies circulating, and perhaps more copies in manuscript form than has previously been 
imagined. 
26 Monstrelet, 2: 176. See also Famiglietti, RojalIntiigue, p. 67. 
27 Thierry le Roy's report to the duchess is printed in full in Douet d'Arcq, Document inedit sur 1'assassinat 
de Louis, duc d'Orleans (23 novembre 1407)', in ABSHF part 2 (1864): 11-26. For this particular quote, see 
p. 13. 
28 Coville, Jean Petit, pp. 105,113. 
29 Coville, `Le veritable texte', pp. 63-70. 
30 Michel Pintoin explained the process by which the text was condemned at Paris, and the first of the book 
burnings which followed their public announcement in front of Notre Dame cathedral on 23 February. RSD, 
5: 270-278, and especially p. 276. Coville, `Le veritable texte', pp. 68-70; Willard, `Some Burgundian 
Propaganda Methods', pp. 274-276. 
31 RSD, 5: 270-272 
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In the preceding chapter we examined the most important underlying theme of 
Jean Petit's text: that of tyranny. This theme he developed by relying on examples of 
Orleans' alleged lese-majesty and general misrule as the king's substitute. Burgundy's desire 
to serve the king and realm loyally, and his intention to establish a stable and righteous 
administration was thus contrasted to Orleans' convoilise, and his foolish mishandling of the 
government. The disparity between John the Fearless and the duke of Orleans in terms of 
their character and their handling of the government was typical of all the Burgundian 
texts. The appeal of the later texts is that the authors were able to trace the progression of 
the Armagnac party after Orleans died, and in particular, appreciates how his supposed 
treachery continued among his predecessors, the Armagnacs. For modem historians, they 
are excellent source material for gauging how the Burgundian perspective of events was 
regenerated and presented after John the Fearless was assassinated in 1419. 
5.2. THE LATER BURGUNDIAN TEXTS 
It is regrettable, however, that very little is known about the circulation of the Geste 
and the Pastoralet. Thus far, there is no extant evidence of the Geste featuring in any of the 
prominent libraries inventories that survive, including the Burgundian inventory records. 32 
The Pastoralet was listed in Philip the Fair's library where it remained until the end of the 
nineteenth century, but the range of dissemination is questionable as there is only one 
existing copy, and little to suggest that others were ever transcribed 33 Although the specific 
dates of completion for the two are unknown, it is certain that they were published after 
John the Fearless' death in 1419. " 
32 Doutrepont, L tterature franfaise, p. 82. 
33 Dogaer and Debae, La Iibrairie de Philippe k Bon, p. 131; Blanchard, `Introduction', Partoralet, p. 7; 
Doutrepont, Littirature franfaise, p. 82. 
34 According to Doutrepont, both the Geste and the Pastoralet made their appearance under Philip the Good's 
reign as duke of Burgundy. Ilttirature franfaise, p. 90. 
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The story told in the Geste followed the events from the beginning of the civil war 
up to the defeat of the Armagnacs by the duke of Burgundy's army at the village of Saint 
Cloud in 1411. The Geste alleged that the root cause of the civil war was the marriage 
between Louis of Orleans and Valentina Visconti in 1389, which was the result of the 
`mauvaise alianche' between the duke of Orleans and his rapacious father-in-law, Gian 
Galeazzo. The latter had allegedly nurtured Orleans' natural ambition and greed 35 
It is obvious when one reads the Geste that the Justi cation had a profound influence 
on its content. Regarding the narrative up to 1409, the Geste reiterated the majority of 
Petit's text, modifying it into verse poetry. This is evident in the introduction where the 
author explains the purpose of his work: 
Signeur, or entendes canton bien ordenee 
Qui nouviellement a estet falte et rimee 
Pour donner connisance et maniere ordenee 
Comment par convoitise et par folle pensee 
Fu France en plusyeurs lieus mout desierte et gastee. 36 
The notion that convoitise was to blame for the devastation that the realm had sustained was 
a distinctive echo to jean Petit's statement in the introduction to his major in the Jnstifzcation 
where he argued `convoitise est de tous maulx la ravine. " just as Petit had sought to 
defend Burgundy's assassination of Louis of Orleans by exposing the latter's greed, and 
most importantly, his tyranny, it would also feature as the founding premise in the Geste. 
Indeed, the poem was replete with forms analogous to the Justification. The description of 
the marriage alliance between Gian Galeazzo's daughter and Louis of Orleans is a good 
example because it provides an interesting comparison between the texts: there are a 
number of close similarities, but also several subtle differences. Petit wrote: 
35 `Pourquoy la guerre esmut... /... Mais tous ces fais vinrent par mauvaise alianche', Geste, p. 261. Because 
Bernabo Visconti was related to the Wittlesbachs, and therefore affiliated to the Burgundian family, the 
Wittlesbachs despised Gian Galeazzo for assassinating his uncle and usurping the ducal throne. The details of 
the usurpation were recounted in the Geste, pp. 262-267. For an historical account, see Guenee, Un meurrtre, 
pp. 155-157. 
36 Geste, pp. 269-270. 
37 Petit, Justification, p. 187. 
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Aussi apparut, par cc qu'il convoita merveilleusement que sa 
fille feust royne de France et pour y cuider parvenir fist tant 
qu'il traicta d'elle et dudit feu duc d'Orleans... Commune 
renommee est que quant sa file se partit de luy pour venir en 
France, il lui list : "Adieu belle fille 1 Je ne vous vueil jamais 
veoir tant que vous soiez royne de France. " Et pour parvenir ä 
cc, les dessusdiz ducs d'Orleans et de Milan par diverse voics 
ont depuis continuellement machine en la mort du Roy et de sa 
generacion. '38 
The Geste's author paralled this account very closely: 
Chieux vot Bonner sa Pille a tout grande finanche 
A Loy duc d'Orliens des le tans sen enfanche 
En France la tramist, mais il of d'esperanche 
Qu'encoire seroit roine [... ) 
De Melant la citet, il li dist par beubanche 
`Adieu, ma belle Pille, menes lie samblance 
Mais ne vous quier veir, telle est bien m'esperanche 
Tant que vous seres dame et royne de France. " 
The similarity between the two farewell speeches is one example that demonstrates to what 
extent the later text relied upon the Justification. Both literary works stressed the duke of 
Milan's envy and his scheming nature by demonstrating that his actions were premeditated: 
he had every intention of seeing his daughter become the queen of France. As an active 
agent in the complicity between him and Orleans, Gian Galeazzo's became a scapegoat: he 
had planted the seed of convoitise in the soul of his son-in-law. 
Jean Petit's Justification was nearly eighteen thousand words long, and highly 
theoretical. Hence, a second advantage of the Geste was that it provided an opportunity to 
present the arguments made against Louis of Orleans and his successors in a style that was 
more accessible and palatable for courtly audiences; it was most certainly designed to be 
read aloud, as this was usual during this period. "' The obvious difference between the two 
texts here, however, is that the author of the Geste employed verse poetry rather than prose 
narrative. Evidently, he aspired to write a type of a chanson degeste, an epic poem reminiscent 
38 Ibid., 229. 
39 Geste, p. 261. 
40 Ruth Crosby, 'Oral Delivery in the Middle Ages', in Speculum, 11 (1936): 91-99. 
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of the twelfth-century model that sought to praise the military virtue, prowess, courage and 
loyalty of its heroes. " Although Doutrepont argued rather too severely that the work failed 
to achieve the proper `epic spirit', or, the `art' of French verse, "' it did indeed correspond to 
the rise of the `cult of heroism' in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries identified by 
Boulton and Keen 43 As Boulton stated: 
Deeds of these latter-day `preux' were usually recorded for the 
edification of posterity, often by a herald, in the form of a 
`chivalric biography' not different from romance. The line 
between romance and reality was thus blurred in the present no 
less than in the past 4a 
The Geste had a similar purpose. Using a style first employed to celebrate Charlemagne the 
Great's era, he attempted to underscore the duke of Burgundy's valiant heroism and loyalty 
in the service of his lord. The by-product was necessarily the vilification of the Armagnacs. 
This text, then, aimed to provide a `history' of the root cause of civil war for present and 
future audiences, though it was, clearly, a prejudicial version. 
Similarly to the Geste, John the Fearless would figure as the Pastoralet's epic hero. 
The prologue of the anonymous poem reveals that the author's intention was to call 
attention to the duke of Burgundy's loyalty to the king and his courage in the face of 
adversity. The author was very explicit about the fact that he had written the text in honour 
of John the Fearless `qui en son tamps fu moult preux et vaillans, et tant loialment ama le 
roy Charles Sisime, le roialme et le bien de la chose publique qu'en la fin en morut, comme 
appert ou livre qui s'ensieut' 
45 The author claimed that his work was a truthful, though 
indirect narrative of the first phase of the French civil war. His focus consequently 
41 Boulton, Knights of the Crown, p. 7. 
42 Referring to the 10,540 verses of the Geste, Doutrepont commented: 'Ils s'offent ä nous comme une geste, 
mais c'est une geste ou une chanson de geste i laquelle on ne saurait reconnaitre, sans un exces de 
bonne 
volonte, l'accent ou plutöt 1'esprit epique. ' Litteraturr franfaise, p. 78,80. 
43 Boulton, Knights of the Crown, pp. 11-12; Maurice Keen, `Huizinga, Kilgour and the Decline of Chivalry', in 
Medievalia et Humanistica. Medieval and Renaissance Culture, series 8 (1977): 5-7. 
44 Boulton, Knights of the Crown, p. 12. 
45 Pastorales, p. 39. 
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remained on the duke of Burgundy's steadfast loyalty. His tale, he claimed, would help 
avert civil wars in the future: 
Sy m'estoet laissier droite histore 
Et tourner aux fables couvertes 
Ou seront dittes et ouvertes 
Les paix, les gherres et les tours 
Des bergieres et des pastours 
Qui sont de haulte extraction [... ] 
Pour exemple c'on doibt fuir 
Le mal et le bien ensurr. 46 
In this story, Florentin, the `maistre du pourpris', oversaw a large group of shepherds 
tending their flocks. "' Florentin was betrayed by his amie Belliguere (Isabeau of Bavaria) and 
Tristifier. "S Consequently, the `hault pastour' descended into madness and, because of his 
incapacity to oversee his flocks properly, his sheep suffered greatly. 49 His story would draw 
attention to the renown of loyal shepherds (pastours), and would reproach the `false 
disloyalty' of others so that he might use them as paradigms of good and evil. 
Unsurprisingly John the Fearless, who was personified by Leonet, became the epitome of 
the loyal shepherd, whilst Louis of Orleans' character, Tristifer, was its direct opposite. 
Reflecting on the disastrous circumstances during Charles VI's reign, the Pastoralet 
paralleled the civil war between the Burgundians and the Armagnacs up to the invasion of 
France by Henry V, king of England, and concludes with the latter's death in 1422. 
The fact that the Geste and the Pastoralet were written after John the Fearless' death 
reveals the more enduring importance of the arguments made in the Justifrcation. By the time 
of John the Fearless' murder in the presence of the dauphin Charles in 1419, the two 
parties had been in conflict for well over a decade. The duke's murder at the hands of the 
dauphin, an `Armagnac' prince, substantiated the Burgundian claim that the Armagnacs 
were `desloiaux traistres', a phrase commonly used by John the Fearless to describe the 
46 Ibid., pp. 39-40. 
47 Ibid., p. 42. 
48Tant seront d'amours eschaudes / Que Florentin sera fraudes. ' Ibid., p. 66. 
49 Florentin is also referred to as the `hault pastour' Ibid., p. 46. 
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Armagnac princes and their partisans. His death ultimately presented the opportunity to 
revisit the alleged tyranny of Louis of Orleans, thereby reinforcing their statement that his 
treachery was the root cause of the civil war. Equally, the later texts allowed the 
Burgundian authors to expose the subsequent duplicity of his supporters, which had 
prolonged the war. Perceived in this way, John the Fearless was blameless in the conflict; 
he was, in effect, a victim. Whereas Louis of Orleans had been assassinated because his 
convoitise had led him to try to usurp the crown and misgovern the realm, John the Fearless 
had been murdered out of spite and malice. Therefore, the Burgundian party led by Philip 
the Good had an unimpeachable case against the Armagnacs for having killed John the 
Fearless. According to their perception, the latter was an unjustifiable murder. 
The later Burgundian works kept returning to the illusory origin of the conflict 
between the house of Orleans and the house of Burgundy because their purpose was, to 
some extent, dictated by their function as memorial artefacts for the Burgundian cause. 
Mary Carruthers, an expert in the field of memory, has provided modem historians with a 
useful conceptual framework for approaching texts and art as memorial artefacts. Although 
literary critics and historians generally look at texts with the objective of interpreting their 
meaning, she urged scholars to examine also how the interpretation was constructed so that 
we may begin to appreciate how these works were used for the purpose of remembering. ' 
How, we should then ask, did the Burgundians construct the interpretation of John the 
Fearless' rivalry with Louis of Orleans and his successors so that it could be both 
memorable, and effective in the long term? This was achieved by using common forms and 
constructs from the larger structure of political discourse, and the more particular system 
of Burgundian rhetoric. Hence, the Justifrcation fit within the wider language of tyranny and 
misgovernment; the Geste corresponded to the rise in chivalric `epic' writing; the Pastoralet 
So Mary Carruthers, The Craft of Thought. Meditation, Rhetoric, and the Makinnq of Immer, 400-1200 (Cambri dge, 
1998), pp. 4-5. 
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allegory conformed to the popular shepherd metaphor that was a useful trope for 
illustrating the constitution of good government. 
Carruthers added: Before a work can acquire meaning, before a mind can act on it, 
it must be made memorable, since memory provides the matter with which human intellect 
most directly works. "' She suggested that the most effective way to make something 
memorable is for the author or compiler to draw on emotional experience, or to make 
certain characteristics of the narrative particularly distinctive. S2 Thus, the illuminated 
manuscript of the justification opened with a provoking verse and an extraordinary miniature 
(fig. 7). The accompanying verse reads: 
Par force le leup rompre et tire 
A ses dens et gris la couronne 
Et le Lyon par tres grant ire 
De la pate grant coup luy donne53 
Images have long been associated with the arc memorativae, acting both as rhetorical tools for 
a text and mnemonic devices for remembering. 54 Moreover, the medium used to 
communicate a message influences its method of delivery and interpretation. It is as 
important as the meaning itself. " Thus the words and the accompanying image 
collaborated as the trigger for recalling the content of the Justification, though it should be 
noted that this illumination was not included on the paper copies. However, on at least 
some of the paper copies, the four-line verse describing the scene was incorporated. 
Therefore, the miniature and the verse evoked the figurative battle between the duke of 
51 Ibid., p. 114. 
52 Ibid., pp. 114-117. 
53 BNF, ms. fr. 5733. For a clearer image see Vienne, Österreichischen National bibliothek, Cod. 2657, which 
is reproduced and accompanied by short description of the text with the historical context in L ärt d la Cour de 
Bourgogne, pp. 39-40. The BNF image does not differ in any significant fashion from the Vienne version. The 
former features a cliff landscape from which the lion seems to jump to attack the wolf, whereas the latter 
takes place on flat wooded ground. The lion in the former seems to appear from the woods beside the tent 
when he rescues the crown. 
s4 Brigitte Buettner, `profane Illuminations, Secular Illusions: Manuscripts in Late Medieval Courtly Society', 
in The Art Bulletin 74 (1992): 78-80. 
55 Hawkes, Structuralism and Semiotics, p. 111. 
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Burgundy and the duke of Orleans for the sake of the crown of France. They did, 
therefore, contribute to the very fabric of the rhetoric. 
Moreover, the scenario played out in the miniature and verse is an excellent 
example of how the Justi cation text played on the emotions of its audience. Both 
functioned as a moral exempla, which very clearly differentiated loyalty from treason, and 
virtue from vice. "' Similarly, the Geste and the Pastoralet employed textual referents as 
mnemonic tools. Each introduced their narratives by calling attention to the `original sin' of 
the conflict, recalling that it was Louis' convoitise that lay at the heart of the conflict. The fact 
that the Pastoralet explained that the work was written in honour of John the Fearless 
confirms that one of the main functions of the texts was to remember the past: to edify a 
particular history. Doutrepont was correct in assessing the Geste and the Pastoralet as 
representing the `spirit' or `passions of the time'. 
5.3. PIERRE SALMON'S DEMANDES(1409, c. 1411-1415) 
Regarding Pierre Salmon's Demander, there are two different versions of the text, 
BNF, ms. fr. 23279, and Geneva ms. fr. 165, both of which were written by and illuminated 
under the eye of the author. These are the only two extant manuscripts. The first of these 
was completed toward the end of 1409, and the second, between 1411 and 1415.57 The 
generally accepted position is that Salmon's work was a Burgundian propaganda text. 8 
However, this raises a number of important problems. First, it is important that we 
question how this text would actually have functioned as piece of active propaganda 
literature if the primary audience was the king. It is true that the text may have been 
56 Buettner, `Profane Illluminations', p. 83. 
57 Pair 1400, p. 123. 
58 To date only Anne D. Iiedeman has provided a convincing case arguing against the accepted position She 
argued that although Salmon was very plain with regard to his sympathy for the Burgundian cause, employing 
certain elements of the Burgundian discourse in his work, his purpose was not to denigrate the duke of 
Orleans by generating the Burgundian ideology. Rather, Orleans' refusal to heed Salmon's advice and change 
his ways was a powerful exemplum for the king, encouraging him to take Salmon's advice. This would restore 
the king's royal dignity. Hedeman, Of Counsellors and Kings. The Tbrre Versions of Piem Salmon's Dialogues' 
(Urbana and Chicago, 2001), pp. 19-21. 
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accessible also to others among the high aristocracy. Because the text's circulation was so 
restricted it is doubtful that it was of any benefit to the duke of Burgundy as a piece of 
propaganda regardless of how partisan its content was. If we put in it within its rightful 
context, the accepted view of Salmon's manuscript is even more perplexing. At the time of 
its composition, Burgundy had already been successfully pardoned for the assassination of 
the duke of Orleans, he had negotiated the return of the king from Tours to Paris, the 
peace of Chartres had long since been ratified (March 1409), he had just had the grand maPtre 
de I'hötel executed, his project of reform was underway, and had been offered the 
guardianship of the dauphins' There was very little need to try to persuade or manipulate 
the opinions of the intended audience of the text. The only benefit the manuscript would 
have had as a `Burgundian' text was as a reinforcing medium. 
This is particularly patent when one examines part three of Salmon's second 
version of the Demandes, produced between 1411-1415 (Geneva, ms. fr. 165). The Paris 
1400 catalogue argued that the manuscript was probably written between 1411 and 1413, 
`pour tenir compte de la tournure defavorable des evenements (mort Alexandre V, 
demission de Salmon en 1411) etait lors destine ä Charles VI, mais 1'enluminure resta 
inachevee, peut eire du fait des emeutes de 1413 et du depart de jean sans Peur. i6" The 
dating of the Geneva manuscript is problematic because there is no concrete evidence to 
determine when it was begun, or when it was left incomplete. There are nonetheless clues 
built in to the text that suggest Salmon completed it between 1414 and 1415. For the sake 
of brevity, we will examine only the most pertinent here. 
The most suggestive indication that this text was written between mid-1414 and the 
dauphin's death in December 1415 was Salmon's plea that the princes finish the peace 
59 For the issue of the dauphin's guardianship: ACO, B 11892, layette 4; and, Plancher, Preuves, pp. 262-263, n. 
261. 
61) Pant 1400, p. 123. 
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process that they had started by concluding the peace treaty. " Although throughout the 
civil war there had been many broken peace treaties, including the 1412 Peace of Auxerre 
(22 August) and the 1413 Peace of Pontoise (26 July), this particular statement would seem 
to apply most accurately to the long-drawn-out negotiations between the first peace 
arrangement at Arras at the end of the royal campaign against Burgundy in October 1414, 
and the publication of the peace treaty a year later in July 1415 62 Salmon's comment in his 
highly edited version of the 1 November 1408 letter to the king stated that if one princely 
group rises up, that the king should resolve the issue with reason rather than arms 63 This 
would appear to be a direct comment on the most recent royal campaign, which was 
against the duke of Burgundy in 1414, and Salmon's desire that it not repeat itself. 
Furthermore, the author made a `prediction' that if the princes did not end their 
war, enemies of the realm would take advantage of France's vulnerability. Considering that 
this is precisely the fate endured by France in 1415, this prophecy suggests that Henry V 
had already begun his aggressive negotiations with France, during which he demanded a 
treaty strictly on his terms " It seems truly doubtful that Salmon would have had this 
insight had overt threats not already been placed. Perhaps Henry V's eventual debarkation 
into Normandy, and his subsequent successes throughout August 1415 had occurred, or 
were in the process of occurring. 65 If Salmon wrote this before the Peace of Arras was 
finalised at Rouvres in Burgundy on 30 July 1415, it would then make sense to place it 
61 `[V]ous mettez a fin et a effect cc que vous avez ja commencie et entrepris a faire et encore proposez et 
preserverez de jour en jour sicomme le fait sen demonstre assez estes en aventure de devenir a telle et si 
miserable fortune comme cy dessus povez avoir oyr et entendu se dieu et vous mesmes tous ensamble dun 
mesme accort' Geneva, ms. fr. 165, fol. 100r. 
62 Publication of the Peace of Arras: ACO, B 11894, layette 72, n. 34. For the reparation of John's honour 
and letters concerning the banishments, consult ACO, B 11894, layette 72, n. 34-37. For the original peace 
agreement, RSD, 5: 394-398; Hhstoin' de Charles VI, p. 501. The latter includes full transcriptions of the letters 
of negotiation throughout 1415, pp. 512-516. 
63 'Et se aucunes questions divisions ou descors estoient meuz ou se mouvroient entre vous trespuissants 
prince et aucuns de mes seigneurs de vostre noble sang ou autres vous vassaulx ou subgiez ou entre aucuns 
deulx samblablement ne vueilliez de present procedez ne souffrir proceder par voie de fait. Mais y vueilliez 
comme roy et souverain pourveoir par voie de raison et dc justice et pour cause. Et afin aussy que vostre 
pueple pulst mieulx et plus paisiblement vivre soubz vous. ' Geneva, ms. fr. 165, fols. 84r-84v. 
64 Histoin de Charles VI, pp. 504-505. 
65 Curry, Hundred Years War, pp. 94-102, and, 'Henry V's Conquest of Normandy 1417-1419', pp. 237-254. 
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while the English were, at the very least, threatening war. This would then account for his 
insistence that peace be reached with the enemies of the realm 6G 
Putting the date of composition aside, Salmon was noticeably neutral in this second 
text. The drastic shift in perspective suggests that Salmon was naturally inclined to 
Burgundy's ideology in 1409, but realised that it was highly inappropriate to include in the 
later manuscript, due of course to Burgundy's exclusion from the royal council and 
banishment from Paris. The change in tone, therefore, underscores the important role of 
the audience in determining the function of the text. Truly if there was any time where 
Burgundy could have benefited from a `propaganda text' within the royal council, it was at 
that time, rather than in 1409. 
Hence, rather than identifying Salmon as a Burgundian agent, it is more appropriate 
to conclude that the Burgundian perspective had an important impact on the content, at 
least with respect to the first manuscript. Likewise, there is little doubt that the Justification 
was an equally strong influence over the Geste and the Pastoralet. As a result, the latter texts 
reinforced the duke of Burgundy's ideological rationale behind the assassination of his rival. 
Yet in the case of the texts examined here, only the Justi ication had a direct and immediate 
impact on its audience. It is therefore difficult to ascertain whether the other texts 
produced within the Burgundian sphere of influence, which do not seem to have been 
disseminated widely, had any impact at all on people outside the immediate, elite circle of 
the Burgundian nobility. For Salmon this is even less clear, for there is no evidence to 
suggest that it extended beyond the royal court, or even whether either version (BNF, ms. 
fr. 23279, or Geneva ms. fr. 165) met with any success there. Yet putting Salmon's work 
aside, we can be certain that the specific political function of the three Burgundian texts 
66 'Item pour pourveoir et resister aux choses dessusdictes il seroit bon que vous feissez paix ou treves ou 
bonnes alliances aux ennemis de vostre royaume et que de present vous ne souffrez faire aucunes assamblees 
de gens darmes de nobles ne de communes en vostre dit royaume. Et se aucunes en estoient la faites ret[i]re 
chascun en son lieu reserve toutesfoiz ceulx qui seront neccessaires et ordonnez es frontiers contre les 
ennemis de vostre royaume. ' Geneva, ms. fr. 165, fol. 84r. 
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discussed above, was to communicate John the Fearless' ideology, and to justify his 
conduct. They were therefore necessarily a part of the wider Burgundian political discourse 
during the civil war in France and a central element of the larger Burgundian perspective. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE LETTERS 
As the primary vehicle for communication in the middle ages, letters were vital 
sources of information. Because chanceries could manufacture letters in large numbers they 
had the potential to reach a wide audience across far distances. Letters were thus the ideal 
medium for passing on official news between secular and ecclesiastical lords and their 
subjects. The publication process contributed to their efficiency: townspeople and 
surrounding villagers generally gathered together to witness the public reading of the 
information. ' Indeed, royal and ducal proclamations were customarily read out in very 
public places, such as town squares, markets and crossroads! Important writs and letters 
were also frequently attached to doors of churches as visual reminders of what had been 
read aloud, and were subsequently accessed by those who could read the documents 
themselves. 
Although letters adhered to conventional formula of composition, there was ample 
room for inflammatory rhetoric designed to persuade or mislead audiences. A letter was, 
therefore, an incomparable medium for the transmission of propaganda during periods of 
conflict. " Certainly there was widespread use of letter campaigns during the conflict 
I See for example, Arch. Comm. d'Amiens, BB. 2, fols. 17v-18v. Macon's letter of response to John the 
Fearless 1 September 1405 reads: `lesquelles letters ont este leues present le commun de la vile... ' Arch. 
Comm. de Macon, EE 41, n. 8, cited in Mirot, Pieces, pp. 403-404, n. 5. 
2 Many royal letters stipulated that letters patent, ordinances and mandates be read aloud in all public places 
according to local custom. For example, 1 September 1411, a royal mandate which requested John the 
Fearless' military assistance to expel the `gens d'arrnes et de trait' from the realm, was very explicit about the 
manner by which it should be published: `Si donnons en mandement ä nostre prevost de Paris et a tous nos 
seneschaux, baillis, provosts, justiciers et officiers quelxconques, que Us et chascun d'eulx, ez mettes de leurs 
senechaussees, baillages et jurisdictions et resorts d'yceulx et lieux oü 1'en a accoustume ä faire cris et 
publications, Us facent crier et publier ces presentes, tellement que aucun n'en puist pretendre ignorance. ' 
Plancher, Preuves, p. 276, n. 275. 
3 Monstrelet, 2: 434 and. 459. 
+ For some examples of general studies on letter writing as a form of medieval propaganda, see B. Guenee, 
States and Rulers; Yves Renouard, `Information et transmission des Nouvelles', in LNistoire et set methodes (Paris, 
1961), pp. 95-142; Pons, `Informations et rumeurs', pp. 409-433. 
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between Milan and Florence at the turn of the fifteenth century (1394-1402,1423-28), S the 
Hundred Years War (1337-1453), 6 and the Wars of the Roses (1455-1487). ' It was equally 
the case with the Burgundo-Armagnac civil war. Scholars of the fifteenth-century civil war 
in France have long considered John the Fearless' letters as one element of his political 
propaganda, though mostly in passing! Yet if modern historians have acknowledged 
Burgundy's letters as one important element of his propaganda campaign, there are no 
current studies which offer detailed analyses of his letter campaigns. 
So that we may fill this important void, the focus of this chapter is Burgundy's 
ability to use letters efficiently as a channel for his propaganda. Although the Armagnacs 
produced letters against John the Fearless in turn, in addition to engineering the publication 
of royal ordinances to his detriment while they had control of the king between August 
1413 and May 1418, we argue that theirs was primarily a defensive counter-propaganda 
campaign. We will demonstrate that it was Burgundy's initiative in 1405 that set the pace. 
This he did by writing more prolifically, and more assertively. For these reasons he appears 
to have met with greater success than his Armagnac rivals. Consequently, this chapter is 
primarily concerned with the duke's missives, letters patent and close, and the royal 
proclamations published in his favour, which he disseminated en masse to the towns 
outside his own domains, to the bonnet villes of the French realm. 
5 Albert Rabil, 'Humanism in Milan', Renaissance Humanism. Foundations, Forms and Legacy, ed. Albert Rabil 
(Philadelphia, 1988), 1: 235-263; The Cambridge Companion to Renaissance Humanism, ed. Jill Kraye, (Cambridge, 
1996), especially J. Hankins, `Humanism and the Origins of Modern Political Thought', pp. 118-141. See also 
pp. 63-64; Willard, `The manuscripts of Jean Petit's justification', p. 272. 
6 Contamine, 'Aper4us sur la propagande de guerre', pp. 5-27; Hale, `War and Public Opinion', pp. 24-25. 
7 Richmond, 'Propaganda in the Wars of the Roses', p. 13; Maddicott, 'I'he County Community', pp. 33-35. 
8 Vaughan, John the Fearless, p. 30,35,92-93. Schnerb, jean sans Peur, pp. 174-75,588; Etat Gourguignon, pp. 147, 
162,164-166. 
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6.1. THE "PROPAGANDA MACHINE': THE DUCAL CHANCERY 
6.1.1. Composition 
Although the duke of Burgundy oversaw the production of letter writing, like most 
princes of this period, he left the actual drafting of the documents to his chancery. ' This is 
obvious in the careful, complex construction and the eloquence of the letters, all of which 
conformed to the language of political discourse in the early fifteenth century. Moreover, 
many of the themes evoked in Burgundy's letters overlapped with other texts and 
documents. Burgundy would not have been able to construct such sophisticated texts 
without the specialized training that his chancellor and secretaries had received. In the later 
middle ages, the style and techniques of letters were taught according to the ars dictaminis 
tradition, a practice that provided a clear rhetorical framework for letters. Letters were 
typically read aloud, as they were derived from the art of oration and retained similar 
characteristics. " The arc dictaminis spread rapidly from the twelfth century through the later 
middle ages, its development shaped mainly by French and Italian academics. The 
circulation of treatises on the art of writing increased in the thirteenth and fourteenth 
centuries, and those trained in letter writing learned the conventions under the guidance of 
the chancery. " This was a highly specialised field. 
Notwithstanding, there is little doubt that it was only on Burgundy's orders that the 
chancery composed these documents. For example, letters patent and close that were sent 
`De par le duc' were typically sent from wherever John the Fearless resided at that specific 
9 Christian de Borchgrave, `Diplomates et diplomatie sous le duc de Bourgogne jean sans Peur' in A la cour de 
Bouigqne. Le duc, son entourage, son train, ed. Jean-Marie Cauchies (Turnhout, 1998), p. 74, and Vaughan, John the 
Fearless, p. 231. 
10 Because the compositional structure of letters was based on the oration formula, letters consisted of the 
salutatio, captatio, proverbium, narratio, petitio, conclusio. Martin Camargo, 'Arc dictaminis, an dictandi, Typologie des 
sources du moyen ae occidental, 60 (Turnhout, 1991); Ronald Witt, `Medieval Italian Culture and the Origins of 
Humanism as a Stylistic Ideal', in Renaissance Humanism, 1: 29-70; Peter Mack `Humanist Rhetoric and 
Dialectic', in The Cambridge Companion to Renaissance Humanism, pp. 82,89. Georges Tessier, Diplomatigue royale 
franfaise (Paris, 1962), pp. 215-217; Sarah Williams, English VernaailarLetterr C. 1400 - C. 1600: Language, Literacy 
and Culture (PhD diss., York, 2001), p. 41. 
ý1 Camargo, `Ars dictaminir, arc dictandi', pp. 33-40; Witt, `Medieval Italian Culture', pp. 45-47; Williams, English 
VernacularLetterr, pp. 34,40-43. 
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moment. 12 Gazelles explained that letters close were `[une] acte qui eminent directement de 
[sa] personne et qui est la manifestation precise de ses volontes. i13 Whenever the duke of 
Burgundy was travelling he was always able to seal and sign letters patent in front of his 
council. This is evident in the letter patent sent from Hesdin, 25 April 1417: 
En tesmoing de cc nous avons signees ces presentes de nostre 
main et y fait metre nostre seel secret en absence du grand. 
Donne en nostre chastel de Hesdin le xxv` jour d'Avril, Ian de 
grace mil quatre cens et dix sept apres Pasques. Jean. 'a 
The differences between letters patent and letters close were considerable. The 
most obvious distinctions between them were the presentation format and sealing. 'S Letters 
patent were open documents such as privileges or ennoblements that the chancellor 
authenticated with the great seal. They were official writs, most frequently ordered by the 
king or princes in their duchies, but under the control of their chancellors. After the 
sovereign had given the order for the letter, there was no further need for his involvement 
in the writing process. This is because the chancellor oversaw the procedure and inspected 
the letters for legal and compositional errors before sealing the document. 
The most important interrelating differences between letters patent, close and 
missive, with regard to propaganda, were their purpose and nature. Whereas letters patent 
were permanent, official documents, letters close were the result of a direct order from the 
sovereign given to his accompanying secretaries. According to Cazelles, these reflected 
precisely what the prince wanted to impart to the receiver. They were also effective because 
'G in passing over the authentication process, dissemination was rapid. For this reason, a 
12 Cazelles explained that letters 'De par le roy' could be either letters patent or close, depending on which 
seal was used, where it was placed, and the purpose of the letter. Cazelles, `Lettres closes, lettres `De par le 
Roy' de Philippe de Valois', in ABSHF (1958): 63. 
13 Ibid. 
14 ACO, B 11895, layette 72, n. 39. 
15 For this section I have relied on chapters 13 and 16 in Tessier, Diplomatique royale, pp. 229-250,295-315; Lot 
and Fawtier, Histoire des institutions, pp. 85-96; Arthur Giry, Manuel de Diplomatique, rpt. (Paris, 1974), pp. 766- 
784; Cazelles, `Lettres closes, lettres `De par le Roy', pp. 60-84; Pierre Cockshaw, Le personnel de la chancellerie de 
Bourgogne-Flandrz sour let duct de Bourgogne de la Mahon de Valois (1384-1477), (Kortrijk-Heule, 1982), pp. 58-59, 
158-167. 
16 Cazelles, `Lettres closes', p. 63. 
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letter close was the preferred way for the rulers of France to communicate with the bonnet 
, ill ec. " As the duke's personal guard and the guardian of the privy seal in the duke of 
Burgundy's household, the first chamberlain sealed letters while the chancellor was away. 18 
Similarly, letters missive were documents declaring the personal will of the prince: 
they were regularly used for issuing direct orders or used in personal correspondence. This 
might explain why they included petitions and prayer clauses. Frequently, letters missive 
concluded with a salutation formula, omitting the year of composition from the date given. 
The imprecise dating method was a feature that missives shared with letters close. This is 
explained by their ephemeral and urgent nature as mediums of personal correspondence. 
They were also useful for transmitting brief orders, instructions, and concise explanations 
in times of need. This may explain why so few remain in the ducal archives. Nevertheless, 
letters close and missive could be valuable tools of propaganda. They provided the 
opportunity for the sender to communicate his personal views more liberally, and in an 
efficient and timely manner. In August 1411, Burgundy hired several clerks to copy the 
letters of defiance by the house of Orleans and his reply, which he sent with letters close to 
his allies. ' They also wrote out `mandemans patent'. 20 Therefore, in addition to providing a 
brief explanation of the circumstances for the letters, these epistles probably outlined his 
intentions and gave specific orders to his allies for retaliation. The accompanying copies of 
the defiance provided the necessary evidence to demonstrate the gravity of the situation 
and to show that his victimisation was genuine, thereby legitimising his planned response. 
In this way, a letter close was an efficient form of communication and a useful means of 
propaganda. 
What is crucial for our retention here is that the duke was involved in the writing of 
documents insofar as he would instruct his chancery to draft whatever documents he 
t7 Tessier, Diplomatique royale, pp. 295-297. 
1s Cockshaw, Le personnel de !a chancellerie, pp. 58-59. 
'9 ACO, B 1570, fols. 277v-278r. 
20 Ibid. 
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needed to serve him in that moment. There is little doubt that he had direct input into his 
letters close and missives; therefore there is no reason to suppose he did not have the same 
measure of input into his letters patent. Nevertheless, it was his chancery that took over the 
technical aspects of writing the documents. This is of great consequence because it helps us 
understand the mechanics of letters as a medium of propaganda. The chancery provided 
the necessary framework for the composition and the distribution of letters as widely as 
possible. Moreover, it was the chancery that was able to make letters useful as a channel of 
communication by ensuring that the rhetoric fit within familiar structures of discourse, 
employing overlapping themes. These were important facets of letter writing, because it 
was critical that the message imparted by the duke of Burgundy resonate with the intended 
audience - the bonnes villes. 
6.1.2. The Chancery 
The importance of a prince's chancellor in the drafting of propaganda letters is 
manifest when one examines the development of chanceries across Europe. For example, 
James Hankins claimed that the Italian chanceries controlled what he called the 
`propaganda machine'. " According to Willard, `it is an established fact that the early Italian 
humanists were often the paid ghost writers of princes and city governments and that their 
writings sometimes served the purpose of accompanying the war of swords with the war of 
words'. " Yet the expression `ghost writer' is misleading; the humanist chancellors were 
actually responsible for writing the propaganda letters against their employer's enemies, and 
this was not a hidden fact. Referring to the conflict between Milan and Florence in the last 
decade of the fourteenth century, Rabil called the letter campaigns of the Florentine 
chancellor Calucio Salutati and the Milanese chancellor Antonio Loschi `a striking instance 
21 Hankins, `Humanism', p. 122. 
22 Willard, `The manuscripts of jean Petit's Justification', p. 272; Paul Oskar Kristeller, Renaissance Thought (New 
York, 1965), 2: 8. 
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of letters serving arms. i23 On Florence's behalf, Salutati attacked the city's enemy, Gian 
Galeazzo Visconti, Duke of Milan, with a barrage of disparaging letters. Gian Galeazzo 
allegedly declared that the letters had done more damage to him than an army one 
thousand strong. 24 
The chancellor was the duke of Burgundy's first and most important minister and 
counsellor, and was his assistant in all areas of his administration and government ZS Philip 
the Bold had united the chanceries of Burgundy and Flanders into one body, calling the 
minister the `chancellier de monseigneur de Bourgogne'. " During this period, the ducal 
chancellor's role emulated that of the chancellor of the king of France in terms of function 
and prestige. ' A 1388 ducal ordinance gave the chancellor the autonomy to act on his own 
accord. Z" Therefore, the chancellor had considerable influence over his chancery and 
indeed over the ducal administrative body. "' In fact, this change was essential for the dukes 
of Burgundy because the duke and the chancellor frequently resided in different locations. "' 
Both Philip the Bold and John the Fearless spent the majority of their time in Paris, 
and the remainder travelling between Paris, Burgundy and Flanders. John the Fearless was 
in Dijon only six times throughout his reign (1404-1419). The remainder of his time he 
divided between Paris and his counties of Artois and Flanders. " Because of his itinerant 
23 Rabil, `Humanism in Milan', p. 238. 
24 Charles Stinger, `humanism in Florence', in Renaissance Humanism, 1: 183; Kristian Jensen, `The Humanist 
reform of Latin and Latin Teaching', The Camhrldge Companion to Renaissance Humanism, p. 63; Willard, 'The 
manuscripts of jean Petit's Justification', p. 272; Kristeller, Renaissance Thou«ht, p. 8. 
25 For a comprehensive dicussion of the development of the function of chancellor under the dukes of 
Burgundy, consult Cockshaw, Le per onnel de la chancellerie. For comparisons with the chancellor of the French 
kings, see pp. 56-65, and 85-96. See also Tessier, Diplomatique royale, pp. 125-149; Pons, Its chancelleries 
parisiennes sous les regnes dc Charles VI et Charles VII', in Cancelleria e cultura net medio evo. XVI Congrerro di 
ScienZe Storiche (Staccarda, 29-30 agosto 1985) Germano Gualdo ed. (Rome, 1990), pp. 137-168 ; Gilbert Ouy and 
Tessier, `Notaires et secretaire du roi dans la premiere moitie du XV' siecle d'apres un document inedit', in 
Bulletin phtlologique et histotique (/usqu ä 1610) du Comiti des travaux historiques et scientifiques (1963): 861-90. 
26 Cockshaw, Le personnel de la chancellerie, pp. 12-14; Schnerb, L tat hourguignon, p. 96-98. 
27 Ibid., p. 100. 
28 Cockshaw, Le personnel de la chancellerie, pp. 12-13; Scnerb, LBtat houiguignon, pp. 232-233. 
29 Ibid., pp. 298-301. 
30 Cockshaw, Le personnel de la chancellerie, pp. 16-17,32; Schnerb, L l; `tat bou, gutgnon, p. 233. 
31 Vaughan, John the Fearless, p. 9. 
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way of life, Philip the Bold retained his Grand conseil with him at all times 32 Likewise, John 
the Fearless' curia duds accompanied him in his displacements; it included specialised 
administrative servants, foremost of whom were the first chamberlain and private 
secretaries 33 Additionally, numerous chevaucheurs de I'ecurie (mounted couriers) accompanied 
Burgundy. ' It is significant that all of these functionaries remained with him wherever he 
went, because these were among the most important individuals involved in the writing 
process and dispatch of all letters patent and letters close under the duke's great seal, the 
privy seal or the signet. They were on hand to transmit letters and other documents upon 
the duke's immediate orders. This further supports the argument that the duke was wholly 
in charge of his letter writing. 
Although the first chamberlain was responsible for sealing documents when the 
chancellor was absent, there were many occasions when John the Fearless' chancellor was 
with the duke; he was most certainly involved in John the Fearless' letter campaigns. 
Indeed jean de Saulx, lord of Courtivron, who was the duke's chancellor from April 9 1405 
to 1419, actively engaged in the 1405 letter campaign. 35 His first signature among the 
collection appears at the end of the letter of requests the duke of Burgundy and his two 
brothers (Anthony, then duke of Limbourg, and Philip, count of Nevers) presented to the 
duke of Guyenne, who was standing in for his father during one of his `absences', and the 
royal council. '6 Jean de Saulx was the first to sign the 8 September 1405 letter patent. His 
32Andre Leguai, `Les ducs Valois et les villes du duche de Bourgogne' Les Relations entre princes et villes aux 
XIVXVP siecles: aspects politiques, iconomiques et sociaux. Rencontre de Gand (24 au 27 septembre 1992), ed. Jean- 
Marie Cauchies (Neufchatel, 1993), pp. 21-25, but especially p. 24; Schnerb, L'Etat bourguignon, p. 100. See 
also John Bartier, Legirter etgenr de finance au XV siecle. Let conseillers des discs de Bourgogne Pbilippe It Bon et Charles 
It Temeraire (Brussels, 1955), p. 37, and Eugene Lameere, Le Grand Conseil des ducs de Bougogne de la Maison de 
Valois (Brussels, 1900), p. 23-29. 
33 Cockshaw, Le personnel de la chancellerie, pp. 58-162; Lameere, Grand Conseil, p. 23. 
34 Takemi Kanao, 'Les messagers du Duc de Bourgogne au debut du XVC siecle', in Journal of Medieval History, 
21 (1995): 195-226. 
35 Schnerb, jean sans Peter, p. 295 ; Cockshaw, Le personnel de la chancellerie, pp. 39-40; Vaughan, John the Fearless, 
p. 134. 
36 John's secretary Baudes des Bordes translated these requests from their Latin original. Immediately below 
`signe Sauls', reads: `Cedula suprascipta traditi fuit curie et allata per magistrum Baldum de Bordis, ducis 
clericum et secretarium, XXVI die augusti, anno domini MCCCCV. ' AN, X'A 8602, fol. 189v, cited in full in 
Mirot, Pieces, pp. 399-403, especially 403. 
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signature was followed first by Anthony's chancellor Q. Le Merchant) and Philip's notary 
Qoudrier) 37 The lord of Courtivron is not to be confused with one of the most important 
ducal secretaries, jean de Saulx, the former's bastard son. 8 We know that Saulx was an 
important secretary to John the Fearless because twenty-five percent of all ducal ordinances 
bear his signature. 39 Moreover, in 1412 he was made audiencier, that is, the first chancery 
officer after the chancellor. ' Among other duties, the audiencier was in charge of policing 
and supervising the secretaries and notaries attached to the chancery. " 
The use of secretaries for letters issued directly by the prince was standard practice 
at the ducal court, as it was at the French royal court in the second half of the fourteenth 
century. 42 Notwithstanding his many displacements, the sovereign's highly qualified 
personal secretaries were continuously attached to his court. As noted above, these men 
were specialists in letter writing, having undergone the necessary training in the arc 
dictaminis. Drafting and signing letters was their primary function, though they tended to 
other important tasks within the prince's court such as the duplication of documents. `3 In 
the duke of Burgundy's court, his private secretaries supervised clerks charged with the task 
of copying letters close, though he only permitted selected secretaries to sign or make 
changes to letters concerning finances or gifts 4; In one example, a messenger was sent 
37 Arch. Comm. de Macon, EE 41, n. 2, cited in Mirot, Pieces, p. 413. 
38 Schnerb, jean sans Peur, pp. 297,348-349. 
39 Ibid. 
°0 Ibid. 
41 For further details on this role, see Tessier, Diplomatique royale, pp. 166-167. 
42 Vaughan, John the Fearless, pp. 129-130; Cockshaw, Personnel de la chancellerie, pp. 158-164. For a more general 
examination of personal secretaries in the royal context, see Tessier, Diplomatique royale, pp. 161-166; Lot and 
Fawtier, Histoire des institutions, pp. 86-93; Kathleen Daly, `Mixing Business with Leisure: Some French Royal 
Notaries and Secretaries and their Histories of France, c. 1459-1509', in Power, Culture, and Religion in France c. 
1350-c. 1550 (Woodbridge, 1989), pp. 99-115. 
43 Cockshaw, Personnel de la chancellerie, pp. 158-164. 
" Cockshaw, Personnel de la chancellenie, p. 162; Tessier, Diplomatie royale, p. 162; Lot and Fawtier, Histoire des 
institutions, pp. 87-88. Vaughan, John the Fearless, p. 129. 
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from Ghent to Saint-Omer in October 1413 to obtain changes to the address on the back 
of a letter close from John the Fearless' secretary Guillaume Vignier. as 
Guillaume Vignier featured in another interesting account document in the chambre 
des comßtec in Dijon. A record under the Despen es communes witnessed a payment made to 
several clerks hired to write letters patent, which were sealed and sent. They were a call to 
arms sent from the duke of Burgundy to his vassals. Once they achieved this task, they 
made copies of John the Fearless' response to the duke of Orleans' letter of defiance in the 
summer of 1411: 
A maistre Guillaume Vigniers secretaire de mon dit seigneur... 
lesquelz il avoit baillier par le comandement de mon dit seigneur 
a plusieurs clercs estranges qui au mois d'aoust 1411 ont escript 
les mandemens patens ... [d']aler 
devers lui pour le servir en son 
armee. Et aussi ont escript plusieurs coppies tant de defiance a 
mondit Seigneur par le duc d'Orleans, comme de la response 
par mondit Seigneur scellees sur icelles defiances, lesquelles 
copies avec lettres closes ont este envoiees 4" 
There are several points to highlight here. First, there was a clear distinction made between 
the letters patent that requested military aid from Burgundy's vassals, and the letters close, 
which accompanied the copies of the letters of defiance and Burgundy's response. These 
he sent to his allies, the `Quatre Membres de Flandres', Ypres, Bruges, Ghent and the 
Franc, 47 and several royal towns, notably: Therouanne, Amiens, Peronne, Noyon, 
Montidier, Corbie, Abbeville, and Tournai. Furthermore, the chambre des comptec record 
reveals that the clerks, whom the secretary had hired personally, were clercs estranges- that is, 
clerks from outside the ducal chancery. 
Similarly, Jean Petit had employed outside help when he supervised the 
reproduction of the Justification text. First, the duke had several manifestoes duplicated by 
as These were: Guillaume Vignier (1403-1419), Baudes Des Bordes (1405-1419), Georges d'Oostende (1408- 
1419) and Jehan Seguinat (1412-1419). His other secretaries included Jehan Fortier (1402-c. 1416) and Jean de 
Saulx. See Vaughan, Jobn the Fearless, p. 129 and Cockshaw, Personnel de la chancellerie, p. 166. 
46 ACO, B 1570, fols. 277v-278r. 
47 Vaughan, John the Fearless, p. 14. 
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Guillaume Euvrie, and sent out on 1 March 1408 48 After the presentation of the justification 
de monreigneur de Bourgogne, it was copied into several illuminated manuscripts for John's 
most important allies, and a `popular edition' on paper. Almost immediately after Petit gave 
the Justification in the Hotel St. Paul on 8 March 1408, Petit brought between six and eight 
masters and students from the University of Paris to his quarters in the College du 
Tresorier where Master Johan Johanis dictated the text to them so that they could copy it 
to paper. 49 Jean Petit was himself paid for `quatres copies escrite a la main reliees et 
enluminees d'or et d'azur couverte de parchemin du discour qu'il a fait pour le duc en 
l'hotel du Roy a Paris, a St. Pol; l'un pour le duc, I'autre pour la duchesse, le iii' pour le duc 
de Brabant, et le iiii` pour le comte de Charollois'. 5" The explicit of ms. fr 5732 (Paris), fol. 
56 reads: collatio(acta de verbo ad verbum, which, Coville argued, indicates that it was either one 
of the original paper copies transcribed immediately following the presentation, or was at 
the very least one that was copied directly from one of the exemplars from that periods' 
Dictation was the common manner by which much literature was copied in the fifteenth 
century. Clearly John the Fearless had outside help hired when increased demands 
necessitated it, and that he did so with the intention of circulating the documents as widely 
as possible. 
6.2. JOHN THE FEARLESS' LETTER CAMPAIGNS 
From as early as August 1405 John the Fearless began using letter campaigns to 
transmit his polemic, and met with a level of success. Yet according to Richard Vaughan, 
this was not the case. Vaughan claimed that the 1405 letter campaign was a `sterile 
pamphlet war', one that ultimately served no purpose. 2 Although it is true that the duke of 
48 BNF, Collection Bourgogne, vol. 65, fol. 80v. 
49 Coville, jean Petit, pp. 134-137, and `Le veritable texte', 63-70. 
50 BNF, Collection Bourgogne, vol. 65, fol 84r. 
51 Coville, `Le veritable texte', p. 79. 
52 Vaughan, John the Fearless, p. 35. 
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Burgundy's letter campaign did not result in significant practical changes in the 
government, Vaughan's assessment was nonetheless rather pessimistic. Firstly, Burgundy's 
swift letter-writing campaign resulted in the support of the University of Paris. " Secondly, 
it is abundantly clear that the duke went unpunished for disobeying the queen by 
intercepting the dauphin at Juvisy. Finally, the very fact that Burgundy was so concerned 
with informing the king's subjects of the events reinforced his public persona as a 
`reformer', one who was interested in preserving the common good. Whether the people 
bought in to his hyperbole is not our primary concern in this chapter. What is prevalent 
here is that the duke of Burgundy was more efficient in his letter writing than his 
opponent: he maligned the duke of Orleans in letters close, letters patent, and indeed in a 
formal request for reform. This he accomplished more quickly and efficiently than his rival. 
From a purely technical perspective, this was a triumph for Burgundy. 
Louis of Orleans also engaged in letter writing during this period, but it appears 
that it was primarily a response to John the Fearless' initiative. 5' The letter campaigns 
nonetheless became an important medium for propaganda on both sides throughout this 
period because letters were an ideal platform for airing grievances. Moreover, the letters 
provided the opportunity for the protagonists to implore their intended audience to choose 
their side in the conflict, so that they might offer up financial or military assistance. 
Additionally, because the king suffered from dementia, the faction that had control over 
Charles VI and his royal council could rely upon the widespread publication of royal letters 
and proclamations to `officially' deprecate the other party. Regarding the royal council, 
Ferdinand Lot and Robert Fawtier explained: 
53 Monstrelet, 1: 112-113 ; Guenee, Un meurt z, pp. 170-171; Coville, Les Cabocbiens, p. 143. 
5; Louis of Orleans wrote his first letter to the hones vllles on 2 September 1405, several weeks after the 
alleged kidnapping had taken place (18 August 1405), and after John's first letter of justification to the towns 
written on 19 September (AN, J 1044, n. 39; and Douet 
d'Arq, Choix, 1: 273-283). Orleans' letter was 
essentially a outlet through which he tried to defend himself against the numerous accusations of corruption 
against him in John's letters, and the measures for reform that Burgundy had presented to the Parlement on 
26 August, which were also published and subsequently sent to the Donner oilier. 
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`Le Conseil est donc tout. Tout part de lui, tout about it a lui, et 
ses attributions sont aussi etendues que Gelles de la monarchie 
elle-meme. C'est a dire que celui qui est maitre du Conseil 
domine 1'Etat. 'ss 
The measure of control that Burgundy had in 1411 over the publication of royal letters was 
evoked in the chronicle typically attributed to jean Juvenal: `le duc de Bourgongne estoit ä 
Paris, et avoit en ses mains le Roy, et monseigneur le Dauphin, toutes lettres qui 
s'escrivoient ä monseigneur de Berry, et autres seigneurs, se faisoient au nom du Roy, ou 
dudit monseigneur le dauphin. i5" We can be certain that the same was true for any form of 
official communication issued in the name of the king. 
Yet the duke of Burgundy felt as though his reputation had been maligned when a 
number of royal proclamations were published against him once he was ousted from Paris 
in August 1413.57 Consequently John sent a letter of complaint to the king, claiming that it 
was unjust to have been so publicly disgraced. He explained that there had been numerous 
speeches and sermons given, and letters sent to all parts of the realm, which were 
deliberately designed to defame him. He asserted that although they were frequently 
allegorical, the criticisms were nonetheless perfectly clear to those who were even 
moderately enlightened. " 
However, it was his party that was the first of the two to exert real influence over 
the writing of royal letters during the initial stages of the conflict between March 1409 and 
August 1413. In effect Burgundy used royal proclamations to his advantage early on, when 
his absolution for Louis of Orleans' murder was published throughout the realm in 1408.59 
Later, in 1411, when the duke of Burgundy had firm control of the king and the royal 
council, Charles VI published a number of royal letters accusing the Armagnac faction of 
ss Lot and Fawtier, Hi. ctoire des institutions, 2: 80. 
56 Histoirr de Charles VI, p. 455. 
57 For one of the royal letters, written 18 September 1413: AN, K 58, n. 5. See also RSD, 5: 210-220. 
58 RSD, 5: 214. 
59 ADN, B 656, n. 15.088; See also Plancher, Prruves, p. 254, n. 256. For the letters published after the Peace 
of Chartres, 9 March 1409, see ACO, B11892, and Plancher, Preuves, pp. 256-258, n. 258. 
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high treason G° The letters gave the duke of Burgundy full royal backing for his military 
campaign against the Armagnacs, and confiscated the Armagnac princes' goods and titles 6' 
Charles VI's chancery also published an ordinance that excommunicated Burgundy's rivals 
and their supporters from the Catholic Church 62 
Thus, the epistolary evidence and the profusion of transcribed letters incorporated 
in the diverse chronicles of the period confirm that John the Fearless used letter campaigns 
very effectively to propagate his ideology to the towns of the realm 63 John's letters were so 
effective that in January 1414 the Armagnac government found cause to forbid the towns 
of the realm from publishing any epistle that the duke of Burgundy might send. ` The royal 
mandate published in Charles VI's name stipulated that should John send the towns any 
letters, the townspeople were required to forward them to the king's royal council 
immediately. 65 The royal letter threatened the towns, warning: 'si de ces choses, vous, ou 
aucun de vous, faites le contraire, nous vous en ferons si griefvement punir et en brief, que 
ce sera exemple a tous autres. " It also demanded that the town publish it without delay by 
having it cried in all the areas that were customarily used for public readings, so that no one 
in the community could feign ignorance of the edict. 
6" For example : AN, K 57b, n. 13-13h. See also Monstrelet, 2: 193-195; Histoirr de Charles VI, p. 470. 
61 For one of the letters giving John the Fearless the right to assemble an army for this purpose, see Plancher, 
Pn'uves, p. 273, n. 272. The later royal letters supporting the duke of Burgundy's military campaign against the 
Armagnacs are found at: ACO, B 11893, layette 85, cotes 5,8 and 9. 
62 This ordinance appropriated pope Urban V's papal bull, issued 9 May 1367, which excommunicated any 
men-at-arms who had assembled against the king. Ordonnancer, 9: 652. For the excommunication bulls see 
RSD, 3: 532-550; Histoire de Charles VI, p. 467,470. See also Monstrelet, 2: 210. Tournier, L'Universite de Paris, 
pp. 79,88; Lehoux, jean de France, 3: 253, n. 1. 
63 Enguerrand de Monstrelet, Michel Pintoin and the Jouvenal compiler transcribed a vast number of letters 
in their works. Whenever possible, I have cross-checked the transcriptions with surviving letters and archival 
records, or those transcribed in published sources such as Urbain Plancher's Preuves, and Douet d'Arcq's 
Choix. The chronicles themselves are useful for this purpose, as all three texts generally include publication 
details for the same letters. 
o^ The publication of a document such as a letter patent or royal mandate generally entailed either a public 
reading of the letters by town criers at various locations throughout a town or city, or more officially in an 
organised assembly consisting of the town officials and the other `habitants et manants'. See, for example, the 
Arch. Comm. d'Amiens, BB. 2 series. 
6s This letter cited in Histoire de Charles VI, pp. 495-496. 
66 Ibid. 
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The Armagnac government sent an additional ordinance to this effect in February 
1414. Amiens' town deliberation records reveal that they received the royal letter. 7 
Interestingly, the count of St. Pol had sent envoys to the town of Amiens carrying letters 
close from the duke of Burgundy only the day before, on 15 February 1414. Amiens was 
doubtless intimidated by the king's threats to punish the town severely should they not 
comply with the royal ordinance, because they decided, after much consideration, to send 
Burgundy's letters to the king and royal council immediately. The concentrated attempt by 
the king's royal council to control the publication of Burgundy's letters implies that they 
were concerned with the potential impact that the letters would have in the towns that 
were exposed to them. It suggests that Burgundy's letters were a successful source of 
communication for him, and a genuine threat to Armagnac hegemony. 
Following the duke of Burgundy's exile from Paris, a royal proclamation made in 
the autumn months of 1413 restored the honour and repealed the banishment of the 
Armagnacs. fi8 More importantly perhaps, the proclamation explained that all the 
defamatory libels that had been previously published by town criers and attached to doors 
of certain churches against them were erroneous, and henceforth considered by the crown 
of France to be null and void. In addition, it asserted that the malevolence of some 
`seditious, disturbers of the peace' had led to the publication of previous proclamations 
against the Armagnac princes and their allies in the name of the king. 
67 According to the 
mandate, these counsellors had purportedly given false reports to the king, and engaged in 
intrigue to achieve their `damnable objectives'. The `seditious' counsellors to whom the 
Armagnacs referred were clearly Burgundy's partisans, for the royal council that presided 
over the drafting of the anti-Armagnac letters issued during this period was full of the 
67 Archives Comm. d'Amiens, BB. 2. fol. 36v. For a transcription of the letter patent written by the duke of 
Burgundy on the 11 February 1414 consult Monstrelet, 2: 434-437, and 442-456. 
68 The royal letter is transcribed in full, but in Latin. The original letter would have been written in French. 
RSD, 5: 184-194. Ordonnances, 10: 163-165.167-170 
69 AN, K 58, n. 5; RSD, 5: 190. 
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duke's loyal servants. For example, the royal council, which published a royal proclamation 
on 10 September 1411 in favour of the duke of Burgundy, included known Burgundian 
partisans such as the count of Saint Pol; Jean de Nielles, the dauphin's chancellor; the 
bishop of Tournai Qean de Thoisy); the Guillaume de Vienne, lord of St. Georges and St. 
Croix; Charles of Savoisy; Antoine de Craon; Pierre des Essarts, the provost of Paris; 
Eustace de Laitre, and Nicole d'Orgemont 70 
It is highly significant that the two royal ordinances described above were focused 
on retracting the letters that Burgundy had sent while in power, and in controlling any 
further information he might dispatch via letters. " It is plain that there were two reasons 
why the Armagnacs were concerned with repealing the official documents that had been 
published against them while Burgundy had enjoyed control over the government, between 
1409 and 1413. The first was to retract their label as traitors, thereby repairing their male 
fama. Additionally, this counter-propaganda campaign suggests that the duke of Burgundy's 
verbal assaults against the Armagnac faction must have made an impact on audiences; 
otherwise the Armagnacs need not have been so anxious to set the record straight and to 
forbid any further Burgundian letters from being published. 
The sense of urgency among the Armagnac party is more easily understood in the 
context of the events leading to the outbreak of war in August 1411, the violent Cabochien 
70 For the letter, ACO, B 11893, n. 13. Charles duke of Orleans accused the bishop of Tournai, jean de 
Nielles, Antoine de Craon, and Charles of Savoisy of being the king's enemies as well as his own in a letter 
sent to the king in April 1411 (Orleans' letter is transcribed in full in Monstrelet, 2: 116-121). The bishop of 
Tournai was one of John the Fearless councillors, later becoming Philip the Good's chancellor. (Schnerb, Jean 
sans Peur, p. 202 and 395,304). He also received two queues of wine from the duke of Burgundy in 1411 (B 
1560 fols. 64-64v). Likewise, Eustache de Laitre, the king's president of the chambrr des comptes, received wine 
gifts from Burgundy in 1412 (ACO, B 1572, fol 37). He was later a member of the 1413 Cabochien throng 
(Monstrelet, 2: 343). D'Orgemont also received wine gifts from Burgundy in 1412 (ACO, B 1572, fol. 37). In 
1416 he was arrested by the Armagnacs government for his collusion in a conspiracy to help the duke of 
Burgundy back in to Paris (Bourgeois, pp. 70-71; Hirtoinr de Charles VI, p. 531). Michel Pintoin referred to the 
lord of St. George as a celebrated baron of the county of Burgundy (RSD, 3: 304). He frequently acted as an 
ambassador for the duke of Burgundy (e. g. ACO, B 1558, fol. 179r. Monstrelet, 3: 129). The count of St. Pol 
received an annual pension from John the Fearless from as early as 1405 (ACO, B 1542, fo. 62r), and his 
daughter was married to John's brother Anthony, the duke of Brabant (Famiglietti, Royal Intrigue, p. 246, n. 
41). Jehan de Nielles and Antoine de Craon also received annual pensions beginning in 1406, and both were 
councillors and chamberlains of the duke of Burgundy (ACO, B 1543, fols. 68v and 69r). 
71 See again, AN, K 58, n. 5. 
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uprising from May to July 1413, and John the Fearless' subsequent fall from power in 
August 1413. There is little doubt that the armed conflict in 1411 had caused the towns of 
the realm to divide into partisan groups, which were henceforth called `Armagnac' and 
'Burgundian'. 72 The subsequent `Cabochien Uprising' further exacerbated the divisions 
among the people in the principal towns of the realm. When the Armagnacs gained control 
of the government, they recognised that John the Fearless still had many sympathisers in 
the northern towns, particularly in Picardy and Champagne. 73 They acknowledged that if 
the towns published the duke's letters, it might encourage the remaining Burgundian 
loyalists to join Burgundy's campaign. The more people who joined him in arms, or helped 
fund his military campaign, the more powerful the duke would become. This was 
particularly true if entire towns joined Burgundy's side. Therefore, to maintain a firm grip 
over the government of the realm, it was vital that the Armagnacs dissuade the king's 
towns from offering any assistance to John the Fearless. 
To this end, the royal mandate issued in January 1414 was very specific about the 
type of support the towns and their surrounding villages were forbidden to proffer to the 
duke of Burgundy. " In the letter that Charles VI sent to the town of Paris, he ordered, `que 
en nostredite ville ne souffriez ny laissiez entrer, demeurer, sejourner, passer ny repasser 
nostredit cousin de Bourgongne, ou autres de par luy, ou a luy favorisans, quels qu'ils 
soient, qui en armes voudroient venir par deca, comme dit est, et ne leur donniez conseil, 
confort, ny aide, en quelque maniere que ce soit. i75 Ostensibly this referred mainly to 
provisions, predominantly lodging and food supplies. 
Yet this was precisely what Burgundy was soliciting. Monstrelet explained that 
when John the Fearless sent letters to the towns in Picardy in August 1417, requesting that 
72 RSD, 4: 446; Hirtoire de Charles VI, p. 467. Also, Bourgeois, p. 10. 
7' Coville, Ds Cabochiens, p. 89. 
74 Hirtoire de Charles VI, 495-496. 
75 Ibid. 
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they `ouvry la voye', he was in effect asking for provisions. " Burgundy's primary need for 
provisions is evident in an earlier letter written to the bonnes olles the 25 April 1417, in 
which he explained that he had tried, ever since his exile had begun, to come to the king's 
aid, but had been thwarted when the Armagnacs had forced the towns of the realm to 
reject him: `les dessus dits rapineurs et dissipeurs firent faire defense par les cites et bonnes 
villes fermes que l'en ne nous laissast entrer ens ne nos gens, ne baillast aucuns vivres ne 
autres necessitez comme se nous feussions propres ennemis de ce dit Royaume. " 
Burgundy claimed that he deserved the help of the bonner villes because his intention was to 
free the king from tyranny. According to his viewpoint, the treatment that he had received 
was more appropriate for the enemies of the realm than a loyal subject. This statement was 
well placed: it came immediately after he had blamed the Armagnacs for devastating defeat 
at Agincourt by the English in October 1415. In likening his mistreatment by the bonnes 
Lilles to that which should rightfully have been reserved for the real enemies of the realm - 
the English - he implied that the Armagnac faction should be rebuffed by the towns in his 
place. 
When Burgundy did obtain the material support he solicited, the towns assumed 
that he would pay for it. This was an ideal in the later middle ages, but was not a policy that 
all men-at-arms adhered to. 
78 As Allmand has shown, the ability to efficiently provide for 
and control one's army tested the effectiveness of the ruler. 
" Yet, `the civilian was no 
longer the accidental victim of war but was now becoming one of the chief targets of those 
who were waging a `just' war with royal or princely authority. 
"" This was the result of years 
of raids by the English into the French countryside where peasants and townspeople alike 
76 Monstrelet, 3: 184. 
77 ACO, B 11895, layette 72, n. 39. For a copy of the document AN, K 60 n. 8. 
78 Allmand, Tbt Hundred Years War. England and France at Ware. 1300 - c. 1450 (Cambridge, 1989), p. 97. 
79 Ibid., p. 97; `Changing Views of the Soldier', p. 179. 
80 Allmand, `War and the Non-Combatant', p. 263. 
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were either plundered or had their holdings razed to the ground 81 In consequence, most 
generally accepted that the enemy might, as a natural by-product of war, appropriate 
civilian possessions without offering restitution, though the non-combatant himself should 
remain unharmed as long as he did not resist. " However, the rules of civil war were less 
clear. Although theoretically the king's subjects had to obey the king in all matters, Charles 
VI's inability to rule the kingdom undermined this ideal in practice. The Burgundian and 
Armagnac factions had control over the king and royal council at different times, and this 
frequent fluctuation in the royal government had a destabilising effect upon the realm. In 
effect, it forced the king's subjects to take a huge gamble in choosing which faction to 
support. 
Yet because both factions claimed to be fighting to preserve the interests of the 
king and the common good it was, in theory, easier for the non-combatants to insist upon 
compensation. If either party did not want to risk compromising their ideological 
standpoint, it was imperative that they try not to destroy the countryside as they proceeded. 
This must have been widely understood, because there is sufficient evidence to suggest that 
the king's subjects felt justified in retaliating should they not be compensated for their 
livestock or other goods. Such was the case in 1417 when a garrison of six Burgundian 
men-at-arms stationed near Sommereux allegedly attempted to acquire some cattle `pour la 
provisions des compaignons de ladicte garnison. '83 Evidently this caused great upset in the 
village, inciting `soixante compaignons et vint femmes ou environ' to seek out the 
Burgundian partisans. They called them `faulx traistres bourgignons', and threw sticks and 
rocks at them. After the Burgundians shot and killed the ringleader with an arrow, the 
8I Ibid, pp. 259-262; Clifford Rogers, By Fire and Sword. Be!! Xm Hostile and "Civilians" in the Hundred Years' 
War', in Civilians in the Path of War (Lincoln, Nebraska, 2002), pp. 34-55. 
82 Allmand, `War and the Non-Combatant', p. 268. 
83 AN, JJ 170, n. 163 cited in Douet d'Arcq, Choix, 2: 103-105. 
140 
animals were returned to their owners, and one of the duke's men was captured and 
brought to Amiens to stand trial. " 
The importance of remuneration is further manifest in the letter of alliance that the 
citizens of Beauvais and the duke of Burgundy signed and published on 23 August 1417. It 
stated: `Item que les dits de Beauvais recevront mondit seigneur le Duc et les siens en 
ladicte ville, leur bailleront pour leur argent, vivres et autres choses dont ils auront besoin, 
et garderont et deffendront comme eux mesmes, pourveu que ladicte ville demeure la plus 
forte, et feront a leurs pouvoir que les marchands de ladicte ville ameneront vivres aupres 
mondit seigneur le Duc en son ost pourvu qu'ils seront tenus seurs et paies de leur 
denries. i85 A similar arrangement was made with Doullens g6 It was an important article to 
include in the alliance, because John the Fearless frequently boasted that his army paid for 
everything that it needed while on military campaigns. This statement was in itself 
important for Burgundy's ideological platform because it provided theoretical `evidence' of 
his concern for the bien public and his desire to preserve the common interests of the realm. 
However, it is questionable whether John the Fearless and his army actually 
adhered to this policy or merely took advantage of it for its rhetorical value in encouraging 
the towns to offer him their support. In a letter he issued on 11 March 1414 from Lille, 
John assured his audience that `en faisant le dit voyage [a Paris], ne a l'aler ne au retourner 
nous en entretenant nostre dicte entencion et volonte nous avions meu ne fait guerre ä 
personne quelconcques [... ] sommes paisiblement aler et repassez en paiant noz despens 
en chemin'. 87 Yet regardless of whether he paid his way or not, for our purpose it is 
important that this was a significant element of John's propaganda. It was effectively one 
94 Ibid., p. 105. 
85 ADO, Collection Bucquet-aux-Cousteaux, vol. 55-56, pp. 402. 
86 This letter patent is transcribed nearly verbatim in full in Monstrelet, 3: 185. 
87 ADN, B 658, n. 15.253r. 
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that he used to separate himself from his rivals, whom he claimed devastated the bier public 
with their warmongering. 88 
Ironically, to be able to pay his way Burgundy needed to acquire both supplies and 
financial assistance. In his letters to the bonnes olles in July 1411 whilst preparing for war 
with the Armagnacs, John specifically asked the merchants to send `denrees et 
merchandises' to his army. 89 In a letter written to the town of Amiens on 3 October 1417 
and presented by two of Burgundy ambassadors, the duke highlighted how his desire to 
serve the king above all things had `couste et coustoit grandement'. For this reason, his 
ambassadors asked the mayor, the alderman, the burgesses and the inhabitants of the town 
to consider raising an aide to help alleviate the costs and expenses of his large army. "' 
Clearly the ambassadors' affirmation of John the Fearless' loyalty to the realm and love of 
the king was merely a preamble to his request for their financial assistance. This request is 
not surprising because the duke of Burgundy had won Amiens to his cause earlier, in 
August. Indeed on 15 August 1417, he made his entry into the town and celebrated the 
feast day of the Assumption in the cathedral of Notre Dame 91 The town of Amiens 
granted John the Fearless an aide of three hundred livres tournois. 92 Amiens gave him a 
further aide in December 1417, and on 16 May 1418, gave him a third aide for the siege of 
Senlis 93 
What is remarkable, however, is that only seventeen days after the ambassadors had 
presented their case to the burghers back in October 1417, Amiens refused to send two 
88 See, for example, Petit in Monstrelet, 1: 241. A similar statement was made in a royal letter issued on 2 
November 1411, while Burgundy controlled the royal council. ACO, B 11893, layette 85, no. 8. 
89 ACO, B 1570, fols. 277v-278. 
90`[L}edit monseigneur de Bourgongne avoit expose et exposoit son corps et toutes sa chevance ou service du 
Roy nostre sire, pour le bien d'icellui seigneur et de son royaume, qui lui avoit couste et coustoit grandement, 
et requierent de par lui advis maieur et eschevins, bourgeois et habitans qu'il vaulsissent faire aucun aide, tel 
que i eulx plairoit, pour aidier ä supporter les frais et despons de l'armee par lui miles sus, pour la cause 
dicte. ' Arch. Comm d'Amiens, BB. 2, fol. 113v. 
91 Schnerb, jean sans Peur, p. 658. 
92 Arch. Comm. d'Amiens, BB. 2, fol. 113v. 
93 For the aide granted to Burgundy on 23 December 1417, see Arch. Comm. d'Amiens, BB. 2, fols. 120v- 
121r. For the third aide in May 1418, see 126v. 
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leading burgesses to John the Fearless so that he could `traictier, pacifier et accorder sur ce 
qu'il leur vorroit faire exposer au bien du Roy nostre site et de son royaume'94 
Unfortunately, no reason is given in the deliberation records for their refusal. However, 
their vacillating decisions may represent the tension between the rival parties, the towns, 
and the obligation to the crown of France. Indeed the bonnet t'illec had to tread very carefully 
during this conflict for fear that they might choose to back the `wrong' faction 95 The 
autumn of 1417 was particularly perilous because any town that opposed the Armagnacs in 
favour of the duke of Burgundy was theoretically committing lese-majesty. This was the 
major obstacle that Burgundy had to overcome, and therein lies the reason why he 
orchestrated such an aggressive letter campaign to persuade the towns to back him. 
The bonnes ti!! es had much to be concerned about, because the duke was a 
formidable force to oppose. 96 This point is made very clear in the letter John wrote and 
sent to the bonnet tiller the 29 September 1417. The letter began by declaring that John had 
undertaken his military campaign to `dejecter et ouster dudit gouvernment [les Armagnacs], 
et pour eviter que par leur convoitise et ambition, ledit royaulme ne sois perdus... "He 
added that he would maintain peaceful relations with anyone who was `a friend' of the king, 
and therefore loyal also to him. Yet, he was not at all subtle in his threats to attack those 
who did not help him. He asserted that it was not enough to `soy obstenir de mal faire'. 
Rather, he expected everyone to engage in the conflict and help him achieve his ends: `car 
en ycelle poursuite avons employe et entendons employer nostre corps, nostre devance, 
94 Arch. Comm. d'Amiens, BB. 2, fols. 114r-114v. The letter they sent explaining this to John the Fearless was 
described in an assembly on 20 October 1417. See fol. 115v. 
95 Anne Curry examined this issue closely in a case study of Mantes, emphasising the necessity for towns to 
sit on the fence in order to survive the many changes in power. See `Bourgeois et soldat dans la ville de 
Mantes pendant l'occupation anglaise de 1419 ä 1449', in Guenr, pouvoir et noblesse au moyen 4ge. Melanges ä 
! 'honneur de Philippe Contamine (Paris, 2000), pp. 177-178,184. 
96 Vaughan, John the Fearless, pp. 215-223; Kelly de Vries, 'John the Fearless' Way of War' in Reputation and 
Reprrsentation in Fifteenth-Century Europe, eds. Douglas L. Biggs, Sharon D. Michalove and Albert Compton 
Reeves (Leiden, 2004), pp. 39-55. 
97 BNF, Collection Boulogne, vol. 55, fols. 254r-254v. 
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nos amis et bienveuillans et allies et tout clue Dieu nous a preste sans y riens epargner. '" 
With his intimidating army standing outside the town gates, northern towns such as 
Amiens, Beauvais, Doullens, and the many other towns within close proximity to Paris 
ultimately had little choice but to pledge their support to the duke of Burgundy. " 
Yet according to the Jouvenal compiler, it was John's letters to the bonnes villes that 
generated positive results rather than the army. 1°° Allegedly, Rouen took up the Burgundian 
cross as a symbol of their allegiance to him following their reception of his letters. 101 
Rheims, Chalons, Troyes and Auxerre followed Rouen's example. "' Yet to maintain the 
appearance of autonomy, towns that had capitulated to Burgundy could maintain that it 
had been their own choice to join the duke. This was certainly the case with Troyes in 
August 1417.103 Burgundy's original letter to the town of Troyes announced his intention to 
liberate the king and to save the realm from imminent destruction. He justified his armed 
march on Paris by claiming that he was compelled, through his ardent concern for the 
king's well being and that of the entire realm, to liberate him from the tyranny of the 
Armagnacs. Just as Rouen declared itself in favour of John the Fearless following their 
reception of his letter, it was also the ostensible catalyst for Troyes' own change of heart. 
6.3. RECEPTION 
6.3.1. The publication of letters to the bonnes villes 
The 1405 `letter war' that followed the alleged kidnapping of the dauphin in August 
of that year is very useful for piecing together the process of publication. Additionally it 
tells us something substantial about the reaction that the senders (Burgundy and his rivals) 
9° Ibid. 
99 These were: Senlis, Beaumont-sur-Oise, Provins, Vernon, Mantes, Poissy, Montlhery, Chartres, Rouen, and 
Rheims. Schnerb, Etat houauignon, p. 165. See also Vaughan, John the Fearless, pp. 215-222. 
100 This was also the view taken by Schnerb, 
Etat bouquignon, p. 165. 
i°1 Histoire de Charles VI, p. 533. 
102 Ibid. 
103 For this and what follows, BNF, Collection Boxrgogne, vol. 55, fol. 248r. 
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anticipated from their audiences. In his first letter to the inhabitants of Macon on 19 
August 1405, Burgundy gave very precise instructions as to how the inhabitants should 
respond to his letter. He claimed that the letter was written so that they would know 
exactly what his intention had been, and remained - that is, to endeavour to protect the 
king, the dauphin, and the realm. He asked that they `rescrivez ce que [vous] aurez 
entencion de faire sur ce' and give their letter to his messenger. According to Burgundy, 
whatever the town wanted him to do regarding the issue, he would do it `tres 
voulentiers. '"" 
It is interesting that in this letter Burgundy asked that the town send some of their 
burgesses to hear his intentions relating to the king, his family and the good of the realm. 
This was a rather oblique question, which was designed to feel out where their loyalty lay. 
Naturally, the townspeople of Macon responded by stating that they were and would 
remain loyal subjects of the king, and by association, to anyone who `par lui sont et seront 
commis et deputez ä garder le bien, honneur, estat du Roy nostre seigneur'. For this reason, 
they would send some of their burgesses to `oir ce qu'il plaira au Roi et ä son bon conseil 
commander. ""' This is an interesting response for a number of reasons. First, because it 
was a safe answer: Macon was not committing to anything other than serving the king, and 
whomever the king himself charged with overseeing affairs in his stead. By sending 
deputies to Paris, they were not necessarily supporting the duke of Burgundy, but were 
waiting to hear what the king and the royal council agreed would be the best solution to the 
crisis. 
Alternatively, Macon's assurance of their undying loyalty to the crown was 
essentially meaningless. This is because there wasn't another appropriate response to give, 
or at least not one that would have impeded potential repercussions. When John the 
Fearless asked them to send representatives of their town out of their duty to the king and 
1114 This is a copy of Arch. Comm. de Macon, EE 41 n. 1, cited in Mirot, Pieces, p. 404, n. 4. 
1115 Ibid. 
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his realm, it was in actual fact a hollow question that deliberately deflected any chance of 
losing their support entirely. Propagandists typically ask questions of their intended 
audience which outwardly appear to reinforce their ideology, but that are actually 
inconsequential. "" This is because it adds to the hyperbole, which makes the rhetoric 
appear meaningful on the surface. 
In a later letter, dated 17 September, Burgundy not only asked for the 
townspeople's response, but also gave very specific instructions for the way that the letter 
should be published. He asked them to publicly read the letter verbatim so that everyone 
would be assured of the validity of the previous accusations that he had made against 
Orleans. These accusations were made in Parlement on his behalf for the improvement and 
restructuring of the realm, and were subsequently published in the form of a letter patent. 
The letters were then dispersed around the realm. Once the townspeople were assured of 
the `truth', Burgundy expected that they would feel compelled to help him implement the 
new reforms. "" Hence, we can conclude that the sender intended his letters to inform the 
townspeople of the situation, while simultaneously inviting them to engage with him in 
political dialogue. 
Finally, the instructions given in a royal letter patent stresses the importance of 
distributing the letters as widely as possible. In one of the many royal ordinances published 
against John the Fearless after his exile from Paris in August 1413, the king insisted that the 
proclamation be sent to the provost of Paris, to all the bailiwicks, seneschals, provosts and 
other royal officers of justice scattered around the realm. He demanded that the letters be 
published to the towns in their `sieges et auditoires', in the markets and all the other usual 
places for publishing royal ordinances and proclamations so that `personnes n'en puisse 
1°6 Noam Chomsky, Media ContmL The Spectacu/arAchievements of Propaganda, 2nd edn. (New York, 2002), pp. 25- 
29. 
107 Arch. Comm. de Macon, EE 41, n. 4 cited in Mlirot, Pieces, pp. 413-414, n. 8. 
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pretendre cause d'ignorance. ""' The auditoria to which the royal letter referred were likely 
the assembly halls used by the towns to deliberate on various issues relating to the good of 
the community. This was clearly an event wherein the king's royal officers and townspeople 
around the realm gathered together to hear the reading of the letter. Amiens' records of 
assemblies and deliberations held in communal archives in Amiens create a clearer picture 
of the involvement that the townspeople had in the ritual. 
The record of the assembly held on 9 August 1412 at Malmaison in Amiens, lists 
the names of those present, including the bailiwick, the mayor, the aldermen and other 
town councillors, the bishop of Amiens and `un grand nombre de bourgeois manans et 
habitans en ladicte ville'. "'9 The record further specified that the reading had included all the 
neighbouring villages under the jurisdiction of the bishopric of Amiens. In another 
assembly held 13 July 1417, Burgundy's letters, which were signed by the duke's own hand, 
were read out to the captain of Amiens, the mayor, the town councillors, and `plusieurs 
bourgeois, manans et habitans'. 10 The fact that the `manans and habitants' were included in 
the address of the letter and also in the assembly suggest that it was important for the 
information to reach each level of urban society, rather than remaining an exclusive 
document reserved for the town's ruling elite. The records are full of evidence that prove 
that it was more usual than not for the entire town and its surrounding rural villages to 
gather together to hear the reading of letters that were sent by the highest levels of French 
society. The record of an assembly held on the 6 April 1414, stated that it was the 
unanimous decision of the town to reject the duke of Burgundy's request for military 
assistance in his campaign against the Armagnacs. 
"' Another Amiens town record reveals 
that on 3 October 1417, at least five hundred `bourgeois et habitants' participated in the 
reading of the duke of Burgundy's letters close which addressed his ongoing military 
108 RSD, 5: 249-269. 
109 Archives Comm. d'Amiens, BB. 2, fols. 17v-18v. 
11 0 Ibid., fol. 108r. 
III Ibid., fols. 38v-39v. 
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campaign to `liberate the king' from Armagnac control. "' The vast number of people 
involved in this particular public reading demonstrates how comprehensive and inclusive 
these assemblies were. 
Furthermore, one of Burgundy's letters to Beauvais written the 1 September 1417 
illustrates this process of inclusion, in addition to clarifying the impact that the letters may 
have had. In this document the duke explained that after the town had published his letters, 
which declared his 'vraye et loyale entencion que avons au bien et honneur de mondit 
seigneur et a la bonne et brieve reparation de son dit Royaume', the bishop and the dean of 
the town, the captain of Beauvais, the mayor, and the `bourgeois, manans et habitans' had 
all officially declared themselves in favour of the duke of Burgundy, and swore to assist the 
duke `en corps et en biens'. They legitimised their agreement with the duke by sealing the 
letter patent with the town's official seal. It is interesting that the duke of Burgundy claimed 
that the townspeople of Beauvais gave him their full support based solely on the reading of 
his letter. In truth, the army that was camped outside the city probably had much to do with 
persuading them. Yet regardless of his army's influence, it is significant that the duke 
claimed that the letters had won the support of the Beauvaisis. 
This assertion is consistent with statements made in other Burgundian letters. A 
descriptive letter sent by two of Burgundy's men, jean de Fraignant and the lord of 
Toulonjeon, to the duchess of Burgundy following the capitulation of Troyes in 1417 
provides one example. "' The letter explained that the two men had asked the townspeople 
of Troyes to provide their official response to the duke of Burgundy's letter patent that had 
previously been sent to them. The duke's initial letter had declared his intention to free the 
king and realm from the tyranny of the Armagnacs. When the duke's representatives had 
not received any reply they asked to see the bailiwick of Troyes, who was, incidentally, an 
Armagnac sympathiser. He refused outright to publish the duke's letters, and also refused 
112 Ibid., fol. 133v. 
13 For this and what follows, see BNF, Collection Bourgogne, vol. 55, fol. 248r. 
148 
to give them leave to enter the city to do so themselves. They explained to the duchess that 
they nevertheless found a way into the suburbs of the town, and spread the word that they 
had letters to publish on behalf of the duke of Burgundy. In less than an hour, they claimed 
that between six and seven thousand people turned up fully armed and insisted that 
Burgundy's letters be read aloud. Because they were angry for being excluded from the 
reading in the first place, the bailiwick was compelled to allow the reading to take place. 
Thus, Fraignant read the letter `en la plus grand et haulte place de Troyes, appelle le marche 
de Ble, aprez laquelle lecture ledit peuple fut tres joyeux et content crians ä haulte voix: 
Noel! Vive le roy et monseigneur de Bourgogne! ' 
It was commonplace for the bearer of the letter or the herald to read it out in full 
view of the predestined audience, in very public places, such as town squares, assembly 
halls, markets and crossroads to a wide and varied audience. Frequently the publication of a 
royal proclamation - or one made on the king's behalf by either the duke of Burgundy or 
the Armagnacs while they controlled the royal council - was heralded in by the sound of 
the trumpet. When the king wanted to publish the Peace of Auxerre (22 August 1412), for 
example, his orders to the Parlement of Paris and the provost stated the following 
instructions: `(V]ous mandons et expressement enjoingnons que la dicte paix vous faites 
crier et publier de par nous solemnellement et a son de trompe en notre bonne ville de 
Paris par tous les carrefours et autres lieux accoustumes a faire cris en ville en commandant 
de par nous a tous nos subgies'. "' Evidently, the king wanted to make a spectacle of the 
reading and to gain the full attention of all potential participants in this particular exchange 
of information. This publication process was, according to Michele Fogel, a particular 
114 AN, K60, n. 3 
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`ceremonie de l'information. i15 The trumpet not only served to seize the attention of the 
audience, it effectively invested the message with royal authority. "6 
Although writing and literacy gained more prevalence in medieval society between 
the eleventh century and the beginning of the fourteenth century, Michael Clanchy has 
shown that oral communication, including reading letters aloud, remained the favoured and 
more trusted means of reception. "7 In fact, the visual materiality of the letter was designed 
to substantiate the oral message, to act as an evidentiary document. This explains why most 
letters patent began with `A tous ceux qui ces lettres verront, salut. ' The formula was 
unlikely to imply that the sender intended everyone to read the letter personally, but rather 
to see its physical manifestation while the crier read it aloud. "8 When important writs and 
letters were also frequently attached to doors of churches they became visual 
manifestations of what had been read aloud, there as reminders or as resources for those 
who could read them. For example, when John the Fearless realised that he would not be 
successful in his siege of Paris in February 1414, he returned to Saint Denis where he `fist 
escripre lectres lesquelles il fist atacher par nuit par aucuns de ses favorisans aux portaulx 
de l'eglise Nostre Dame, du Palais et ailleurs aval Paris, et lesquelles il envoya en plusieurs 
bonnes villes. '"' 
Therefore it is clear that the publication of letters was designed to incorporate a 
wide and varied audience in the exchange of information. This complemented the senders' 
direct request for a response, which naturally encouraged an active reading and reaction to 
the content of the letter. Moreover, most contemporaries seemed to have recognised the 
potential threat that letters posed in manipulating public opinion. Indeed the main purpose 
tt5 See Michele Fogel, Les ceremonies de 1'infornmtion dann la France du XVl` au XVI1. siecle (Pari s, 1989), pp. 23- 
59. 
116 Fogel, Lee ceremonies de ! 'information, pp. 24-25; Clouzot, `Le son et le pouvoir', p. 625. 
117 Michael Clanchy, From Memory to Written Record. England 1066-1307,2nd edn. (Oxford, 1993), pp. 1-2. See 
also Crosby, 'Oral Delivery in the Middle Ages', pp. 88-110. 
I's Williams, English Vernacularlitterr, pp. 60-70. 
119 Monstrelet, 2: 434. The letter itself is transcribed in full pp. 434-436, and in Plancher, Preuves, p. 297, n. 
289. 
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behind the publication of official information was to exert control over the `clamour' of the 
people - to control public talk (rumours), because it was not recognised as an `official' form 
of speech. 12' Those in positions of authority perceived these forms of dialogue as highly 
dangerous because they were considered the first step towards sedition, or for our purpose, 
partisanship. "' It was expedient therefore to ensure that public talk was monitored, and 
where possible, manipulated to suit the needs of the propagandist. In this way, John the 
Fearless tried to accomplish two things when he embarked upon a letter campaign. Firstly 
he attempted to control public talk so that the people of the realm would not react against 
him. The second was in some ways a by-product of the first, because in trying to control 
what people said publicly about him he was effectively trying to control his reputation 
(fama). Clear evidence to this effect is found in the intense propaganda campaign against 
John the Fearless in the months between his exile (August 1413) and his siege of Paris 
between January and February, about which he complained to the king. 'ZZ 
But how did the townspeople react to the content of the letters sent during this 
period, and in particular, to the duke of Burgundy's letter campaigns? Did the message 
imparted by the duke of Burgundy persuade the townspeople to accept his position and to 
join his cause? If we are to believe Fraignant and Toulonjeon, the town of Troyes 
capitulated to the duke of Burgundy upon hearing the content of the his letter. This may 
have been the case, but it was the bailiwick's refusal to publish the letter in the first place 
that led to mass discontent and consequently contributed to the town's acceptance of the 
duke's terms. The townspeople's reaction against him suggests that they felt that it was 
their natural right to have access to all manner of information so that they could make their 
decisions independently. The most important point to draw from this example is that the 
townspeople of Troyes clearly wanted to be included in political affairs, and to maintain the 
120 Fogel, Les ceremonies de ! 'information, p. 13. 
121 Gauvard, 'Rumeur et stereotypes', p. 165. 
122 RSD, 5: 214. 
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illusion that they had the right to make their own choices when they were confronted with 
the information that they received via letters. 
A similar story can be told of Beauvais' capitulation in 1417 to John the Fearless. 
Ostensibly the Beauvaisis had agreed to the terms by their own volition upon hearing of 
the duke's `true' intentions to save the king by the reading of his letter. Likewise, in his 
March 1414 letter to the bonnes villes John explained that the townspeople in Compiegne 
and Soissons had collectively agreed to Burgundian garrisons in their towns after they had 
listened to his version of events, which were recounted to them in letter format. ' Thus the 
towns clearly reacted to the letters even if it was not because they sincerely believed in what 
he was saying. What is important here is that the towns claimed to have believed him, 
which is, at the very least, a passive acceptance of the propaganda that John the Fearless 
disseminated. 
Burgundy's main audience for his letter campaigns comprised the bonnes villes, 
who were consequently of great importance to his strategy, since, over the course of the 
fourteenth century, they had become influential voices in the government of the realm. The 
very fact that Burgundy felt the need to justify himself to the bonnes villes during periods 
of political crisis, confirms that their opinion mattered to him. This explains why the duke's 
letters requested a response and frequently invited them to engage in the political dialogue. 
However, the most important point that has been addressed here was Burgundy's ability to 
use letters more efficiently to promote his ideology than his Orleanist rivals. Although in 
later years they seemed to take John the Fearless' example and use missives, royal 
ordinances and letters close and patent to their advantage, their letter writing was initially 
defensive counter-propaganda. This is significant because it determines that Burgundy was, 
in effect, setting the bar. Even the Armagnac counter-propaganda campaign between 1413 
and 1414, which had devastating consequences for John's fama, was defensive; it was 
123 ADN, B 658, n. 15.235. 
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designed to attack at the heart of Burgundy's previous propaganda campaigns - insisting, 
for example, that what letters the king had published under Burgundy's influence were false 
and even treasonous. In 1417, John's intensive letter campaign that accompanied his 
military manoeuvres was triumphant. Although the military threat did have a great 
influence over his success with the bonnes villes, the letters did play an equally vital role. 
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CHAPTER 7 
SYMBOLS 
`Symbols are matters of relationships which must in some way be publicly 
recognized and remembered - they are not absolutes, but function entirely within social 
life. " Indeed a symbol is effectively a complex `sign', consisting of a connection between a 
signifier (an object, image or sound) and what is signified (the meaning, or concept); this 
connection is what allows receivers to subjectively ascribe meaning? Semiotic theory states 
that `the true nature of things may be said to he not in things themselves, but in the 
relationships which we construct, and then perceive, between them. i3 Hence, no observer is 
passive in the process of interpretation of sign form, that is, of symbols, icons, or rituals. 
Meaning can be derived through learning and experience, or can imposed upon us from 
persons in positions of power. ' This is important within the medieval context, for, as 
Beaune states: `Signs and symbols can carry enormous weight in a society where 
communication is primarily orally based and belief in appearances strong, often more 
meaningful than texts. " 
It follows that the symbols that formed the emblematic language of heraldry, livery, 
and badges in the middle ages were indeed exceedingly suggestive influences in medieval 
society. 6 According to Keen, `[d]isplay was necessary to make power meaningful. ' 
I Mary Carruthers, The Book of Memory: A Study of Memory in Medieval Culture (Cambridge, 1990), p. 260. 
2 Ferdinand de Saussure was the first to coin these terms in his linguistic studies. Saussure, `The Object of 
Study', pp. 5-8. Also, Hawkes, Structuralism and Semiotics, p. 13; Macey, Dictionary of Critical Theory, pp. 342-343, 
351-352; Bressler, Literary Criticism, p. 92. 
3 Hawkes, Structuralism and Semiotics, p. 7. 
4 Ibid., pp. 6-7,100-101; Esther Cohen, The Crossroads of Justice. Law and Cultum in Late Medieval France (Leiden, 
1993), p. 157. 
5 Colette Beaune, The Birth of an Ideology. Myths and Symbols of Nation in J_-ale-Medieval France, trans. Susan Ross 
Huston (Berkeley, 1991), p. 197. 
6 Hablot, `Les signes de 1'entente', pp. 320-341; Colette Beaune, The Birth of an Ideology, p. 197; Beaune, 
`Costume et pouvoir', pp. 125-146; Huizinga, Le declin du moyen äge, pp. 285-286; Adrian Ailes, Heraldry in 
Medieval England: Symbols of Politics and Propaganda', in Heraldry, Pageantry and Social Display in Medieval 
England, eds. Peter Coss and Maurice Keen (Woodbridge, 2002), p. 83. 
7 Keen, `Huizinga, Kilgour and the Decline of Chivalry', p. 10. See also Boulton, The Knights of the Gnwn, p. 2. 
154 
Accordingly, this present chapter examines the way that John the Fearless incorporated his 
personal emblems into his propaganda campaign. These he distributed widely to retainers 
and partisans in all social orders for the purpose of recruitment, which, as we shall see, 
helped to foster a strong sense of identity among both elite and non-elite partisans. In 
distributing his personal badges to aristocratic and urban followers alike, the duke was able 
to manufacture a distinct Burgundian' community, and a correlating, hostile Armagnac 
anti-community. Identity is one of the most important facets of a successful propaganda 
campaign. According to Taithe and Thornton, propaganda is a 
two-way process which reaches out for unanimity within a 
group it often helps to define. This purpose, that is, to define, is 
central to the concept, and it is a tool of exclusion as well as 
inclusion! 
Furthermore, the badges that Burgundy chose as his own personal emblems - the 
carpenter's plane and the mason's level - reinforced his policy of reform, thereby 
conveying also his ostensible devotion to the crown. In this way, the medium was more 
than simply the vehicle through which the message was conveyed; it was itself an important 
component of that message. ' This is most evident in the way that John made what were 
originally abstract symbols more tangible by turning them into items to be worn on 
clothing as brooches, or on armour, horse trappings and banners. 
It should be noted however that the duke of Burgundy was not the first to 
distribute badges to his allies and supporters. Rather, his innovation lay in the fact that he 
was ultimately responsible for turning what had, hitherto, been a private dispute between 
princely houses and their allies, into a full-scale civil war involving the townspeople of the 
realm by distributing Burgundian ensigns among them. At the end of August in 1411, 
John's ally, the count of Saint Pol, who was then the captain of Paris, mobilised a large 
group of Parisian butchers, skinners and tanners to seek out Orleanist supporters in the 
8 Taithe and Thornton, `Propaganda', Propaganda, p. 3. 
9 Hawke s, Structuralirm and Semiotics, p. 111. 
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capital. The provost of Paris, Pierre des Essarts, another Burgundian ally, declared by royal 
ordinance in September that all Orleanists were henceforth considered rebels, and that it 
was therefore permissible to kill and confiscate their property. Doubtless as a direct 
consequence of violent coercion, those who claimed to support the duke of Burgundy's 
cause began to wear lead and pewter badges with crosses of Saint Andrew (figs. 10-13) to 
differentiate themselves from non-partisans. '" Fearing exclusion and potential reprisals, the 
pressure on townspeople to openly pledge allegiance to Burgundy's faction by wearing his 
badge(s) must have been great. Consequently, many probably accepted his badges out of 
panic. 
Notwithstanding the coercion, Burgundy's second innovation was that his badges 
buttressed his main ideological tenets regarding reform, anti-taxation and good 
government. Thus, while Burgundy tried to win the hearts and minds of the people by 
ensuring that his use of symbols conformed to his underlying platform, he simultaneously 
made use of psychological and violent duress to recruit less decisive partisans to his cause. 
These two approaches made a formidable combination, and one that was undoubtedly 
difficult for many to resist. We will, therefore, examine both aspects within this present 
chapter. 
7.1. THE SOCIO-POLITICAL CONTEXT 
The vogue of secular badge-wearing for the purpose of personal identification 
gained momentum in the mid-fourteenth century. 
" Lead and pewter badges were a 
common appearance on clothing of people across Europe in the middle ages and in 
1 Bourgeois, p. 12; Histoirr de Charles VI, p. 467. 
I1 Bruna, `Le bijou emblematique', pp. 3-22; Hablot, `Les signes de 1'entente', pp. 320-341; Ronald W. 
Lightbrown, Medieval European Jewellery, with a Catalogue of the Collection in the Victoria and Albert Museum (London, 
1992), pp. 188-201; Beaune, 'Costume et pouvoir', p. 125. 
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particular, among pilgrims. 12 Likewise, they were distributed to persons who were attached 
to aristocratic households. Denis Bruna explained that secular brooches such as these were 
available for use by the general population in both France and England as far back as the 
mid-fourteenth century. " A large number of lead and pewter badges have been found in 
England to support this assertion. ' This pattern of distribution was so vast that it 
sometimes led to outbursts of violence among disparate social groupings. Consequently, 
both Richard II and Henry IV instituted laws to limit distribution. This confirms that the 
less valuable brooches were widely available and were disseminated to a broad range of 
social groups. 15 In France, badges were no less fashionable and useful among the menu 
people during the fourteenth century. When Etienne Marcel led the popular revolt in the 
1350s, he and his partisans wore ensigns of small red and blue enamel shields on which was 
written the motto: `A bonne fin'. " We can be sure, therefore, that by the time of the 
Burgundo-Armagnac war the practice of distributing badges to all members of a faction 
was firmly in place. 
The most important socio-political development that influenced the progression of 
badge-wearing among the aristocracy was arguably the great importance placed upon 
appearances, and in particular upon clothing and jewellery. In any age, clothing and 
accessories are a form of communication, part of `a system of signs that derives meaning 
from its context'. '? Indeed clothing and other forms of semiological display tend to 
12 See Bruna, Enreignes de pelerinage et ense: 
1996), pp. 13-20. 
gner profane:, Musee National du Moyen Age Thermen de Cluny (Paris, 
13 For this and what follows, Bruna, `Le bijou emblematique', pp. 14-21. 
II See Brian Spencer, Purim Souvenirs and Secular Badges, Salisbury Museum: Medieval Catalogue. Part 2 (Salisbury, 
1991), p. 97-106,123-127. 
15 Spencer, Pim Souvenirs and Secular Badges, p. 96. 
16 Lightbrown, Medieval European jewellery, p. 200, cited in Bruna, `, `Le bijou emblematique', p. 15. 
17 Nathan Joseph, Uniforms and Nonun(forms. " Communication through Clothing (New York, 1986), p. 1. For more 
on the importance of clothing as symbolic signs see chapter 2 `Sartorial Signs: A Social Vocabulary', pp. 9-30. 
See also Francoise Piponnier and Perrine Mane, Dress in the Middle Ages, trans. Caroline Beamish (New Haven, 
1997), p. 114. 
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communicate a strong message to spectators about power, prestige and authority. " This 
was particularly true in the middle ages, in a society in which the primary function of 
clothing was to distinguish one's rank and estate. An obvious instance is the importance of 
the sumptuary laws instituted across Europe in the fourteenth century, though these were, 
at best, representative of an ideal. The theory was that these `laws' would attempt to 
control the display of wealth. " Fastidious rules of display were equally observed among the 
differing ranks of nobles, where the style and cut of personal clothing, trimmings and 
ornaments were representative of position within the social hierarchy. 20 Moreover, 
extravagance in both costume and ritual at princely courts was a traditional feature of 
chivalric society. " The aristocracy continued to make their wealth and prestige manifest 
with increasingly extravagant costume and jewellery, frequently incorporating symbols such 
as heraldic emblems, devices, and chivalric orders. This trend accelerated at the French 
royal court and in other princely affinities during the second half of the fourteenth 
century. 22 
It was not merely the aristocratic estate of medieval society that recognised the 
important symbolic value of clothing and accessories. The general understanding that royal 
emblems were representative of the king's majesty and royal dignity had increased under 
1 For information on the colours used in clothing as a means of confirming the hierarchy within the royal 
house of France for example, see Christian de Merindol, `Le prince et son cortege. La theatralisation des 
signes de pouvoir 1 la fin du moyen age', in Les princes et !e pouvoir, 23e tongut de la S. H. M. E. S., Brest mai 1992, 
eds. Dominic Boutet and Jacques Verger (Paris, 1993), pp. 310-317. Piponnier and Mane, Dress in the Middle 
Ages, p. 74; Beaune, 'Costume et pouvoir', p. 127. Peter Arnade argues that the dukes of Burgundy displayed 
themselves in such a way as to create a `public profile worthy of lordship', Realms of Ritual Burgundian Ceremony 
and Civic Life in Late Medieval Ghent (Ithaca, 1996), pp. 9-10. 
19 Frederique Lachaud, Dress and Social Status in England before the Sumptuary Laws', in Heraldry, Pageantry 
and Social Display, pp. 105-107. See also Piponnier and Mane, Dass in the Middle Ages, p. 81-89,72; Piponnier, 
Costume et vie sociale. La tour d'Anjou XIV` XV'siecle (Paris, 1970), p. 25; Lightbrown, Medieval European Jewellery, 
pp. 79-88. 
zQ Boulton, Knights of the Crown, pp. 4-5. 
21 Keen, `I iuizinga, Kilgour and the Decline of Chivalry', pp. 5-9; Boulton, Knights of the Crown, p. 2. 
22 Michel Pastoureau, Traue d'heraldique, 2nd edn. (Paris, 1993), pp. 215-220; Hablot `L'emblematique', pp. 81- 
83; Hablot, 'Les signes de 1'entente', p. 319-321. See chapter 5 in Boulton, Knights of the Crown, pp. 267-210, 
and also p. 272. 
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Charles V. 23 Insisting that magnificence and luxury played a major role in distinguishing the 
king's authority from his lesser peers, Strubel argued `c'est l'habit que fait le roi'. Z4 This was 
a fundamental feature in preserving the royal dignity of the king, because his appearance 
and ritualised performance was as much a gauge of his pre-eminence over all his subjects as 
it was of his commitment to his royal duty. 2S Other princes began to borrow the strategy 
employed to bolster the `royal image', which attests to its efficacy in reinforcing the notion 
of sovereignty. 26 Indeed ducal household accounts indicate that outer appearances were 
exceedingly important to a prince's image. 27 Charles V's eldest son, Louis, was concurrently 
the duke of Anjou and the king of Sicily. His accounts disclose that he was deeply 
concerned with ensuring that his clothing and jewels befitted both exalted titles 28 His 
brothers, the dukes of Burgundy and Berry, appear to have had similar preoccupations. The 
duke of Burgundy's sumptuous court and extensive patronage of the arts is well 
documented, and one needs only look at the Tres riches heureg du duc de Berrjs illuminated 
images to call witness to the magnificence of display in courtly circles 29 
23 Armand Strubel, 'Le chevauchier de Charles V: Christine de Pizan et le spectacle de la majeste royale', in 
Penser le pouvoir au moyen dge (VIII' XV siecle), eds. Dominic Boutet and Jacques Verger (Paris, 2000), p. 390. 
For a brief overview of the heraldry of the lilies as the official arms of France in the fourteenth century see 
Beaune, Birth of an Ideology, p. 210-213. See also William Hinkle, The Fleury de Lis of the Kings of France 1285-1488 
(Carbondale, 1991), pp. 4-33. 
24 Strubel, `Le chevauchier de Charles V', p. 390. 
25 For the symbolic aspect of his royal duty see Peter Lewis, `Pourquoi aurait-on voulu reunir des 
Etats 
Generaux en France, ä la fin du moyen age? ', in Representation, pouvoir et myautd ä !a fn du moyen äge, (Pari s, 
1995), pp. 122,128-129. 
26 Merindol, `Le prince et son cortege', pp. 316-317. Michael Jones' study of the dukes of Brittany charts the 
development of this trend in the duchy from jean V (r. 1399-1442) to Anne (r. 1488-1514). "'En son habit 
royal": Le duc de Bretagne et son image vers la fin du moyen age', in Between France and England, Politics, Power 
and Society in Late Medieval Brittany (Aldershot, 2003), pp. 253-277. For a similar phenomenon in the House of 
Anjou under King Rene of Sicily, duke of Anjou, see Piponnier, Costume et vie soeiale, p. 255-259. 
27 Strubel, `Le chevauchierde Charles V', p. 390; Bruna, `Le bijou emblematique', p. 3. 
28 For information on Louis I d'Anjou's expenditure on his and his wife's wardrobe see Piponnier, Costume et 
vie . rociale, pp. 
19-45. For his rivalry with all his brothers (Charles V, Philip duke of Burgundy and John duke of 
Berry) see pp. 44-45. 
29 For Philip the Bold's patronage of the arts, see L'art ä la tour de Bourgogne. Vaughan, Philip the Bold- The 
Formation of the Burgundian State (London, 1962), pp. 188-207. For the duke of Berry's patronage, see Millard 
Meiss, French Painting in the Time of jean de Beery, I. The Late XIVth Century and the Patronage of the Duke (London, 
1967); Autrand, Jean de Berry, pp. 385-392,428-459,473-489. 
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Heraldic emblems, badges and chivalric orders gained prominence at the French 
royal court during the Hundred Years War. 30 This was the natural extension of what 
scholars refer to as `bastard feudalism', where service was given to a prince for a reward 
that was generally cash-based rather than in land tenure 3' Originally, liveries were the 
clothing given to all those who were attached to a prince's household, and were distributed 
in measure according to rank. 32 To wear a lord's chosen livery was an indication that one 
was his retainer, and had earned his protection and support. 33 From this practice the term 
`livery' took on its present meaning as the specific colours associated with a person or an 
institution 34 During the course of the fourteenth century, the gifts of clothing given to 
higher-ranking members of a prince's household or entourage were soon replaced with 
gifts, and were usually gifts of money or overie. 3S These types of favours bestowed by a 
prince were the dominant feature of `bastard feudalism'. In one example, John duke of 
Burgundy gave three thousand pounds of `vaiselle d'argent doree et blanche' to diverse 
lords, knights and squires who came to Paris between August and October 1405 to serve 
him in arms. 36 Similarly, lords distributed badges of differing quality to his retainers. The 
lower ranking members of his household might receive lead or pewter badges with the 
lord's emblem to wear upon their clothing. The distribution of gold, silver and jewelled 
badges as gifts were, by and large, reserved for the prince's elite clientele and allies. This 
30 Pastoureau, Traite d'beraldique, pp. 215-220; Hablot `L'emblematique', pp. 81-83; Hablot, 'Les signes de 
1'entente', p. 319-321. 
31 This is an area of study which has been examined in great detail, particularly as it concerns England. See 
Kenneth Bruce McFarlane, 'Bastard Feudalism', in Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research 20 (1945): 161- 
180. For an overview of the scholarship, see Gerald Leslie Harriss, 'Introduction', in McFarlane, England in the 
Fifteenth Century. Collected Essays (London, 1981): ix-xxvii; and Michael Hicks, Bastard Feudalism (London, 1995). 
For the French context see Lewis, `Decayed and Non-Feudalism in Later Medieval France', in Essays in Later 
Medieval French history (London, 1985), pp. 41-68. For a general understanding of the impact of change on 
courtly culture, see Boulton, Knigbtr of the Crown, pp. 1-26. 
32 Piponnier, Dress in the Middle Ages, p. 135; Malcolm Vale, The Princely Court: Medieval Courts and Culture in 
North-West Europe, 1270-1380 (Oxford, 2001), pp. 93-135; Bruna, `Le bijou emblematique', pp. 3-5; Boulton, 
Kn: ghtt of the Crown, pp. 4-5; Hicks, Bastard Feudalism, pp. 63-65. 
33 Hicks, Bastard Feudalism, pp. 63-64; Boulton, Knights of the Crown, p. 3. 
34 Hablot, 'Les signes de l'entente', p. 319, n. 2; Boulton, Knights of the Crown, pp. 3-4; Piponnier, Dress in the 
Middle Ages, p. 135. 
35 Piponnier, Dress in the Middle Ages, p. 135. 
36 BNF, Collection Bouggne, vol. 65, fol. 78v. 
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was a practice used by princes to tie lesser nobles and knights, vassals and non-vassals to 
his court according to ties of service. 37 
His retainers might wear his device in the form of a collar, though collars were 
typically indicators of membership to a curial order. 38 They were, according to Hablot, the 
most prestigious gift conferred by a prince. 39 Because the prince invited the recipient to 
enter into an exclusive corporate identity under his sovereign leadership, chivalric orders 
were not merely attempts to bind retainers to princes, but opportunities for princes to exert 
their influence over them. 4° This process is observed when we examine John the Fearless' 
Order of the Golden Tree, an order that was first started by his father, Philip the Bold, in 
1403. Firstly, we note that in December 1407, he gave sixteen crowns to his squires jean de 
Montjeu and to Huguenin de Marcy for the purchase of silver collars of the order. 41 
Additionally, the records reveal that John's personal collar was exceedingly luxurious, 
deliberately flaunting his great wealth. " Because the display of wealth was representative of 
noble character, it was one method of legitimising authority. Clearly, then, both badges and 
chivalric orders were extremely useful gifts with which Burgundy confirmed his power 
base. 3 
The military interaction between the nobles of France and England offered ample 
opportunities for cultural exchange. For example, while being held as hostages of Edward 
III for king John II's ransom, his sons, the duke of Berry and the duke of Bourbon, were 
exposed to Edward III's Order of the Garter and his pervasive use of the leopard as his 
37 Hablot, `Les signes de 1'entente', pp. 319-320; Beaune, `Costume et pouvoir', p. 127; Bruna, `Le bijou 
emblematique', pp. 11-14; Ailes, `Heraldry in Medieval England', pp. 95-98; Boulton, Knights and the Crown, pp. 
4-13. 
38 The differences between the distribution of badges and membership to a chivalric order are summarised in 
Maurice Keen, Chivalry (New Haven, 1984), pp. 182-183. 
39 Hablot, 'Les signes d'entente', p. 330. 
40 Keen, `Huizinga and Kilgour', pp. 9-10; Boulton, Knights of the Crown, pp. 2-3. 
4l BNF, Collection Bourgogne, 65, fols. 81v, and 80v. 
42 Ibid., fol. 81v- 
43 For the symbolic significance of displaying wealth see Arnade, Realms of Ritual, pp. 10. For chivalric orders 
as a tool for the acquisition of power, Vale, Warfafr and Aridoeratic Culture in England, France and Burgundy at the 
End of the Middle Ages (London, 1981), pp. 33-62; Keen, Chivalry, pp. 174-199; Jones, 'Les signes de pouvoir', 
pp. 141-143. 
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personal emblem. "' After their release in 1366, they brought this fashion back with them to 
the French court 45 The duke of Berry adopted the bear as his first badge, and the motto 
`Le temps venra' in 1365, while his brother-in-law Louis II of Bourbon took the Belt of 
Hope and the Ecu d'Or in 1366-67.6 Soon their other brothers, Anjou and Burgundy, 
followed their lead. 
Although the vogue was particularly well established in England during the mid- 
fourteenth century, orders of chivalry and the proliferation of personal badges were 
nevertheless a universal phenomenon in western Europe throughout the century. In 1325, 
the Angevin king Charles I of Hungary founded the Societe Fraternelle des Chevaliers de Saint 
George. ' Other orders were founded throughout Europe in the second half of the 
fourteenth century in Castille (1330), England (1344), Naples (1352/3), Cyprus (1347), the 
Empire (1355), Savoy (1364), Brittany (1381), and France, where John II founded the 
Company of the Star (1351/2). 48 In 1403, just one year before his death, Philip, duke of 
Burgundy founded the Order of the Golden Tree, which his son, John the Fearless, 
continued. 9 
Similarly, princely and noble families across medieval Europe began wearing 
personal emblems during the second half of the fourteenth century. By the end of the 
fourteenth century, personal badges were pervasive in aristocratic circles. European princes 
exchanged badges with one another on an international scale to reinforce political alliances, 
and according to Hablot, so that they would remain highly visible on the international 
44 For the French princes' experience in England: Boulton, Knights of the Crown, p. 272; Hablot, 
`L'emblematique', p. 81. For the Order of the Garter, see again Boulton, pp. 96-166. For the leopard, 
Caroline Shenton, `Edward III and the Symbol of the Leopard', in Heraldry, Pageantry and Social Display, pp. 69- 
81. 
4s Ibid. 
46 Hablot, `L'emblematique', pp. 81-82, and `Les signes de 1'entente', pp. 321-322. 
47 Boulton, Knights of the Crown, pp. 27-45; Jones, `Les signes du pouvoir. Vordre de l'Hermine, les devises et 
les herauts des ducs de Bretagne au XV' siecle', in Between France and England, p. 142. 
48 Castille, the Order of the Band; England, the Order of the Garter, Naples, the Order of the Knot; Cyprus, 
the Order of the Sword; Holy Roman Empire, the Order of the Golden Buckle; Savoy, the Order of the 
Collar; Brittany, the Order of the Ermine; France, the Company of the Golden Star. Boulton, Knights of the 
Crown, pp. 46-95,96-166,211-240,241-248,241,249-270,274-278,167-210 respectively. Jones, `Les signes 
du pouvoir', p. 142. See also Keen, Chivalry, pp. 179-199. 
, gogne, 
65, fol. 81v, and 80v. See also Boulton, Knights of the Crown, pp. 271,360, n. 8. 49 BNF, Collection Bonr 
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political stage. "' As most badges would therefore be recognisable within this community, 
they were effective means of identification within elite circles. Accordingly, the symbols 
were not necessarily understood outside this rather insular social group unless they were 
made tangibly accessible to the lower estate. This, as we shall see, was precisely what the 
duke of Burgundy attempted to do with his personal emblems. 
The bearers of aristocratic badges chose the motif for themselves, and they were 
frequently accompanied by a motto. Often ambiguous in meaning, they were the 
`expression of some particular conceit of the wearer'. " One reason that they were so 
prolific among the higher and lower nobility was due to their unrestricted nature; there 
were no set rules governing composition or the number of symbols one could have SZ 
Hence, they were far less formalised or complicated than heraldic coats of arms. Yet 
badges were virtually meaningless unless considered in their proper context 53 Because 
every emblem was intimately associated with the devices of their family, allies, or enemies, 
all badges derived their own individual meaning from the dialogue between them. During 
disputes, this element was particularly important, as was the case for the `emblem war' 
between the duke of Burgundy and the duke of Orleans. 54 
Finally, the exchange of badges often occurred during the cementing of peace 
alliances. This was precisely what occurred very publicly between Louis of Orleans and 
John the Fearless in June 1406. Laurent Hablot explained that as a mode of 
communication, the exchange of devises made alliances between princes visible to all. With 
specific reference to the 1406 wedding ceremonies, he argued that the dukes' exchange of 
badges was also a way of reinforcing their submission to Charles VI's will, given that the 
50 Lightbrown, Medieval European Jewellery, p. 199; Hablot, `Les signes de 1'entente', p. 321. 
51 Mrs. Barry Palliser, Historic Devices, Badges and War Crier (London, 1870), p. 3. See also Lightbrown, Medieval 
European Jewellery, pp. 166,188. 
52 Pastoureau, Traite hiraldique, pp. 218-219 and Hablot, `L'emblematique', pp. 81-83; Bruna, `Le bijou 
emblernatique', pp. 7-8. See also Dress in the Middle Ages, p. 133; Huizinga, Le declin du moyen 4ge, p. 22; Palliser, 
Historic Devices, pp. 1-4. 
53 Pastoureau, `Emblemes et symboles de la Toison d'Or', in L'ordre de la Toison d'Or de Philippe le Bond Philippe 
le Beau (1430-1505). Ideal ou reffet de la rodete? (Brepols, 1996), p. 100. 
54 See below. 
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king had insisted that they maintain cordial relations. " Yet as modes of communication, the 
negative subtext of the duke of Burgundy's badge must have been evident 56 However 
affable their relations appeared after their peace agreement in October 1405 and their 
exchange of badges in June 1406, the fact that John continued to use what was, at its 
inception, an antagonistic badge, suggests that the rivalry was not truly appeased. Vaughan 
agreed, calling the period between the peace agreement in October 1405 and Louis' 
assassination in November 1407 an `uneasy truce . 57 
The significance of this particular exchange is clear when we examine the Orleanist 
counter-attack against Burgundy in later years. When the Abbot of Cerisy gave his 
refutation of jean Petit's Justification in September 1408 on behalf of the Orleans princes 
(Charles, Philip and John), he argued that Louis had willingly exchanged badges with John 
in 1406 under false pretences. 58 In their `Jargeau Manifesto' against the duke of Burgundy, 
which they sent to the king and to the bonnet rilles, Louis' sons also emphasised the fact that 
their father had signed several treaties of peace with John, publicly swearing to uphold the 
agreement. The manifesto claimed that the exchange of the `ordre et le collier l'un de 
l'autre' was a `grande confirmation desdites fraternite et compagnie d'armes : S' John 
submitted to convention in August 1412 when he and Louis' sons agreed to the peace 
treaty of Auxerre, which they finalised by exchanging their badges. John the Fearless gave 
the Orleans princes horse trappings decorated in his personal colours of white, green and 
black, `lequels sont semes de rabos et de couppeaux de laton dore, ä la devise de 
monseigneur. '`° 
55 Hablot, `Les signes de l'entente', p. 325. 
w Schnerb agreed. Armagnacs et Bouquignons, p. 63. 
57 Vaughan, John the Fearless, p. 38. 
58 Hablot, 'Les signes de 1'entente', p. 328. 
59 AN, K 56, n. 18. For a contemporary copy of the Jargeau Manifesto see ADN, B 657, n. 15.183. See also: 
Monstrelet, vol. 2, pp. 152-153; RSD, vol. 4, pp. 434-436; Histoire de Charles VI, pp. 456-464. And, Plancher, 
Pnuves, pp. 278-285, n. 277. 
60 Laborde, Les dues de Bourgogne, 1: 90,92, nos. 259,261. See also Hablot, `Les signes de 1'entente', pp. 331- 
332. 
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7.2. JOHN THE FEARLESS' BADGES 
John the Fearless chose the carpenter's plane with shavings as his personal emblem 
in 1405, and scholars agree that when he did so, it was a direct challenge to Louis of 
Orleans' ragged, knotty cudgel during their first conflict in August-October 1405 61 This 
assumption is likely due to the way that Monstrelet interpreted the symbols. He claimed 
that after the duke had been murdered, the Parisians, who had been unhappy with the duke 
of Orleans' excessive taxation, `commencerent ä dire l'un a l'autre, en secret: Le baston 
noueux est plane! '62 The knotty cudgel purportedly symbolised Orleans' intention to club 
John the Fearless while his accompanying motto, `Je 1'envie' (`I challenge [him]'), was 
apparently a gaming term 63 John's retort was the Flemish motto `Ich houd' (Cl hold) and, 
as noted above, the apparatus with which he could plane down his opponent's alleged 
weapon. To illustrate his continuous efforts to wear down Louis of Orleans and remedy his 
misgovernment of the realm, John's plane was depicted at all times discharging shavings, an 
element that strengthened the power of the image. The plane's shavings were thus a 
significant element of the iconography. 
" 
However, there are some problems with the current notion that Burgundy and 
Orleans' badges and mottoes were chosen as part of an antagonistic dialogue. The first 
unresolved issue is the fact that John, a French prince with mainly French interests, chose a 
Flemish motto. If he had indeed chosen his badge as a direct response to the duke of 
61 According to Monstrelet's account of 1405: `tors avoit, ledit duc de Bourgongne, tres grant nombre de 
gens d'armes, tant dedans Paris comme dehors, lesquelz portoient en leurs pennonceaulx de leurs lances en 
flaming Hich houd, c'est ä dire je le fiend. Et c'estoit ä 1'encontre des Orliennois qui, comme dessus est dit, 
portoient: Je 1'envie. ' Monstrelet, 1: 123. For critical references to the 
dukes' respective mottoes and badges see: 
Pastoureau, `Emblemes et symboles', p. 99-106; Hablot `L'emblematique', p. 83; Schnerb, Armagnacs et 
Bourguignons, p. 63; Lightbrown, Medieval European Jewellery, p. 199; Margaret Scott, The History of Dress Series. 
Late Gothic Europe, 1400-1500 (New Jersey, 1980), p. 94. 
62 Monstrelet, 1: 165. 
63 Schnerb, Armagnacs et Bouquignons, p. 63; Scott, Late Gothic Europe, p. 94; Lightbrown, Medieval European 
Jewellery, p. 199. 
64 For example: `Le duc de Charolois portoit une escharpe, une ceinture et un poitrail d'argent gamy de 
rabots, rabotures, ais et pierreries comme celle 
du Duc'. One of the duke's belt was described thus: `une 
grosse cinture toute d'or sans nulle tissure 
faite d'ais ployer entrelasses ensemble, sur les ais il ya de petit 
rabots faicts apres le vif. Au bas de la cinture 
il y avoit des sonnettes d'or au bout desquelles il y avoit de 
rabotures et des sonnettes entremeslees d'ais... ' BNF, Collection 
Bourgogne, vol. 65, fol. 82r. 
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Orleans' knotty stick and challenging motto, we should expect Burgundy to have taken a 
French phrase. However, when one turns to examine his emblematic history, we note that 
his Flemish `Ich houd' was not an anomaly. 
In 1385, the year in which he married the German princess, Marguerite of Bavaria- 
Hainaut, John adopted the flowering hop branch, which continued to be a prominent 
badge until his death. This badge was and remained, according to Hablot, directly 
correlated to the motto he also took: `Ich haltz mich' ('I am silent', or, `I keep silent'), 
which doubtless signified something political that is, as yet, undetermined 65 Later, in 1390 
he translated the German motto into Flemish, `Ich swinghe', and took the chapeau allemand 
as an additional badge. "' According to Hablot, once his conflict with the duke of Orleans 
was firmly underway, Burgundy deliberately alternated between German and Flemish, with 
regards to his various mottoes, to revise the intended meaning according to his 
requirements. For example, the notorious Flemish `Ich houd' ('I hold) translated into 
German as `Ich hals mich'. This was an interesting play on words because the rather close 
grammatical construction cleverly called to mind the abovementioned German motto 
meaning `I am silent', whilst its meaning signified something far more assertive ('I hold). 
Likewise, the Flemish version of the phrase `Ich swinghe' could easily be morphed into `Ich 
singhe' (`I sing'). ` These very slight variations on the motto `I am silent' had important 
political implications, and are therefore of great consequence to this present study. It is 
needless to point out the aggressive undertone inherent in the alteration of `Ich swinghe' (I 
am silent) to `Ich singhe' (I sing). If Hablot's assessment is correct in stating that the latter 
was chosen during the first phase of conflict with Louis of Orleans, it is probable that 
Burgundy's figurative meaning was to assert that he would not accept a passive role in the 
65 Hablot, `L'emblematique', p. 83. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid 
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running of governmental affairs. Indeed it suggests that he would `sing' loudly of the need 
for reform, rather than remaining quiet. 
Yet the remaining question is why he chose languages that were foreign to typical 
French subjects if these were who he was predominantly interested in persuading to accept 
his policies? First, because mottoes are not tangible entities, non-aristocratic observers 
probably had little direct contact with them anyway. Therefore, the visual symbols 
themselves (the plane, and later the level and hammer) doubtless communicated his 
message adequately to French townspeople. Additionally, Burgundy's recourse to German 
and Flemish as the language he used to reinforce the emblems indicates that he had a 
strong interest in forging a solid foundation within his feudal patrimony. Where his father 
and mother's policy regarding the Flemish subjects was generally one of neglect, John not 
only attempted to appease his subjects in terms of their political requests, but actually spent 
a significant period of time in Flanders - more than in his ducal capital of Dijon. 
" This 
issue was of great importance to his county subjects, and was consequently one of the 
principal stipulations in the demands that the Four Members of Flanders submitted to him 
for ratification in March 1405" Another important clause in this document was that the 
duke would respect their language by using it in formal proceedings, which they insisted 
should be held henceforth in the Flemish-speaking part of Flanders rather than French- 
speaking Lille. 
"' Interestingly, John agreed to these demands by solemn vow, in Flemish. It 
was then registered in urban centres across his counties" We may reasonably contend, 
therefore, that John intended to display a degree of solidarity with his Flemish subjects, 
using language as a symbolic means of strengthening their relationship. One is inclined to 
agree with Schnerb, who posited: `D'emblee, les rapports du nouveau comte de Flandre et 
68 Vaughan, John the Fearlesr, pp. 14-28. 
69 Ibid., 15-16; Schnerb, jean sans Peur, pp. 147-148. 
70 Vaughan, John the Fearless, p. 15; Schnerb, jean sans Peur, pp. 147-148. 
71 Ibid., p. 148. 
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de ses Sujets avaient pris la forme d'un indispensable dialogue. ''' By identifying himself as a 
veritable Flemish ruler rather than solely a French prince, he might secure the support of 
his rather volatile Flemish subjects ." 
The second troubling problem with current thinking on the relationship between 
the two dukes' respective devices is the obscurity that surrounds the early development of 
the Orleans' badge and motto. Monstrelet first mentioned the duke's motto `Je 1'envie' in 
his account of 1405, though he does not make any reference to the badge that the duke is 
said to have used alongside the motto: the knotty stick, or cudgel. " Interestingly, Louis' 
household accounts at Blois reveal that he used a `baston tortissie' as far back as June 1401 
- nearly three years before John the Fearless would become the duke of Burgundy (April 
1404). 75 Yet this date obviously raises some important problems. Firstly, if Orleans used 
this particular badge long before he had any hostile dealings with John the Fearless it does 
not follow that the knotty stick was originally used as an aggressive overture to the latter. 
Secondly, the sparse documentary evidence between the 1401 entry in Laborde's inventory 
of the house of Orleans' ducal accounts (1852), and Monstrelet's mention of the knotty 
stick in the summer of 1405, raises the important question of whether it was in fact a 
predominant and recognisable badge within his emblematic discourse? 76 There are few 
entries in the house of Orleans' inventories amassed by Laborde or F. M. Graves that refer 
to the knotty stick directly, and none that evoke his motto `Je l'envie'. " There are only 
three further references to any sort of stick in Laborde's survey, and it is unclear whether 
72 Ibid. 
73 The explosive nature of the Four Members of Flanders is obvious in the fact that they still behaved 
uncooperatively, and at times spitefully, toward John the Fearless. Vaughan, John the Fearless, p. 25. 
74 Monstrelet, 2: 120-121. For Burgundy's response, see p. 123. 
75 Laborde, Les ducs de Bourgogne, 3: 197, n. 5936. See also Slanicka, Krieg der Zeichen, pp. 113-114. To confuse 
the problem, Schnerb dated the knotty stick to 1403. Schnerb, Armagnacs et Boue uignonr, p. 63. 
76 None of the historians or art historians who examined these badges provided concrete references in 
support of their claims. Bruna, for example, wrote: 'Ainsi, Louis d'Orleans prit pour badge un baton noueux, 
Sorte de gourdin charge de protuberance, garni de la legende suivante: "Je le Liens", legende addressee bien 
stir ! jean sans Peur' 'Le bijou emblematique', p. 16. 
77 Laborde, Let duct de Bourgogne, 3; Frances M. Graves, Quelques pieces relatives ä la vie de Louis I, duc d'Orleans et de 
Valentine Visconti, safemme (Paris, 1913). 
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he is referring to the knotty club, or merely another type of emblem. There are only two 
final mentions of a baston in the two inventories, both of which feature among Valentina 
Visconti's possessions: `Un baston ä maniere de fermail' in Laborde's inventory, and `une 
escharpe d'or toute chevronnee de bastons blancs et vers' in Graves'. ` It is true that 
neither of these surveys is necessarily exhaustive, but it is curious nonetheless that both 
works should mention the stick so sparingly, whereas there are copious mentions in these 
inventories of Orleans' other badges on clothing and jewellery, such as wolves, porcupines, 
tigers, or crossbows. The variety and the range of badges included in Louis' accounts is not 
puzzling in itself, for there were no restrictions on how many badges a prince could have 
and use. What is curious is that while each of the above-mentioned badges was ubiquitous 
in the accounts, the knotty stick was not. For this reason, it is difficult to discern precisely 
how important and how prominent the knotty stick actually was in Orleans' emblematic 
repertoire. 
To add further complication to the issue, the duke of Burgundy's accounts state 
that the badge Louis of Orleans used during the wedding celebrations in Compiegne in 
May and June 1406 was the bird's nest rather than the knotty stick. " One can make the 
necessary connection between a `baston tortissie' and the intertwining of sticks for a nest. 
However if, as most scholars suggest, the knotty stick was Orleans' main badge during the 
1405 conflict with John the Fearless, it is remarkable that he should choose the bird's nest 
when they publicly exchanged badges to reinforce their peace agreement. Especially when 
John the Fearless' plane was unavoidable: it featured prominently on his armour and 
clothing for the tournaments, and all over that of his men, and he also had a very luxurious 
78 Laborde, Let duct de Boulogne 3: 234; Graves, Que1ques pieces, p. 230. 
79 `Le duc prit la devise du rabot en l'an 1405. Celle du duc d'Orleans estoit un nid d'oiseau. Ces devises 
furent peintes aux armes pour la feste faite i Compiegne au mois de juin au dit an [1406]. ' BNF, Collection 
Bougo, gne, vol. 65, fol. 191v. See also ACO, B 1543, fols. 154v-1 55r. 
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collar with planes and shavings made for the occasion. " During that time he also gave the 
dukes of Orleans and Berry large jewelled planes embellished with a large pearl and 
emerald. " Famiglietti stated that John the Fearless turned up to the proceedings wearing a 
black surcoat with images of a cudgel, but unfortunately, he did not back this claim with 
any evidence. 82 
There are several coterminous explanations for this quandary. Firstly, it is entirely 
possible that Louis of Orleans did not regularly use the knotty club after he and John the 
Fearless had agreed to a peace settlement in October 1405, preferring to use his other less 
hostile emblems. This would certainly not have been an unusual practice among his peers. 
Secondly, he may have been trying to negate the message that the club and motto had 
originally conveyed, thereby deliberately undermining the dialogue that had existed between 
his symbol and John the Fearless'. If this was the case, he would have weakened the power 
of Burgundy's intended meaning significantly. Yet, whereas both of these options are 
plausible, the evidence suggests that the knotty stick did not originally bear the meaning or 
have the prevalence that modern historians believe it to have had. Although Orleans' 
motto, `Je 1'envie' was almost certainly an overt challenge to John the Fearless, the ducal 
accounts have insufficient evidence to categorically prove that Orleans' knotty cudgel was 
designed alongside his motto, or that it was used against John the Fearless in the same 
aggressive way. 
Nonetheless, it is perfectly clear that Burgundy chose his carpenter's plane and 
motto `Ich houd' with both the knotty stick and the motto `Je l'envie' in mind, and that 
they were designed to work together. Through his badges Burgundy accepted Louis' 
ideological challenge, deflecting it back. It suggests, therefore, that Burgundy redefined the 
meaning of Orleans' knotty stick for his own purpose, turning it in to something altogether 
80 For the exchange of badges at Compiegne see BNF, Collection Bourgogne, vol. 65, fol. 78v, and 82r. For 
specific details on the carpenter's plane during the festivities, see fols. 81v-82r. 
81 BNF, Collection Bourgggne, vol. 65, fol. 82r. 
92 Famiglietti, Rnyallntngue, p. 55. 
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aggressive. This is significant because it demonstrates that Burgundy had a sense of the 
impact the symbol could have within a wider political and social context. Indeed he was 
aware of how his own choices could reflect negatively upon his rivals, a strength which he 
would use to its full advantage. Therefore, unlike Louis of Orleans, he did not associate 
himself with a large number of personal emblems; he chose three main badges as his major 
icons: the carpenter's plane, the hop branch and the mason's level (from 1 January 1410). 83 
These overwhelmed spectators with their pervasive repetition in the duke's private and 
public life. 
One has only to look at representations of John's appearance as depicted in various 
manuscript illuminations and portraits to see how much a part of his public image these 
were. There is little reason for John the Fearless to have advertised his emblems so widely 
if they had no meaning at all to people outside his immediate social sphere. In the funerary 
sculpture over his tomb at the Chartreuse de Champmol in Dijon, the duke was depicted 
wearing an ermine-lined black robe, probably a hhouppelande, covered in golden carpenter's 
planes. (fig. 8). Similarly, the dedication page of Pierre Salmon's Demandes (1409), BNF ms. 
fr 23279 fol. 1r, depicts the duke of Burgundy in a black and red fur-lined houppelande, 
covered in carpenters planes and levels (fig. 3). He also wears a black houppelande in a 
miniature on fol. 11 9r, where he sits on a ducal throne over which hangs a canopy covered 
in carpenter's planes and houblon (fig. 4). His colours, green and white (to which we would 
add black), accentuates the edges of the canopy, making this space purely his own. Finally, 
he holds in his left hand what is either a hatchet or a hammer. This implement was one of 
the attributes he holds on fol. 4r in the Geneva manuscript (ms. fr. 165). " Associated with 
building and carpentry, the hammer was, of course, complementary to the plane and the 
level. It would, therefore buttress his ideological platform of `rebuilding' the government. 
83 For the first record mentioning the mason's level, BNF, Collection Boulogne, vol. 65, fol. 91r. See also 
Nlonstrelet, 2: 57. Bruna, `Le bijou emblematique', p. 17. 
84 Roux, Dialogues, pp. 83-83; Hedeman, The Rnyýal Image: Illustrations of the Grandes Chroniques de France 
(Berkeley, 1991). 
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David Nicholas has shown that the same tool was also a symbol of anti-taxation during the 
1382 Parisian revolt. The rebels were called `Maillontins' because they swore an oath on a 
hammer not to pay the tax imposed by royal authority. 85 As we have seen, Burgundy's anti- 
tax position was an important element of his propaganda. Therefore it is likely that 
Burgundy capitalised on the association between the hammer and the notion of anti- 
taxation. At the very least, it was an excellent mneumonic cue in manuscript illumination to 
remind observers of his intention to `renovate' the government. 
Additionally, on jean de Hayton's dedication page to his Merveilles du monde, BNF 
ms. fr. 2810, fol. 226 (c. 1412) (fig. 5), the duke wears a red fur-lined red and black 
hoiippelande covered in golden planes, levels and hop branches. He wears a collar of gold 
from which are suspended both planes and levels, which is reminiscent of the collar he 
wore in May 1406.86 In the dedication illuminations of both the Livre des merveilles and 
Salmon's Demandes, the duke of Burgundy is portrayed in profile with similar hand gestures. 
According to Anne D. Hedeman, Burgundy's pose in BNF ms. fr. 23279 `reflects an 
official portrait. 187 Buettner emphasised the importance of portraiture in manuscript 
illumination on its function. She claimed it was `a sort of self-celebratory mark of visual 
ownership, the mimetic equivalent of a heraldic device. i88 Certainly it was in line with 
Burgundy's ostentatious display of his personal symbols; these too were designed for the 
purpose of self-aggrandizement. 
In the Hayton manuscript the duke sits on a spacious bench over which hangs his 
coat of arms. Four emblems unite the outer border of folio 226. The vertical left border is 
decorated with a hop branch around which a scroll bears the motto `Ich swighe' ('I am 
silent'). It is rather intriguing that John should use an earlier, less aggressive motto here. 
This manuscript was, after all, completed between 1411 and 1412, during a period of 
85 David Nicholas, The LaterMedieval City 1300-1500 (London, 1997), p. 128. 
86 BNF, Collection Bourgogne, vol. 65, fol. 81v. See above. 
87 Hedeman, Of Counsellors and Kings, p. 8. 
88 Buettner, `Profane Illuminations, Secular Illusions', p. 76. 
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intense tension between the duke of Burgundy and his rivals 87 However, the fact that it 
was given to the duke of Berry for the etrennes of 1 January 1413, only four months after the 
Peace of Auxerre was ratified, might explain this curiosity. "' Perhaps he felt that there was 
little reason to insult Berry with an aggressive message in this manuscript. Alternatively, this 
may have indicated to Berry that he would `keep silent' as long as he was able to continue 
implementing his policies unhindered. The deliberate inclusion of the mason's levels 
throughout the manuscript would have reinforced this message. 
We note, for example, in the top left corner of this particular folio there remains a 
mason's level with a banderole now faded. It is apparent that the level was deliberately 
covered at some point after its composition. Likewise, a lion (the emblem of Flanders) 
faces right, with a coat of arms hanging from his neck that was originally John the Fearless', 
but has since been repainted in Jacques d'Armagnac's. In the bottom right, an eagle bearing 
a shield with an additional coat of arms hangs from his neck. Although this too is faded, 
the red band across suggests that it was also repainted in Jacques d'Armagnac's arms. 
Unfortunately, the image and banderole in the top right corner is undecipherable. 
However, based on the fact that most of John the Fearless' other predominant emblems 
were included here, one might reasonably posit that a carpenter's plane was figured there. 
Interestingly this same framing pattern repeats itself several times throughout the 
manuscript. 
Therefore, it is clear that these particular badges were ubiquitously placed upon his 
person. Loaded in meaning, and solely associated with the duke of Burgundy and his 
partisans, they thereby helped to create a distinct `Burgundian' community for his 
adherents in both elite and non-elite social groups 
91 We have already noted that Burgundy 
distributed his personal badges in the form of jewellery and armour to his noble retainers 
89 Hedeman, Of Counsellors and Kings, p. 89, n. 4. 
90 Schnerb, jean sans Peur, p. 454. 
91 He did, however have other emblems which he used, but none as predominantly as the three discussed 
here. 
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and to his most important allies" In 1411 John distributed his badge to higher-ranking 
members of his household 93 On 1 January 1410, he gave golden mason's levels decorated 
with sapphires, diamonds and pearls to `tous les seigneurs, chevaliers et escuyers qui 
estoient de son party... 04 Therefore, by identifying his retainers as belonging to his `party', 
he not only emphasised their traditional feudal obligation to him, but also differentiated 
them from those who opposed him: the Orleanists. This is not surprising given that 
sartorial uniformity has always been an effective means of creating and strengthening 
corporate identity. 95 John may also have distributed rings with his cameo and a carving of a 
carpenter's plane to his more elite peers, including the dauphin Louis duke of Guyenne (fig. 
1) 96 Guyenne's ring was given to him on 1 January 1412, during the height of the first 
phase of civil war between the Burgundians and the Armagnacs 97 Defining a community 
and its correlating anti-community was a fundamentally important propaganda process" 
The duke's badges were also painted onto the armour and banners of armies in 
times of tournaments or military conflict. ' For the 1406 jousts at Compiegne, John had his 
carpenter's plane painted onto his armour and that of his men for the jousting tournaments 
and other festivities that were held for the royal children's marriages. ""' John's accounts of 
1407 under the receiver-general of all finances jean Pressy (November 1406-November 
1407) indicated that the duke made three large standards and three thousand banners for 
92 In just one of many examples, John gave 315 carpenter's planes embellished with diamonds to `plusieurs 
chevaliers, seigneurs et escuyers', and also a plane 'en facon d'aneau a un diament une perle et un ruby' to 
several other important officers of his household, and to the count of Charollais. BNF, Collection Bourgogne, 
vol. 65, fol. 78r. 
93 Laborde, Les dues de Bourgogne, 1: 28, n. 24. 
94 BNF, Collection Bourgogne, vol. 65, fol. 91r. See also Monstrelet, II: 57. 
91 Hicks, Bastard Feudalism, p. 64; Joseph, Uniforms and Nonuniforms, p. 2. 
96 Paris 1400, p. 66. The ring that was given to the dauphin is only slightly different than that which the Paris 
1400 exhibit featured. See also Art d la cour de Bourggqne, p. 734. 
96 Art ä la cour de Bourgogne, p. 734. Paris 1400, p. 66. 
97 One of Burgundy's main rivals, the duke of Berry, had received similar types of rings with his own cameo 
from his son-in-law John of Bourbon in 1409, and his grandson, Charles count of Eu in 1413. Art ä !a cour de 
Bourgogne, p. 734. Paris 1400, p. 66. 
9e Taithe and Thornton, `Propaganda', Propaganda, p. 3. 
99 Palliser, Historic Devices, p. 1. 
100 BNF, Collection Bouigogne, vol. 65, Pols. 78v-82r, 191v. 
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his army which were all decorated with carpenter's planes and their shavings. t°' Similarly, 
when fighting broke out in September 1411, John the Fearless paid for `deux milliers de 
pannonceaux, faits ä la devise de mondit seigneur, du rabots' in addition to `ij" 
pannonceaux a lances fais de sa devise' for war in 1411.102 When he triumphantly re-entered 
Paris with the queen on July 1418, Burgundy's army was also carrying banners decorated 
with carpenter's planes. 103 In 1414 John paid for a large number of pennants and banners 
for his trumpets and those of the duke of Guyenne, to be decorated with their coats of 
arms and personal badges. This was done in preparation for his campaign to `liberate' the 
dauphin from the Armagnacs. 1°4 Trumpets served to announce something important such 
as the march of an army or an official proclamation. Martine Clouzot argued that in the 
Burgundian court they were used during entry ceremonies and corteges as aural symbols of 
the duke's power, for the reason that the resonance of the noise emanating from the 
instruments imposed itself on the people who heard it. 1°5 As a herald of his coming, the 
trumpets helped to legitimise his prestige and authority. "" Therefore, in integrating his coat 
of arms and personal badges with those belonging to the dauphin on the banners of these 
instruments, John emphasised his and the dauphin's illusory unity, thereby legitimising his 
siege of Paris. There is little doubt, therefore, that every person who saw John's army, 
whether a noble person, townsperson or villager, would notice the copious number of 
planes that decorated its armour, banners and pennants. 
101 BNF, Collection Bourgogne, 65, fols. 79r. 
102 John also paid for three large banners painted with the king's personal arms to accompany his. Laborde, 
1 
_, es 
duct de Bouogne, 1: 29, nos. 28-30. At this time, Charles duke of Orleans also paid for three thousand nine 
hundred pannonceaux to be painted with one of his personal badges, the stinging nettle, `pour l'armee qu'il 
envoyait contre le duc de Bourgogne' during the same conflict. Vol. 3: 259, no. 6220. 
103 Auguste Longon, `Entree de la reine Isabeau et du duc de Bourgogne ä Paris (14 juillet 1418)', in Soctiti de 
I'histoirr de Paris et de 17le-de-France 2 (1875): 106. 
104 'Item, pour une banniere et I pennons de mondit seigneur de Bourgogne armoyes et fais ä sa 
devises-Item pour deux bannieres pour les trompettes de mondit seigneur de Guienne semblablement 
faittes et armoires ä sesdites armes... Item, pour III bannieres pour les trompettes de mondit seigneur de 
Bourgoigne semblablement faictes et armoiee[s] ä ses dites armes ... 
IIII'' petiz penonceaulx faiz ä la devise 
de mondit seigneur... ' Laborde, Let duct de Bouqogne, 1: 94, no. 64. 
105 Martine Clouzot, `Le son et le pouvoir en Bourgogne au XVe siecle', in Revue historigue 302 (2000), pp. 615- 
628. 
106 Clouzot, `Le son et le pouvoir', p. 625; Fogel, Lea ceremonies de 17nformation, pp. 24-25. 
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Yet Bruna argued that emblems and badges were part of a form of communication 
reserved exclusively for the aristocracy. "' Although it is true that people outside this elite 
sphere would not have found the meanings of badges necessarily obvious, it does not 
preclude the fact that they had the ability to interpret the symbols accurately. Firstly, we 
must not imprudently suppose that the people of the realm were oblivious to what was 
happening in aristocratic and political circles. There is little doubt that they did follow 
events, for letters were published widely, informing the townspeople of the realm exactly 
what was occurring between the houses of Burgundy and Orleans. 
Secondly, we must bear in mind that, by their very nature, symbols require an 
interpretive audience that is equipped with the appropriate references to make sense of 
what they are seeing; otherwise the symbols are worthless. Charles Pierce has posited that 
the sole reason that symbols succeed is because the audience learns the signifying message 
of the sign. "" With regards to John the Fearless' symbols, we can be certain that they were 
not so abstract as to have no resonance whatsoever among diverse social stratums within 
the medieval hierarchy. Two of his most predominant emblems - the carpenters' plane 
and, later, the level - were mundane tools, with which many townspeople (and in 
particular, artisan families) would have been very familiar. We know that John the Fearless 
was considerably vocal about his goal to reform the government, and indeed about his 
desire to serve the common good. In light of the fact that he published his ideology as 
extensively as he could in towns across the realm, it is not implausible to believe that urban 
audiences would have understood the metaphor that John the Fearless used, by which he 
conveyed his plan to `rebuild' a virtuous and strong government with his plane, level and 
hammer. This was particularly true if the hammer had remained a symbol of anti-taxation, 
for this was one of the cornerstones of Burgundy's platform for reform. 
'°7 Bruna, 'Le bijou emblematique', p. 16. 
108 Hawkes, Structuralism and Semiotics, p. 100. 
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Moreover, the fact that his emblems were so pervasive raises the question of why 
he took the trouble to exhibit them so widely if they were not understood. Not only did his 
planes and levels appear all over his clothing, on all of his banners during war and as 
badges on his soldiers, retainers, and his urban partisans, they were featured on the exterior 
of his Paris residence, Hotel Artois. Indeed on the only remaining tower of his residence 
one finds a large carving of a level set within a window frame, now facing rue St. Etienne 
(fig. 9). A closer look at the Litre des merveilles reveals that the windowpanes of the duke's 
residence also incorporated mason's levels. Additionally, in preparation for the December 
1407 conference with the dukes of Anjou and Berry held at Amiens regarding the murder 
of Louis of Orleans, John hung from his place of residence an imposing banner with a 
carpenter's plane and a combat lance on one side, and a jousting lance on the other. 
Apparently this banner signified that he was ready for either peace or war, depending on 
the outcome of the conference. "" It would be rash to assume that only the dukes of Berry 
and Anjou had the capacity to understand this less-than-subtle message. This further 
anecdote makes it patent that Burgundy's emblems were as accessible to townspeople as to 
the aristocracy. 
Certainly we know that urban partisans wore lead and pewter badges with the cross 
of his patron saint, Saint Andrew, to indicate their affiliation to the duke of Burgundy. Four 
badges that were found among countless other secular and profane brooches on the 
riverbed of the Seine when it was excavated in the nineteenth century correspond 
accurately to the chroniclers' descriptions of Burgundian partisan brooches worn from 
August 1411 onwards (figs. 10-13). 110 All four have saltires, and one is exactly as it was 
described in the chronicles of the period under study here (fig. 11): `En ce temps prindrent 
ceulx de Paris chaperons de drap pers et la croix de Saint Andrieu, ou milieu ung escu a la 
109 Schnerb, jean sans Pear, pp. 239-240; Vaughan, John the Fearless, p. 69. 
110 This was done to facilitate heavy shipping. The French archaeologist Arthur Forgeais preserved and 
catalogued them, and today they are 
kept at the Musee National du Moyen Age (Paris). There were also four 
Armagnac badges found. Bruna, Enseignes, pp. 20-26. 
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fleur de lis, et maint de quinze jours avoit ä Paris cent milliers, que hommes que enfens, 
signez devant et derriere de ladicte croix, car nul n'yssoit de Paris qui ne 1'avoit. '"' Most 
interestingly, one of the four features a carpenters' plane and level alongside Saint Andrew 
and his saltire (fig. 10). This is significant because it confirms that the lower estates did 
indeed have access to the duke of Burgundy's personal emblems, and did, in point of fact, 
appropriate them into their own iconography - this was their parole within the underlying 
emblematic `language'. There is no reason to assume that this was the only popular badge 
to incorporate both the saltire and the plane and level simply because it is the only one 
found during the excavation. 
According to Michel Pastoureau, the Burgundian emblems were consciously 
filtered down from the top to the bottom: from the prince, the emblems passed unto his 
household and to his entourage, and finally to his urban partisans. The above-mentioned 
badge supports this claim. Saint Andrew was the patron saint of Burgundy in general, and 
of the Valois dukes of Burgundy in particular. "' John the Fearless' Book of Hours 
reinforces the position that St. Andrew was of foremost importance to the duke by 1411 
(BNF, ms. lat. nouv. acq. 3055 fol. 172v). In this image, the plane and the level flank Saint 
Andrew, and incorporated also the duke's coat of arms (fig. 6). Hitherto, this book has 
been rather vaguely dated between 1406 and 1415.13 Yet we know that John did not begin 
to use the mason's level until 1410. "a Moreover, the fact that there are no other saints 
within this particular Book of Hours where Burgundy's personal emblems are featured 
III Bourgeois, p. 12. The Jouvenal compiler's version is virtually identical. He wrote: `Et prirent l'enseigne du 
duc de Bourgogne, ou devise, qui estoit le sautoir, qu'ils appeloient la croix Sainct Andre, et une fleur dc lys 
au milieu. Et y avoit en escrit Vitae le Roy. Et tour la prenoient, voire les femmes, et petits enfans. ' Hirtoirr de 
Charles VI, p. 467. 
112 Vale, War and Chivarly, p. 40. According to Chaume and Drouot it was Philip the Bold who had been given 
a piece of Saint Andrew's cross from the abbey of Saint Victor in Marseilles: il la placa dans une eglise de 
Bruxelles, et ce fut cette relique qui determina le mouvement de devotion ä la suite duquel saint rindre prit 
figure de patron de la principaute constituee par les ducs dans le Nord et en Bourgogne. ' M. Chaume and H. 
Drouot Bibliographie bourguignonne. Iconographie et Emblemes Historiques' in, Annalen de Bourgogne 11 
(1939): 150-151. 
113 John Harthan, Books of Hourr and their Owners (London, 1977), pp. 98-101. 
114 BNF, Collection Bourgogne, vol. 65, fol. 91r. See also Bruna, `Le bijou emblematique', p. 17. 
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suggests that Saint Andrew had indeed become a highly politicised symbol by the time of 
composition. The date of composition was, therefore, most likely after August 1411, the 
moment when his popular partisans began wearing St. Andrew's crosses as symbols of 
their support. Furthermore, it is revealing of the saint's weight that the artist arranged the 
four icons together in this way, and exclusively within this image. The four interconnected 
symbols reinforced the rhetorical dialogue between them, and testified to their importance 
within John's emblematic discourse; clearly these were all equally important facets of the 
duke of Burgundy's identity by this time. The abovementioned pewter badge (fig. 10), in 
which all were carved, establishes that all these symbols did indeed become mutually 
supporting. This particular badge establishes beyond any doubt that the Parisians 
appropriated his personal emblems to use alongside his patron saint's attribute in their own 
emblematic repertoire as signs of their loyalty to his faction. 
Although Burgundy's patron saint and his attribute were initially the symbols of 
popular division of his faction, through time the aristocratic members appropriated them 
also. "-5 By the autumn of 1414, the saltire began to take precedence over the carpenter's 
plane as a badge denoting allegiance to the duke of Burgundy. When the dauphin held the 
first negotiations for what became the peace of Arras, he demanded that all present remove 
either their saltires or their white bands, symbols which represented the Burgundian and 
Armagnac faction respectively. "' Furthermore, with the Virgin Mary, Saint Andrew became 
the protector of the Burgundian Order of the Golden Fleece from its inception, and the 
saltire became one of its most important emblems. "' The first official meeting of the Order 
of the Golden Fleece was held on 30 November 1431, Saint Andrew's feast day. Moreover, 
the Burgundian army under Philip the Good always wore a red saltire on the front of their 
1ts Pastoureau, 'Emblemes et symboles', p. 101. 
116 Vaughan, John the Fearless, p. 200. 
117 Philip the Good was John the Fearless' son and heir. He ascended to his position upon John's death at the 
hands of the young dauphin, the future Charles VII, in November 1419. For details on the Order of the 
Golden Fleece, Pastoureau, 'Emblemes et symboles', pp. 101-104; Boulton, Knights of the Crown, pp. 370-372. 
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armour. Pastoureau postulated that the two sticks of the later Burgundian saltire were 
reminiscent of Louis of Orleans' emblem, the knotty stick, which John the Fearless had 
figuratively smoothed with his carpenter's plane. "' 
It should be noted here, however, that similarly to the duke of Burgundy's elite 
faction, the Orleanists princes wore emblems denoting their affiliation to each other by 
wearing white bands as far back as July 1410, when they made their first armed stand 
against the duke of Burgundy. According to the Bourgeois de Paris it was because of their 
1410 alliance that they had first received their name `Armagnac'. He explained: 
Et tout le mal qui cc faisoit de delä, chascun disoit que cc faisoit 
le conte d'Armignac, tant estoit de malle voulente plain, et pour 
certain on avoit autant de pitie de tuer cc gens comme de 
chiens; et quelconques estoit tue de delä, on disoit `C'est un 
Armignac', car ledit conte estoit tenu pour tres cruel homme et 
tyrant et sans pities "9 
Throughout his chronicle, the Bourgeois de Paris referred to the Armagnac faction as the 
`bandez', often qualifying the adherents as `faulx bendez'. 
Yet before August 1411 only the princes and their allies bore the symbol. It was the 
Burgundian militia and Burgundian ensigns that swept the general population up into the 
conflict, and forced them to choose their new identity. 
Est ä advertir que toutes ces choses se faisoient au nom du Roy 
et de monseigneur le Daulphin. Mais ils laisserent la croix droite 
blanche, qui est la vroye enseigne du Roy, et prirent la croix de 
Sainct Andre, et la devise du duc de Bourgogne le sautoüer, et 
ce qu'on disoit Armagnacs portoient la bande, et pour ce 
sembloit que ce fussent querelles particuliers. 120 
Hence, by 1411, all Burgundian partisans who wished to associate themselves with the 
duke of Burgundy began wearing St. Andrew's crosses as a sign of their loyalty, and those 
who wished to associate themselves with his rivals wore white bands. The 1411 massacres 
of Armagnacs from all social strata, and those that similarly occurred in 1413 and 1418, 
118 Pastoureau, "Emblemes et symboles', p. 103. 
119 Bourgeois, 10. 
120 Hirtoin de Charles VI, p. 473. 
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confirm that those who were responsible for the killings did indeed consider their 
Armagnac rivals as treasonous and corrupt, or, at the very least, claimed it to be so. 
Therefore, badges and emblems played a vital role in the drama that unfolded between 
Burgundians and Armagnacs. The proliferation of Burgundian crosses in 1411 forced the 
people of the realm to choose whether they wanted to be considered `Burgundian' or 
`Armagnac'. In September 1411 while John's army and noble allies and retainers bore the 
carpenter's plane on their armour as a symbol of their partisanship, his militia and his other 
supporters bore the cross of Saint Andrew as a sign of their ostensible allegiance. Yet even 
if Burgundy's symbols were representative of an iconographical hierarchy, they later 
blended together and were made available to all members of the party, across all social 
orders. Therefore the connection between the plane and the level on the one hand, and the 
saltire on the other, is unquestionable. Both types of badges were highly visible as symbols 
of war against the Armagnacs, and both thus helped forge a Burgundian' identity. The 
binary process of inclusion and exclusion was crucial to Burgundy's propaganda because on 
a theoretical plane it reinforced clear policy divisions, whilst on ground level, endorsed an 
abhorrence of the `other'. Both further perpetuated the dichotomy between `good' and 
`evil', a cornerstone of Burgundy's ideological platform. 
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CHAPTER 8 
CEREMONIAL DISPLAY 
There is nothing in our world that is void of meaning; all of our words and actions 
transmit messages that communicate something about our society's social, political or 
cultural structure, or `language'. Therefore a ritual is, according to the eminent 
anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss, `a partial expression of the total culture, conceived 
ultimately as a single gigantic language. " This was a view similarly held by Michele Fogel, 
who explained that a ceremony is the `ensemble articule d'elements rituels qui fixent au 
plus pres par les objets, les Bestes et les paroles la place qui revient ä chacun dans la 
hierarchie des pouvoirs. i2 Therefore, we must understand rituals and ceremonies as one 
important form of communication within a larger cultural structure; a sign system that 
expresses a particular ideology through the symbolic, whereby the meaning is dependent 
upon the context in which the ritual is performed. 
' Moreover, like symbols, rituals are 
designed to publicise a specific, if complex, message, and relies therefore on the active 
participation of its spectators who witness the event. Without spectators the ritual would 
lose signification. ' For this reason, they are fundamental in state building. ' They are more 
than a means of legitimising sovereign power: they are, in fact, the very manifestation of 
the existing power. Arnade argued that power was essentially the authoritative force upon 
which ceremony depended, claiming `power served pomp, not pomp power. ' In this way, 
rituals and ceremonies ensured that the authority that medieval rulers held in their 
respective territories, was preserved. Thus, staged public events such as entries and 
I Hawkes, Structuralism and Semiotics, p. 21. 
2 Fogel, Ler cerimonies de ! 'information, p. 18. 
3 This interpretation is further confirmed in Kiril Petrov, The Kiss of Peace. Ritual, Self, ' and Society in the High and 
Late Medieval West (Leiden, 2003), p. 6. 
4 Christiane Klapisch-Zuber, 'Rituels publics et pouvoir d'Etat', in Culture et ideologie daps la genese de l'etat 
moderne. Actes de la table ronde organisle par 
le Centre National de la recherche sdentifigue et l Ecole franfaise de Rome (Rome 
15-17 octobre, 1984) (Rome, 1985), p. 136; Jacques Heers, 'Les metiers et 
les fetes medievales en France du 
Nord et en Angleterre', in Revue du Nord 55 (1973): 194. 
5 Arnade, Realms of Ritual, p. 4. See also Guenee, States and Rulers, pp. 25-28. 
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processions, executions, and the publication of proclamations were useful media through 
which John could promote his version of events and attempt to influence public opinion. 
These were opportunities to reinforce the predominant tenets of his ideology through 
ceremonial display, that is, his unwavering loyalty to the king and royal family, and the 
contrast between his own `good government' and the Orleanists' misgovernment. 
There is little doubt that the king's subjects were familiar with this form of semiotic 
discourse because they were accustomed to relying on ritual to interact with their king and 
his representatives. Barbara Hanawalt and Kathryn Ryerson emphasised the importance of 
the `sensory impact' upon spectators during medieval urban ceremonies, and highlighted 
the complex symbolic role that townspeople undertook in creating and upholding the 
multifarious customs and rituals. " Urban officials also depended upon powerful symbols to 
express their town's dignity and honour. ' Thus, townspeople were not only capable of 
comprehending the complexity of royal symbolism, but helped to create and maintain it. In 
this way, entries were a semiotic structure in themselves, from which a clear message 
reinforcing the political hierarchy of the middle ages was issued! 
The subtextual dialogue between the carefully organised performances of both ruler 
and subjects is, arguably, the most intriguing element of medieval royal rituals. For the 
subjects, it was an event whereby they simultaneously validated their sovereign's authority 
whilst confirming their urban privileges to preserve their right to self-determination. " 
Spectators were active participants in the rite: many actually engaged in the progression of a 
great number of public events, or enthusiastically voiced their approval or disapproval from 
6 Barbara A. Hanawalt and Kathryn Ryerson, `Introduction', in City and Spectacle in Medieval Europe, eds. 
Barbara A. Hanawalt and Kathryn L Ryerson (London, 1994), pp. xiv-xv. 
7 Lorraine Attreed, 'The Politics of Welcome. Ceremonies and Constitutional Development in Later Medieval 
English Towns', City and Spectacle, p. 210. 
8 Hawkes, Structuralism and Semiotics, p. 110. 
9 Guenee and Lehoux, Les entries royales Franfaises de 1328 ä 1515 (Paris, 1968), p. 24; Lawrence Bryant, `La 
ceremonie de 1'entree ä Paris au moyen age', in Annalec ESC 4 (January-February 1986): 515; Bryant, 
'Configurations of the Community in Late Medieval Spectacles. Paris and London during the Dual 
Monarchy', in City and Spectacle in Medieval Europe, pp. 9-13; Attreed, 'he Politics of Welcome', pp. 208-209, 
224. 
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the periphery. As a result, over the course of the middle ages, urban groups had a 
considerable influence over the organisation of the majority of public rituals and the 
semiotic meaning implicit in the practice, which they modified to suit their own collective 
interests. 10 Urban ceremonies were vital to the preservation of stability and tranquillity of 
medieval urban society. " Lorraine Attreed argued that the meticulous details of urban 
ceremonies, from the clothing that was worn to which social groups were physically 
included in the ceremonial performance, were of great importance. " These, she argued, 
`bore witness to the prestige of the community, they expressed the power relations of its 
members, and they permitted a visual reminder of the ordered and unified structure of all 
the parts of the urban social body. '" As noted above, this is explained by the fact that 
meaning is constructed by the receivers, either because it was an established cultural 
referent, or was learned through experience. ' 
According to Guenee and Lehoux, Charles VI's illness impeded the continued 
staging of grand ceremonies, such as royal entries, unless they were executed in response to 
a victory or a peace treaty. " This is not entirely accurate. In fact there were a large number 
of impressive spectacles held in Paris and elsewhere during the period under study. John 
the Fearless orchestrated a number of entries, military and religious processions, and 
several public executions of high-profile Orleanist sympathisers, particularly in 1405,1408- 
09,1411-12, and 1418. The Armagnac princes also staged some rather impressive 
processions and entry ceremonies while they were in control of the government, mainly 
from the end of 1413 and in 1414. While in the long term these events contributed to the 
10 Bryant, `La ceremonie de l'entree', p. 513; Bryant, `Configurations of the Community', pp. 10-11. 
II Attreed, The Politics of Welcome', p. 209. 
12 See also Bryant, `La ceremonie de 1'entree', pp. 519-520,526-530. This interpretation is supported by 
Roland Barthes, Elements of Semiologp, trans. Annette Lavers and Colin Smith (New York, 1973), pp. 25-30; 
Hawkes, Structuralism and Semiotics, pp. 110-111. 
13 Attreed, 'The Politics of Welcome', p. 209. 
14 Peirce was the main proponent of this view, though this is one of the fundamental principles of both 
structuralism and semiotics. See Hawkes, Structuralism and Semiotics, pp. 6-7,100-101; Macey, Dictionary of 
Ci'itical Theory, pp. 293-294,352. 
15 Guenee and Lehoux, Les entries royales, p. 18. 
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divisiveness of civil war, in the short term they had a stabilising effect upon a society where 
uncertainty and volatility ruled. Laurence Bryant argued that during the Lancastrian 
occupation of France in the 1420s and 1430s, the government's spectacles `opened new 
spaces for political expression and thought at a time when the customary political 
vocabulary was in disarray and incapable of addressing the malaise and near anarchy of the 
existential conditions. "" Similarly, John the Fearless and his Armagnac rivals appear to have 
appropriated the language of royal ritual to strengthen their grip over the royal government. 
Although it was certainly not innovative to use ceremonial display and ritual to promote 
oneself in medieval society, what was unique about Burgundy's approach was that he used 
this medium to propagandise his policies. Whereas the Armagnacs appear to have used 
ritual and ceremony to either counteract the duke of Burgundy's pageantry, or merely to 
consolidate their power, Burgundy was far more consistent. Indeed he used them as a 
platform to endorse his programme for reform and to substantiate his ostensible loyalty to 
the crown of France from the very beginning of his career. This chapter, then, will examine 
the duke of Burgundy's reliance on `political dramaturgy' to promote his ideology during 
his conflict with the Armagnacs, and measure its effectiveness as a medium of propaganda 
alongside the other forms he used. ' 
8.1. ENTRIES AND PROCESSIONS IN PARIS 
The most obvious example of the signification of ritual as a code of 
communication was, arguably, the royal entry ceremony. 18 Townspeople traditionally 
16 Bryant, 'Configurations of the Community', p. 3. 
`Political dramaturgy' is a phrase Arnade used to describe the political rituals that contribute to the 'theatre 17 
state' as coined by C. Geertz. It refers to the cultural interaction between urban and political groups, which 
encouraged the staging of public ceremonies and spectacles. See Arnade, Ritual and Representation, p. 4. 
18 For the importance of entries and processions as ritual see Bryant, The King and the City in the Parisian Royal 
Entry Ceremony: Politics, Ritual, and Art in the Renaissance (Geneva, 1986) and `La ceremonie dc 1'entree', pp. 513- 
542; Guenee and Lehoux, Les entries royales; Guenee, `Liturgie et politique. Les processions speciales ä Paris 
sous Charles VI', in Saint-Denis et la royaute, pp. 23-49; Ralph Giesey, `Models of Rulership in French Royal 
Ceremonial', in Rites of Power. Symbolism, Ritual, and Politics since the Middle Ages, ed. Sean Wilentz (Philadelphia, 
1985), pp. 41-64. 
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welcomed the ruler outside their city walls and escorted him through a planned trajectory 
to a specific destination within the town. " This act was symbolic of their autonomy, whilst 
simultaneously accentuating their deference to their sovereign lord. 20 During entry 
ceremonies townspeople frequently staged small dramas along the processional route on 
themes that they felt related to their monarch, or to the political circumstances of the 
period 21 
Given that entries were reciprocal, signifying rituals of power between subjects and 
rulers, in theory the former could refuse to welcome a prince into their town. In one 
instance, Edward of York was initially declined entry to the town of York in 1471 on his 
way to meet Henry VI, probably because the issue of the throne remained highly 
contentious. The town finally agreed to let him into the city under the condition that his 
army remained outside the walls. " Attreed explained that the Wars of the Roses caused a 
great deal of confusion for towns. 23 Yet despite the two disparate claims to the throne by 
the Yorkists and the Lancastrians, the expectation remained that the towns of the realm 
would welcome their princes with solemnity, in the traditional way. This situation was not 
unlike that in France in the early fifteenth century, and in particular during John the 
Fearless' reign as duke of Burgundy. Both the Burgundian and the Armagnac faction 
competed for the support of the bonnes tiller in their attempts to secure control of the royal 
government. Because both factions declared that they stood in the name of the 
incapacitated king, the towns of northern France were forced to oscillate in their loyalty 
between parties so that they might avoid accusations of treason to the crown. ' If 
townspeople were found to support the wrong party, they could have their property 
19 Bryant, `L'entree royale ä Paris', p. 515,519 and, `Configurations of the Community', p. 10. 
20 Bryant, `Configurations of the Community', pp. 11-13, and Giesey, 'Mfodels of Rulership', p. 53. 
21 Bryant, `L'entree royale ä Paris', pp. 521-523,524. 
22 Attreed, The Politics of Welcome', pp. 215-216. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Curry, `Bourgeois et soldat', pp. 177-178,184. 
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confiscated, face imprisonment or even execution. The partisan badges were, therefore, 
useful in determining who was a `loyal' subject of the king and who was not 25 
The first proper entry that John the Fearless used for the purpose of political 
advancement was the entry into Paris with the dauphin 19 August 1405. According to the 
chroniclers, he arrived to the `grande joye du peuple. 26 The king of Navarre, the dukes of 
Berry and Bourbon, and some of the town's leading burgesses met the duke of Burgundy 
and the dauphin at the gates. The cortege proceeded through the streets lined with cheering 
spectators all the way to the Louvre 27 According to Michel Pintoin, the greeting that 
Burgundy received from the king of Navarre and the dukes of Berry and Bourbon had 
been carefully staged. 28 This is significant, because if it is an accurate assessment, it suggests 
that Burgundy was consciously aware of the potential positive impact the entry would have 
in his cause against Louis of Orleans. As noted above, the initial welcome of a royal entry 
was important to the ceremony. Accordingly, Navarre, Berry and Bourbon's show of 
support for Burgundy's act was a considerable sign for the people: it demonstrated their 
unanimous agreement that Burgundy had not acted inappropriately in bringing the dauphin 
back to Paris. This was crucial for his public image, because having the sanction of the 
princes of royal blood for his impulsive decision would help clear him of any wrongdoing. 
The princes were, after all, Charles VI's most important peers, central members of the royal 
council, and his royal representatives. 
Furthermore, the fact that Navarre, Berry and Bourbon appeared at the gates in full 
armour helped to underscore the instability that the incident had purportedly caused. 
Naturally Burgundy blamed the duke of Orleans entirely for the tension that followed the 
interception, even though he himself had a retained a substantial number of armed men 
25 Similar emblematic devices were employed during the War of the Roses in urban centres as public 
manifestations of loyalty. Attreed, The Politics of Welcome', pp. 223-224. 
26 Hirtoire de Charles VI, p. 432. 
27 RSD, 3: 296; Monstrelet, 1: 111. 
28 RSD, 3: 296. 
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around the capital. " Burgundy fabricated the illusion of insecurity by choosing the Louvre 
as the final destination of the cortege. Although the Louvre had the capacity to 
accommodate the king and the royal family, this was not his regular place of residence; he 
much preferred the luxurious Hotel St. Pol. " According to Janet Shirley, the Louvre was 
preferred as an `arsenal, a fortress and a prison; only resorted to by the king in times of 
danger. i31 Hence, Burgundy tacitly implied that the duke of Orleans would use armed force 
to reclaim the dauphin, which in turn would be devastating for the capital. John explained 
in his letters to the bonnet t'illes that he had specifically chosen the Louvre so that he might 
better protect the heir apparent 32 Propaganda theorists have commented on the usefulness 
of this tactic as a way of both distracting people from significant domestic problems, and 
equally, in whipping up support for what might otherwise be deemed a dubious 
campaign. 33 Thus the perceived threat of Orleanist retaliation allowed Burgundy to divert 
attention away from his own misconduct, for, his disregard of the queen's will in having 
her children brought to her at Melun was unlawful. " Additionally, the illusion helped edify 
a heroic public image of the duke of Burgundy. Heroism was a very important feature of 
chivalric culture, and one to which John the Fearless readily ascribed" 
During the periods when John the Fearless enjoyed his greatest measure of control 
over the government of the realm (1409-1413; 1418-1419)" he regularly employed 
29 BNF, Collection Bourgogne, vol. 54, fol. 99r; Monstrelet, 1: 108-114; RSD, 3: 306-308, Histoire de Charles VI, 
pp. 432-433. 
30 Guenee, Un meurtre, p. 129. 
31 Janet Shirley, `Introduction', in A Parisian Journal, 1405-1419 (Oxford, 1968), p. 11. 
32 Arch. Comm. de Macon, EE 41, n. 1. Cited in full in Mirot, Pieces, p. 397. 
33 For example, the noted scholar Chomsky wrote that this tactic is `one way [one] can keep the bewildered 
herd from paying attention to what's really going on around them, keep them diverted and controlled... 
There's always an ideological offensive that builds up a chimerical monster, then campaigns have to have it 
crushed. ' Media Control, pp. 44-45. 
34 Famiglietti, Royallntngue, p. 47. 
35 See Keen, `Huizinga, Kilgour and the Decline of Chivalry', pp. 6-11; Boulton, Knights of the Crown, pp. 11-12. 
36 Following the Peace of Chartres 9 March 1409, John the Fearless consolidated his power. The 24 March, 
he signed a treaty of alliance with the queen, her brother and the count of Hainault (ACO, B 11892, layette 
81, n. 18), and the reforms that John had suggested in August 1405 were finally undertaken by the royal 
administration. It was at this point that jean de Montaigu, the grand malirr de ! 'bötel du my was arrested and 
executed. In December 1409 John was offered the guardianship of the dauphin, his son-in-law. ACO, B 
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processional ceremonies similar to the 1405 entry to publicly exhibit the measure of his 
growing power. Yet even before Burgundy's power was truly established in 1409, he boldly 
organised an immense armed procession through Paris on his way to the oral justification 
that jean Petit gave on his behalf for the murder of Louis of Orleans 37 Although he had 
been warned not to enter Paris with an entourage greater than two hundred, he came to 
Paris escorted by somewhere between six and eight hundred men-at-arms. 38 Pintoin 
expressed his astonishment at how Burgundy entered Paris. He explained that he had 
arrived in full armour with a vast army, with his emblems in full view as though making a 
victory triumph 3' Significantly, Pintoin added that Burgundy feigned he was acting in 
accordance with the king's orders and that this was not in fact the case. One might be 
inclined to believe that this was a fabrication by Pintoin, whose intention was to emphasise 
Burgundy's dishonesty. However, this statement would have been in line with similar 
assertions the duke made throughout his campaign, and in particular, when he was out of 
favour with the king. In January 1414, he laid siege to Paris on what he claimed were the 
specific orders of the dauphin. In 1417, he again claimed, unlawfully, that he was 
undertaking his military campaign on the king's behalf. Hence, there was a palpable level of 
consistency regarding the level of alleged cooperation between Burgundy and the king. 
A great many Parisians enthusiastically met the duke at the gates of St. Denis. "' The 
duke of Bourbon evidently thought that Burgundy had overstepped his mark, for, during 
the negotiations for peace in early 1409 the duke chastised the Parisians for their role in 
John's elaborate entry ceremony. This he deemed both inappropriate and reprehensible. " 
11892, layette 4; Plancher, bzuves, pp. 262-263, n. 261. See Famiglietti, Royallntrzgue, pp. 82-84; Vaughan, John 
the Fearless, pp. 79-81; Schnerb, Armagnacs et houquignons, pp. 101-103. 
37 See chapter 5, `Burgundian Texts', pp. 112-117. 
38 RSD 3: 752-754, and 4: 103; Histoire de Charles VI, p. 445. 
39 `[TJendens Parisius, ibi, cunctis non immerito mirantibus, in apparatu bellico, velut de hostibus regni 
feliciter triutnphasset' RSD, 3: 752-754. 
40 RSD, 3: 754; Monstrelet, 1: 111; Histoire de Charles VI, p. 432. 
41 RSD, 4: 188-190. 
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To add further insult to the duke of Bourbon and his peers, the spectators had cried `Vive 
le duc de Bourgogne! ' as John's cortege drove past 42 
Bourbon was obviously as outraged by the fact that the Parisians had given the duke 
of Burgundy a welcome that was rightfully reserved for kings, as he was that they had 
rejoiced in the murder of the king's brother. Indeed it appears that Burgundy took 
advantage of the universal feeling of mistrust that Orleans' government had generated 
among the populace to assert himself as their champion. There was clearly an important 
dialogue subtextually vocalised between Burgundy and the spectators of this entry. It spoke 
of the general approval of the assassination among the Parisians, and therefore emphasised 
their esteem for Burgundy. Ultimately, his entry displayed his confidence in having done 
right by the king and realm when he assassinated the king's brother. Moreover, by 
disobeying the royal mandate limiting his entourage, the large armed contingent that he 
brought with him was a blatant challenge to any Orleanists in the royal council. It also 
discouraged any of their potential supporters among the townspeople from speaking out 
against the duke of Burgundy. This was a carefully staged event, which was designed to 
exhibit the scale of Burgundy's strength. It was therefore a powerful propaganda channel, 
and at a critical moment in his political career. 
His careful stage-management of the actual presentation performance was the 
second phase of John's propaganda before the oral justification was given on his behalf. His 
strategy was to hold a very public and overstated event, inclusive of all social levels in Paris, 
from the princes of the royal blood to the lower echelons of Parisian society. To this end, 
he refused to hold it in any other venue than the royal Hotel St. Pol. The benefit of the 
palace of St. Pol over the Chätellet or the Louvre was its distance from his own residence, 
Hotel Artois. Not only did he have to travel down rue St. Denis within close proximity to 
the Halles market, where he would undoubtedly find many supporters among the 
42 Hirtoire de Charles VI, p. 445. 
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spectators, he would have to progress down the main thoroughfare on his way to Hotel St. 
Pol. Organising the lengthy route to Hotel St. Pol was an excellent manoeuvre because it 
ensured that the spectacle of his procession would be seen by a much greater audience than 
if he had merely travelled a few blocks to either the Chätellet or the Louvre. As one of 
Burgundy's reporters on the event explained in his letter to the duchess, the cortege was 
enormous and overwhelmed the spectators along the route. 43 
As a means of further ingratiating himself with the burgesses of Paris, he took care 
to involve a great number of the Parisians in the event. Many were included in the 
procession, and were invited to sit in on the oral justification. "' Others lined the streets. 
One of Burgundy's reporters, Thierry le Roy claimed that a great number of the Parisians 
who had not been officially invited to participate in the presentation found their way into 
the auditorium regardless 45 There was no contest to Burgundy's official justification; the 
duke was absolved of the death of Louis of Orleans the day after the presentation in Hotel 
St. Pol, and royal letters to this effect were published and disseminated throughout the 
realm. °G This was a momentous ideological triumph for John, and he did not hesitate to use 
it to its full advantage throughout his conflict with the Armagnacs. 
This is important because it confirms that there is, as Fogel argued, a `cohesive 
force between ceremony and the elaboration of a political or theoretical thought for 
whatever purpose. A7 Each individual involved in this particular spectacle helped to assign 
meaning to his propaganda by taking a part in the proceedings, proceedings that fit well 
within the established underlying structure of political thought and deed. Therefore, 
although they were a part of the event, they nevertheless allowed themselves to be 
43 Douet d'Arcq, `Document inedit', p. 13. 
44 Monstrelet, 1: 178. See also Coville, Jean Petit, p. 107. 
45 Douet d'Arcq, `Document inedit', p. 12-13. 
46 For a copy of the letter of absolution, see ADN, B 656, n. 15.088. The letter is also transcribed in full in 
Plancher, Preuves, pp. 254-255, n. 256. 
47 Fogel, Les eirimonies de %information, p. 18. 
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somewhat anaesthetised to the fact that they were helping Burgundy construct an 
alternative reality of the current political situation, one that was of a clear benefit to himself. 
It was not long before Burgundy found another opportunity to use ceremony to his 
ideological advantage. This came in March 1409, several months after the queen, the kings 
of Navarre and Sicily, and the dukes of Berry, Bourbon, and Orleans had retired to Tours 
with the king at the beginning of November 1408.4' The trouble began when Burgundy 
achieved a military victory at the battle of Othee on 23 September 1408. This naturally 
caused anxiety among the royal princes and the queen, who feared the effect that the duke 
of Burgundy's return to Paris with his army would have on the Parisians. The royal council 
already sensed general unrest among the people of the realm, and particularly in Paris. The 
Parisians were unquestionably agitated. They seem to have sustained their scepticism where 
the queen was concerned, because at this time, they suspected that the queen wanted to 
disarm them by removing their chains from the capital city. " With the purpose of diffusing 
the tension, the queen and the royal court fled to Tours. Yet this decision had the opposite 
effect on the Parisians, who were irate that the royal court removed their beloved king 
from the capital. Both Monstrelet and the Jouvenal compiler described them as `moult 
troublez et esbahis'. 5° They sent word to the duke of Burgundy, who was equally cross at 
the situation. Consequently, John the Fearless decided to return to Paris directly with his 
army. Predictably, the duke of Burgundy's cortege was a large and rather daunting force 5' 
Similarly to his entry into Paris earlier that year, many burgesses cried `Noel! ' as he made 
his way to hotel Artois with his armed guard. 
"Z Apparently this displeased a number of the 
king's officials. Monstrelet explained: 
48 RSD 4: 181-183; Hirtoirr de Charles VI, pp. 448-449; Vaughan, John the Fearless, p. 74. 
41 For an overview on the townspeoples' reliance on chains as a urban defence mechanism see Philippe 
Contamine, `Les chaines dans les bones vMes de France (specialement Paris), YIVe-XVIe siecle', in Gem et 
socilti en France, pp. 293-320. 
so Histoirr de Charles 1/7, p. 449. See also RSD 4: 183. 
s' Hirtoire de Charles VI, p. 449. 
52 Monstrelet, 1: 391-392. 
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Et furent aucuns serviteurs du Roy qui dirent ä aucuns d'iceulx 
crians Noel, vous lui povez demonstrer et faire bonne chere et 
he, mais pour lui, ne a sa venue, vous ne devez point ainsi crier. 
Mais ce non obstant, de tous notables hommes et gens 
d'auctorite lui fut faicte aussi grant honneur et reception 
comme ils eussent fait au Roy leur souverain seigneurs' 
The similarity between this particular entry and the one made in March 1408 is 
patently clear. Yet whether or not this entry was a deliberate instrument of propaganda is 
less certain because one is immediately left questioning whether the duke of Burgundy 
actually planned this event to run so smoothly and successfully. One thing that is certain, 
however, is that Burgundy did plan to have a large contingent of armed combatants meet 
him outside Paris and escort him through the city. We should not doubt that this was an 
important factor here, because this particular entry was, effectively, a victory procession. 
Furthermore, Burgundy had not been granted leave of the king to undertake his battle with 
the Liegeois. Thus, to re-enter Paris fully armed and boasting of victory at a battle he was 
not sanctioned to wage was a powerful statement indeed, and one whose aim was doubtless 
to win over the hearts and minds of the Parisians. Firstly, it reinforced the notion that he 
was the chivalric hero par excellence, something that was extremely important to the nobility. 
More importantly from a wider perspective, it left little room for doubt that he was a 
capable military and political leader. Additionally, the anxiety that the duke's return to Paris 
caused for the royal court did not go unnoticed by the Parisians. Therefore, as a codified 
message saturated in both tradition and semiotic form, this armed procession was ritualised 
propaganda in pure form. 54 
Burgundy began labouring to bring the king back to Paris from Tours on behalf of 
the Parisians. As the negotiations between his ambassador, the count of Hainault (his 
53 Ibid. 
s4 Fogel, Li ceremonies de ! 'information, p. 18; Pratkanis, Anthony R. and Elliot Aronson, A, ge of Propaganda The 
Everyday Use and Abuse of Persuasion (New York, 2000), p. 11. 
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brother-in-law), and the royal council dragged on, the Parisians grew impatient for results 55 
The outcome of their decision to engage in the conference led them to confront the duke 
of Bourbon. Finally, John the Fearless was called to Chartres Cathedral on 9 March, where 
the king, the royal council and Louis of Orleans' sons had gathered to finalise the first of 
the many peace treaties between them. John returned the same day `ä tout noble gent' s6 
Eight days later, the king made his official re-entry into Paris. " Although John the Fearless 
does not seem to have played a direct role in the performance of this particular ceremony, 
he could boast a significant backstage role, which was undoubtedly recognised by a 
significant number of Parisians. They could not have so easily forgotten that they had 
asked for his help in bringing the king back to Paris in the first place, a situation that 
inevitably reinforced his role as guardian of the king and realm. Reminiscent of how he 
justified his actions in August 1405, this was, superficially, a further immediate response 
that proved his concern for the interests of the king's urban subjects. In the process, he 
had secured a peace treaty with Louis of Orleans' sons wherein he was able to maintain 
that his assassination of Louis of Orleans was carried out for the good of the king and of 
the realm, without fear of future reprisal. 
John's exploitation of entry rituals was therefore one successful method whereby he 
was able to appropriate the semiotic language of royal ritual to communicate a strong 
message to his audiences. Likewise, he recognised the inherent value in exploiting religious 
processions for the same purpose. In his article on the political importance of these 
processions, Guenee argued successfully for their importance as `instruments of 
propaganda' during the French civil war. 
58 Although this form of procession was, by its 
55 During the negotiations jean de Montaigu spoke on behalf of the queen and royal council and insisted that 
John the Fearless give an official and public apology for murdering the duke of Orleans. Montaigu incurred 
the duke of Burgundy's deepest loathing for his part in this event, which would ultimately lead to his 
execution in 1409-M Met, `Biographie de jean de Montaigu', pp. 273-279. 
56 Bourgeois, p. 4. 
57 Bourgeois, p. S. 
Ss Guenee, `Liturgie et politique', pp. 23-49. 
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nature, a `religious' event, it was nonetheless an ideal vehicle for the transmission of secular 
messages, by secular authorities, for secular audiences. " Michel Pintoin disclosed that in 
October 1411, the presidents of the Parlement and the chambn des requetes met with some 
members of the royal council and scholars from the University of Paris to plan a solemn 
and general procession to Ste. Genevieve. ' The ultimate plan was to have the `apostolic 
mandate' - the official excommunication of the Armagnacs from the Church - read aloud, 
in French, to the crowds that had gathered at the procession's final destination. Royal 
councillors had recalled a document that had originally been drafted by Pope Urban V on 9 
May 1367, which stated that any group who assembled in arms against the king of France 
would be immediately excommunicated. " Scholars working for the royal council on this 
matter investigated the royal archives thoroughly in search of this document to frighten the 
duke of Orleans and his allies so that they would `end the depredations'. 62 Pintoin explained 
that professors of theology and scholars in civil and spiritual law who `favoured' the duke 
of Burgundy, declared that this mandate was both lawful and incontrovertible. 
" On 13 
November, a minor pronounced the excommunication on the forecourt of Notre Dame 
cathedral. " A devastating blow for the Armagnac party, it was a huge triumph for the duke 
of Burgundy. 
That the group had decided to hold a general and a solemn procession the same 
day as the announcement made the event all the more important and impressive. A `general 
procession' was an event in which all the parishes of the city were invited to participate, 
and could last anywhere from a day to several days. 
"' In terms of display, the general 
procession was typically a simple parade. A `solemn procession' was a far more elaborate 
59 Guenee, 'Liturgie et politique', p. 31. 
60 RSD, 4: 532-550. 
61 Histoire de Charles VI, p. 470. 
62 '[E}t qualiter consiliarii regni ducem Aurelianensem ac stipendiaros suos omnes dignum duxerunt terrere, ut 
deinceps a rapinis, cedibus et incendiis abstinerent. ' RSD, 4: 532. 
63 RSD, 5: 532-534. 
64 Ordonnances, 9: 652; RSD, 3: 532-550; Histoire de Charles VI, p. 470; Monstrelet, 2: 210. See also Tournier, 
L'Univerrite de Paris, pp. 79,88; Lehoux, Jean de France, 3: 253, n. 1. 
65 For this and what follows consult Guenee, `Liturgie et politique', pp. 32-37. 
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experience for participants and spectators alike. The most common defining element was 
the use of crosses, banners and relics, and the special clothing worn by the canons. 
Additionally, candlelight played a key role in solemn processions, which was generally 
accompanied by the participants' singing or chanting, frequently in bare feet. 
The November 1411 procession is the best example of the way this ritual could be 
used politically. The duke of Burgundy's men in the royal council, the University of Paris 
and the Parlement carefully choreographed an event that would have the greatest spiritual 
and secular influence over its spectators. The solemn procession, in which all the parishes 
of Paris were invited to participate, underscored the importance of the event, and would 
have assembled a large crowd. Moreover, the liturgical element of the procession provided 
an authoritative spiritual platform from which Burgundy's clerical supporters could attack 
the Armagnacs. The act of excommunication had two important purposes: it publicly 
rejected the Armagnacs from the religious community of the Church for an indefinite 
period of time and, likewise, expelled them from the secular community. 
During the period that Burgundy had control over the king (1409-1413), there were 
similar types of religious processions that strengthened the duke of Burgundy's ideological 
campaign. In the spring of 1412, for example, there were general processions from early 
May to the end of June. 66 These were held as public prayers for the king's swift defeat of 
the Armagnac army, though the subtext of this frenzy was effectively a public 
manifestation of sympathy for the duke of Burgundy's cause 67 
Guenee argued that it was John the Fearless who was the first to have the presence 
of mind to use religious processions to their full political potential. "' Although the 
66 Bourgeois, pp. 20-24; RSD 4: 656-660; Histoire de Charles 1/I, p. 476. See also Jacques Chiffoleau, `Les 
processions parisiennes de 1412. Analyse d'un rituel flamboyant', in Revue Historique, 284 (1990): 54, n. 10; 
Guenee, `Liturgie et politique', pp. 28,30,45. 
67 Ibid., p. 45. 
68 Ibid. 
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Armagnacs took from his example, it was in his hands that `la liturgie se fit propagande. "' 
In terms of reaching a broad and varied audience, the processions and the entries were so 
successful because these events had a substantial spectator base. Moreover, entries and 
processions did not require one general assembly; rather, because they progressed through 
the streets of Paris, they invited a large crowd along the way, with some people following 
the procession to its natural end. They were, in effect, a politicised urban ritual. 
However, if we are to gauge whether or not the duke of Burgundy was doing 
something altogether innovative in the way that he used entries and processions as a means 
of communicating highly politicised messages, we must enquire as to whether the 
Armagnacs organised any similar entry ceremonies or armed processions. The first of these 
took place in August 1408, when the queen made a solemn entry into Paris, escorted by 
those royal princes who would, from 1410 onwards, be identified as `Armagnacs': the 
dukes of Berry, Orleans, Bourbon and Brittany, the counts of Alencon and Charles of 
Albret, the constable of France. 0 
This entry is significant for several reasons. The first is that it confirms that 
Burgundy's entry in March 1408 was disproportionate to his standing. This we know 
because the queen's decision to enter Paris herself was apparently motivated primarily by 
revenge for the murder of Louis of Orleans, and the show he put on. It was, additionally in 
retribution for a meeting he had held with the leading burgesses of Paris before leaving for 
Liege. " At this conference, the duke asked the Parisians to continue obeying the king. In 
his speech he added that he had only remained in Paris for so long because he had had to 
`detain' people from the University of Paris so that he would determine who the king's 
loyal subjects were. Before we can examine what followed, it is important that we take note 
of this remarkable meeting, at which two important things occurred. Here again Burgundy 
69 ibid. 
70 RSD, 4: 56-58. 
71 For this and what follows, RSD, 4: 56. 
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posed an empty request when he asked the Parisians to remain loyal to the king. As we 
have already observed, this was a device that propagandists typically employ. '' In asking 
questions relating to national loyalty, for which there is only one available response, the 
propagandist orchestrates a situation whereby the respondent is either `with, or against' the 
state - or here, the crown. 
" Consequently, he receives a set response, that is entirely 
meaningless, but which further supports his illusive platform of protecting the state 7" This 
was precisely the duke's intention here. In addition, his demand was a veiled threat against 
those who would side with the duke's rivals as soon as his back was turned. This he 
reinforced with the follow-up comment on the need to discern who were the king's 
veritable loyal subjects. 
This conference infuriated the queen because she took it as a personal offence. In 
retribution she hoped that her entry into Paris would begin to negate the accusations jean 
Petit had made against the duke of Orleans on Burgundy's behalf earlier in the year. 75 Her 
first course of action was to plan a ceremony for the 26 August that would surpass that of 
the duke of Burgundy's in terms solemnity and indeed, in pageantry. " Consequently she 
ordered the princes of royal blood, the principal officers of the king's household, and her 
son, the dauphin, to escort her carriage into the capital. Furthermore, she had an 
innumerable amount of knights and squires meet her at the gates of the city in full 
armour. 77 Ultimately, the queen's elaborate entry ceremony and armed guards 
communicated a `need' to protect the capital from the duke of Burgundy. Additionally, she 
used it as a platform from which she too commanded her subjects to remain obedient to 
the king and the royal family, and that they remain tranquil within the city. Naturally the 
subtext of the message was that they should not offer any form of support to the duke of 
72 See chapter 6, `Letters', pp. 144-145. 
73 Chomsky, Media Control, pp. 25-29. 
74 Ibid. 
75 RSD, 4: 56. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid., pp. 56-58. 
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Burgundy or his men-at-arms. The widowed duchess of Orleans entered in to Paris the 
following day exhibiting her bereavement over the loss of her husband. She was dressed in 
mourning and was brought into the capital in a horse-drawn carriage draped in black. " The 
symbolic association of the double entries would not have been lost on observers. 
The queen's desire to outdo the duke of Burgundy's cortege proves also that 
Burgundy's entry into Paris in March 1408 was indeed impressive, implying that it had a 
significant impact upon spectators. Moreover, the fact that queen planned to use two entry 
ceremonies to counter Burgundy's arguments against Louis of Orleans corroborates our 
argument that the entry ritual was truly an essential form of communication between rulers 
and their subjects. It is clear, then, that urban groups and their political leaders understood 
the semiotic language of entry ceremonies, and that this particular system of codes, 
symbolic references and ritualised dialogue was one that was essential to the preservation 
of their system of communication. 
Another important entry ceremony orchestrated by the Armagnacs occurred in 
August 1413, following the Peace of Pontoise. The first thing we must note is that John the 
Fearless fled Paris on 23 August 1413, without taking leave of the Parisians or the king. 
According to Michel Pintoin he deliberately fled to avoid the planned entry ceremony of 
the Armagnac princes, Louis of Anjou, Charles of Orleans and his brother, the count of 
Vertus, the duke of Bourbon and the count of Alencon. 79 This in itself speaks volumes 
about the negative impact this entry might have for him and his supporters in the capital. 
On the king's orders, the duke of Berry led the welcome party, which included, in 
order, the provost of Paris and numerous men-at-arms, the chancellor, the royal council, 
the provost of merchants and a substantial number of burgesses from the capital. The 
Armagnac princes arrived wearing violet surcoats, upon which a straight white cross and 
78 Douet d'Arcq, Choix, 1: 311. 
79 RSD, 5: 148-150. 
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the motto `le droit chemin' were sewn 80 They also wore hoods halved in black and red. 
Apparently these were designed according to the style of hood worn by the `majority' of 
the Parisians. 81 This was an obvious attempt to emphasise their cooperation with the 
Parisians. To further prove their respect of the townspeople, the Armagnac princes publicly 
swore at the gates of the city to preserve the dignity and liberties of the townspeople and to 
pay for all of the provisions they would consume. They were then permitted to enter the 
city, which they did to the sound of trumpets, and drove the cortege to the king's palace, 
where he and the dauphin warmly welcomed them. According to Pintoin, the Parisians 
lined the streets fully dressed in armour, evidently to honour the arrival of princes and to 
keep the streets open to the cortege. 82 
What is interesting about this particular entry was the high level of involvement of 
the townspeople. This, only two months after chaos had reigned in the city, wherein the 
Armagnacs and their supporters were specifically targeted with violence within its walls. 
Not only, then, was this entry designed to publicly reinforce their return to the fold in 
terms of the royal council, it was a sign of the renewal of their relationship with the 
townspeople. Indeed their very active participation in every stage of the event reveals that 
they clearly understood the semiological framework within which this ceremony took place. 
This was due to its intertextual relationship with the `language' of the ritual. There was, 
moreover, an inverse relationship between the pageantry here, and the violent events 
against the faction that had taken place in Paris during 1413. In a sense, this was an attempt 
to erase the violence and to start fresh. The motto `le droit chemin' - the true or straight 
path - only reinforced this notion. 
The Orleanist entries and processions are important because they confirm how this 
particular ritual could be politicised in an effective way. It is equally interesting that these 
80 Hirtoire de Charles VI, p. 490; Bourgeois, p. 44. For the details of the costs involved see Laborde, Les dues de 
Bou qne, 3: 262, no. 6229. 
81 RSD, 5: 150; Histoire de Charles VI, p. 490; Bourgeois, p. 44. 
82 RSD, 5: 150. 
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were ceremonies that were implemented by royal persons of high standing, and who were 
firmly placed within the Orleanist camp. However, what is clear is that rather than being 
executed by their own initiative, both entries were reactionary. They were deliberately 
designed to dismantle the political reality constructed by Burgundy with his earlier 
ceremonies, which were complemented by his numerous letter campaigns and his use of 
emblems. We can confidently argue, therefore, that the Orleanist entries here described 
were elements of counterpropaganda. 83 
Nevertheless, it is now certain that we may not take the position that the duke of 
Burgundy was an innovator in the use of entry ceremonies as vehicles of propaganda. 
However, the fact is Burgundy's entries were effectively his parole within the langue of 
entries, and this within the greater language of political discourse g; Because one can argue 
that everything achieves meaning from that to which it relates, we are able to see that 
Burgundy was able to use this system of signs effectively to help him construct his 
ideology. 
8.2. PUBLIC EXECUTIONS 
Another form of urban ritual that John the Fearless used advantageously was the 
public execution. Because executions were highly ceremonial events that gathered large 
urban audiences together, these were perfect opportunities for slander. Moreover, they 
typically followed very stringent conventions. Therefore, John could appropriate a medium 
that was accepted and familiar to reinforce his own ideological position against his 
Armagnac rivals. Moreover, the medium both affected and was affected by the messages it 
conveyed about reform and lese-majesty: `Like numerous other rituals staged by politico- 
judicial authorities, punitive rites and ceremonies were part of a deliberate set of symbols 
83 As further retribution, the queen used her authority to revoke John the Fearless' pardon in the company of 
the dukes of Berry, Bourbon and the young Charles duke of Orleans while in bielun. AN, K 56, n. 18. 
84 Saussure The Object of Study', pp. 3-9; Hawkes, Structuralism and Semiotics, pp. 10-11; Macey, Dictionary of 
Critical Theory, p. 365. 
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intended to impress upon the public the majesty and power of the law and its 
representatives. "' In this way, Burgundy was able to use them as opportunities to publicly 
disgrace his rivals, whilst maintaining the illusion that he was merely a loyal servant of the 
king and the bier public. Although his use of them is our greatest concern here, we need to 
try to understand how public punishment worked in the early fifteenth century by focusing 
on some rather specific examples. 
When the duke of Bourbon had scolded the Parisians for their over-zealous 
welcome John the Fearless into Paris in March 1408, he concluded his reprimand with his 
opinion on what punishment they should suffer for this betrayal of the king. He demanded 
that those who had consented were to meet the king at the gates of the city with a noose 
around their neck, begging for the king's mercy. They should also agree to pay whatever 
fine the king imposed. " This is significant because Bourbon's suggestions reveal that he 
viewed their role in Burgundy's entry ceremony as evidence of lese-majesty87 One way to 
punish lese-majesty without having recourse to capital punishment was to initiate a mock- 
execution 88 As a `ritual of infamy', the aim of a mock-execution was to impose shame 
upon the transgressors, marking them with disgrace, or male Fama, while concurrently 
informing the spectators around them of the serious nature of their crime. " All 
punishments were in fact symbols through which a judicial message was conveyed to the 
spectators, and whose primary aim was to reinforce royal authority. "" The moral correction 
that occurred during public punishment rituals was also designed to have a didactic impact 
ßs Cohen, Crossroads of Justice, p. 156. 
$6 RSD IV: 189-191. 
87 On the ritual aspects of public executions and mock executions see Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish. 
The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (London, 1977), pp. 3-69; Esther Cohen, "To die a criminal for the 
public good'. The execution ritual in late medieval Paris', in Law, custom and the social fabrication in medieval 
Europe, ed. Bernard Bachrach and David Nicholas (Kalamazoo, 1990), pp. 285-304; Cohen, The Crossroads of 
Justice, especially chapters 8-11; Pieter Spierenburg, The Spectacle of Suffering: Executions and the Evolution of 
Repression from a Preindustrial Metropolis to the European Experience, (Cambridge, 1984); Gauvard, `La peine de 
mort en France ä la fin du moyen age: esquisse d'un bilan', in Le pouvoir au moyen dge. Ideologies, pratiques, 
nererentations, eds. Claude Carozzi and Huguette Taviani-Carozzi (Aix-en-Provence, 2005), pp. 79-80. 
88 Cohen, Crossroads of Justice, pp. 165-167. 
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upon spectators - it was designed to be an example both of what would not be tolerated, 
and how it would be punished. "' It was, then, intended as a deterrent. Therefore, by having 
a mock hanging procession of the leading burgesses through the streets of Paris, the 
proposed punishment of the leaders of the city of Paris was in fact a way of figuratively 
punishing all the Parisians who had participated in the event, for their collective treason. 
Equally, it warned others that manifestations of disloyalty to the crown would not be 
tolerated. The duke of Bourbon clearly felt that this symbolic punishment was appropriate 
for the treasonous manner by which they had welcomed the man who had wickedly, and 
inexcusably, killed the king's brother. 
However, the punishment was not implemented. Instead the Parisians welcomed 
their king back to Paris in the usual way: with great pomp and solemnity. No doubt this 
was because of Burgundy's control of the situation. Unfortunately for the grand maitre de 
l'hötel, jean de Montaigu, he did not enjoy a similar favourable fate. He was arrested on 7 
October 1409 by Pierre des Essarts, the provost of Paris, on the order of the duke of 
Burgundy. 92 Montaigu was truly notorious for having enriched himself greatly during his 
service to the crown under Charles VI. 93 As the lord of Marcoussis, he had built an 
incredibly ostentatious and expensive residence there, for which he was virulently 
criticised. " Regarding this luxurious castle, the anonymous author of the Songe veritable 
asked, 'Oü peut avoir Montagu pris / La finance qu'il ya mis? '''S Montaigu's family had also 
accrued great favour and advancement from 1398 in the form of offices and marriage 
alliances 96 
91 Gauvard, `La peine de mort', pp. 78-79; Cohen, op. cit, p. 185. 
92 RSD, 4: 272-276; Bourgeois, p. 6; Hirtoire de Charles VI, p. 451. Merlet, `Biographie de jean de Montaigu', 
pp. 273-279; Vaughan, John the Fearless, pp. 79-80; Famiglietti, Royal Intrigue, p. 78; Schnerb, Armagnacs et 
Bouruignons, pp. 101-103, and Jean sans Peur, pp. 515-517. 
93 hlerlet, `Jean de Montaigu', pp. 254-273. 
94 See for example the Henri Moranville (ed. ), Le Longe veritable. Pamphlet politigue dun parisien du X1" siecle, 
(Paris, 1891), pp. 43-45. Schnerb, Jean sans Peur, pp. 515-516. 
75 Songe veritable, p. 45. 
96 See Schnerb, Jean sans Peur, pp. 515-516. hserlet, `Jean de Montaigu', pp. 270-273. 
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When the provost of Paris arrested Montaigu, he accused him of being a `traitre 
infame'. " It was a contentious decision, which caused a riot in the city. 98 However, the 
provost and his men apparently toured around the capital in an attempt to calm them. 
Essarts declared that they had captured those who had `betrayed' the king, and there was 
little reason therefore not to return to their professions ." 
Essarts' public denouncement of 
Montaigu and the others for their treason was used as a tool for threatening Montaigu's 
supporters, whilst appealing to the agitated Parisian crowd with the intention of returning 
order. It boasted control of an imagined crisis. Therefore the provost's claims of having the 
traitors under guard exposes the very spirit of the message that the duke of Burgundy 
wanted to express with this arrest and those that followed. Claiming to be the protector of 
the realm, John the Fearless had an `obligation' to eliminate those whom he identified as 
having committed treason against the king. From Montaigu's arrest to the end of John the 
Fearless' reign as duke, the public executions and unofficial massacres of known and 
suspected Armagnacs were justified by the Burgundians' belief that they were obliged, like 
their leader, to rid the realm of the corruption of the Armagnacs. 
Originally Montaigu was charged with misappropriating the king's treasure, but 
when that charge became difficult to prove, Essarts accused Montaigu of acting as an 
accomplice to the duke of Orleans. This meant that he was accused of using sorcery with 
the intention of harming the king and dauphin. He was therefore, guilty of lese-majesty. 
After being tortured, Montaigu admitted to the crime but later retracted on the grounds 
that he had confessed under the duress of torture. Nonetheless he was convicted as being a 
`traistre, et coupable de la maladie du Roy, et qu'il desroboit l'argent des tailles et aydes. '"' 
His execution was staged like any other high-profile execution of a nobleman: it was highly 
97 RSD, 4: 272. 
98 Ibid.; Bourgeois, p. 6; Histoirr de Charles VI, p. 451. 
99 RSD, 4: 272. 
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public and involved an audience of thousands of people. "' On its own, there was nothing 
innovative therein. What was important was how this particular execution served the duke's 
larger political policy, and indeed his propaganda programme. Charges of corruption, 
sorcery and disloyalty fit neatly within his principal themes of misgovernment and lese- 
majesty among the Orleanists. Thus, this execution only further supported Burgundy's own 
image as a reformer, and as the king's most loyal servant. 
On 17 October, Montaigu was driven to the scaffolding in a cart `ä son de trompe 
et au milieu dune nombreuse escorte de bourgeois en armes'. "' To drag the condemned 
through the streets to the place of punishment was a typical part of the ceremonial aspects 
of punishment ritual designed to involve the crowd in the dialogue. The procession 
functioned on two levels: it alienated the criminal from the community, whilst also securing 
the consent of the spectators for the pending punishment without which the ritual was not 
supposed to proceed. 103 Yet Montaigu's procession to the scaffolding at the Halles market 
square evoked an unparalleled emotional response from the spectators. Even those who 
had despised the grand maitre before this moment collapsed in tears, according to Michel 
Pintoin. 104 Not surprisingly, this is a detail completely overlooked in Monstrelet's account 
of the execution. "" Montaigu's head was severed and fixed on a lance, and his body 
transported to the gibbet at Montfaucon `et pendu au plus hault, en chemise, ä toutes ses 
chausses et esperons dores'. 106 The distance of the gibbet from the centre of the city, 
emphasised the criminal's condemnation to eternal banishment from the community, and 
was therefore a significant element of the ceremonial of punishment. "" Therefore, 
Montaigu's execution and subsequent alienation from the Parisian community not only 
101 For the public ceremonial aspects, see again Cohen, Crossroads ofJustice, pp. 185-187; Gauvard, `La peine de 
mort', P. 79. 
102 RSD, 4: 274. 
103 Cohen, Crossroads of Justice, p. 185; Gauvard, `La peine de mori', p. 79. 
104 RSD, 4: 274. 
105 Monstrelet, 2: 44. 
106 Bourgeois, p. 6. 
107 Spierenburg, The Spectacle of Suffering, p. 90; Cohen, Crossroads ofJustice, p. 189. 
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highlighted his alleged treason, but also reinforced the difference between Burgundy's 
programme of `good government' and the disloyalty of those who had helped Orleans 
misgovern the realm. Ultimately the subtext of the event served to underscore the division 
between the two factions. 
Significantly, Montaigu's head was axed before the reading of his sentence was 
carried out, contrary to normal practice. 108 This is significant because it was an important, 
traditional aspect of the ritual to publish the sentence of high-ranking convicts. 
Consequently, the dukes of Berry and Bourbon and the other princes queried this matter. 
The reason given by Essarts was that that Montaigu had told the crowd before his death 
that he had admitted to his crimes under torture, and showed the people his wounds. He 
asserted with great conviction that neither he nor Louis of Orleans were guilty of stealing 
money from the king. The fact that Montaigu had communicated this message to the 
crowd was immensely significant. As seen above, every public execution was a carefully 
planned event to the most precise detail so that that the event would have the desired 
impact upon the audience. 1°9 All the actors involved, including the royal officials, the culprit 
and the spectators, played out the staged event according to a carefully scripted language of 
ritual. "" Montaigu's breech of his duty to accept his punishment and beg forgiveness 
caused the entire rhetoric of the spectacle to break down, and could have led the crowds to 
demand his release. 
Had the crowd asked that Montaigu be released, it would have undermined the 
explicit message behind the execution. Indeed John's sense of loyalty to the king and his 
desire to rid the government of corruption would have been called into question. To avoid 
these problems, Essarts removed the possibility by skipping the reading and having 
Montaigu's head prematurely severed. Although this spectacle may not have had its desired 
108 RSD, 4: 274-276. 
109 Cohen, Cmjamads of Justice, pp. 157-161; Spierenburg, The Spectacle of Su, letinq, pp. 43-45,54. See also 
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effect, as the general population understood the real reason behind the execution (`pour 
oster ledit Montague du gouvernement qu'il avoit'), the symbolic meaning behind the grand 
mait, 's execution and hanging on the gibbet was nonetheless very clearly articulated: by 
ridding the government of people he accused of being dishonest and evil, John legitimised 
his authority over the royal administration. "' 
Interestingly, when Pierre des Essarts fell out of favour with the duke in 1413, he 
faced a similar fate. 12 He too was accused of corruption, and was executed in the Hanes, 
his body subsequently hung high on the gibbet. We must see Essart's execution within this 
context, because it is suggestive of just how far Burgundy's tentacles reached into public 
consciousness, and therefore of the effectiveness of his ideology. Even though it was, 
ostensibly, the Parisians themselves who demanded Essarts, the whole affair is rather 
suspect. The Bourgeois de Paris described the general public perception of Pierre des 
Essarts: 
Mais il avoit en sa voulente, s'il eust plus vesqu, de trahir la ville 
et de la livrer es mains de ses ennemis, et de faire lui mesmes 
tres grans et crueller occisions, et piller et robber les bons 
habitans de la bonne ville de Paris, qui tant l'aymoient 
loyaulment; car il commandoit rien qu'ilz ne feissent ä leur 
povoir, comme il apparoit qu'il avoit prins si grant orgueil en 
soy, car il avoit assez offices pour six ou pour huit filx de contes 
ou de bannerez. 13 
What the Parisians commonly believed with regards to Pierre des Essarts matched the 
rhetorical message that the duke of Burgundy and his chancery had worked so hard to 
propagate regarding the duke's enemies, ever since his ascent to power began in March 
1408. The idea that the duke's rivals were intent on committing atrocities against the king 
and the people and on delivering the realm to its enemies were common threads 
throughout the duke's ideological campaign against the house of Orleans and the 
Armagnacs. Regardless of whether they believed it, or merely used it for their own benefit, 
" Hisloire de Charles VI, p. 451; Monstrelet, 2: 44. 
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the fact that the Parisians now used this argument against their old provost demonstrates 
that they had received and contemplated John the Fearless' message, and made it their 
own. 
Similar accusations of corruption and treason were then appropriated and launched 
at later Armagnac `criminals', who were then publicly shamed and killed. Burgundy's 
message regarding his constant loyal service and good government, which was contrasted 
to the Armagnacs' corruption, was therefore, both implicit and explicit during the 
executions. The execution of other high ranking nobles from the royal court in 1413 like 
Jacques de la Riviere, were all justified with the pretext that they were Armagnacs, and had 
conspired against the king and realm. Jacques de la Riviere met his unfortunate fate after 
being arrested in June 1413. Apparently Riviere was accused of having written letters 
indicating his desire to betray the king and dauphin. "; His body was dragged to the Place 
du Marche where his head was put on a lance, and his body hung from the gibbet outside 
the city walls. "' Once again we note a direct reference to the accusations made against 
Louis of Orleans in 1408, and Montaigu in 1409. 
A similar situation unfolded in May 1418 when the Burgundians broke into Paris 
and took over the city from Armagnac control. Crowds of people began wearing crosses of 
Saint Andrew and crying: `Vive Bourgogne! ' when they met the duke of Burgundy's 
army. 16 Those who did not publicly display their allegiance to the duke of Burgundy and 
his party were killed rather brutally, as were the count of Armagnac, the chancellor of 
France and others of high rank within the Armagnac government: 
Et si estoient retournez ä Paris des bouchers, et autres du temps 
passe... Ils allerent aux prisons du Palais, et entrerent dedans: et 
en icelles prirent le comte d'Armagnac connestable de France, 
messire Henry de Marle chancelier de France et un nomme 
Maurignon qui estoit audit comte. Its les tirerent hors de la 
Conciergerie du Palais emmy la cour, et 1ä les tuerent bien 
114 RSD, 5: 56. 
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inhumainement, et trop horriblement, et les despouillerent tous 
nuds, excepte des chemises: mesme il y en eut qui ne furent pas 
contens de les voir morts et tuez: mais leur estoient cruellement 
des courroyes du dos, comme s'ils les eussent voulu 
escorcher. "' 
The symbolic value of these murders was great. The Burgundians took extra measures to 
strip the count of Armagnac and his friends of all their dignity, so that they would ensure 
they were irreparably disgraced. This was true of all Armagnac partisans who were refused 
burials in terra sancta on the grounds that they were not worthy. "' By disallowing a proper 
burial in sanctified ground, traitors and criminals helped reinforce the idea that they were 
spiritually and physically banished from their community for eternity. "' This method of 
alienation and humiliation seems to have been effective. The Jouvenal compiler explained 
that those in Paris who wore the straight white cross decided to change allegiance to the 
duke of Burgundy because they understood the consequences of behaving otherwise. "' 
This chapter has argued that the duke of Burgundy's use of the more visible modes 
of communication, namely entry ceremonies, processions both secular and religious, and 
public executions, was instrumental to his ability to influence public opinion and win 
communal support for his political agenda, whilst securing his authority over the royal 
government. We have shown that Burgundy consciously staged political spectacles to 
propagate a very specific message to an urban, Parisian audience about his loyal service to 
the king and realm. This he achieved by developing the semiotic language of display to suit 
his interests, which ultimately served to contribute to the creation of a distinct `Burgundian' 
identity, and, therefore, an `Armagnac' anti-community. 
The duke of Burgundy took advantage of the symbolic language of ritual to further 
promote his persona as the guardian of the king and realm. This he accomplished by 
117 Ibid., p. 541. 
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appropriating the rituals normally utilised by the crown to demonstrate its legitimate 
sovereign power. Yet John manipulated the political vocabulary of these ceremonies to 
articulate his ideology without overstepping his legal boundary. John had to reorganise the 
performance entirely to focus on the royal majesty of the king or dauphin, whilst still 
emphasising his role as loyal servant and defender of the king, and endorse his programme 
of good government. He first accomplished this in 1405 when he and the dauphin entered 
Paris after he had `rescued' the dauphin from Louis of Orleans. Similarly, in 1409, John was 
ultimately held responsible for the return of the king to Paris after his near-captivity at 
Tours. Later in 1418, he escorted the queen back into Paris to meet the king. 
The duke's public persona was also reinforced by the public executions of high 
profile Armagnacs. Labelled traitors who had conspired to corrupt the government and 
destroy the king, they were executed on the order of John the Fearless, whose objective 
was, purportedly, to protect the king from treason, and to maintain stability in the realm. In 
a society where the majority was illiterate, reliance on the symbolic as a way of 
communicating was vital. John recognised the usefulness of the semiotic language of ritual 
and depended on it to articulate his ideological ideas about the corruption of his 
adversaries. Indeed there was a consistency in the message that the duke of Burgundy 
communicated to the people of the realm, and this fundamental tenet of his ideology was 
transmitted through his texts (namely, the Justification), his letters and manifestoes, his 
badges, and his ceremonies. 
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CHAPTER 9 
AUDIENCE: PARIS AND THE BONNES VILLES 
In previous chapters we have examined the media and the main themes of John the 
Fearless' propaganda. We have noted throughout this study that whenever the duke 
publicised his ideology through letters and manifestoes, symbols and emblems, and various 
ceremonies and rituals, the intended audience was not restricted to an elite courtly 
audience. Rather, it included persons from all orders of the social hierarchy. Only the 
Burgundian texts, the Geste and the Pastoralet, were intended for a strictly aristocratic 
audience, for even the Justification was presented to a large group of spectators which 
included numerous Parisians, and was subsequently made accessible on paper for wider 
consumption. Hence, it is clear that one of Burgundy's primary concerns during his 
political career was to ingratiate himself to the general population, located mainly within 
the bonnes villes of the French realm. Therefore, we may reasonably argue that he was greatly 
concerned with public opinion, and recognised the value inherent in winning it over to his 
cause. 
Chevalier has shown that it was vital to win the support of the bonne trlles during a 
civil war because during periods of unrest, the towns were the only stable element in a 
government otherwise weakened by endless changes to its personnel and its policies. ' 
Additionally, the bonnes Lilles were a valuable source of financial support. Considering that 
Burgundy would have needed fiscal backing for his numerous campaigns, maintaining a 
good relationship with the bonnes villes was crucial to his political objectives. Furthermore, it 
was essential during his military campaigns that he have the public support of as many 
towns as possible within close proximity to Paris, and in particular, those located between 
the capital and his domains: Picardy, Boulogne, Vermandois and Champagne. The more 
I Chevalier, Bonner d1ler, pp. 46-47. 
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support that the towns believed that the duke had, the stronger was his backing for war, 
and equally, the funds to sponsor it. This is evident in a letter written on 11 February 1414 
in which he tried to persuade Paris and other towns to support his siege of the capital? In 
this letter the duke of Burgundy stated that he not only had God's help in the matter, 
because, according to him, he held the moral high ground in the quarrel, he also had the 
assistance of `plusieurs et notables bonnes villes de ce royaume, lesquelles nous avons 
trouve qui demourront aveques nous. i3 Burgundy did indeed have garrisons in Compiegne 
and Soissons at this time. 
If we are to fully appreciate John the Fearless' political propaganda, and in 
particular, his strategy to win over public opinion, it is necessary to examine the bonnes Lilles 
in greater depth. After a brief discussion on the bonnes villes and their particular relationship 
with the duke, we will attempt to ascertain what impact, if any, the letters that the duke 
sent, the ceremonies, rituals and symbols that he employed to propagate a sense of division 
and partisanship had on the townspeople of the realm. 
9.1. DEFINING THE BONNES VILLES 
Although numerous scholars have endeavoured over the last forty years to define 
the expression `bonne ville', the term nevertheless remains vague, and a precise list is still 
lacking. s The leading scholar in the field, Bernard Chevalier, suggested that if such a list was 
2 Plancher, Preuves, p. 297, n. 289; Monstrelet, 2: 434-436. 
3 Monstrelet, 2: 434-436. See also Plancher, Paeuves, p. 297, n. 289. 
4 `[N]ous avons fait garnir les villes de Compiegne et Soissons et y mis de noz gens a la garde dicelles... et 
<pour les dictes> villes mieulz estre gardee a lonneur de mon dit seigneur et les dits habitans <dicelles> et 
plusieurs des oppressions et menaces que l'on leur 
faisoit de jour en jour nous pour la dicte <cause et non 
pour autres, et des responses des habitans> mis et laissie noz gens a la garrisons <et pour la seurte> des 
villes dessusdictes <et les habitans 
dicelles> comme aussi faire. ' ADN, B 658, n. 15.253. See also Schnerb, 
Jean sans Peur, p. 590; Vaughan, John the Fearless, p. 197. 
S Gerard Mauduech, 'La bonne ville: origine et sens de 1'expression', Annales. ESC 27 jjuillet-octobre 1972): 
pp. 1441 1448; Georges Duby, Hictoire de la France urbaine. 
VoL 2. La vi!! e medievale des Camlingiens ä la Renaissance 
(Paris, 1980), p. 309. Chevalier, Bonnet viller, Chevalier, The bonnet villet and the king's council in fifteenth- 
century France', in The Crown and Local Communities in England and France in the Fifteenth Century, ed. John Roger 
Loxdale Highfield and Robin Jeffs (Gloucester, 1981), pp. 110-128; Monique Bourin (ed. ) Vi! les, bonnet villes, 
cites et capitaler. 
Etudes d'hittoire urbaine (XII'-XVIIF siecle) offertes ä Bernard Chevalier (Tours, 1989); Contamine, 
Philippe, 'Les chains dans les bonnes villes de France', pp. 293-320. 
212 
compiled, the number of towns would probably exceed two hundred. " The original sense 
of the expression bonne ville' signified those towns enclosed by fortifications! Georges 
Duby has identified these as: `[villes] fortes, riches, importantes, suceptibles de fournir au 
roi de bons contigents militaires et de forts subsides fiscaux. i8 After tracing its meaning 
back to its origins, Gerard Mauduech explained that the term evolved to designate the 
principal towns of the realm, the majority of which were probably royal towns. ' This 
change occurred during the thirteenth century, when the bonne villes' civic, economic and 
political importance began to outweigh its military significance. " Due to the ever-increasing 
participation of these towns in political affairs and their considerable economic force, their 
political weight and influence increased throughout the fourteenth century and into the 
fifteenth. " According to Chevalier: `L'etat monarchique et la ville ne se dominent pas 
d'abord Fun, 1'autre; is wont ensemble dans le meme sens, comme des allies egaux, mais 
des allies qui s'observent. '12 
Because of their regular involvement in governmental affairs, especially in the 
second half of the fourteenth century, the bonnes t ller had a history of direct 
communication with the king. " As a result of the Hundred Years War, the towns had 
become more vocal about their desire for peace and stability, and about their dissatisfaction 
with the government of the realm. Moreover, they wanted the government to keep them 
informed about how it was spending its money. These were not surprising requests when 
one considers the destruction sustained in the countryside during the first half of the 
Hundred Years War, particularly in the northern regions of Normandy, Picardy and 
6 Chevalier, Bonner d1les, p. 47. 
7 Nicholas, The LaterMedieval City, p. 106. For the impact of fortifications for encouraging unity in the towns, 
Philippe Contamine, `Les fortifications urbaines en France ä la fin du Moyen Age: aspects financiers et 
eeonomiques', in Revue Histotique 260 (1978): 32,47. 
8 Duby, Histoin' de !a France urbaine, p. 309. 
9 Mauduech, `La bonne aille', pp. 1441-1443,1448. 
10 Chevalier, Bonner viler, pp. 7-8. 
" Duby, Hi rtoirr de la France Urharne, pp. 306-309. 
12 Chevalier, Bonnet tvillea, pp. 13,43-47. Similarly, Duby argued: `Elles sont un reseau de plus en plus 
intimement lie aux structures monarchiques qui se mettent en place. ' Histoire de !a France uriaine, p. 309. 
13 Ibid., pp. 322-323. 
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Champagne, and in Aquitaine and the surrounding areas. ' The constant desolation that the 
towns endured during the war with England resulted in a strong desire for reform. 15 Their 
dissatisfaction caused the towns to choose the king of Navarre as their natural champion in 
the second half of the fourteenth century, while he and the future Charles V were 
embroiled in fierce conflict. 16 After he had suppressed the uprisings against him, the 
dauphin Charles recognised that the bonner villes were a very powerful enemy when they 
were on the wrong side of royal authority, and that it was therefore necessary to maintain 
amiable relations with them. Consequently, he committed to undertaking certain reforms to 
please them in order to sustain their cooperation. It was due to his experience with the 
bonnes villes in the 1350s that Charles V continued to keep his towns well informed about 
the state of affairs in the government via letters close, patent and royal proclamations. It 
was his hope that in so doing, the towns would have no need to form assemblies and 
leagues of opposition against him. " 
Because the towns were such important pillars to the edifice of royal government, it 
was logical that Burgundy and his rivals attempted to influence public opinion. Ostensibly, 
the protagonists did this so that they might modify the decisions of the tonnes olles during 
particularly tense periods of conflict, in addition to currying royal favour with what was, 
essentially a support network. Evidence to this effect is found in the events immediately 
following the duke of Orleans' assassination in November 1407, and the subsequent public 
justification given in Paris in 1408. There were two reasons why Burgundy was able to 
obtain letters of remission from the king for the homicide of the king's brother. The first 
was that he had a formidable armed host with him; the second was that he had the mass 
14 This issue is emphasised in Burgundy's request for reform. See chapter 4, `Desloiaulx traistres'. For 
secondary source accounts of the effects of the Hundred Years War on the French countryside, see Allmand, 
`War and the Non-Combatant', pp. 163-183; Allmand, `Changing Views of the Soldier', pp. 171-188. 
15 For the reforms that the townspeople undertook independently, consult Contamine, 'Les fortifications 
urbaines', pp. 29-47. 
16 Chevalier, Bonner nilles, pp. 95-96. 
17 Ibid. 
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support of the Parisians. Had these not been important factors for consideration within the 
royal council in March 1408, it is entirely possible the duke of Burgundy would not have 
been pardoned as he was. 
As residents of the foremost city of the realm, not least for its sheer size and 
population, it is unsurprising that the Parisians had a significant collective voice. '8 It was 
not only the economic centre but also the political capital, where one would find the king's 
main residence and a great number of royal administrators and officials, in addition to the 
town residences of the more prominent members of the nobility, such as the royal 
princes. " Furthermore, there were other important influences at work in Paris, namely the 
University of Paris and the urban elites. It was its economic and political weight that made 
Paris of such great consequence to political figures such as the duke of Burgundy. Indeed it 
appears that he recognised the importance of securing favour amongst members of the 
governing elite in Paris early on in his career. The result was that he had many influential 
supporters for his cause in the city. 
Like all of medieval society, towns were organised in a descending hierarchy. There 
were three fundamental divisions, or three `estates', though each was similarly subdivided. "' 
The three main groups were: the `gens d'etat', the bons bourgeois and greater merchants; the 
`corps d'arts et de metiers', or the occupational merchants and artisans; and the `menu 
peuple', those who generally made up half the population of any given town or city. " 
Although this was generally a term assigned mainly to men of labour who held no capital, 
and whose work was their sole means of subsistence, there was a level of ambiguity 
18 Though there have been estimates that the population in Paris at the turn of the fifteenth century hovered 
around 200,000 Favier argued that it was more likely around 100,000. Favier, Paris, pp. 53-54. 
19 For a full discussion on medieval Paris, see Favier Patin, Cazelles, Paris de la fin du regne de Philippe AuBuste ä !a 
, pnort de 
Charles V. 1223-1380 (Paris, 1972); Michel Felibien, Hirtoire de la rille de Paris (Paris, 1725). See also 
Duby, Histoirr de la France urbaine, pp. 315-322; Guenee, Un meurtn, pp. 121-131; Coville, Les Cabochrenr, pp. 90- 
114. Guy Thompson's first chapter `The Place of Paris in a Divided France' provides some significant 
insights on Paris before English rule, during the opening phase of the civil war. Paris and its People Under 
English Rule. TheAnglo-Buigundian Regime 1420-1436 (Oxford, 1991), pp. 3-25. 
20 Chevalier, Bonner vllles, pp. 65-66. 
21 Ibid., pp. 83-84. 
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regarding precisely what this term implied to people in the fifteenth century. 22 Christine de 
Pizan's work is one example of where one finds the `gens de metiers' and the manual 
workers categorized together as the `menu peuple'. In her reaction against the violent 
Cabochien uprising in the 1jvrr de la Paix she stated: 
Car quel mal aventure avoit enseigne ä un homme de mestier 
qui toute sa vie n'ara exerce autre chose mais son labour ou de 
bras ou de mains sans se mouvoir de son astelier pour gaigner la 
vie, n'avoir frequente gens legiste ou coustumiers en choses de 
droit et de justice, n'ara veu honneur ne sara que est sens, n'a 
apris ä parler ordeneement par raisons belle et evidens, ne les 
autres savons et choses qui afferent a gens propres a establir es 
gouvernements 23 
Her system of classification was dearly determined by the level of cultural or academic 
education, and the exposure that each group had to the political functioning of 
government. 
The socio-political differences between the `bourgeois' of Paris and the two lower- 
order groups were fundamental to French society in the fifteenth century because it related 
to their political voice as much as their economic clout Z; The main demarcation between 
groups depended upon their level of intimacy with the trading market. 25 The first group 
among them were the very rich urban dwellers, the majores of the towns. Typically, these 
were men who had gained their fortune through commerce and export, or the 
entrepreneurs of the textile industry, or those who traded in luxury goods for the nobility. "' 
Equally, it included clerks involved in royal administration and offices 27 They were 
essentially the ruling elites of the bonnes t lies. Nicholas explained that by the turn of the 
fourteenth century, a rigid differentiation between this group and those below was very 
clearly defined: 
22 Ibid., pp. 66,84. 
23 Pizan, Lim de lapaix, p. 131. 
24 For a very detailed analysis of the hierarchy, see Nicholas, The LaterMedieval City, pp. 180-257. 
25 Chevalier, Bonner tiller, p. 84; Nicholas, The LaterMedieval City, pp. 141-142. 
26 Chevalier, Bonner tillea, p. 67. 
27 Ibid., pp. 71-73; Mutrand, Naissance d'un, grand corps de 1Etat, pp. 83-88, and especially p. 89. 
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The officeholding elite was usually distinguished legally from the 
rest of the population, although all were considered citizens... 
Although the councillors' social position and political privilege 
was still determined more by their possession of land, their wealth 
was being increasingly generated by trade... They had a collective 
consciousness of their standing and strenuously resisted any effort 
of artisan organisations to penetrate the inner circles of city 
government. 28 
Yet it was not only the artisans whom the `elites' attempted to exclude from local 
government. The group designated by Chevalier as the `corps d'arts et de metiers', the 
occupation guilds, incorporated the greater majority of merchants, and the upper stratum 
of craftsmen guilds and confraternities" The first factor that restricted these merchants 
and tradespeople from joining their upper peers was economical. Once again, precedence 
depended upon one's position in relation to the market. "' Those who were `true' merchants 
because the nature of the product they sold, which was such that it instantly went to 
market, were prioritised over those who either sold or laboured with the raw materials of a 
given industry. " The second factor was based entirely upon social conditioning: certain 
trades were less esteemed than others due arbitrarily to how they were perceived in 
medieval society. " For example, although many butchers might be wealthy, as many were 
in Paris, they were not held in high regard. This was also the case for skinners, tanners, and 
many artisan trades, such as carpenters and masons. 
33 In fact, these were often referred to 
in documents and chronicles from our period as men of `petit estat'. 31 There is little 
wonder, then, that writers such as Pizan included many of this second order in her general 
notion of the menu perrple. 
28 Nicholas, The laterMedieval City, p. 6. 
r9 Though, Chevalier explained that some masters of certain professions were situated below labourers of 
others in the social hierarchy due to the type of trade they were involved in. Chevalier, Bonner viler, p. 76. 
30 Ibid., p. 84. 
31 Ibid., p. 77. 
32 Ibid., p. 76. 
33 Interestingly in Flanders masons and carpenters were not in the same position of poverty as in the French 
realm. Ibid., p. 84. 
34 In an appeal case recorded in October 1417, a man who was inadvertently killed in a drunken scuffle 
following his abuse of a Burgundian prisoner was described in the document thus: `Et adonc icellui Pigneres, 
homme de petit et has estat'. Douet d'Arcq, Choix, 2: 109. 
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The social distinctions were very dearly observed in fifteenth-century society, and 
are discernible in evidentiary documents such as chronicles, letters, proclamations and 
town deliberation records, and also in contemporary political theories of the period. With 
regards to the latter, Christine de Pizan's organic model of society is a good example. 
According to her conception of the body politic, the `bourgeoisie' was the stomach, the 
merchants were the thighs, and the menu people were the legs and feet 35 Because the 
hierarchy placed the bourgeoisie in a superior position, they were expected to mediate 
between the other townspeople and the higher levels of society: the clergy (the flanks); the 
gentry (the arms); the great princes of the realm (the shoulders); and the king (the head)36 
This was accomplished by participating in local and royal government. 
The bourgeoisie's domination in this province is obvious in a plethora of more 
tangible contexts. When, for example, Michel Pintoin described in great detail the events of 
the Cabochien Uprising in his Chronigue, he related an anecdote about a meeting that 
occurred the 28 April 1413 that, following custom, the foremost `quinquagenariis', whom 
he qualified as both moderate and wise (graves et modesti tin), joined several of the privileged 
burgesses (auctoritatis dues), and the provost of merchants and aldermen to deliberate on 
current affairs. " The provost of merchants and his aldermen were the seated leaders of the 
political oligarchy. In addition, it was usual for the `bourgeoisie', such as it was described 
above, to be involved in wider governmental affairs, as the king frequently called upon 
`notables bourgeois' from the bonnet villes to join him and his royal council to discuss certain 
politically important matters. This was the case in 1412, when he asked Amiens to send two 
men to Auxerre to swear to uphold the peace treaty signed between the House of Orleans 
and of Burgundy. 
" In another example, a significant number of Parisian bourgeoisie 
35 pizan, Llvre de lapaix, p. 124. 
36 Ibid. 
37RSD, 5: 11. 
38 'Assemblee du ix aout (malmaison) ... auxquelz 
furent leues et exposeez unes lettres du Roy nostre sire 
apporteez ou jour Bier soux le seel de son secret adrechans aux 
bourgeois manans et habitans de ladicte vile 
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participated in the reading of the justification in 1408.3' Interestingly however, Monstrelet 
revealed that there were other townspeople present at the reading of jean Petit's text. He 
claimed that, `un grant nombre de docteurs et autres clers, et tres grant nombre de 
bourgeois et peuple de tout estas. '4° For our purpose here, it is very revealing that 
Monstrelet included the `peuple de tout estas', but that he did so by distinguishing them 
very clearly from the `bourgeoisie'. 
Furthermore, we observe the distinction within urban society in royal 
proclamations and the majority of letters that were addressed to the bonner villes. In a letter 
written by the duke of Burgundy on 11 March 1414, his salutation reads: `A 1'honneur et 
sagesse des bourgeois et habitans de la bonne vile de Rouen salut et dilection. '' The 
difference was equally clear in a copy of a previous letter sent by John the Fearless, dated 
23 January 1414. In the copy to Amiens, the subscription opens: `A mes treschers et bien 
amez les bourgois, manans et habitans de la ville d'Amiens. ' 2 The tripartite separation of 
urban society is also found in the town deliberation records in Amiens: in one assembly 
held the 13 July 1417, letters that had been sent by the duke of Burgundy to the town, were 
read aloud to an audience comprising of the captain of Amiens, the mayor, the town 
councillors, and `plusieurs bourgeois, manans et habitans'. 4' Although there remains some 
ambiguity regarding the precise meaning of the term `manant' at the turn of the fifteenth 
century, it is certain that it designated a very specific group of inhabitants within urban 
d'Amiens, par lesquelles il leur mande et enjoint expressement qu'il envoient par devers lui en la vine 
d'auxonne, au x jour de cest present mois deux des plus notables bourgeois de ledicte ville, aians pour jurer et 
promectre i tenir les ordonnances qui seront faictes par ledit seigneur au bien honeur paix et transquilite du 
Roy nostre sire et de son royaume... ' Arch. Comm. d'Amiens, BB. 2, fols 17v-1 18v. 
39 Douet d'Arcq, 'Document inedit', p. 13. According to Monstrelet, 1: 178. 
40 Ibid. 
41 The state of this particular letter indicates that it is very clearly a draft. The name of the town to which it is 
addressed has either been deliberately rubbed out, or is no longer visible in its entirety, though one can make 
out the capital `R' at the beginning of the name, which appears to end in 'en'. For this reason, and the short 
length of the name, I have hypothesised that it is, likely, Rouen. ADN, B 658, n. 15.235. 
42 Letter cited in full in Monstrelet, 1424. 
43 Arch. Comm. d'Amiens, BB. 2, fol. 108r. 
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society. " Its placement between the `bourgeois' and the `habitants', in addition to its 
connotations of wealth and power, suggest that it referred to the group that rested below 
the ruling elites but above the menu people. Therefore the term `manant' doubtless 
designated the mid-range tradesmen and corporations, such as the butchers, the tanners, 
the tailors, perhaps including also some artisans; a social group who enjoyed some 
privilege, but who ultimately found themselves excluded from the haute bourgeoisie, as did the 
Parisian butchers. 
In Paris, the `bourgeoisie' and the second order of town dwellers were a significant 
political and economic force in Paris, a fact that did not elude John the Fearless. Indeed a 
large proportion of the Parisian elites supported Burgundy and his policies. 'S To explain 
this phenomenon, Marie-Reine Lobry has argued that the Parisian `bourgeoisie' and the 
duke were involved in a reciprocal relationship wherein Burgundy supported and guarded 
the latter's political interests in the government in return for financial assistance. 46 
According to Francoise Autrand, a large number of those who supported Burgundy were 
members of families who had recently established themselves in Paris from the 
surrounding regions of Burgundy, such as Auxerre. These `new' families were 
predominantly reformers who sympathised with the duke of Burgundy. 47 
A powerful group of Parisians from the second order of the urban hierarchy, which 
was very closely connected to John the Fearless, consisted of the butchers of Paris. " As a 
long-established community, the Grande Boucherie held an influential and central position 
around the Rue St. Jacques, between the Grande Chätelet and the Seine, not far from 
4 'Habitant domicilie', and `riche, puissant'. Algirdas Julien Greimas, Dictionnain de 1'ancien franfais, 3^" edn. 
(Paris, 2004) p. 364. This is consistent with Godefroy's edition of the Lexique de ! Anden Franfais, defines the 
manant as a noun: `habitant, qui demeure, domicilie'. He also added that as an adjective, it denoted `riche, 
opulent, puissant. ' Frederic Godefroy (ed. ), Lexique de ! Anden Franfais (Paris, 2000), p. 318. 
^S Favier, Paris, pp. 154-155. 
46 Lobry, Relations, pp. 1,27-40. 
47 Autrand, Naissance dun grand corps de ! Etat, pp. 83-89. See also Lobry, Relations, p. 16-27. 
48 For this and what follows on the butchers, see Rene Heron de Villefosse, `La Grande Boucherie de Paris' in 
Bulletin de !a Sodete de 1'histoirr de Paris et de 17! e-de-France, 55 (1928): 39-73. Favier, Paris, pp. 37-40; Coville, Let 
Cahochiens, pp. 101-104; Famiglietti, RoyalIntnque, p. 115. 
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Burgundy's Parisian residence Hotel Artois. " The Grande Boucherie was not only the market 
stall area, but incorporated the entire community who were under the watchful eyes of the 
maitre-chefs" Additionally, there were other smaller butcher communities who were 
dispersed throughout Paris, on both the right and left banks. According to Favier, the 
butchers were a dominant, aggressive and vulgar confraternity in the capital. " Heron de 
Villefosse was less severe regarding their status in the city. He maintained that the butchers 
were an ancient community in Paris, who held a great many special privileges granted by 
royal authority. "Z Nonetheless, it is certain that they were considered `gens de metiers' 
rather than greater merchants, due to their unsavoury labour-intensive profession, and 
were, therefore, typically excluded from local governance. " Yet however grisly outsiders 
may have perceived their trade, Villefosse argued that as a community they were concerned 
with appearing well-groomed and ordered; indeed there were a number of strict regulations 
that were enforced by the maitre-chef and his officers of justice regarding the policing of the 
`bonne condui[te]' of the entire community. For example, if a butcher married a woman of 
ill repute, he was excluded from the Grande Boucherie permanently. 54 Nevertheless, Favier 
maintained that the reputation of the butchers continued to be rather boorish in Paris, and 
were therefore isolated from the haute bouqeoisie. 
ss There is little doubt that their 
involvement in the violence of 1411 and 1413 damaged their reputation further. Yet, their 
strong presence and their highly organised confraternity union made them a very powerful 
voice in Paris. 
+o Hotel Artois is now called Tour jean sans Peur', and is located on 20 rue Etienne Marcel. 
50 Villefosse, `La Grande Boucherie de Paris', p. 67. 
51 Favier, Paris, pp. 37-38. 
52 Villefosse, 'La Grande Boucherie de Paris', pp. 63-67. 
53 Chevalier, Bonnet villes, p. 86; Nicholas, The LaterMedieval City, p. 139. 
54 Villefosse, `La Grande Boucherie de Paris' p. 67. 
51 Favier, Paris, pp. 37-38. 
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A final group that we must consider as important among John the Fearless' 
intended audience was the University of Paris. " Laurent Tournier has shown that both 
factions attempted to appeal to the University, because they acknowledged it had the 
potential to have a substantial impact upon public opinions' However, he argued 
convincingly that although the Armagnacs doubled their initiative to get the University of 
Paris on its side in the conflict, from 1410 onwards, it was John the Fearless who was the 
first to understand just how important the institution might be to his political strategy. " 
Indeed scholars generally agree that prior to the Cabochien Uprising in 1413, as far back as 
1405, the university favoured John the Fearless over Louis of Orleans. 59 When John 
brought the dauphin back to Paris in August 1405, the university sent ambassadors to 
thank him for his `bonne amour et affection qu'il avoit au Roy, ä sa generation, et i tout le 
royaume. '`° The university delegates stated that they were, and would remain certain that 
the duke of Burgundy would endeavour `ä bonne fin et ä la reformation et reparation 
d'icellui... '6' It was his reforming policy which had secured the favour of the institution. In 
actual fact, it was a programme that they had tried to get to Orleans to accept when they 
sent a delegation to mediate between him and Burgundy. 
62 Unfortunately for the duke of 
Orleans, this conference met with disaster, mainly because he insisted that they stay out of 
the affair entirely and leave the running of the government to `ceulx de sang royal et du 
56 Exhaustive studies on the University of Paris' political involvement in this phase of the war, and of 
individual scholars are well beyond the confines of this present doctoral dissertation. It is our intention here 
to flag the institution's overall importance as a prospective audience of John the Fearless' propaganda, and to 
measure, where possible, whether it had any impact upon individuals within the University, or vice versa. For 
a more thorough examination of the University of Paris political role during the Burgundo-Armagnac 
conflict, see Tourniers PhD dissertation: L'Universiti de Paris. 
57 Tournier, L'Univerriti de Paris, p. 71, and 81-82. 
58 Tournier, L'Univerriti de Paris, pp. 72-73. 
59 The root of this relationship was in all likelihood the fact that the 
dukes of Burgundy supported the Roman 
pope and had assisted the University of 
Paris in encouraging Charles VI to withdraw obedience from the 
Avignon pope, Benedict XIII. Orleans had always supported Benedict XIII. Coville, Les Cabochiens, p. 143; 
Guenee, Un meurtn, p. 170-171. See also Tournier, L'Univetriti de Paris, pp. 73,79-80. 
60 Monstrelet, 1: 113. Tournier, L'Univeriti de Paris, p. 51. 
61 Monstrelet, 1: 113. 
62 Tournier, L'Universiti de Paris, pp 50-51. 
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grant conseil. 63 Furthermore, he asserted that it was unnecessary to pacify the relationship 
between the dukes because, he claimed, there was only a manufactured conflict between 
them anyway. Apparently the University of Paris was displeased by his arrogance. It is 
therefore unsurprising that a great many men from the University, like Eustache de Pavilly, 
later began to support the duke of Burgundy's cause. 
It is certain that John the Fearless employed a number of maltres is ars from the 
university at various times, some of whom became his advisers, such as the theologian 
Jean Petit. ' One finds further evidence in the records of his chambn des comptes in Dijon 
that John the Fearless employed university men as counsellors and ambassadors. For 
example, the rector of the University of Paris, Pierre Cauchon, maistre is ars et licence is decret, 
was in the duke of Burgundy's service as early as February 1406, for which he was given a 
pension until 1413 '5 In February 1412, eight other scholars from the university along with 
Pierre Cauchon, were given wine and money gifts, though the reason was not disclosed in 
the records bb Presumably the gifts were rewards for services rendered in 1411, perhaps for 
their assistance immediately following the Jargeau Manifesto and the letters of defiance 
sent by Orleans and his brothers. Or, perhaps for their involvement in recovering and 
supporting the legitimacy of the May 1367 papal bull of excommunication that was then 
promulgated against the Armagnacs in November 1411. 
The reason that the University of Paris was so important was because the king and 
his advisors held the institution in very high regard, and sought its opinion on all political 
and spiritual matters 67 This was particularly true with regard to issues relating to the 
63 Monstrelet, 1: 121-122. 
6+ Jean Petit figures in John the Fearless' pension records for 1406. ACO, B 1554, fols. 55r-55v. See also B 
1558, fol. 60v. 
65 The payment was ordered by letters patent written in Bapaumes, stating that from the 6 February 1408, 
Burgundy had `retenut son conseillier [Pierre Cauchon] a la pension de cinquante frans par an... ' This was 
recorded in Paris, 19 May 1413. ACO, B 1576, fol. 113v. For more on 
his relationship to John the Fearless, 
see Schnerb, jean sans Peur, pp. 324-325. 
66 ACO, B 1570, fols. 233-235. 
67 Serge Lusignan, `Verite. garde le my: La construction dune identite univercitahr en France (XIIP-XV siede), (Paris, 
1999), pp. 179-199. Also, Tournier, L'Universiti de Paris, pp. 48-97. 
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Church and the papal schism. The University defined its role as the king's counsellor by 
developing two diverse but inter-reliant metaphorical concepts: the translatio strudii and the 
notion that it was the `daughter of the king'. It was for this reason that when in 1405 Jean 
Gerson delivered his sermon Vivat Rex in the name of the University of Paris to the king 
and the royal princes, he referred to the University as the `falle du roy', and defended its 
right to criticise both the government and the enmity between the princes. `i8 Scholars of 
the University of Paris were consulted on a number of occasions during the civil war in 
France, and their opinions were frequently held to represent those of all Parisians. This 
was particularly clear in the early months of 1413, when the king had called for a meeting 
of the Estates General. When on the 9 February 1413, the first of the University's 
spokesmen, Benoit Gentien, a monk of Saint Denis and a professor of theology, presented 
a speech that some of the University's men considered to be very weak, they asked for a 
second audience 69 The second speech was given by Eustache de Pavilly, who took the 
opportunity to aggressively condemn the mishandling of the king's finances, the 
corruption in the Parlement and king's household, and the abuse of justice throughout the 
realm. Interestingly, he also stated that there was need to reassemble the princes of the 
realm so that they could renew their oaths to observe the peace treaty, because there were, 
apparently, a great many lords who were resuming acts of war under the order of the 
count of Armagnac. 70 Pavilly later became one of the Cabochiens' spokesmen by May 
1413, and defended the extreme measures taken by the group when they seized a number 
of men and women who were suspected Armagnacs from the dauphin's entourage. " 
68 Jean Gerson, `Vivat Rex', pp. 1136-1185. 
69 For Gentien's speech, see RSD, 4: 740-742. For the dissatisfaction among the more zealous reforming 
University scholars, and the subsequent speech given by Eustache de Pavilly, a doctor from the order of 
Notre-Dame du Carmel, see pp. 744-768. 
70 RSD, 4: 746. 
71 For information on Pavilly, Coville, Les Cabochiens, pp. 167-168,195,200-201. 
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9.2. PARTISANSHIP & PUBLIC OPINION 
It is commonly held by scholars of the French civil war that, at least in the first 
stages of the conflict, Burgundy was more popular among the Parisians than was the duke 
of Orleans or the Armagnacs. This was naturally due to his consistence in propounding a 
policy of reform. Yet this hypothesis is taken as a given, based mainly on the events of 
1411 and 1413, when partisans seem to have displayed their fervent loyalty to the duke. 
Because the Cabochiens were associates of the duke, it goes some way to support the 
general view that up to that point, he did indeed have the support of a substantial portion 
of Parisian society. Yet upon closer scrutiny, it is apparent that the partisanship that 
occurred in Paris in favour of the duke of Burgundy's faction from August 1411 until July 
1418, when Burgundy re-entered Paris in triumph, was essentially a passive phenomenon 
for a large number of those who were involved. It is true that he had launched a 
particularly acute rhetorical invective against his adversaries Charles of Orleans and his 
brothers in July-August 1411. It is equally true that the duke of Burgundy had been actively 
displaying his personal emblems and badges in a very pervasive manner, symbols which 
were loaded with meaning that was conducive to his main ideological campaign. 
Ostensibly, those who wore the Burgundian badges from 1411 were displaying their 
solidarity with the Burgundian cause. This was most certainly the case for the more zealous 
partisans. 
However, it is unreasonable to discount how important the threat of violence was 
as a major coercive force during this particular propaganda campaign. The persecution that 
the duke of Burgundy's militia imposed upon whomever they suspected of being an 
Armagnac supporter among the Parisian populace was a very real hazard in September 
1411. According to Michel Pintoin, people took advantage of the right to persecute 
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identified Orleanist supporters, victimising whomever had offended them. 72 Violence in the 
capital was so rampant that even Monstrelet, a Burgundian sympathiser, admitted that it 
was a dangerous time for all people, regardless of their factional membership, `par ce que le 
peuple et commun dessudit avoient grant partie de la dominacion dedans icelle. i73 
The result of the uninhibited violence was that there were many who would have 
had little choice but to wear the Burgundian badge of the cross of Saint Andrew, with or 
without carpenter's planes, if they were to avoid persecution. Yet, even if they did accept 
and wear the Burgundian badge there is no clear evidence to prove whether they agreed 
with Burgundy's ideology. Pintoin again makes this clear when he described the 
ambivalence of partisanship during the duke of Burgundy's military campaign in 1417, 
whose main objective was to `free' the king from the alleged tyranny of the Armagnacs. 
Pintoin recalled that in the autumn of 1417, people in the countryside had once again 
begun wearing either Burgundian saltires or the upright Armagnac crosses depending on 
the circumstance, simply so that they could steal and pillage freely. 74 This was a rather 
strong indictment of the violence imposed upon the countryside during this phase of war 
by all participants, and is therefore a fascinating judgment. Even if this was an exaggeration, 
it was not an unreasonable one to make given peoples' natural proclivity to opportunism. 
Moreover, it echoes earlier comments by the chroniclers that the distinction between 
`Burgundian' and `Armagnac' was to some degree a superficial construct buttressed by 
excessive violence. Therefore, although the duke of Burgundy's emblems may have been 
rich in meaning, there is no certainty that the people of the realm understood or agreed 
with that significance. Coercion was obviously one of the key factors in encouraging 
partisanship. 
72 `Effrenis eis concessa licencia, inter plurimos quos pariebat abusus, ille permaximus erat, quod si quis in 
aliquem odium concepisset et cum publice Armeniacum vocasset, et si non occidebatur, carcerem tarnen non 
vitabat, et protinus a prevenientibus bona ejus 
idstrahebantur libere sine auctoritate cujuscunque. ' RSD, 4: 
444-446. 
73 Monstrelet, 2: 163-164. 
74RSD, 5: 154-156. 
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Nevertheless, we cannot ignore the fact that there was an obvious group of staunch 
Burgundian supporters in the towns, and especially in Paris. It was the unanimous opinion 
of all the chroniclers of the period, regardless of their partiality, that from his entry onto 
the political stage, the duke of Burgundy had won the favour of a great majority of 
Parisians. Neither can we deny that the butchers and skinners of Paris, among other 
prominent burgesses, were clearly devoted to him. Did these individuals digest and believe 
in the rhetorical arguments that Burgundy propagated against the duke of Orleans and his 
successors, the Armagnacs? Or was their devotion and loyalty to the duke of Burgundy 
based purely on a mutually dependent relationship? 75 One of the court cases registered in 
the Chätelet suggests that some did buy into Burgundy's rhetoric. Marguerite la Boitelle, 
the wife of one of the royal secretaries, Guillaume Barrau, was banished from the realm in 
December 1413, after having her possessions confiscated for having contravened the Peace 
of Auxerre (22 August 1413). 
76 Evidently she was disturbed by the fact that everything that 
had been accomplished prior to the Armagnacs' taking control of the government would 
be undone. For this reason, she was charged with having `murmure et conspire, et fait 
murmures, monopoles, conspiracions et assemblees dampnees et illicites, et induit et 
admoneste sondit mary et autres a faire lesdiz murmures, monopoles, conspiracions et 
assemblees avecques plusieurs autres sedicieux et violateurs de ladicte paix, en nostredicte 
ville de Paris et ailleurs. '77 The fact that the wife of a royal official was so concerned that 
the new government would overturn earlier advancements that she conspired with others 
of similar dispositions suggests that Burgundy's propaganda did indeed have an impact 
upon at least some people among the ruling urban elites. At the very least, the practical 
applications that had accompanied the rhetoric were deemed effective. 
75 This was the position Marie Reine Lobry held in her thesis, Relations, pp. 1,27-40. 
76 AN, JJ 168, no. 81 cited in Douet d'Arcq, Choix, 2: 178-179. Douet d'Arcq had mistakenly assigned the date 
of 15 December 1414 rather than 1413 to this 
document. See volume 1, p. 369. 
77 Ibid 
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The accounts of wine gifts of 1411 also indicate that there were a number of 
Parisians who were generously rewarded for their loyalty to the duke, including a number 
of the king's royal officers: Eustache de Laitre, president de la chambre des comßtes du mr, Nicole 
d'Orgemont, Michel Laillier and Guillaume Le Clerc, all consedlers & maistres des diZ compter 
Pierre de Fontenay, a Burgundian court counsellor and maitre d'hötel, and gouverneur de la 
despense du Roy, Jehan de Pressy, tresorier desguerres du Roy, and finally, Guillaume Varran, the 
king's secretary. 78 Of these men, it is certain that jean de Pressy and Pierre de Fontenay 
were, without a doubt, loyal Burgundians. Pressy, was, in 1403-1404 the rrceveur des aides 
royales in Artois, and was given the title of receveurgeneral of the duke of Burgundy's finances 
in November 1406, which he retained until August 1410. " At this juncture, he became a 
counsellor of the duke and was given an annual pension. 
"' According to Schnerb, it was 
due to John the Fearless' influence that he was honoured with the office of tresorier des 
guerres du roi in August 1410, which he held until February 1413 
81 Pierre de Fontenay, lord 
of Rance, had a similar success story. Fontenay had inherited his new noble title from his 
father, Nicholas de Fontenay, the gouverneurgeneral des finances of Philip the Bold. 82 In 1405, 
Pierre was given the office of maitre d'hötel, which he retained at least until 1417, and in June 
1409 he became one of the duke's general conseiller. 83 In 1409 Charles VI officially named 
him the `gouverneur de toutes les finances qui sont ou seront ordonnees dorenavant, tant 
sur le fait de notre domaine que sur le fait des aides.. . pour 
la depense des h6tels. '84 
As for the other men listed above, such as the more moderate Michel Laillier and 
Guillaume Le Clerc, many had not been specifically involved with the Burgundian cause 85 
78 ACO, B 1570, fols. 233v-234r. 
79 See Schnerb, jean tans Peur, pp. 326-329. See also the ducal accounts at the ACO. For example the `Recette 
generales par Jehan de Pressy' 1407-1408 in ACO, B 1554, 
fol. 45r and what follows, or B 1560, fol. 33v. 
"o Schnerb, jean sans Peur, p. 327; ACO, B 1560, fol. 59r. 
81 Schnerb, jean sans Peur, p. 327. Also Rey, Finances royaler, pp. 392-393. 
82 Schnerb, jean . rat 
Peur, p. 335. 
83 Rey, Domain du roi, p. 297. 
84 Rey, Finances rnyales, p. 53. 
85 Laillier was a wealthy moneychanger in Paris. Rey, Domain du mi, p. 300. Guillaume le Clerc sat on several 
royal council meetings in 1411 where 
letters in favour of John the Fearless were drafted and published. For 
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Therefore it is likely that Burgundy used the wine to entice them to join ranks. The others 
that appear on the above list seem to have only allied themselves with the duke of 
Burgundy over the course of time. This was the case with the Parisian jurist, Eustache de 
Laitre. Laitre was from a wealthy `bourgeois' family, and throughout his career had been a 
counsellor to the king at the Chätellet, a lawyer in the Parlement, a maitre des requetes de ! 'hotel 
du my (from 1398), and from 1404 had sat in various royal council meetings. "' There is little 
to suggest that Laitre had any direct affiliation with the Burgundian faction before October 
1409, when John the Fearless included him in his commission for reform (20 October). " 
But in early December, Laitre was rewarded with the new office of president of the chambre 
des comptes in the place of jean de Montaigu, who, as we have seen, was executed two 
months before. In May 1414 Laitre was banished from the realm alongside Pierre Cauchon 
and John the Fearless' secretary, Baudes des Bordes ga Similarly, the Parisian cleric Nicole 
d'Orgemont was a jurist, and had served in the Parlement from as early as 1392, as a 
conseiller clere. B9 In December 1409, he too was given a royal office, that of maltir de la 
chambre des comptes. 9" One naturally concludes, therefore, that December 1409 was a turning 
point for both Laitre and d'Orgemont. Indeed d'Orgemont was later arrested by Armagnac 
government after his collusion in a conspiracy to help the duke of Burgundy back into 
Paris was revealed 9' 
Furthermore, wine gifts were given to the butchers and tanners of Paris and their 
peers, people whose names are known to posterity because of their involvement in the 
Cabochien uprising of Paris (1413). These are: Denisot de Chaumont; Thomas Legois and 
his two sons; Simon de Caboche; Jean de Troyes (surgeon); and finally, the provost of 
the royal letter inviting John the Fearless to `rescue' the realm, 01 /09/1411 see Plancher, Preuves, pp. 275-276, 
n. 275. For a second royal letter relating to the same issue, consult: ACO, B 11893, n. 13. 
"s ACO, B 1570, fols. 233v-234r. 
86 Schnerb, jean tans Peur, p. 554. 
87 Ibid. 
e9 Douet d'Arcq, Choix, 1: 368. 
89 Schnerb, jean sans Pear, p. 555. 
90 Ibid. 
'' Bourgeois, pp. 70-71; Hictoirr de Charles VI, p. 531. 
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merchants at the time, Pierre Gencien. 'Z Moreover, in March 1413, jean de Troyes, 
`bourgeois et eschevin de la ville de Paris', was given a further gift of eighty gold francs 
`pour considerations de plusieurs agreables servicesi93 In the same month, the butchers and 
skinners of Paris listed above were given further gifts of wine. The list also included 
Gamier St. Yon, who was an alderman of Paris from 23 October 1412 to August 1413. ý 
Unsurprisingly, others who were attached to the municipal government of Paris in 1411- 
1413 received similar wine gifts 95 The list included jean de Troyes for the second time, and 
jean d'Olive (both of whom were aldermen during this period), Pierre Gencien and Andriet 
d'Espernon (both provosts of merchants at different times between January 1412 and 
September 1413), Robert Louvet, `clerc du prevot des marchand', and many other royal 
officials. Among them was Elyon de Jacqueville, a `chevalier, conseiller et chambellan' of 
the king and of John the Fearless. Jacqueville would later become one of the leaders of the 
Cabochien Uprising. 
These gifts might induce some to believe that the relationship between the duke of 
Burgundy and his partisans in Paris was one which was built entirely upon financial returns. 
However, this is a rather reductive way of looking at what was a very complex connection. 
If Burgundy simply used these men to further his own ambitions, there would have been 
little reason for him to defend them as stalwartly as he did. Prior to the 1413 revolt, jean 
Jouvenal, Lord of Traignel, allegedly begged John the Fearless to disassociate himself from 
the butchers, as he claimed that their relationship was dishonouring the duke's reputation. 
According to the Jouvenal compiler's chronicle, Burgundy's response was that he would do 
as he pleased. 96 It is true that the Jouvenal compiler's perception of the event here 
described was naturally predisposed to the lord of Traignel's version of events rather than 
92 ACO, B 1570, fols. 233v-234r. 
93 ACO, B 1576, fol. 129r. 
94 For the wine gifts see ACO, B 1576, fols. 193v-195r. For a list of provosts of merchants and of aldermen 
from 1412-1499, see Favier's chart, Paris, p. 419-431. 
95 See also Schnerb, jean sans Peur, pp. 555-556. 
96 This anecdote is not related in any other chronicle of the period. Histoire de Charles 1/I, pp. 480-481. 
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to the duke of Burgundy. Consequently, we must approach this story with great caution. 
Yet it is a significant anecdote nonetheless, because there is other corroborating evidence 
which proves that the duke did publicly, and without shame, favour the butchers of Paris, 
regardless of how this affected his public profile. Following the mass exile of those who 
were involved in the uprising, Burgundy sheltered some of the men in his domains, and 
supported them with gifts of money. 97 In addition, he continued to fight to have those who 
were banished recalled to the realm and their honour restored .$ Finally, once the 
duke of 
Burgundy had regained control of the government in the spring of 1418, he had the Grande 
Boucherie rebuilt for his loyal partisans, and all their rights and privileges restored. "' It is 
clear, therefore, that John the Fearless went beyond what one might naturally expect had 
he merely chosen to exploit his partisans to his own advantage. Therefore, one concludes 
that the duke of Burgundy and this particular group of partisans did indeed have some sort 
of reciprocal relationship that was mutually beneficial, and one that was durable and 
permanent. 
The question remains however, whether the Burgundian partisans believed in the 
duke of Burgundy's propaganda, whether they were ambivalent to it, or merely powerless 
to resist. There is some fairly reliable evidence which provides some insights into the minds 
of the Burgundian partisans, and suggest that a great many people around the realm, and 
especially in Paris, did support the duke of Burgundy's ideological perspective against the 
Armagnacs. The first is an anecdote from February 1416 that was brought to the fore by 
Douet d'Arcq regarding a rebellion against an aides commanded by the royal government by 
'» Compensation was given to Denisot de Chaumont and Simon de Caboche for their expenses in Besancon 
and Auxerre in September-October 1413. ACO, 
B 1576, fols. 138v-139v. 
os For example, the Jouvenal chronicler wrote that in 1415, 'estoient 
i Paris les ambassadeurs du duc de 
Bourgongne, qui pourchassoient pleine abolition pour les banns, et reparation de 1'honneur du duc de 
Bourgongne', p. 507. For a detailed description of the negotiations regarding the restoration of honour of the 
rebels, Histoirr de Charles VI, pp. 512-515. See also ACO, 
B 11894, layette 72, n. 36. 
99 When the Armagnacs came to power in 1414, they destroyed the Grande Bosreherie. Villefosse, 'Grande 
Boucherie', pp. 52,69-70; Favier, Pans, pp. 37-39. 
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ordinance in Languedoc. "w The townspeople of Carcasonne immediately assembled at the 
hötel de vile to deliberate on whether or not to pay it, and decided in the end to refuse it. It 
was at this point when they received letters from the duke of Burgundy which had a rather 
astounding effect: 
Et asses tost apres les consulz d'icelle ville eussent fait 
assembler ledit peuple pour ladicte cause, et ilec ledit jour 
eusent este leues certaines lettres envoyees par nostre tres cher 
et tres ame cousin le duc de Bourgongne, adrecans ausdiz 
consulz et habitans de ladicte ville, contenans entre autres 
choses qu'ilz se tenissent fors et qu'ilz ne paiassent riens de 
ladicte taille, et qu'il se faisoit fort de faire tant devers nous ou 
feu nostre chier et tres ame filz le duc de Guienne, dont Dieu 
ait 1'äme, qu'ilz ne paieroient riens. Soubz couleur desquelles 
lettres ledit peuple se feust tenu en l'oppinion de riens paier. 
Depuis lesquelles lettres ainsi leues, les gens de ladicte ville 
commancerent tousjours ä murmurer entre eulx... "" 
After this, the townspeople found arms to defend themselves against royal officials, and 
accused any who came to the town of being a `traistre Armignac! '"'2 Burgundy's reminder 
of his anti-tax policy seems to have been well-placed at this particular moment, and was 
effective in achieving the reactionary response that he desired. 
Secondly, we must consider that there were numerous insurgencies on behalf of the 
duke of Burgundy during his long exile from Paris, 1413-1418. On 11 December 1415 
information was relayed to the royal council from the Grande Chätelet that `il y avoit grant 
murmure de sedicion'. 
103 A plot was discovered wherein a pastry baker situated near the 
Grande Boucherie had sent letters to the duke of Burgundy explaining that he would arrange 
to open the gates of Montmartre or Saint-Honore. 
"" In 1416 there were additional 
discoveries of conspiracies to let the duke of Burgundy back in to the capital, which were 
executed by members of the `bourgeoisie', among them a `homme d'honneur et estoit en 
'°° AN, JJ 169, n. 67 cited in Douet d'Arcq, Choix, 1: 378-381. According to modem dating conventions, the 
date of this document is actually February 1416. 
101 Douet d'Arcq, Choix, 1: 379. 
102 Ibid., p. 380. 
103 Ibid., p. 375-377. 
104 Ibid., p. 376-377. 
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ars nomme maistre Regnault [Maillet]', an alderman of Paris, Robert de Belloy, and the 
archdeacon of Amiens, and canon of Notre Dame, Nicole d'Orgemont. 105 
Perhaps the most obvious displays of partisanship occurred during the massacres 
of the Armagnac partisans in August-October 1411 and also the 1413 Cabochien uprising. 
The Jouvenal compiler described the beginning of the violence in the following way: `A la 
fin d'avril, et au commencement de may, se mirent sus plus fort que devant meschantes 
gens, trippiers, bouchers, et escorcheurs, pelletiers, cousturiers, et autres pauvres gens de 
bas estat, qui faisoient de tres-inhumaines, detestables, et deshonnestes besongnes. i116 Here 
highlighted were not only the gent de metiers including the butchers and the associative 
professions, but also the menu peuple. This is significant for several reasons. First, the 
chronicler's disdain is revealing of the tension that existed between social groups in 
medieval urban culture. In associating the butchers with the lowest and most poor among 
Parisian society, the Jouvenal compiler denied them their true place as one of the most 
privileged confraternities in Paris. 117 Secondly it is important that Juvenal included the 
`pauvres gens de bas estat' in his description of the 1413 mob, because it suggests that the 
group was much more broad than we might imagine. This was certainly the case, for the list 
of banished men and women in 1413 and 1414 include some of their occupations: 
`chaussetier', `batiller', a pastry baker, a fishmonger, a tavern owner, a tailor, and a wax 
vendor. "" It also included numerous people from the higher social spheres, such as a 
money-changer, numerous valets, and several esquires. 
`9 This was also true of the 1411 
mob. Monstrelet asserted that a large majority of Parisians got involved: `Et alors, les 
bouchers, le quartier des hales et la plus grant partie des Parisiens, estoient du tout 
affectuez au duc Jehan de Bourgongne, et ne desiroient que nul eust le gouvernement du 
105 Bourgeois, pp. 70-71. 
106 Hirtoire de Charles VI, p. 481. 
107 This was the case for all butchers belonging to the Grande houcherie. 
108 Douet d'Arcq, Choix, 1: 367-369. 
109 Ibid. 
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Roy et de son royaume si non lui, et ceulx qu'ilz scavoient estre ses arms et favorables. '110 
Therefore, although the butchers of Paris took the lead during the autumn of 1411, there 
were people from diverse professions included. "' There were indeed `gens de plusieurs 
mestiers de Paris, chirugiens comme maistre jean de Troyes [... ] et tou[s] gens pauvres, et 
meschans desirans pillier et desrober estoient avec eux. '"2 
The 1413 throng appears to be even more varied. 1' It comprised the president of 
the chambre des comptes (Eustache de Laitre), the surgeon jean de Troyes, at least one 
academic from the University of Paris (Eustache de Pavilly), at least one changeur (Andre 
d'Espernon), and several lesser nobles from the duke of Burgundy's household in Paris 
(Robert de Mailli and Charles de Lens). "' Both Pavilly and Troyes were the Cabochien's 
spokesmen, and did most of the negotiating between their group and the royal court during 
the revolt. "' If the men listed above, and indeed other Burgundian supporters, had not 
joined the Burgundian cause for ideological reasons, they might have been interested in the 
more practical reforming policies. Many of them were named to another commission for 
reform in the early months of 1413.16 Among them, the bishop of Tournai, the Moustier 
de St Jean, Pierre Cauchon, jean de l'Olive, two men from the Parlement, and several 
noblemen. "' Their list of reforms became the basis for the notorious `Cabochien 
Ordinance' published 26 May 1413. Therefore, they could not have rejected the ideology 
completely if they were so actively involved. Yet because Burgundy packaged all of the 
diverse aspects of his propaganda, all of his attempts to publicly vilify the Armagnacs for 
their ostensible lese-majesty in addition to the misgovernment, as one underlying ideology, 
the Armagnacs suffered from mass persecution in 1413 as they had done in 1411. We must 
1 10 Dionstrelet, 2: 163. 
For numerous examples of the dominant role of the butchers, see bionstrelet, 2: 162-163,169, and 199. 
112 Hirtoirr de Charles 1/I, p. 467. 
113 Douet d'Arcq, Cboix, 1: 367-369. 
11a Monstrelet, 2: 343. 
115 Coville, Ler Caborhiens, pp. 167-168,179-208. 
116 Coville, Lbrdonnance tabocbienne, p. iii. 
117 Ibid. Also, RSD, 5: 4. 
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not forget that the part of the reason for assembling the Estates General in January 1413 
was to discuss a programme of reform to cover the large expenses of the recent campaign 
against the Armagnacs. Likewise, they had to decide how to deal with the English, who had 
entered France on the request of the Armagnacs in the first half of 1412. Therefore, 
although the long-term cause of the deficit ran far deeper than this, the culpability of the 
Armagnacs seemed, on the surface, obvious. This goes some way to explaining the frenzied 
attack on the Armagnacs during the rebellion. It is therefore undeniable that Burgundy did 
have some success in damaging the reputation of the Armagnacs and turning many 
townspeople against them. 
Superficially at least, the concept of Armagnac corruption seems to have 
dominated the minds of all the Cabochiens, and especially Troyes and Pavilly. On 28 April 
the angry mob stormed the Bastille Saint Antoine and demanded that Pierre des Essarts 
surrender himself to them. Burgundy swore to protect him, and took him to the Louvre. 
The crowd, joined by several other men of arms from John the Fearless' household, 
immediately stormed the duke of Guyenne's hotel. Jean de Troyes provided Guyenne with 
a list of the names of certain `gens de tres-mauvaise volonte' whom they wished to detain, 
at which (the Jouvenal compiler claims) there was `tres-grande commotion et sedition'. "' 
The butchers were victorious and arrested the duke of Bar, jean de Vailley, Jacques de la 
Riviere and several others. "' This event set a dangerous precedent for the Cabochiens. 
During the next three months, they returned to the dauphin's palace several times, 
chastising him for excesses and arresting people of all ranks, including the queen's brother 
and several ladies in her entourage. On 25 May, they presented a list of reforms to the king, 
known as the `Cabochien Ordinance', which he published the following day in his Lit de 
justice. "' The Cabochiens donned white hoods to demonstrate their solidarity with one 
""s Hisloire de Charles VI, p. 481. 
119 Ibid. 
120 For a transcription of the ordinance see Coville, L'Ordonnance cabochienne. 
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another, and insisted that everyone who supported reforms wear one also, even offering 
their hoods to the royal princes, the dauphin and the king. "' Anyone who did not wear 
their rallying symbol, was suspected of being an Armagnac, and could face imprisonment 
or even death. 
Finally, due to the diligence of the duke of Berry and Jouvenal, lord of Traignal, the 
king and the royal princes began negotiating a peace, at Pontoise. On 1 August, the articles 
of the peace treaty were read to the king. Jean de Troyes, Simon Caboche, the Saint Yon 
and LeGois families tried to impede the peace process, but were overruled by the royal 
council and a large number of Parisians who had lost patience with the violence within the 
capital. "' The peace was published on 26 August 1413. Their severe and cruel 
discrimination against the Armagnacs during the uprising only confirms, therefore, that this 
event was propelled by partisanship, and was inspired on some level by the Burgundian 
ideological complaint against the Armagnacs. This is corroborated by the proclamation 
cried at every crossroads in Paris on 6 August 1413 that `nul ne se meslast de chose que les 
signeurs feissent, et que nul ne feist armee, si non par le commandement des quaterniers, et 
"z3 
cinquanteniers ou diseniers. 
Yet it is significant that during the uprising, the Cabochiens did not wear St. 
Andrew's crosses. The fact that Burgundian partisans among the regular Parisian populace 
wore the crosses in 1411 to distinguish themselves from the Armagnacs, but not in 1413 
suggests that there was a conscious attempt by the Cabochiens to disassociate themselves 
from the duke of Burgundy. The white hoods were reminiscent of the hoods worn by the 
Flemish during the urban uprisings in the early 1380s, and were therefore symbolic of 
121 Coville suggested that the Ghentois had offered their hoods to the Parisians, hoods that they themselves 
had worn in their rebellion against royal and comital authority in 1382. Coville, Ler Cabochiens, p. 3. This is 
supported by Nicholas, The LaterAfedieval 
City, pp. 127-129. 
122 Histoire de Charles VI, p. 486. 
123 Bourgeois, p. 42. 
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urban strength and power. 124 Although their victims were certainly the duke of Burgundy's 
political rivals, they nonetheless had their own agenda. Indeed, the duke of Burgundy had 
lost all control over the butchers by May 1413. Yet it was notorious that they were his 
partisans and as noted above, some even remained under his protection in his lands after 
they were banished by royal ordinance. 125 
The Armagnacs' reaction against the duke of Burgundy in 1414, and against his 
partisans once they had gained control of Paris and suppressed the rebellion in August 
1413, confirms the effect that his epistolary propaganda and the Burgundian partisan 
symbols had played in the persecution against the Armagnacs. To welcome in the new 
government, the city of Paris adopted the Armagnac livery of violet, white and silver. 12' 
The Bourgeois described the scene in Paris: `Item, la iii` sepmaine d'aoust ou environ, 
furent commencez hucquez par ceulx qui gouvernoient, oü il avoit foison feulles d'argent, 
et en escript d'argent: le droit chemin, et estoient de drap vyollet, et avant que la fin d'aoust 
fust, tant en avoit a Paris que sans nombre, et especialment ceulx de la bande, qui estoient 
revenues, ä cens et ä milliers la portoient. "27 
The motto `le droit chemin' and the straight white cross - an emblem representing 
the French realm - was an overtly anti-Burgundian message. In emblematic terms, the 
saltire cross that the Burgundians wore had been the direct opposite to the straight white 
cross. 128 By re-appropriating the royal emblem, the latter was designed to counteract the 
saltire entirely. The motto asserted that the 
Armagnac leadership was the only `right', or 
`true' way forward. It implied that those who wore the opposite had been misled, and those 
124 Coville, Let CaGochienr, p. 193; Schnerb, Etat Gour ; izgnon, p. 158. 
125 ACO, B 1576, fols. 138v-139v. 
126 Hirtoirc de Charles VI, p. 490. 
127 Bourgeois, p. 44. See also RSD, 5: 150, and Histoin de Charles VI, p. 490. Charles of Orleans' accounts for 
September 1413 indicate that he paid `cent seize livres cinq sols toumois' to a draper, goldsmith and 
embroiderer for 'douze aulnes de violet de Bruxelles pour faire quatre heuques brodees i la devise oü est 
escript !e droit chemin, ä Vaillant [the goldsmith] pour avoir fait les feuilles et petites feuillettes dorees'. Laborde, 
Les duct de Bourgogne, 3: 262, no. 6229. 
128 In 1411, 'ils laisserent la croix droite blanche, qui est la vraye enseigne du Roy, et prirent la croix de Sainct 
Andre, et la devise du duc de Bourgongne, le sautoüer, et ceux qu'on disoit Armagnacs portoient la bande, et 
pource que sembloit que cc fussent querelles particuliers. ' Hirtoire de Charles VI, p. 473. 
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who accepted their badges and livery were the only sincerely loyal subjects of the crown. 
This was a message that was complemented by an extensive letter campaign organised by 
the Armagnacs in September and October 1413. '2' Monstrelet and the Bourgeois de Paris 
noted that wearing the Armagnac emblem became obligatory, as decreed by royal 
ordinance. "' Furthermore, the Armagnacs took care to remove all Burgundian symbols 
from Paris and they banned the singing of any songs relating to the duke of Burgundy. 13' 
They also took care to remove or cover all images of Saint Andrew in Paris with their white 
scarves. On 13 September 1414, a Parisian artisan was caught tearing a white scarf from an 
image of Saint Andrew that had hung in the church of Saint Eustache near the Halles 
market. This he did out of spite for the Armagnac princes, who, Pintoin explained, wore 
similar scarves. 132 In punishment, he had his hand cut off in front of St. Eustache and was 
banished. "' The impact of this punishment was great, for the Bourgeois explains that no 
one dared complain openly about the Armagnac government again even though the realm 
was `tout mal gouvernez et de maulvaises gens. '1 
Simultaneously, there were a number of important royal proclamations given 
against the duke of Burgundy. In a royal proclamation written 15 September 1414 
(published 11 October), in which the Armagnacs had their banishment repealed, they 
attacked the duke of Burgundy openly. 
"' We have already noted that although the stated 
purpose was to restore the honour of the Armagnac princes, the subtext was to shame the 
royal advisors who were in fact the duke of Burgundy's partisans. It was ultimately a direct 
condemnation of the duke of Burgundy for his reprehensible conduct since his rise to 
. '29 RSD, 5: 184-194. 
130 Monstrelet, 3: 21; Bourgeois, p. 50. 
131 Bourgeois, p. 46. 
132 RSD, 5: 447. 
133 Bourgeois, p. 56. 
"a Ibid. 
135 For this and what follows, RSD, 5: 185-195. 
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power in 1409. Further proclamations were made against Burgundy over the next six 
months. 
Yet, despite the numerous proclamations against Burgundy, the letters patent and 
the desperate attempts by the Armagnacs to remove every last Burgundian cross from 
Paris, support for John the Fearless continued to grow in the capital. In December 1415, 
rumours spread that the duke of Burgundy would advance on Paris. The Jouvenal compiler 
anxiously calculated that Burgundy had over four thousand supporters in the capital at this 
time. "' Whether he was exaggerating is irrelevant - his estimate is simply representative of 
what others might have believed. The persecution of suspected Burgundians during this 
period suggests that they did indeed feel vulnerable. Unjustifiable arrests were regular, they 
banned assemblies, dismantled the Grande Boucherie, removed the Parisians' chains, and 
locked the Bastille Saint-Antoine. ' 37 
When the opportunity presented itself in 1417, the Burgundian saltire resurfaced 
during the duke of Burgundy's campaign to regain control of Paris in the name of the 
king. 13' As noted above, John the Fearless' letters to the bonnes villes in which he accused the 
Armagnacs of corruption and `evildoing' from April to October 1417, met with some 
success. Several important towns acquiesced to his plea for support and submitted to John 
the Fearless without incident. The townspeople then began wearing ensigns with Saint 
Andrew's cross on them, and cried together `Vive Bourgogne'. Many of the king's officials 
in these towns were taken prisoner, executed and their goods confiscated. As in 1411 and 
in 1413, it sufficed to accuse a man of being an Armagnac to kill him, however tenuous the 
accusation was. 
139 Again, we cannot be certain that the towns actually believed in the duke 
of Burgundy's claims that the Armagnacs were `evildoers' and `tyrants', but it is interesting 
'36 Hirtoire de Charles 1/I, p. 525. 
137 Bourgeois, pp. 69-75; Histoire de Charles VI, p. 531. For the symbolic importance of the chains to the 
Parisians, see again Contamine, 'Les chains dans les bones villes de France', pp. 293-320. 
138 See RSD, 6: 157. 
139 Histoire de Charles VI, p. 533. 
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that even the Jouvenal compiler - an Armagnac sympathiser - believed that the letters had 
an impact on the towns, and had led to their surrender. '" When the Burgundian army 
entered into Paris on 29 May 1418, a vast majority of Parisians were already wearing the 
Burgundian crosses, and openly declaring their support for the duke of Burgundy. `[O]n 
[eust] trouve ä Paris gens de tous estaz, comme moynes, ordres mendiens, femmes, 
hommes, portans la croix de Sainct-Andry ou de Troyes ou d'autre matiere, plus de deux 
cens mille, sans les enffans. Lors fur Paris moult esmeu, et se arma le peuple moult plustost 
que les gens d'armes... '' He also claimed that the majority of Parisians wore the cross of 
Saint Andrew and like in the other bonnes villes, cried Wive Bourgognel"" 
There were some who resisted however. The Bourgeois de Paris alleged that the 
remaining Armagnacs would rather surrender Paris to the king of England than submit to 
the duke of Burgundy, and that they would then force everyone to wear the cross of Saint 
George on a black shield. According to the Bourgeois, this was a reflection of their utter 
hatred for any Burgundian partisan. "' The Bourgeois later added that once the 
Burgundians had entered Paris, the Armagnacs purportedly cried `A mort! ä mort! Ville 
gaingnee! Vive le roy et le dalphin et le roy d'Engleterre! Tuez tout! tuez tout! '" The 
Bourgeois' exaggerated view is interesting here because it is representative of the success 
that the Burgundian spin had in permeating through urban society, and over the course of 
time. 
There is one final facet of this story which suggests that some of the Parisians who 
were favourable to the duke of Burgundy fervently believed in him. During the June 
massacres, Saint Eustache founded a confraternity of Saint Andrew in honour of their 
protector. The Bourgeois de Paris estimated that the confraternity reached over seven 
1 40 Ibid. 
141 Bourgeois, pp. 90-91. 
'42 Histoire de Charles VI, p. 540. 
143 Bourgeois, p. 87. 
144 Ibid., p. 90. 
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hundred members in Paris. "' According to the chroniclers, priests used only the cross of 
Saint Andrew instead of the regular sign of the cross when blessing or baptising, as the 
latter cross was unequivocally associated with the Armagnacs. Throughout the summer, 
those identified as Armagnacs suffered greatly. The massacre was extreme; the Jouvenal 
compiler claimed that the Burgundians spared no one. When they were killed, the 
Armagnac victims were not given proper burials, but were thrown outside the city walls, or 
in the river. "' The divisions among the people of the realm were excessively destructive. 
The Jouvenal compiler illustrated it well, saying `C'estoit grande pitie, car le pere contre le 
Pils, et le frere contre le frere estoient bandez, faisans guerre les uns contres les autres en 
cette maudite querelle, qu'on disoit de Bourgongne et Armagnacs'"47 It was the use of 
symbols and livery which reinforced the divisions that had already been excited by the 
publication of so many letters and proclamations against each of the parties. However, the 
fact that there were three separate occasions where the persecution of Armagnacs was the 
driving force, suggests that at least some of the people of the realm, and especially Paris, 
reacted in accordance with the duke of Burgundy's ideology, even if they used it as a 
pretext for engaging in violence. 
145 Ibid., p. 95. 
146 Histoire de Charles VI, p. 542; Monstrelet, 3: 266. 
147 Hirtoirr de Charles 11I, p. 539. 
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CHAPTER 10 
CONCLUSION 
This doctoral dissertation has responded to two significant voids in fifteenth- 
century historiography. There were two aspects which were the initial cause of inspiration 
for this study. First, we were stimulated to resolve the issue of how the townspeople of the 
realm were swept up into what had, up to 1411, remained a private dispute between the 
princely houses of Burgundy and Orleans. Additionally, we were intrigued by what 
appeared to be John the Fearless, duke of Burgundy's inadequately explained popularity 
among the Parisians during the first phase of this conflict. To answer our queries, this 
study's primary aim was to undertake a methodical and in-depth analysis of his propaganda 
programme between 1405 and his death in 1419. A closely related second objective 
stemmed from our first: this dissertation is the first attempt at a systematic study of the 
mechanics involved in the execution of a medieval propagandist's ideological campaign. 
Although propaganda is a field wherein there is increasing interest among medievalists, to 
date there are no studies that are entirely committed to discerning how a campaign worked 
from either an epistemological or an empirical perspective. 
The most significant obstacle to this study was the challenge presented by the 
uncertainty of whether `propaganda' is a legitimate term, or concept, to identify the 
palpable attempts among persons involved in high politics to promote a particular ideology 
in the later middle ages. To tackle this issue head on, we examined the criteria posited by 
theorists and historians alike who study propaganda. We have confidently argued that the 
term and the concept are wholly applicable to the fifteenth century. This was a position 
that we confirmed by putting forward numerous examples of how John the Fearless' varied 
attempts to gain public favour during his career corresponded to abovementioned 
conditions of a `propaganda campaign'. For example, we have shown that, like most 
242 
successful propagandists, Burgundy ensured that the majority of his propaganda was either 
based in loose truths, or founded upon well-established conventions of medieval political 
thought. Both were important, because if propaganda is to be effective, it must be framed 
around elements of shared experience, or resonate with recognisable concerns of the 
recipients. In Part Two, where we analysed two of the core themes of Burgundy's 
propaganda, we drew out examples where these aspects were observable in practice. 
Certainly this was the case when on numerous occasions Burgundy publicly deemed taxes, 
aides or other levies implemented by the Orleans/Armagnac administration as `unfair' and 
`overburdening', as he did in March and August 1405, and again in his letter campaigns of 
1417. During the latter campaign, he explained that the Armagnacs were oppressing the 
`powre peuple' with their many different forms of taxations, and likened these actions to 
pillage and robbery. ' Likewise, John the Fearless' fixation upon calling for reform to 
`repair' the chose publique and preserve the integrity of the king and his realm was 
ubiquitously inserted into his propaganda? To ensure that this idea of repairing the 
crumbling edifice of government was firmly implanted into audiences at street level as 
much as within the higher social strata, we have argued that John deliberately used the 
carpenter's plane and, after January 1410, the mason's level, as his two predominant 
personal emblems. 
Likewise, we have shown that Burgundy used a corrupt form of information, 
known to communications theorists as `disinformation', or `black propaganda'. The most 
useful medium for this genre comprised the many letters and manifestoes that he sent. 
Burgundy intended his disinformation to create a deflective source of origin for the 
particulars which he conveyed to his audience, a source which he ultimately hoped would 
legitimise what were, essentially, rather questionable decisions. We have, moreover, flagged 
numerous other examples wherein John the Fearless employed strategies that corresponded 
ACO, B 11895, layette 72, n. 39. 
2 See for one of innumerable examples, BNF, Collection Bourgogne, vol. 55, fol. 254r. 
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directly with those put into practice by propagandists, as identified by theorists. For 
example, we explained that he frequently asked hollow questions of his audience regarding 
their loyalty to the crown. With this approach, he was able to further reinforce an imagined 
disparity between his partisans, who were loyal' subjects of the king, and the `treasonous' 
Armagnacs and their adherents. This strategy, in concert with his manipulation of truths, 
and the disinformation he spread were designed to damage his rivals'Fama. As for his own 
reputation, Burgundy ensured that he appealed to the general population by endorsing a 
platform that responded to their collective political concerns. He presented the illusion that 
he was devoted to preserving their natural `rights': justice and tranquilitas. At the fore of 
these concerns was the ideal of equitable taxation, an issue which made its appearance in all 
aspects of Burgundy's campaigns. 
Furthermore, in our analysis of Burgundy's diverse media of communication - his 
texts, letters, symbols, and ceremony - we have argued that he employed all the available 
technology to convey his ideology to manipulate public opinion to his advantage. There is 
little doubt that the systems in place for medieval communication were not, obviously, as 
advanced as those of our modern era in terms of both scope and the possibility for instant 
reception. Nevertheless it is evident that John the Fearless' propaganda was a pre-modern 
form of mass-media, in that he disseminated his rhetoric as widely as possible, using as many 
forums for interaction as were accessible to him. This is manifest in the sheer volume and 
vigour with which he circulated his unrelenting letters and manifestoes throughout his 
career, whenever circumstance induced a need either to self-justify, or to malign his rivals. 
Moreover, we have observed that Burgundy used other ocular and aural channels of 
expression to convey his ideology, with the intention of involving his audiences in the 
exchange. These, and in particular his distribution of badges, served to foster a sense of 
identity among Burgundian followers. Simultaneously this approach was also a useful 
method of exclusion, encouraging distrust, anxiety, fear and hatred for the Armagnac anti- 
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community. This, we noted, is a typical strategem employed by propagandists to isolate 
non-partisans, and in Burgundy's case, was a tool for coercion. 
The fact that much of what Burgundy accomplished during his initial rise to power, 
between 1408 and 1413, was very publicly denounced and nullified when he was at the 
nadir of his career, from late 1413 to 1418, suggests that Burgundy was a successful 
propagandist. Starting in September 1413, the Armagnacs repealed many of the royal 
ordinances that were issued during his zenith, and removed every last Burgundian saltire 
from Paris. This was, effectively a counter-propaganda campaign to restore the Armagnac's 
good Fama, and in turn, devastate Burgundy's. The very public acknowledgement of the 
power of his symbols, and the speciousness of the many royal mandates he orchestrated, 
reveals that both Burgundy and the Armagnacs were developing an understanding of what 
ideological warfare was, epistemologically speaking, and how practical it was to further the 
purposes of those employing it. When this factor is seen jointly with Burgundy's dynamic 
strategy in communicating effectively to a very broad, all-encompassing audience base, one 
discerns that there was indeed an emerging collective consciousness of propaganda as a 
`social phenomenon', as described by Jacques Ellul 3 John the Fearless was one person who 
was able to put this phenomenon into practice, and this is one of the reasons, we argued, 
that he was initially the more efficient propagandist of the two parties. 
Thus, in taking the position that propaganda is, in its most neutral form, a system 
of communication designed to persuade the intended recipients, our analysis of the duke of 
Burgundy's propaganda campaign has focused on identifying the underlying message of the 
rhetoric, the channels through which these were articulated, how the intended audience - 
the bonnet villes - received the information and, where possible, how they responded. 
Regarding the rhetoric, we centred our attention on two of the predominant binary themes 
designed to edify a continuous dichotomy between himself and his rivals: loyalty/disloyalty, 
3 See above, chapter 1 `Introduction', pp. 13-14. 
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and good government/tyranny. This contrast was reflective of his awareness of the 
importance of good reputation, and the usefulness in tarnishing that of his rivals. To 
achieve this, we have shown that the duke of Burgundy and his chancery ensured that a 
strong level of rhetorical consistency was maintained. The result was that these themes 
were firmly conveyed to audiences through the collaboration of various media of 
communication, that is, in his texts, and mainly the Justification, his letter campaigns, his 
badges, and the ceremonies he used throughout the course of his career. We have argued 
throughout this dissertation that this collaboration between channels of communication 
was what made the duke of Burgundy such an efficient propagandist. He reacted swiftly 
and decisively, and ensured that his rhetoric corresponded to the universal values of his 
audience, centring his ideology around the interrelated notions of the preservation of the 
common good, the initiation of reform and continuous loyalty to the crown. 
Although we have made significant inroads into discerning how Burgundy's 
propaganda influenced public opinion, it remains a rather contentious issue, as grasping the 
true thoughts of people in any age, and in particular in pre-modern societies, is 
problematic. The difficulty is mainly due to a shortage of source material, evidence that 
could, potentially, reveal more about how individual people responded to the propaganda 
they received. Thus far, we have been able to identify general trends among clusters of 
people with regard to public opinion. For example, we have noted that the majority of 
urban partisans of the duke of Burgundy spontaneously began wearing badges denoting 
their allegiance in August 1411. We also considered the superficial causes of the two violent 
massacres of Armagnacs that Burgundian adherents undertook in 1411 and 1413, and also 
took note of the numerous Parisian conspiracies to bring Burgundy back into the capital 
after he had been exiled (1414-1416). We 
have complemented this by relying on the 
physical manner through which Burgundy's propaganda was received by the townspeople, 
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in addition to teasing out some of the links between known Burgundian partisans such as 
Eustache de Laitre, Nicole d'Orgemont, Eustache de Pavilly and others, and the duke. 
There are other directions of research that may offer a wealth of information to 
complement what we have begun here. If we are to gain a more comprehensive 
understanding of motivations behind loyalties, Parlementary and local court registries 
recorded throughout the conflict ought to be examined closely for the testimony of 
partisans from both factions. Additionally, more solid connections between individual 
university scholars associated with the duke of Burgundy need to be unearthed. Likewise, 
more analytical investigation needs to be launched to uncover precisely what Burgundy 
hoped to achieve in appealing to the bonnes tiller. This was begun here, but the confines of 
this doctoral dissertation limited our scope of enquiry. Therefore, forthcoming studies will 
require an exhaustive search for documents in as many of the king's most important towns 
as is possible. Medieval propaganda and public opinion is a field of study that is gaining 
momentum. It is our intention that this dissertation contribute to the growing body of 
scholarly literature, and become a focal point from which further research in the 
abovementioned areas could, eventually, spring. 
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APPENDIX 1 
IMPORTANT LETTERS 1405-1418 
Date LOCATION DESCRIPTION ARCHIVAL PRINTED SOURCES 
SOURCES 
1405 
18/08 Paris Letter from jean Chousat ACO, B 11912, n. 9. Mirot, Pieces, pp. 
to the chambre des comptes 395-396, n. 1. 
(Dijon). 
19/08 Paris John the Fearless to town Arch. Comm. de Mirot, Pieces, pp. 
of Macon. Macon, E[E] 41, n. 396-397, n. 2. 
1. 
21/08 Paris Letter close from jean BNF, Collection 
Chousat to the chambre des Bourgogne, vol. 54, 
com tee (Dijon). fol. 97r. 
26/08 Paris Official letter requesting AN, Xla 8602, Pols. Mirot, Pieces, pp. 
reform, presented on 189v and what 399-403, n. 4. 
behalf of John the follows. 
Fearless and his brothers, ACO, B 11892, Plancher, Preuves, pp. 
Anthony, and Philip, to 397b. 246-248, n. 250. 
the royal council, and the BNF, Collection 
Parlement. Bourgogne, vol. 54, 
fols. 95r-96r. 
Ol /09 Macon Response from the town Arch. Comm. de Mirot, Pieces, pp. 
of Macon to John the Macon, EE 41, n. 8. 403-404, n. 5. 
Fearless. 
02/ 99 Melun Letter close from Louis of Arch. Comm. de Mirot, Pieces, pp. 
Orleans to the town of Macon, EE 41, n. 3. 404-405, n. 6. 
Macon. 
02/09 Melun Letter patent from Louis AN, J 1004, n. 39. Douet d'Arcq, Choi , 
of Orleans to the town of vol. 1, pp. 273-283. 
Macon. 
08/09 Paris Letter Patent from John Arch. Comm. de Mirot, Pieces, pp. 
the Fearless and his Macon, EE 41, n. 2. 405-413, n. 7. 
brothers to Macon. 
17/09 Paris Letter close from John Arch. Comm. de Mirot, Pieces, pp. 
the Fearless to the town Macon, EE 41, n. 4. 413-414, n. 8. 
of Macon. 
27/09 Paris Letter from jean Chousat BNF, Collection 
to the chambre des comptes Bourgogne, vol. 54, 
(Dijon). fol. 99r. 
1408 
Unkn. Unkn. `Introductions' to the ACO, B 11892, 
duchess of Burgundy, the layette 59, n. 33. 
duke of Lorraine and the 
nobility of Burgundy from 
John the Fearless 
regarding his conflict with 
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le duc d'Orleans. 
01/03 Amiens Guillaume Euvrie paid by BNF, Collection 
John the Fearless for Bourgogne, vol. 65, 
writing letters `en forme fol. 80v. 
de manifeste' for the 
justification of the duke 
of Orleans' assassination. 
09/03 Paris Royal letters granting ADN, B 656, n. Plancher, Pnuves, pp. 
absolution to John the 15.088 (copy). 254-255, n. 256. 
Fearless for the 
assassination of Louis of 
Orleans. 
02/07 Melun Royal letters patent given AN, K 56a, n. 17. 
under the queen revoking 
the pardon granted to 
John the Fearless for the 
assassination of Louis of 
Orleans. 
11/08 Paris Royal mandate to the AN, K 56a, 18bis. 
duke of Burgundy 
regarding the payment of 
1000 francs to the 
duchess of Orleans 
(copy)- 
0 6/11 Avignon Letter from Pierre Salmon ACO, B 11892, Demander, pp. 96- 
toJohn the Fearless. layette 148, n. 1919. 106. 
BNf, ms. fr. 23279, 
fol. 86r-90r. 
1409 
04/01 Paris Missive from Charles VI ACO, B 11892. 
to John the Fearless 
stating that he had 
received Salmon's letter. 
08/01 Unkn. Copy of the duchess of ACO, B 11892, 
Orleans' complaint layette 72, n. 19. 
against John the Fearless, 
and the Burgundian 
response. 
09/03 Chartres Royal letter patent ACO, B 11892, 
publishing the Peace of layette 72, n. 21. 
Chartres. 
09/03 Chartres Royal letters granting ACO, B 11892, nos. Plancher, Ptrutyc, pp. 
absolution to John the 18-18bis. 256-258, n. 258. 
Fearless for the 
assassination of Louis of 
Orleans. 
27/12 Royal castle Royal ordinance granting Plancher, Preutrr, pp. 
at the `garde et 262-263, n. 261. 
Vincennes gouvernement' of the 
dauphin, Louis, to John 
the Fearless. 
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1410 
18/01 Paris Letter from John the ACO, B 11892, 
Fearless to Pierre des layette 4. 
Essarts incorporating a 
transcribed copy of the 
royal ordinance granted 
on 27 December. 
02/09 Letter patent from the Monstrelet, vol. 2, 
duke of Orleans to pp. 82-86. 
Amiens 
09/10 Paris Royal letter patent Plancher, Prruves, pp. 
granting 60001. t. to John 267-268, n. 265. 
the Fearless for his army, 
in the service of the king. 
02/11 Paris Royal letter patent Plancher, Preuves, pp. 
publishing the Peace of 269-270, n. 268. 
Bicetre. 
1411 
May The duke of Orleans Monstrelet vol. 2, 
letter to the king listing all pp. 116-121. 
the `evil councillors' in his 
company. 
14/07 Jargeau `Jargeau Manifesto' sent AN, 56a, n. 18. Plancher, Preuves, pp. 
by the duke of Orleans ADN, B 657, n. 278-285, n. 277. 
and his brothers to the 15.183. Hisloirr de Charles VI, 
tonnes tiller regarding the pp. 456-464. 
murder of their father, Monstrelet, vol. 2, 
Louis of Orleans. pp. 124-152. 
RSD, vol. 4, pp. 418- 
434. 
18/07 Jargeau Missive from the duke of ACO, B 11893, Plancher, Prruves, p. 
Orleans and his brothers layette 72, n. 22. 273, n. 271. 
to John the Fearless, ADN, B 657, n. Monstrelet, vol. 2, 
declaring war upon him. 15.183 pp. 152-153. 
RSD, vol. 4, pp. 434- 
436. 
20/07 Paris Royal letters patent AN, K 57b, n. 11. 
ordering the house of 
Orleans to give up their 
complaint. 
12/08 Paris Royal letters patent ACO, B 11893, n. 5. Plancher, Preuves, p. 
granting John the Fearless 273, n. 272. 
permission to summon 
his army. 
13/08 Douai John the Fearless' letter Plancher, Prruves, p. 
close of response to the 274, n. 273. 
duke of Orleans. RSD, vol. 4, pp. 436- 
438. 
13/08 Douai John the Fearless' letter of Plancher, Preuves, pp. 
complaint to the queen, 274-275, n. 274. 
regarding the duke of 
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Orleans' de . 
14/08 Douai John the Fearless' letter to Monstrelet, vol. 2, 
the town of Amiens. . 159-161. 
Sept. Paris Official mandates sent to Monstrclet, vol. 2, 
bai Iagec and senechaussics pp. 190-191. 
prohibiting anyone from 
joininjz the Armagnacs 
01/09 Paris Royal letter patent asking Plancher, Prruves, pp. 
John the Fearless to 275-276, n. 275. 
pursue the `enemies' of 
the realm. 
10/09 Paris Royal letter patent to the ACO, B 11893, n. Monstrelet, vol. 2, 
town of Paris. 13. . 190-191. 
03-04/ Paris Two copies of declaration AN, K 57b, n. 13- 
10 of war by Charles VI 13'. 
against the Armagnac 
rinces. 
02/11 Paris After the Armagnacs take ACO, B 11893, n. 3. Plancher, Preutes, pp. 
the bridge of Saint Cloud, 276-277, n. 276. 
Charles VI gives John the 
Fearless the funding to 
pursue the `enemies' of 
the realm. 
1412 
01/03 Paris Royal letter patent ACO, B 11893, Plancher, Pnrroes, pp. 
granting John the Fearless layette 85, n. 9. 286-288. 
the right to assemble an 
army needed to chase the 
English and `others' from 
the realm. 
30/03 Paris John the Fearless' letter ACO, B 11893, Plancher, Prruves, pp. 
patent transcribing the layette 81, n. 25. 289-290, n. 284. 
above letter in full. 
05/04 Paris Charles VI gives John the Plancher, Pnrroes, pp. 
Fearless 2000 men-at- 290-291, n. 285. 
arms and 1000 ens-de-trait. 
22/08 Auxerre Peace of Auxerre treaty Plancher, Preuves, pp. 
published by royal letter 295-296, n. 288; 
atent. 
22/08 Royal mandates ordering AN, K 57b, nos. 20 
Charles of Orleans and and 21. 
Philip of Vertus to 
renounce his alliance with 
Henry IV. 
08/09 Letters patent publishing AN, K 57b, nos. 23- 
the terms of the treaty of 25. 
Auxerre between John the 
Fearless and the houses of 
Orleans and Bourbon. 
08/09 Melun? Alliance between John the ACO, B 11893, 
Fearless and the duke of layette 81, n. 26. 
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Berry. 
15/09 Melun Alliance between John the ACO, B 11893, n. Plancher, Preuars, pp. 
Fearless and the Orleans 23. 285-286, n. 280. 
brothers. 
1413 
06/06 Paris Royal letter to Amiens Monstrelet, vol. 2, 
following the lit de Justice pp. 362-369. 
(26 May), denouncing the 
Armagnac princes. 
23/ 88 Paris Letter close from jean de ACO, B 11942, n. Plancher, Preuves, 
Saulx explaining John the 24. pp. 297-298, n. 290. 
Fearless' flight from Paris. 
18/09 Paris Royal letter patent AN, K 58, n. 5. RSD, vol. 5, pp. 210- 
denouncing the uprising 220. 
in Paris, and annulling all 
letters that he was forced 
to write. 
04/12 Paris First letter missive from Plancher, Prruves, p. 
Louis of Guyenne 298, n. 292. 
requesting help from John 
the Fearless. 
13/12 Paris Second letter missive Plancher, Preuves, p. 
from Louis of Guyenne 298, n. 293. 
requesting help from John 
the Fearless. 
22/12 Paris Third letter missive from Plancher, Prruves, p. 
Louis of Guyenne 298, n. 294. 
requesting help from John 
the Fearless. 
1414 
23/01 Lille John the Fearless' letter Monstrelet, vol. 2, 
close to the town of pp. 421-424. 
Amiens. 
24/01 Paris Letter from Louis of Plancher, Prruves, pp. 
Guyenne to John the 298-299, n. 295. 
Fearless demanding him 
to retract his troops. 
24/01 Paris Letter from Paris to other Histoire de Charles III, 
bonner villes countering that pp. 492-493. 
which John the Fearless 
sent. 
31/01 Paris Royal letter patent Histoirr de Charles VI, 
forbidding any town from pp. 494-496. 
offering help to John the 
Fearless. 
11/02 Saint Denis Letter from John the Plancher, Preuves, p. 
Fearless to the bonnes villes 297, n. 289. 
justifying his siege of Monstrelet, vol. 2, 
Paris. pp. 434-436. 
10/02 Paris Royal letter patent RSD, vol. 5, pp. 248- 
publicly denouncing John 268. 
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the Fearless. 
23/02 Paris Condemnation by the AN, K 58 n. 85 and 
Archbishop of Paris, of 8' (85bis is by the 
Jean Petit's Justification du University). 
duc de Bourgogne 
11/03 Lille Letter from John the ADN, B 658, 
Fearless regarding the 15.253. 
dauphin's letters and 
justifying his siege of Saint 
Denis. (Draft) 
?/ 10 Arras Royal ordinance to John RSD, vol. 5, pp. 389- 
the Fearless listing the 394. 
terms of the peace treaty. 
16/10 Quesnoy- Letter patent from John RSD, vol. 5, pp. 394- 
le-Comte the Fearless to the 398. 
dauphin agreeing to the 
terms of the treaty. 
16/10 Paris Letter `a tous ceux qui les RSD, vol. 5, pp. 394- 
presentes lettres verront, 398. 
salut. ' Ratifying peace 
treaty of Arras. 
1415 
? /01 Paris Royal letter patent RSD, vol. 5, pp. 400- 
reconciling Charles VI 402. 
and John the Fearless. 
15/04 Letter from Dauphin AN, K 60, n. 6. 
announcing peace treaty 
of Arras. 
Unkn. Unkn. Letter missive from the ACO, B 11894 Plancher, Preuvec, p. 
Four Members of (Copy). 263, n. 262. 
Flanders to the king, in RSD, vol. 5, pp. 348- 
favour of John the 350. 
Fearless. 
30/04 Paris Royal letters patent of Plancher, Preuves, pp. 
abolition, restoring John 300-301, n. 298. 
the Fearless' honour. 
30/07 Rouvres Letter patent from John ACO, B 11894, 
the Fearless agreeing to layette 72, n. 34. 
the new terms of the 
Peace of Arras. 
3-1/08 Paris Letters for the `reparacion ACO, B 11894, Hi Loire de Charles VI, 
de lonneur de jean duc de layette 72, n. 35. pp. 512-513. 
Bourgogne'. 
24/09 Letter of complaint from Histoire de Charles VI, 
John the Fearless to the pp. 510-512. 
king regarding his 
exclusion from the 
pending battle with the 
English. 
25/09 Paris Royal letter patent ACO, B 11894, 
acknowledging John the layette 72, n. 37. 
253 
Fearless' ambassadors, 
and his response to the 
treaty of Rouvres. 
? /10 Paris Royal letter patent RSD, vol. 5, pp. 420- 
publishing the peace of 436. 
Arras. 
13/11 Paris Royal letter patent of ACO, B 11894, Hictoire de Charles VI, 
abolition for some of the layette 72, n. 36. pp. 522-523. 
banished insurgents. 
15/11 Royal letter patent to the Histoire de Charles VI, 
bonnes villes forbidding any p. 523. 
person of royal blood 
from entering Paris 
without leave from the 
king. 
1416 
Unkn. Letter from John the ACO, B 11895 
Fearless to the town of 
Chalons. 
1417 
25/04 Hesdin Letter patent from John ACO, B 11895, Plancher, Preuves, pp. 
the Fearless to the bonnes layette 72, n. 39 303-306, n. 303. 
villes justifying his pending (Original, French), Histoire de Charles VI, 
military campaign. and 39bis (Original, p. 533. 
Latin). Monstrelet, vol. 3, 
AN, K 60, n. 8 pp. 174-175. 
Co 
03/06 Troyes Letter to John the ACO, B 11942, n. 
Fearless' council that they 33. 
join him and the queen at 
Troyes. 
01/08 Troyes Letter from Jehan BNF, Collection 
Fraignant to the chambre Bourgogne, vol. 55, 
des comptes (Dijon) fol. 248r-248v. 
regarding recent events in 
Troyes. 
7/08 Doullens Treaty between Doullens Monstrelet, vol. 3, 
and John the Fearless. pp. 185-188. 
29/09 Near John the Fearless to the BNF, Collection 
Chatillon, bonnes villes regarding his Bourgogne, vol. 55, 
Burgundy plans to `reform' those fol. 254r-254v 
towns which he overtakes (Copy). 
in the na e of the king. 
03-06 Charny, Letters of response, ACO, B 11895, 
/11 Villier Saint pledging their loyalty to layette 72, nos. 40- 
Benoit, the duke of Burgundy. 40bis. 
Chablies, 
Macon and 
Saint 
Georges 
08/10 Montlhe Letter from John the Plancher, Preuver, pp. 
254 
Fearless to the bonnet villes 307-308, n. 305. 
regarding the tyrannical Monstrelet, vol. 3, 
government of the pp. 230-234. 
Armagnacs. 
Accompanying bill from 
the Council of Constance 
in favour of the duke of 
Burgundy. 
11/11 Troyes Letters from the queen to Monstrelet, vol. 3, 
bonnes vines in favour of pp. 230-234. 
John the Fearless. 
1418 
14/01 Troyes Letter patent from queen ACO, B 1593, fols. 
introducing the new 6-7 (Copy). 
receveur eneral de France. 
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APPENDIX 2 
CALENDAR 1404-1419 
Modern Year Fifteenth-Century Year 
1404 30 March -18 April, 1404 
1405 19 April -10 April, 1405 
1406 11 April - 26 March, 1406 
1407 27 March -14 April, 1407 
1408 15 April -6 April, 1408 
1409 7 April - 22 March, 1409 
1410 23 March -11 April, 1410 
1411 12 April -2 April, 1411 
1412 3 April - 22 April, 1412 
1413 23 April -7 April, 1413 
1414 8 April - 30 March, 1414 
1415 31 March -18 April, 1415 
1416 19 April - 10 April, 1416 
1417 11 April - 26 March, 1417 
1418 27 March -15 April, 1418 
1419 16 April-6April, 1419 
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Fig. 3 Pierre `: alnic>n hrescnts his manuscript to Charles VI In the 
hrrscncc of the duke of Burgundy and another courtier. BNI", nis. fr. 
2327(). fol. Iv. 1409. 
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Fig. 4 Pierre Balinorm and john dIc I-c"arlcss. RNF, ms. fr. 23279. fuel. I 19r. 
1-109. 
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I'ig. 5 John of I lavtou offering his lure de.  to mer john the }ýetrless. 
B\ [' ms. fr. 2810, fol. 226r. 1412. 
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I`it;. 6 Saint Andrew, with cancmutcr's phtics and n1, »(, n's ICS cls. 
_John 
the Fearless' Book of I lours (c. 1-I1O- 1-115). RNF, nis. lat. 
no>uv. accl. 3055 tOl. 172v. c. 1411 -- c. 14 15. 
277 
I'tg. 7. l, rontispiccc to scan Pctit's Jrecli/iculion de on. ceigneur le (lilt' Ile 
I ,, ogee. 1408. BNF, ins. fr. 5733, fol. 2v. 
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Iýi 
.5 
jo l ti the IýcaIlcss tunrrarN scI I Ij)turr. l)ct, u[. Dijon. 
Fii 
.9 
Window trims (m 11C)tc1 Artois, tcaturing a mason's level. 
I nin Jýýc»t . iýait. r 
Peu,, rut' I tiennc Marcel. Paris. 
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I, , ig. 10. I'cwtcr and lead had c, c. 1 -111 
1419. Saint 
. 
Andrew tinkling cross, with 
carpctitcr-'s plalic, mason's lcrcl and 
fleur-de-lys. <W, i e ; Aationa/e do 11loyl'a I Ic 
- 77jerrires c' I lolel Cluny. Paris. 
hg. 11. Pewter and lead badge, c. 1411 - 
1419. Saint Andrew's cross with relief 
{lour-de-lys shield, and `Vivo le Roy'. Alu. re'e 
Nationale du , 11 oyeu be- 'I'herme. r c" I betel 
Cluny. Paris. 
2 80 
1 1l - 12 Pewter and lead badge, C. 
1L1'ß. . 
A1tiu'( , ýalrnn, rle 
do 
I iuernrý rC '' I lolel CG/n}. Paris. 
Fig. 13 Pewter and lead badge, c. 1-411 - 
1.119. All/S c Nationale du il l oy-c/l l9e. 
7'hermei C- I late/ Chilly. Paris. 
